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INTRODUCTION
The question of the nature and significance of the state in 
contemporary societies is perhaps one of the most contentious and disputed 
areas of social science, ¥hile ostensibly a theoretical issue, discussion 
of the social nature of the state derives the characteristic sharpness of 
its polemical quality from the essentially practical problems which 
confr ont social actors (and above all classes) when they materially encounter 
or are encountered by the state. The concern and direction of thise thesis, 
however is primarily theoretical. It will focus on three particular 
approaches.to the analysis of the capitalist state, those contained in 
and epitomised by the writings of Marx, D.urkheim and Weber, It, will further 
attempt to demonstrate that these analytical perspectives are aspects or 
dimensions of three distinct attempts to theoretically reconstruct the 
changes which have characterised Western societies with the emergence, rise 
and consolidation of capitalism. The three ensuing models will be traced 
to their respective sources in distinct conceptions of the subject matter 
appropriate to the study of society; , methodology being inseparable from 
theory-building. Finally, an attempt will be made to indicate and 
examine some variants of our three stanpoints and to assess their 
relevance for a theory which will adequately account for and explain the 
characteristic forms assumed by the post-war state, that of Britain in 
particular, V/hile the overall structuring perspective of the thesis is 
fundamentally Marxist, effort will be directed), toward a critical evaluation 
of certain paths of development within or on the periphery of the Marxist 
tradition itself. This aspect of our discussion constitutes ,, in a crucial 
sense, the pivotal axis-of.'the thesis as a whole.
An initial distinction will be made between two types of critical theo­
retical approaches to the state. Firstly, the Marxist position views the 
capitalist state as a form of social life which reveals and expresses at 
a high level the intrinsic alienated condition of capitalist society in gen­
eral,. Within this fr araework it is seen as essentially an organization of 
the dominant class, a special, institution seemingly standing above civil 
society but ini reality grounded in the contradictions which give to capit­
alist society its particular historical uniqueness. That of Durkheim, by 
contrast, accepts the division of labour of developed industrial societies
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as such. It sees the state as a moral entity, the task of which is to 
re-establish social solidarity and thus overcome a temprary anomic condition 
on the basis of the existing, highly differentiated social division ofl labour. 
Durkheim* s analysis is further informed by a condition of radical meritocracy 
but fundamentally his view of the state isthat of a re-integrative or 
"restitutive" agency with primarily moral, if circumscribed, functions.
Weber's position is again radically different. As against Durkheim*s 
restitution oriented mode^, Weber views the state's relationship to society 
as a whole as one of a basically technical-interventionist nature, born of, 
complementing and furthering; the development of increasingly rational or 
calculable present-day society.
Distinctions of fundamental political importance characterize these 
three theoretical approaches to the state. For Marx.the state is an 
expression of the contradiction^;of class society. It is an instument of 
domination with a historically necessary but temporary role, a role which 
loses it raison d-'atre with the abolition of class divisions by the revolut­
ionary movement of the working class, Marx consistently developed his theories 
of capitalist society with this goal, the seizure of power by the working 
class, in mind. Durkheim sees the state as a means to overcome the contingent 
condition of moral disorder produced by rapid social and economic change 
in the historical transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. For 
Weber it is an essentially technical agency, with a crucial role in the fun­
ctioning of specifically capitalist society in its.: rational form. We 
will be concerned to relate these approaches to their corresponding con­
ceptions:; of contemporary Western societies in greater detail, and to trace 
these conceptions back to three distinctive views oftthe appropriate 
subject matter of Sociology. lih our final section we v/illoperationalize 
the Marxist: theory of the state in the context ofan analysis of the post-­
war dbvelpmentof British capitalism. Our thesis is both theoretical and app­
lied, attempting to avoid the polar extremes of purely conceptual debate on 
one hand, and empiricism on the other.
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The structure of our thesis calls for someadditional explanation, 
however. The distinction between a "theoretical" model and its "application" 
is, of course, purely formal. Quite apart from the empirical overlap between.: 
the two sections at:a number of points, a radical break or disjuncture 
between! theoretical discussion on the one hand andi its. fruits: on the other 
is,- from our point of view, untenable. The practice oftheory invariably has. 
a specific object,, our particular problematic; being the function of the state 
wit bin the class structure of post-war Britain. In cieyeloping; our argument 
we have necessarily had to consider and critically assène: a number of the>* 
orètical positions and perspectives from which this object, cpuld be viewed.
In particular, we have exanined certain Functionalist and Weberian.prnposs- 
itions, theirassumptions and implications, as well as the forms of enquiry 
which have in recent years characterised the theoretical models of the 
writers: in question.
We have necessarily had to imit or abbreviate many areas of work 
which aare of tangetial relevance to our thesis. In discussing the 
"Technocratic" variant èf the Weberian thesis, for example, we would have 
;^ referred to trace this tradition back to its oorigins in the writings of 
Shint-Simon and earler. Our guiding principle of selectivity, however, has 
beeb to specify the essential assumptions and implications of the schools 
in question, in examining the works of particular theorists where pertinent 
and relevant to our immediate concerns. Our discussion of the economic 
theory of marginal productivity, for example, is confined to an analysis of 
its significance for the assumptions of c.ett ain neou-Durkheimian function­
alists*.
Motivating this selectivity is our concern with the ide&Hogical.practices 
of social theorists in relation to the capitalist state form. We believe, 
in this context, that the debate wth the descendants of Weber and Durkheim 
is:, in a critical sense, a ghost-fight. Exorcism at this level, as Marxist: 
epistemology makes clear, necessarily heaves its real object untouched. 
Sociological research in British Universities does not, however, extend to 
the decisive area in which tbeoret ical struggle finds its expression a corr­
esponding material practice. Neither does the subject matter of our thesis 
extend into the field of socialist reconstruction. Within these limits, 
however, we accept full responsibility for the stated and unstated implications 
of our critique of the post-war British state. The rest, with no apologies: 
to our one-time mentor Carl Jung, is anything but silence*
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SECTION ONE
MARXISH AND THE STATE
1.
I. MARX ON THE STATE.
An initial problem in developing a Marxist theory of the 
state is that Marx himself,never completed the fully worked-out 
theory of the state which he projected as part of his overall 
analysis of capitalist society. (1) His early Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right challenged Hegel's theory of the state 
on the grounds that it embodied a false "universality" in civil 
society and, more generally, that it derived from Idealistic 
premises. At this stage of his development, however, Marx had 
not yet clearly specified the centrality of class conflict as the 
motor force of history, nor the exploitation of labour power as the 
primary structuring principle of capitalist society.
This is not to posit an "epistemological break" in the 
Althusserian sense between Marx's"early" and "late" ("humanistic" 
and "scientific") formulations. We will contend that the 
discussion of alienation in the l644 Manuscripts, together with 
the parallel discussion of the fetishism of commodities In Capital, 
yield a perspective from which it is possible to reconstruct a 
perspective from which it is possible to reconstruct a model of 
what Marx's fully developed theory of the state (always inseparable 
from his analysis of capitalism, its historical development and 
class conflict) would have looked like. It will be emphasized 
that the "early" and "late" works are basically concerned with the 
same problematic, alienation and surplus value being alternative 
ways of tracing the sources and nature of man's self-estrangement 
in history.
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The later works, especially The German Ideology and 
Capital, explicitly contain the groundwork for a materialist 
theory of the state. In neither case, however, is the exposition 
developed to a point which has been adequate to prevent various 
diverse and conflicting interpretations being offered and developed 
by writers purporting to be working in the Marxist tradition. Two 
particular problematic areas will be noted here. Firstly, does 
the capitalist state represent a means to overcome the classical 
tendencies towards crisis that Marx saw to be inherent in the 
capitalist mode of production? Secondly, and this is a closely 
related question, when the state intervenes directly in the economic 
sphere, does it engender a sector which is parallel to and part of 
the commodity-producing, market-orientated sphere of production: 
or does it exist "outside" this sector, producing use-values but 
not exchange-value and "unproductive" in the Marxist sense? The 
answers to these questions are of crucial significance both for 
Marxist theory and for revolutionary practice. Before examining 
them, however, we will briefly outline the key features of Marx's 
extant writings on the state.
An important aspect of Marx's early formulations concerning 
the state is the notion, borrowed from Hegel, of the separation of 
civil society from the state. For Hegel, however, the two are 
reconciled in the form of the state itself. The state is seen to 
represent at the same time the protection of persons and property 
(persons, in civil society, being in competition), and the good of 
the whole community, including all its members. (2) Hegel saw 
the bureaucracy (Public Servants") to act in the "general interests
5.
of society”, whereas the Agricultural and Inudstrial classes are 
characterized by their pursuit of particularistic interests# As 
Avineri notes
"The main achievement of Hegel's political 
phllosoptqr was its attempt to construct the 
state as an entity abstracted from the social 
and historical forces which create and condition 
it in empirical reality. Hegel did this by 
depicting civil society as the clash of the 
social forces, to be transcended by the 
universality of the state." (3)
Marx, on the other hand, rejected this notion of the 
universality of the state and its "servants". Rather than viewing 
it as the realization of human spirit and freedom (4), he sees it 
as dependent upon the particularity of civil society. In doing so 
he explodes the Idealism of Hegel's philosophy. Political 
institutuions, despite their claims to universality, merely serve 
to conceal the particular interests of civil society. In particular, 
the bureaucracy, rather than being the universal class, is an agency 
for sectional interests (Avineri, 23).
"What counts in the genuine state is not 
the chance of any citizen to devote himself 
to the universal class as something special, 
but the capacity of the universal class to be 
actually universal, that is, to be the class of 
every citizen. But Hegel proceeds from the 
premise of a pseudo-universal, an illusory- 
universal class, from the premise of 
universality as a particular class." (5)
Thus, while Marx criticises Hegel ' internally' on the grounds 
that his view of constitutional monarchy as the best Ideal representative
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of the state conflicts with his view that the state is the unity 
of the universal and the particular, his central point is that 
Hegel's conclusions involve a speculative reversal of subject and 
predicate; Avineri has demonstrated how Marx, using Qeuerbach's 
•transformative method”, turned Hegel's philosophy "upside down” 
by starting from the perspective of concrete man and establishing 
the dependence of the state on civil society, thus denystifying 
it of the notion of universality. j^ lR] This false universality, 
in other words, is for the young Marx the key to the state# 
Proletarian revolution alone can assert true universality, the 
absorption of conflicting interests into the state's false 
universality being illusory:
"There must be formed a sphere of society which 
claims no traditional status but only a human
status .....  a sphere, finally, which cannot
emancipate itself without emancipating itself 
from all the other spheres of society, without,
thereby emancipating all those other spheres ....
This dissolution of society, as a particular class, 
is the proletariat.” (6)
As Sirardin has observed, Marx's notions of the state are 
intimately associated with his early discussion of alienation:
"For Marx the political state is defined as 
alienation; in the post-Hegelian meaning of the 
term, that is, human essence objectified by 
separation# Thus the state, abstract heaven of 
universality, should be abolished in order to 
establish non-alienated humanity." (7)
Avineri writes in a similar vein. For from the universal 
and the particular being reconciled, under the state bureaucracy
"the human subject becomes a mere object of 
manipulation. What the * fetishism of commodities 
is to economics, bureaucracy is to politics." (8)
While, as the 1844 Manuscripts show, Marx's early conception of
"civil society" clearly prefigures his later analysis of capitalism,
this critique of the state is, in form, philosophical. Oilman
suggests that whereas in capitalist society value is the abstract
product of alienated political activity. Both as based on a
spurious equality ("common citizenship" in the case of the state),
"If 'class' expresses the relations of each 
atomized individual to all others who share 
his socio-economic conditions of life, and the 
relations between him as a member of this ^oup 
to other similarly constituted groups, then 'state' 
expresses the relations of each such individual to 
society as a whole." (9)
Oilman's analytical distinction between the spheres of 
political and economic activity, however, is perhaps misleading. A 
similar distinction informs Parsons' functionalist analysis of power 
as well as Dahrendorfs neo-Weberlan perspective, and obscures the 
ciuoial connection between the economic and the political as 
examined in Marx's works* As we will see, in his later work, Marx's 
analysis of the state is inseparable from his political economy of 
capitalism, and derives its primary repressive role from its special 
position in relation to class-divided society. Oilman's thesis, as 
with his more general conception of the "philosophy of internal 
relations", by contrast underplays the antagonistic relations 
between classes and the state's foundation in that political economy.
In the early writings, however, the state is seen as a social
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relation, but it is an alien one. Already its class nature is 
recognized as is clear in Marx's conception of its transcendence:
"A class must be formed which has radical
chains, a class in civil society which is not
a class of civil society, a class which is the 
dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society 
which has a universal character because its 
sufferings are universal." (10)
Already we see the foundations for a revolutionary critique of
capitalist society and its state form. The state is a crucial
"expression" of capitalist alienation, the roots of which lie in
the contradictions of that society's mode of production. It is
"above" society in that it dominates it, but is dependent upon it
and more or less actively reflects and expresses its exploitative
class nature.
Marx's later writings similarly emphasize this conception 
of the state as "above" yet derived from and expressive of society.
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, for example, he specifies
the historical content of freedom to consist in "converting the 
state from an organ standing above society into one completely 
subordinate to it." (11) As Martin Shaw has suggested, some of 
the "mature" statements do not give as clear an indication of the 
structural role of the state as the earlier works. (12) Ih the 
Communist Manifesto, for example, Marx observes
"The executive of the modem state is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie." (13)
Such statements tend to deny the "relative autonony" that Marx
elsewhere attributes to the state. (see, for example, the "Eighteenth
7.
Brumaire"). In general, however, the state comes to be identified 
more closely with the essentially repressive nature of social 
domination in class societies. In the Manifesto, for example, Marx 
writes
"Political power, properly so called, is merely 
the power of one class for oppressing another." (14)
Again, we read in "The Poverty of Philosophy"
"Political power is precisely the official 
expression of antagonism in civil society." (15)
The capitalist state, that Is to say, exists "above" society in so
far as it constitutes a "special" repressive instrument distinct from
the mere economic domination of the ruling class. It has, in other
words, an independent existence counterposed to that of particular
capital units. Thus
"Through the emancipation of private property 
from the community, the state has become a 
separate entity, beside and outside civil 
society; but it Is nothing more than the form 
of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily 
adopt both for internal and external purposes, 
for the mutual guarantee of their property and 
interests." ' (16)
This conception of the state's "special", repressive nature 
in the context of class domination is historically elaborated in 
Capital. Contrasting the seemingly "integrated" working class of 
developed capitalism with its restive character during the period 
of primary capital accumulation Marx observes
"Then the rising bourgeoisie needs and uses the 
state authority to 'regulate' wages, to restrict 
them within the limits suitable for the making of
8 .
surplus value, to lengthen the working day, and 
to keep the worker in a proper condition of 
dependence# This is an essential element of 
what is termed primary accumulation#" (17)
When, that is to say, Marx «camined the role of the state in the
transition from feudalism to capitalism, the coercive dimension of
state power is emphasized. In general,
"Force is the midwife of every old society
pregnant with a new one. It is itself an
economic power." (l8)
The state, then, for Marx, is both "of" and "above" society. 
It is "above society in so far as it dominates the latter, and in so 
far as it has a unique identity ("special instrument".) But it is 
"of" society in that it plays an active and necessary part in
maintaining the mode of exploitation within class societies.
Having, as outlined above, criticized the Hegelian notion;; 
of the state's universality and moral nature Marx's writings on the 
state were consistently Informed by the materialist premise that 
history is
"... nothing but the succession of the separate 
generations, each of which exploits the materials, 
the capital funds, the productive forces handed 
down to it by all preceding generations, and thus 
on the one hand continues the traditional activity 
in completely changed circumstances and, on the 
other, modifies the old circumstances with a 
completely changed activity." (19)
Marx's assumption was that men make history, but not in conditions
of their own choosing. The state, in particular, represents "the
illusory 'general' interest", struggles within it constituting the
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"illusory forms" of real class struggles. Thus the state is
"continually evolving out of the life-process
of definite individuals, not as they may appear
in their own or other people's imagination, but 
as they really are." (20)
It is within the body of Marx's political economy that the 
precise nature of the social antagonisms which he perceived to 
underlie the "illusory" communal life represented by the specifically 
capitalist state is elaborated. In Volume 5 of Capital Marx left 
uncompleted what presumably would have been his definitive theoretical 
analysis of the concept class, having indicated some of the problems 
in identifying the major classes of capitalist society in terms of 
their incumbents' Sources of income. The tenor of his whole work,
however, indicates that he perceived classes to be located in the
social relations of production, where commodities are produced by 
direct human action on the raw materials of nature, action which 
always takes place in the context of a particular form of property 
ownership.
Marx's view of society, and of capitalist society in 
particular, is an organic view which analyses the various economic 
categories as aspects of the system of social production as a whole. 
As a general methodological principle he wrote
"It would (therefore) be unreasonable and wrong 
to let the economic categories follow one another 
in the same sequence as that in which they were 
historically decisive. Their sequence is 
determined, rather, by their relation to one 
another in modern bourgeois society, which is 
precisely the opposite of that which seems to be 
their natural order or which corresponds to
10.
historical development." (21)
Operationalising this principle in his analysis of the basic 
social relations of production in capitalist society, Marx explains:
"Capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour 
presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition 
the existence of each other; they reciprocally 
bring forth each Other." (22)
In his analysis of capitalism Marx was thus concerned to 
examine what Engels termed "the relations between capital and labour, 
the hinge of which our entire present system of society turns." (23) 
The basis of this relationship is that the capitalist who owns the 
means of production, confronts the worker who owns nothing but his 
own labour power, the (only) value-producing component of the 
production process. A portion of the worker's labour is unpaid, 
and this unpaid labour represents surplus-value, the source of all 
profit, rent and interest in capitalist society. Thus, while Marx 
in the already-mentioned, uncompleted Volume 3 of Capital identifies 
three major classes in the form of owners of labour power, capital 
and land [86^ ,  it is clear that he saw the capital-labour 
relationship to be the basic structuring principle of capitalist 
society.
"It is the employing capitalist who immediately 
extracts from the labourer this surplus value, 
whatever part of it he may ultimately be able 
to keep for himself. Upon this relation, 
therefore, between the employing capitalist and 
the wages labourer the whole wages system and 
the whole present system of production hinge." (24)
The exploitation of wage labour by capital is thus the central 
and fundamental determining relationship in Marx's analysis of
11.
capitalism. The related question of Marx's concern with the 
social relations of production and his analysis of the category 
"value" in capitalist society raises an important problem of 
methodology which is central to his whole science of social 
formations. In an often-quoted passage in the introduction to 
his "Critique of Political Economy" Marx explains that a scientific 
exposition of political economy must follow a particular course: 
that is, to proceed from the "abstract” so as to reconstitute the 
concrete. (25) This method of exposition may be clearly seen 
embodied in his "Capital" where be begins with a discussion of the 
highly abstract concept of the commodity and its dual existence as 
use-value and exchange-value* Now he initially notes that individual 
commodities are the "elementary units" of capitalist society, but in 
the process of examining their fetishlstic quality as exchange value 
Marx observes that they are "transcendental as well as palpable" ,
The explanation of this is that as exchange values, commodities are 
measured by the expenditure of human labour power in terras of its 
duration. In this process, the social relations of producers 
appear to them as relations between the products of their labour.
"Thus the mystery of the commodity form is 
simply this, that it mirrors for men the 
social character of their own labour, mirrors it 
as an objective character attaching to the labour 
products themselves, mirrors it as a social 
natural property of these things." [^5]
It is necessary, however, to distinguish this method of 
exposition (moving from the abstract to the concrete) from Marx's 
method of analysis. He writes, in the 2nd Preface to "Capital";
"Of course the method of presentation must
12.
differ formally from the method of investigation.
The aim of investigation is to appropriate the 
matter in detail, to analyse its various 
developmental forms, and to trace the inner 
connexions between these forms. Not until 
this preliminary work has been effected, can the 
movement as it really is be suitably described.
If the description prove successful, if the life 
of the subject matter be reflected on the ideal 
plane, then it may appear as if we had before us 
nothing more than anappiofi construction." (26)
Marx's method of investigation, then, is to proceed to 
theoretical reconstructions of the subject matter of his enq; uiry 
from a detailed analysis of its elements and forms, and only on 
this basis to proceed so as to "reconstitute the concrete".
Now although many elements of Marx's mature political 
economy are to be found as early as 1844, the 1845-6 "German Ideology" 
is the first systeromatic exposition of Marx's historical materialism, 
the analytical embodiment of his above-discussed methodology
(detail ^ abstract — ^ concrete). In this work (co-written
with Engels) Marx writes:
"The premises from which we begin are not 
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises 
from which abstraction can only be made in the 
imagination# They are the real individuals, 
their activity and the material conditions 
under which they live, boththose which they find 
already existing and those produced by their 
activity. The premises can thus be verified in
a purely empirical way." (27)
Marx's analytical starting point, in other words, is the
activity of real human beings in the real world. The "material
13
conditions" of that world include both those which constitute 
the initial framework of practical activity and those which arise 
from it. Marx continues by observing that production (particularly 
in the forms of labour and procreation) involves a double relation­
ship. Firstly, there is a "natural" aspect, in so far as human 
beings are involved in a relationship with nature, or the material 
world. Secondly, there is a "social" aspect ("moment" would be 
more precise) in that their transactions with nature involve social 
co-operation, in the form of the division of labour.
"How far the productive forces of a nation 
are developed is shown most manifestly by the 
degree to which the division of labour has been 
carried. Each new productive force, in so far 
as it is not merely a quantitative extension of 
productive forces already known (for instance 
the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), 
causes a further development of the division 
of labour." (28)
In examining the social forms which develop during the 
course of mankind's struggle to transform nature, Marx thus begins 
with "real, active men", from "the basis of their real life-process" 
The structure of "Capital" (in particular Volume I) as a completed 
document, is thus misleading, with its opening conceptual discussion 
of the commodity. His I857-8 notebooks, recently published in 
England as the "CrOndrisse", are revealing in this context. This 
work opens with a discussion of production, consumption, distribution 
and exchange (in that order), pointedly commencing:
"The object before us, to begin with, material 
production. Individuals producing in society -
14.
hence socially determined individual 
production - is, of course, the point of 
departure." (29)
Again, we are at the starting point of "real active men", living
in historically defined situations, active, but not in conditions
of their own choosing# Or as Marx expressed this idea in the
"German Ideology":
"Individuals have always built on themselves, 
but naturally on themselves within their given 
historical conditions and relationships, not on 
the 'pure* individual in the sense of the 
ideologists," (30)
Man, in other words. Is both determined and determining. This
constancy of "premises" lends support to the thesis that from at
least 1844 onwards, Marx's works reveal an essential unity, a unity
based on a particular ontological conception of man (philosophical
anthropology). (3!)
The basis for this conception of man is laid out most 
clearly in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts". Here, 
especially in the section titled "Estranged Labour", Marx presents 
his general image of how man exteriorizes himself through labour 
within class systems. The more the worker produces in such a 
context, the more impoverished he becomes: "With the increasing
value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the 
devaluation of the world of men." [lO?] How does such a 
paradox come about? Man's life activity, the clue to his "species 
character", is "free conscious activity". [115] In conditions of 
estranged labour, however, this activity, man's essential being.
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becomes a mere means to his existence. The product of his 
labour is thus "alien, a coerced activity". Q.1^ The alien 
being, for whom this coerced labour is performed, however, is 
none other than "man himself(ibid.J The secret of alienation, 
of estranged labour, thus lies in social formations, rather than, 
as Marx sarcastically suggests, with "The gods". [115]
"If his own activity is to him related as 
an unfree activity, then he is related to 
it as an activity performed in the service 
under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke 
of another roan." (32)
In the context of capitalism this means, as Marx was later 
to elaborate, the exploitation of labour by capital. It will be
noted that the seeds of the later developed labour theory of value 
are present in the Manuscripts. For example, Marx observes there 
that the capitalist
profits doubly - first, by the division 
of labour; and secondly, in general, by the 
advance which human labour makes on the natural 
product# The greater the human share in a
commodity, the greater the profit of dead
capital." (33)
Nevertheless, a number of "empirical" developments took 
place in Marx's analysis of capitalism in the years after he wrote 
these Manuscripts. Perhaps the most important are the shift of 
attention from exchange to production, and the elaboration of the 
concept labour power as against the theoretically less precise 
notion of labour. These shifts, however, are not fundamental to 
Marx's ontological assumptions about man and society. As one
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commentator notes
"There is .... a unity in Marx, but not a 
unity that explains all empirical situations: 
merely a unity that provides the premises from 
which such explanations must begin." (34)
Theoretical understanding of the conditions which constrain and
alienate labour in its estranged form is, in this way, a necessary
precondition of the more exact scientific examination of particular,
historical social formations.
Now the very structure of the "Manuscripts" requires some 
comment at this point* Marx, briefly, begins with an analysis of 
the findings of political economy. He then explains and 
contextualizes these findings through an analysis of the specifically 
capitalist conditions of alienation, and concludes with a critique 
of Hegelian philosophy. He writes
"Political economy starts from labour as the 
real soul of production; yet to labour it 
gives nothing, and to private property 
everything. " ^11?]
Thus, while he contends that political economy has "merely
formulated the laws of estranged labour" and thus failed to explain
or even detect the process of estrangement itself, Marx does
acknowledge its correct subject of analysis, that is the labour
process, however perverse its theories about that subject-matter
may be. |jL3^
So again we can see, this time in the very structure of 
Marx's exposition, that his point of departure is real, active men, 
both determined and determining, exteriorizing themselves through
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the expenditure of labour power in specific social and historical 
contexts. In other words, the premise of Marx's analysis of 
social formations is the "real foundation" of society, as embodied 
in the actual, existent social relations of production. Contrary 
to appearances, he thus did not "begin" Capital with a discussion 
of the concept commodity. Rather, he analysed the commodity as 
"the simplest social form in which the product of labour in the 
present form of society presents itself." (35) The social 
relations of concrete human beings in their struggle to transform 
nature is thus, for Marx, the primary subject of analysis. As has 
been observed
"Marx is concerned with an analysis of the 
social relations of production and his work 
never strays outside of these limits. Man's 
social relations under capitalism appear only 
through the relations between 'things' (commodities). 
Leaving aside their particular properties as use- 
values - which Marx says is an area of concern 
appropriate to commerce - their one common 
quality is that they are products of abstract 
labour, the quantitative measure of which is 
time. In other words, the category 'value' is 
entirely subordinate, in both a logical and a 
historical sense, to the commodity." (36)
On the foundation of these fundamental assumptions - the 
theoretical orientation toward "real, active men" and the conception 
of labour as man's essential species — activity - Marx developed and 
elaborated his model of class structure, exploitation, and the 
revolutionary tendencies inherent in capitalist society. Within 
this body of theory, the state performs a special and necessary role:
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it functions as a distinct, primarily repressive, institutional 
complex, «abov'e*’ society, but owing its existence to the 
antagonisms inherent in the infrastructure of the capitalist mode 
of production# This characterization will be clarified in our 
following discussion of the recent attempt by Poulantzas to elaborate 
a systematic theory of the capitalist state*
19.
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II. MARX ON THE STATE - continued
POULANTZAS, IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES, 
AND THE PARAMETERS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE.
An important debate among Marxists concerning the question 
of the capitalist state was opened up by the publication of 
Poulantzas* Political Power and Social Classes and, more recently, 
his "Fascism and Dictatorship*.* A number of more or less critical 
attempts to evaluate Poulantzas* thesis have already been made, not 
least being the widely-read exchange between Poulantzas and Miliband (1) 
Our concern will not be to review that debate (a precis of the 
exchange may be found in Laclau), much of which centres round a 
two-way methodological denunciation on the points of Miliband and 
Poulantzas, but to look at Poulantzas* work, indicate a number of 
its central theoretical weaknesses and inconsistencies; finally on 
the basis of these critical observations to suggest an alternative 
assessment of the developments with which Poulantzas is concerned 
which is more consistent with the theory of the capitalist state 
developed by Marx and Lenin. Poulantzas* contribution, we feel, 
is important not only for its attempt to systematically elaborate a 
theory of the capitalist state, a project the justification of which 
derives not least from the all too often ritualistic repetition of 
the Ibrmulae of Marx, Engels and above all Lenin, but also for the 
central aspects of late capitalism to which it draws attention, even 
though Poulantzas* theorizing in this area is, in many key instances, 
unsatisfactory•
The major aspect of Poulantzas* work to which we wish to
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draw attention is his theory of "Ideological State Apparatuses".
His discussion of ideology, we will suggest, while illuminating on 
a number of particular aspects, implies and in part makes explicit 
a model of the capitalist state the Marxist inspiration of which is 
virtually unrecognizable, and which, quite in contradiction to his 
interpretation of Bonapartism, effectively undermines the notion of 
the state as a "special instrument" in relation to the characteristic 
conflicts and antagonisms of the capitalist mode of production. Our
discussion of Poulantzas* theory of the relationship between 
ideology and state will involve a consideration of his conception 
of politics in general, which is informed by essentially the same 
misleading theoretical assumptions.
In a number of contexts (2) Poulantzas explains his 
classification of Ideological Apparatuses in terms of the state.
V/e will, however, take as representative his discussion in Fascism 
and Dictatorship, There Poulantzas accounts for their state- 
character in terms of three factors: their inseparable relation to
the sphere of social power and consequently the repressive State 
Apparatus, their role as the "cement" of the total social formation, 
and the permanent, if often hidden, presence of the repressive 
apparatus "behind** them. (5) Partly in order to correct a 
perceived theoretical error in the work of his methodological (and 
semantic) mentor Louis Althusser, Poulantzas characterizes economic 
organizations also as "apparatuses" (304, footnote 6). In doing 
so, however, he specifies that, unlike ideological apparatuses, 
they do not constitute part of the state system, this being the major 
specific instance of his observation that **the concepts of *apparatus*
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and ’State* do not cover exactly the same ground" (303). We will 
contend, however, that a systematic Marxist analysis of capitalist 
economic enterprises undermines Poulantzas* dichotomous separation 
of them from the model of the state system as defined by his 
criteria for including ideological apparatuses within it. We will 
look in rather more detail at Poulantzas* discussion of idology and 
the state.
In the first place, Poulantzas characterizes ideological 
apparatuses as part of the state system on the gounds that the 
dominant ideology functions as the "cement" of the social formation, 
thus constituting a vital aspect of the state’s role of"preserving 
the unity and cohesion of a social formation" (302). This 
integrative role is precisely what, for Poulantzas, differentiates 
ideological from economic apparatuses and justifies the exclusion 
of the latter from his model of the state system. Thus, whereas 
the state functions to preserve the unity and cohesion of a class- 
divided social formation
as * production units* in a system of 
class exploitation, the main role of the 
economic apparatus in relation to the masses 
is to exploit them. The ’authority* or 
despotism of the exploiting class is directly 
determined by exploitation, while the State 
apparatuses do not exploit in the full sense 
of directly extracting surplus value (this at 
least is not their main role)," (4)
We shall overlook the tautologous logic by which Poulantzas 
locates the determination of the despotic structure of exploitation 
in ......  exploitation I (This type of circularity is, unfortunately,
24.
far from uncommon in Poulantzas* work.) The main point is his 
exclusion of economic apparatuses from the structures of the state 
system on the basis of essentially divisive rather than integrative 
function. This exclusion, however, rests on a highly mechanical 
view of the relationship between the sphere of economic activity 
and the political development of the working class, a view which 
conflicts with and stands against the Marxist tradition within 
which Poulantzas, and the Althusserians in general, seek to ground 
their work. Consider, for example, the following passage from 
Capital, written long after Marx made his supposed "epistemological 
break" from humanism and ideology to the science of structures, an 
interpretation of Marx*s intellectual development which Poulantzas, 
incidentally, endorses. (5)
"In the course of capitalist production there 
comes into existence a working class which, by 
education, tradition and custom, is induced to 
regard the demands of this method of production 
as self-evident laws of nature. The organization 
of the fully developed capitalist process of 
production breaks down all resistance. The 
continuous formation of a relatively surplus 
population keeps the law of the supply and demand 
of labour, and therefore the wages of labour, in 
a rut which is accordant with capital’s need for 
self-expansion. Finally, the daily compulsion of 
economic relations completes the subjugation of the 
worker to the capitalist. The direct use of force, 
apart from economic conditions, goes on, of course, 
from time to time, but has now become exceptional." (6)
(ny emphasis - D.B.)
Marx, that is to say, specifically conceived the sphere of production
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itself and its social relations to be a decisive factor in 
enforcing the incorporation of the working class (the major 
problematic of the social formation* s **unity" and "cohesion" in 
Poulantzas* scheme) in developed capitalist industrialist society.
While always viewing the point of production rather than, for 
example, the spheres of circulation or distribution, as the location 
of the systematic exploitation of labour-power, Marx thus recognized 
its other aspect as a source of integration-through-routinization.
Marx, of course, identified the proletariat as the progressive class 
in developed capitalism, alone able to establish a qualitatively 
superior form of society. That he perceived contradictory 
consequences to flow from the experience of labour within capitalist 
production relations, however, renders the long-line of interpretations 
which attribute to him the spontaneous or unproblematic development of 
revolutionary proletarian consciousness questionable.
Lenin, furthermore, considered tlie unraediated economic 
struggles of the working class, struggles deriving directly from the 
exploitative character of the wage-labour relationship in economic 
enterprises, to be in themselves an integrating factor within 
capitalism. He suggests in What Is To Be Done? that
**..., the spontaneous development of the working- 
class movement leads to its becoming subordinated 
to bourgeois ideology, leads to its developing 
according to the program of the Credo, for the 
spontaneous working-class movement is trade 
unionism, is Nur-Gewerkschaftlerei, and trade 
unionism means the ideological enslavement of 
the workers by the bourgeoisie." (7)
The conciliatory character of non-revolutionary wage-bargaining has
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been examined by a series of later commentators, not least by 
C. Wright Mills who characterized trade union leaders as "managers 
of discontent". Marx himself, it may be noted, pointedly observed 
that working class
" struggles for the standard of wages are
incidents inseparable from the whole wages system
   a n d  the necessity of debating their
price with the capitalist is inherent in their 
condition of housing to sell themselves as 
commodities* By cowardly giving way in their 
every-day conflict with capital, they would 
certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating 
of any larger movement." (8)
Economism,that is to say, despite its source in the exploitative
capital-labour relationship, can serve to counteract the development
of revolutionary consciousness.
The purpose of this digression has been to show that Marx 
and later Marxists have recognized the integrative dimensions of 
capitalist production, both in terms of its direct influence on the 
consciousness of individual workers and through the routinization of 
class struggle that characteristically accompanies non-politically- 
directed inter-class relations. Poulantzas, in fact, elsewhere 
indicates how the economic enterprise can and does, through the 
structures of the division of labour, articulate and reinforce 
ideological conceptions of the appropriateness and inevitability 
of capitalist production relations. To quote
" the reproduction of positions in the
relations of ideologico-political domination 
does indeed invoke the {state - D.b J  apparatuses, 
but it also invokes apparatuses other than the
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state ideological apparatuses - most 
importantly the economic apparatus itself.
As a unit of production in its capitalist 
form, an enterprise is also an apparatus in 
the sense that, by means of the social 
division of labour within it (the despotic 
organization of labour), the enterprise 
itself reproduces political and ideological 
relations concerning the places of the 
social classes." (9)
This insight, however, is not incorporated into Poulantzas*s
discussion of the state. Its pertinence to that discussion is
that through partly at least functioning as a force for "the unity
and cohesion of a social formation", the economic apparatuses would
logically have to be included in the state system according to the
first criterion suggested by Poulantzas himself, Poulantzas, .
however, systematically excludes them.
Similarly, Poulantzas* other two criteria for characterizing
ideological apparatuses as state apparatuses apply equally to the
economic enterprise. In the first place, he points out that all
ideologies are class ideologies and consequently relate to power
relations, that is the sphere of the state. Equally, however, all
economic activity is, in capitalist society, class-based and, in
fact the basis of class, as Poulantzas is well aware. In Political
Power and Social Classes, for example, he specifies that in the
formation of social classes the "economic element" is decisive "in
the last instance" (6?-8). For Poulantzas, moreover, a class only
becomes fully such
".,.. when its connections with the relations 
of production, its economic existence, is 
reflected on the other levels by a specific 
presence." (10)
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These "other levels", in fact, are precisely those of ideolo^ 
and politics# The state is both the object and the objective of 
class political practice (Ibid., 96), and power as such is defined 
as "the capacity of a social class to realize its specific interests" 
(Ibid., 104). By Poulantzas* second criterion also, the class- 
structured economic apparatus is related to the sphere of politics 
and, consequently, the state.
Again Poulantzas* correct observation that the repressive 
state apparatus continually stands "behind" the ideological 
apparatuses applies at least equally to those in the economic sphere. 
The state’s armed response to factory occupations in, for example, 
Italy in the 1920*s and, more recently, in Chile, demonstrates that 
the presence of the gun behind the work-desk is no idle or paranoiac 
fantasy.
The logic of Poulantzas*s characterization of ideological 
apparatuses as elements of the state would, in short, consistently 
lead him to similarly locate economic apparatuses inside the state 
system. As we have seen, however, he explicitly repudiates such 
an interpretation. It is, perhaps, ironical that while he 
criticizes Miliband for inadequately considering the political 
conclusions of The State in Capitalist Society (11), his own work 
embodies an unfortunately mechanical view of relationship between 
the economic and the political and, more generally, between base 
and superstructure. Formally, Poulantzas attributes central 
importance to the class struggle. (12) The class struggle is the 
scenario within which the state must function to guarantee cohesion 
and unity. Yet, while in one context recognizing the ideological
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dimension of capitalist production (13) and in another correctly 
(against Althusser) identifying direct state-intervention in the 
process of economic reproduction (14), Poulantzas writes the following:
"In ny view .... the term 'ideological State 
apparatus* is the more necessary when the 
term ’apparatus* is also used for the 
economic apparatus. Otherwise the 
distinction between ideological apparatus 
and economic apparatus could become blurred, 
and thereby the distinction between ’super­
structure* and ’base* also." (15)
Rather than systematically incorporate them into his model of the
state, that is to say, Poulantzas isolates his comments on the
capitalist economy which would contaminate the "purity" of his highly
schematic and taxonomic theoretical reconstruction of the structures
of the system as a whole. The discrepancy between his decision to
include the ideological while excluding the economic apparatuses from
the state system is highlighted rather than resolved by his highly
formalistic and abstracted reference to the base-superstructure
dichotomy.
The source of this inconsistency, we feel, is to be found 
in Poulantzas’ primary concern to analyse the "functions" of the 
capitalist state, as against its institutional order, which is 
effectively seen to be of secondary importance. In order to develop 
this point we will examine Poulantzas* discussion of power and the 
significance of that discussion for his theory of the state.
The state, in the first place, is defined by Poulantzas 
as "the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation". (16) 
It is, that is to say, the regulating factor in the social formation.
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the various contradictions of which are "condensed" in it. The 
state superstructure constitutes the arena of the political, while 
politics is the class struggles and practices around that super­
structure, the object and objective of which is "the institutionalized 
power of the state". (1?) Now while Marx criticized ideological uses 
of the theoretical distinction between state and civil society, he 
retained or rather transformed the distinction in the form of the 
state’s character as a "special instrument", representing and 
defending the general interests of the dominant class as a whole. 
Poulantzas, on the other hand, effectively merges state and civil 
society through his conception of politics and his discussion of the 
relative autonomy of the state. His misleading portrayal of the 
relationship between economy and society paradoxically finds 
expression, we will suggest, both in the generalization of a 
particular form of state with a high degree of autonomy and political 
specificity, and in a distorted extension of that state’s effective 
parameters.
Poulantzas, as we have seen, while viewing class as a 
concept to demonstrate the effects of a mode of production on its 
field of social relations, holds that a class only functions as a 
class when its economic existence is matched by a "specific presence" 
at the ideological or political levels, or both (Ibid., 78). Such a 
class "for itself", as Marx characterized it, has, as the objective 
of its political practice, the state, or "the centre of the exercise" 
of political power (Ibid., 113). The class which is dominant at 
the level of class struggle maintains through the state its dominant 
role in the whole social formation (Ibid., 114).
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The state, for Poulantzas, has relative autonomy within the 
social formation. This relative autonomy, in fact, is the 
theoretical basis for the various theses that he elaborates throughout 
Political Power and Social Classes* He writes concerning the state’s 
role as the factor of cohesion in a social formation
"This function of the state, becoming a specific 
function, specifies the state as such in the 
formations dominated by the C.M.P., characterized 
by the specific autonomy (italicised - D.B.) of
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instances and by the particular place which is 
there allotted to the region of the state. This 
characteristic autonomy is the basis of the 
specificity of the political: it determines the
particular function of the state as the cohesive 
factor of the levels which have gained autonomy." (18)
The legitimacy of the specifically capitalist state, expressed in the
ideology of a "general will", derives from the formally free and
independent status of its citizens and from the democratic institutions
of popular sovereignty. These ideological elements of political
culture constitute, for Poulantzas, the "specific autonomy" of the
realm of politics, and are determined by the commodity form of
capitalist production (Ibid., 123-8). This aspect of Poulantzas*
thesis, incidentally, undermines A.B.Bridge’s unqualified contention
that he underestimates the relativity of the state’s autonony. (19)
His discussion of state autonomy is, in fact, formally and explicitly
contextualized within the class-divisions and commodity-producing
character of capitalist society.
Nevertheless, Poulantzas* doctrine of relative autonomy is 
contradicted by his discussion of state power elsewhere in the same 
work. He writes:
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"When we speak for example of state power, 
we cannot mean by it the mode of the state’s 
articulation at the other levels of the 
structure; we can only mean the power of a 
determinate class to whose interests (rather 
than to those of other social classes) the 
state corresponds*" (20)
The confusion, or rather merging, of state and class power here
leads Poulantzas, as Miliband has pointed out, to implicitly deny
any autonomy to the state at all* (21) Only social classes, as
against the institution of the state, are seen to hold power.
Miliband correctly points to and criticizes the consequent corollaries
drawn by Poulantzas concerning the unity of state power and the role
of the state rather than a party to organize and articulate the
collective demands of the ruling class. Miliband’s criticisms
are, we feel, valid, and we will not elaborate on them.
Nevertheless, Miliband’s comments concerning Poulantzas’ 
confusion of class and state power indicate, in our opinion, what 
is essentially one specific instance of a more fundamental error in 
the letter’s work, the use or rather mis-use he makes of the 
distinction between civil society and the state. We suggested 
earlier that Poulantzas effectively merges the two spheres in his 
treatment of the state’s relative autonomy. We will now examine 
in more detail the way in which he does this.
Poulantzas, in the first place, interprets Marx’s notion 
of the "antagonism between state and society" to refer both to the 
relative autonomy of the political and the economic structures, and, 
more specifically, to the relative autonony of the state from the 
politically dominant classes. (22)
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Concerning the relative autonony of the political and the 
economic, Poulantzas, drawing on Cramsci’s concept of hegemony, 
constructs a model of the state which consists primarily of a system 
of repressive, economic and ideological structures, each, but 
especially those associated with Ideology, having some autonomy.
The particularly high degree of autonomy of the ideological state 
apparatuses finds expression in "major dislocations of state power" 
through their control by particular fractions of the dominant class. (23) 
The repressive state apparatus or "state proper", on the other hand, 
typically is unambiguously controlled by a single class or class 
fraction, thus constituting a "concrete unity", a virtual sub-system 
within the state system as a whole. (Ibid., 308)
In effect, however, this set of interlocking structures 
becomes subordinate, in Poulantzas' analysis, to the second factor 
mentioned above, the relative autonomy of the state from the 
politically dominant class whose interests it represents. In fact, 
the relative autonomy of the political and the economic or, more 
precisely, (although not in Poulantzas* terras) the state and civil 
society is effectively structured by Poulantzas* analysis of the 
relation between the state and the specifically ruling class in 
terms of Bonapartism.' As the autonomy of the state from the 
dominant class (expressed in terras of an expansion of the former* s 
spheres or functions) increases, so the distinction between state 
and civil society, between politics and economics, becomes obscured 
until, implicitly at least, it is effaced. At the same time,
Poulantzas* formal attribution of relative autonomy to forms of 
government or regime is similarly undermined by universalization of
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the Bonapartist state form. Both the distinction between state 
and civil society and the relative autonomy of the form of regime 
are, in short, theoretically obliterated by Poulantzas* treatment 
of Bonapartism, the relative autonomy of the state from the 
dominant class. It is instructive to observe precisely how he 
does this.
The relative autonomy of the political and economic 
spheres is, we suggested, subordinate to that of the autononçr of 
the state from the specifically dominant classes in Poulantzas* 
work. The curcial concept which effects this attribution of primacy 
to the second aspect of the "antagonism between the state and civil 
society" (see discussion above) is that of Bonapartism. Poulantzas 
writes
"The relation between the state and the 
political interests of these classes, which 
Marx frequently distinguished from their 
* private* f * economic *, * selfish*, etc., 
interests, establishes itself only by a 
relative autonomy between the state and these 
classes, whose secret is revealed by 
Bonapartism: its essential characteristic is
precisely that particular independence of the 
state from the dominant classes." (24)
In the same work Poulantzas contends that for Marx and Engels conceived
of Bonapartism, not simply as a particular, concrete form of the
capitalist state but "as a constitutive theoretical characteristic
of the very type of capitalist state". (Ibid., 90)
This contention is clearly erroneous, however, Poulantzas*
major textual source for his thesis is a letter of l866, in which
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Engels* commenting on Bismarck*s proposals for Prussian constitutional 
reform, refers to Bonapartism as
'*.... the real religion of the bourgeoisie ..... a
Bonapartist semi-dictatorship is the normal form; 
it upholds the big material interests of the 
bourgeoisie (even against the will of the bourgeoisie) 
but allows the bourgeoisie no part in the power of 
government .** (25)
This isolated passage, however, far from supporting Poulantzas*
identification of Bonapartism with the capitalist state power per se,
clearly conflicts with the former's general treatment by both Marx
and later Marxists# Miliband has very effectively refuted
Poulantzas* claim that Marx expressed a similar view in The Eighteenth
Brumaire, and in order to avoid repetition we will simply endorse
Miliband*s corrective interpretation# (26)
Marx*6 interpretation of the apparently "independent**
character of the Bonapartist-type state phenomenon in fact emphasizes
its particularity as a regime of social and political crises, of a
specific conjuncture in which the state's political functions
**overdetermine" its economic and ideological ones, to adopt Poulantzas*
terminology. Illustrative of this interpretation is his materialist
analysis of the "apparently indepêndent" nature of the nineteenth
century German state in The German Ideology. There, grounding his
analysis in a study of the material development of German society,
Marx depicts a scenario of social stagnation, the consequence of
the parochial, unorganised condition of the German bourgeoisie on
the one hand, and the decline of the old feudal aristocracy, largely
a result of the peasant wars, on the other. Consequently
".... the special sphere, which, owing to the
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division of labour, was responsible for the 
work of administration of public interests, 
acquired an abnormal independence, which 
became still greater in the bureaucracy of 
modern times." (27)
The exceptional character of the German state, that is to say,
reflected the corresponding exceptional inability of the dominant
classes in that society to articulate and pursue their common
interests by other means. A particular conjunctural crisis produced
the conditions whereby the state functions to unify, through its
expanded autonomy, the interests of the dominant classes. For
Poulantzas, on the other hand, this mode of ruling class unification
is generalized, through the concept of Bonapartism, into a
characteristic of the capitalist state as such. (28) The "last
resort" nature of Marx* s conception of the Bonapartist state is
expressed in Trotsky's observation that it is "one of the political
weapons of the capitalist regime in its critical period". (29)
Consistently, however, Poulantzas stresses this aspect of the state -
civil society antagonism at the expense of the relative autonomy of
the political from the economic as such. The consequence of this
persistent emphasis, when compounded by the expansion of functions
that Poulantzas attributes to the Bonapartist capitalist state, is
the effective undermining of the state-civil society distinction
from which he begins, and as a result the obliteration of the
"special" character of the state on which his theory of Bonapartism
rests. This requires closer analysis.
Formally, we will note, Poulantzas attributes a relative 
autonomy to forms of government or regime within a particular form
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of state. The liberal state form, for example, may be expressed 
by a regime of parliamentary republic or by one of constitutional
monarchy. Such differences are attributed to a certain autonomy
in the sphere of politics, in "the specific structures of the 
political level." (30) At the same time, however, Poulantzas 
seriously minimizes the effective differences between such varying 
forms of regime in particular instances. For example,
in the framework of the capitalist class 
state, parliamentary legitimacy is no 'closer 
to the people’ than that legitimacy which
corresponds to the predominance of the executive.
In fact, there are always ideological processes
in both cases.” (31)
It need hardly be said, however, that the crucial factor in the
characterization of the capitalist state is, from a Marxist
perspective, its mode of operation in capitalist society which is,
in the last instance, orientated towards and determined by
contradictions in the econon^ rather than in the sphere of ideology,
although, or course, ideological as well as directly political
factors will exert some influence.
Poulantzas, however, while formally endorsing the 
conceptual distinction between "base" and "superstructure", (32) 
effectively undermines it and in doing so drastically 
if only implicitly and in fact against his own stated purpose, the 
Marxist conception of the state. We attempted at the outset to 
demonstrate that Poulantzas’ discussion of "ideological State 
apparatuses" logically opens the door to the inclusion of economic 
apparatuses in the state system, even though he actually rejects
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such a conclusion* Poulantzas, we will note, unavoidably but 
formally emphasizes the centrality of class conflict in capitalist 
society. Thus, for example, he observes that
".... the effective emergence of social classes 
takes place at political and ideological levels, 
levels which cannot be analysed in terms of
structures, but solely in terms of class struggle" (italicised)
(33)
The economic basis of class, moreover, is, as we have seen, viewed 
as decisive in the last instance, (ibid., 6?-9) Nevertheless, its 
"global role" is specified as essentially political. The primacy 
of this political role is expressed by Poulantzas in the following 
terms:
"The state is related to a ’society divided 
into classes’ and to political domination, 
precisely in so far as it maintains, in the 
ensemble of structures, that place and role 
which have the effect (in their unity) of 
dividing a formation into classes and producing 
political class domination. Strictly speaking, 
there is no technico-economic, ideological or 
’political* function of the state: there is a
global function of cohesion which is ascribed to 
it by its place, and there are modalities of this 
function overdetermined by the specifically 
political modality." (34)
Now the political character of the state is basic and fundamental
to any Marxist analysis. Poulantzas' notion of the state's
"global function of cohesion", however, serves to shift attention
from the problematic of the relations between economy and politics
or, more generally, between base and superstructure, and effectively
merge them, thus expanding the parameters of the state deep into
civil society. Ideology, we have seen, is, as Poulantzas stresses,
an important factor of cohesion, the "cement" of the social formation.
He further emphasizes its pervasiveness throughout the social
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formation, suggesting that "Only revolutionary organizations and 
organizations of class struggle can in the end * Oscape’ the system 
of ideological State apparatuses". But the, albeit unstated, 
corollary of the definition of the state in terms of its cohesive 
or integrative role and the incorporation of the ideological 
apparatuses within this system is a conception of the state which, 
as we have seen, incorporates virtually all the institutions 
within the social formation, including the economic apparatuses. 
Alone excluded from the resulting effective equation of state and 
society are those organizations which at least implicitly embody 
the goal of revolutionary social change (the palaces of Poulantzas* 
"philosopher kings"?)
If we put aside, for a moment, the critical content and 
purpose of Poulantzas’ work, his implied model of the state as 
outlined above more closely resembles that of the British Idealist 
philosopher Bernard Bosanquet than that of Marx. Bosanquet 
speculated
"By the State, then, we mean society as a unit, 
recognized as rightly exercising control over 
its members through absolute physical power.
The limits of the unit are, of course, 
determined by what looks like historical accident; 
but there is a logic beneath the apparent accident, 
and the most tremendous political questions turn 
upon the delimitation of political units. A 
principle, so to speak, of political parsimony
 .... is always tending to expand the political
unit." (35)
Bosanquet goes on to counterpose against the expansion of the
political unit the opposing tendency toward self-government. Never-
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theless, his conception of an expanding state system, an 
expansion deriving from its function as the source and agency of 
coercive social cohesion, is uncomfortably similar to Poulantzas* 
implied model. In both cases, the "functionalist" orientation of 
the supposed primary role of the state gives the parameters of its 
system an elasticity which is, in principle, without limits in any 
given social formation.
The elasticity of this model co-exists uneasily, of course, 
with the aspect of Poulantzas* work which identifies the specifically 
repressive aspect of the state as "the State apparatus proper". (3&)
There the state's repressive role derives directly from the inherent 
class antagonisms of civil society and attains primacy in Poulantzas* 
account. The specificity of class conflict becomes obscured, 
however, as Poulantzas develops, if not fully, the implications of 
his emphasis on the state's **global role** as a factor of cohesion, 
as we sketched that development above. As, in short, the 
distinction between state and civil society becomes problematic with 
the inclusion of ideological apparatuses in the former, a **functionalist** 
characterization of the various spheres - ideological, economic and 
political - of the state system gains ascendancy over the conflictual 
and repressive source and character of state power.
Marcuse has pointed out that Marxism requires and is 
grounded in "polydimensionality", or the perception of different 
social segments. (37) Poulantzas* "elastic state", if the term 
may be used, obliterates even while (as we have seen) he formally 
endorses and "defends**, a conceptual distinction that is central to 
Marxist sociology, that between 'base* and 'superstructure*. The
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distinction is made in the famous passage from Maix*s Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, which we will quote
"In the social production which men carry on 
they enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will; 
these relations of production correspond to 
a definite stage of development of their 
material powers of production* The totality 
of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society - the real 
foundation, on which legal and political 
superstructures arise and to which definite 
forms of social consciousness correspond#
The mode of production of material life 
determines the general character of the social, 
political, and spiritual processes of life. It 
is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being determines their consciousness." (38)
Now in writing this Marx did not, of course, suggest any 
mechanical or reductionistic relationship between the economic "base" 
and its social "superstructure". Rather, he was concerned to 
establish and specify his materialist conception of man, socially 
producing, as the subject of the historical process in the sense 
that he produces his own world within definite social production 
relations. These production relations, moreover, constitute the 
determinate context of the social transformation of nature, the 
necessary and primary condition of social existence as such, the 
final determinant of the superstructural complex of which the state 
is a part.
But for Poulantzas the state is more than one, specifically
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repressive, element of the superstructure. In the first place, 
his characterization of its primary or global role as that of 
"cohesion" within the social formation, incorporating the ideological 
apparatuses, radically enlarges the state sector of the superstructure. 
For, as Poulantzas himself points out, what organizations but those 
with a purposively revolutionary orientation can fully escape the 
influence of bourgeois Ideology? (39) As Lenin notes
"......the only choice is: either the
bourgeois or the socialist ideology. There 
is no middle course (for humanity has not created 
a'third* ideology, and, moreover, in a society 
torn by class antagonisms there can never be a 
non-class or above-class ideology)." (40)
Poulantzas* capitalist state, then, logically and consistently
pervades that society's superstructural complex.
As we have seen, moreover, that state, however much Poulantzas
may deny this, by implication, incorporates the economic apparatuses 
of the social 'base*. The logical conclusion of Poulantzas* 
discussion of economic and ideological apparatuses has, in fact, been
elaborated by Birnbaum who, on the basis of an analysis of the
structural changes in advanced capitalism, explicitly rejects the 
contemporary relevance of the base-superstructure conceptualization. 
Birnbaum argues
".... a specific political autonomy is difficult
to attribute to the state, but a specifically 
economic autonomy is impossible to attribute to 
the market. Indeed, the classical market has 
disappeared and has been replaced not simply by 
structures of a monopolistic or oligopolistic 
sort but by a complicated apparatus of controlled.
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interlocking processes. The original 
(Marxian) notion of base and superstructure 
has little meaning in the face of this 
concrete totality." (41)
The emergence of political apparatuses extending deep into the
economy (the "overdetermination" of the latter by the former, for
Poulantzas), that is to say, invalidates the analytical concepts of
"base" and "superstructure". But if this is the case, and we have
contended that it is implied in Poulantzas* model, the distinction
between civil society and state is undermined, and with it the basis
of a characterization of the state as a "special" instrument or
organism, a characterization which is fundamental to and inseparable
from Poulantzas* theory of Bonapartism. Class struggle is always
present as a formal backcloth to the ’^regional" structures of the
state, but within that political sphere the major segmental
boundaries are those between the particular types of state apparatuses
in particular the political and the ideological - which collectively
preserve the unity and cohesion of the social formation, rather than
that between the state and civil society. The latter distinction
reveals the presence of a "special", specifically repressive, public
power, and it is this presence, rather than the "functionalist"
notion of social cohesion, that constitutes the essence of the
Marxist theoi^ of the state.
Marx observed
"By the word * state* is meant the government 
machine, or the state in so far as it forms 
a special organism separated from society 
through division of labour (42)
This image of a "machine", distinct from though acting upon a class-
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divided civil society is adopted and elaborated by Lenin in 
The State and Revolution (6-7, 9, 12). Its institutional presence 
as a special, repressive public power, that is to say, is given 
primacy. Poulantzas* attribution of a "global role" of cohesion 
to the state, on the other hand, assumes class struggle as a purely 
formal and schematic element of the environment of political 
practice. At the same time, the parameters of the state system 
widen until, by implication, its limits are effectively identical 
with those of society itself.
Now in his discussion of ideological state apparatuses, 
the aspect of his work which, we have suggested, reveals most clearly 
the functionalist orientation of his analysis, Poulantzas malces a 
number of informative and illuminating observations concerning the 
general character of ideology. His insistence that ideology is 
concretized in the practices of a social formation (43) for example, 
serves as a useful corrective to the superficial view that it pertains 
solely to the realm of ideas. Such an ideational interpretation of 
ideology frequently recurs in Lenin*s work. In The State, for 
example, he writes of the capitalist state
"Yet the state continued to be a machine which 
helped the capitalists to hold the poor 
peasants and the working class in subjection.
But in outward appearance it was free. It 
proclaimed universal suffrage, and declared 
through its champtions, preachers, scholars and 
philosophers, that it was not a class state." (44)
In the same work he polemically but significantly proclaims the state
to be **a bourgeois lie" (Ibid., 24). Poulantzas* emphasis on the
roots of ideology, in particular the notion of a "general will" which
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he recognizes as a dominant element in the legitimization of 
capitalism, in the social relations of production (45) is, by 
contrast, derived directly from a Marxist analysis of the political 
economy of capitalism, and in particular from the notion of the 
fetishism of commodities.
Yet despite this welcome emphasis on the institutional 
and structural nature of ideology Poulantzas errs, we must insist, 
in locating ideological practices and apparatuses within the state 
system. The hypothetical empirical incorporation of partly 
ideological institutions such as trade unions into the state 
apparatus is certainly a historical possibility, but equally 
certainly is not the case in the advanced capitalist countries at 
the present time. It is not, that is to say, sm inherent character­
istic of the capitalist type of state as such. To take the example 
of the trade unions (46), Trotsky* s characterization of them as 
militant economic organizations on the one hand and a school of 
political education on the other, (4?), is still essentially valid. 
The increasing tendency for sections of the rank-and-file membership 
to come into conflict with union leadership over economic issues 
with demonstrably political Implications dramatically undermines 
any attempt to characterize them in toto as state apparatuses (48). 
Such autonomy is not reducible to the "relative autonomy" of a 
state apparatus, however much Poulantzas may emphasize the "major 
dislocations of state power" resulting from the high degree of 
autonomy of the ideological structures. This is not, of course, 
to suggest that the existent trade union bodies are in themselves 
vehicles of revolutionary social change. Rather, that in the
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context of late capitalism the economistic demands that they 
articulate increasingly encounter a state-initiated resistance 
which compounds a scenario of acute and potentially political 
confrontation# The long-term incompatibility of the radical 
econofflism of the powerful trade unions on the one hand and the 
pattern of "indicative planning" that has emerged in the capitalist 
world during the post-war period, that is to say, repudiates 
Poulantzas* thesis that the unions, through their ideological 
function, constitute an element of the state system.
Poulantzas, in summary, adopts an idiosyncratic (for a 
Marxist) conception of the state as primarily fulfilling the role 
of preserving the social cohesion and unity of the social formation. 
Quite despite his taxonomic fervour which distinguishes "ideological 
State apparatuses" from "economic apparatuses" which are not part of
the state system, there is a logic in Poulantzas* theses which, if
pursued, extends the state, defined essentially in terms of a 
"function", to include virtually every element and institution of 
society. This effective identification of state and society 
recalls Hobbes* depiction of the identity of the two. Without 
the social order Ocohesion") guaranteed and enforced by the 
sovereign state, human society as such is impossible.
"Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time 
of Warre, where every man is enemy to every
man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than 
what their own strength, and their own invention 
shall furnish them withall. In such condition, 
there is no place for Industry; because the 
fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no
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Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported
by Sea; no commodious Building: no
Instruments of moving, and removing such
things as require much force: no Knowledge
of the face of the Earth: no account of Time;
no Arts: no Letters: no Society; and which
is worst of all, continual! feare, and danger
of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutlsk , and short." (49)
Hobbes derived this view by identifying the establishment of human
society with the foundation of the state. As against the atomized
model of conflict which the state unifies in Hobbes* account,
Poulantzas* perception of social antagonism is formally Marxist,
specifying the conflict between capital and labour in the capitalist
mode of production. The essentially mechanical nature of the
relationship between this sphere of conflict and the state’s primary
function of integration must be stressed, however. Miliband suggests
that in Poulantzas* work the class struggle "makes a dutiful appearance,
but in an exceedingly formalized ballet of evanescent shadows." (50)
I would replace this rather etherial characterization with a more
contentious one. The presence of the class struggle in Poulantzas*
thesis, in addition to being "dutiful", unequivocally throws into
high relief the unstated implications of his dominant, functionalist
conception of the state. From that conception logically flows an
effective equation of state and civil society, and an obliteration
of the conceptual distinction, crucial to Marxist sociology, between
"base" and "superstructure", which renders his interpretation of the
Bonapartist repressive State apparatus, the "State apparatus proper"
quite meaningless. The respective models of the state as repressive
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and as cohesive not only stand as a formal logical contradiction 
in Poulantzas* work: the latter, on Poulantzas* own account (51)
has both a structural and determining primacy over the former, and 
as such undermines it and the Marxist theory of the state along 
with it.
As against Poulantzas* "pervasive" state, we will suggest 
that a minimal definition of the capitalist state views it as a 
specifically repressive institutional complex, the existence of 
which derives from the class antagonisms of its parent society. In 
the course of capitalist development, it tends, though in an uneven 
way, to more or less use, adapt, penetrate, transform and finally, 
in some cases, actually appropriate a variety of social institutions 
and apparatuses,both in the "base" and the "superstructure". With 
the particular exception of the total appropriation of those 
institutions and apparatuses by the state, (a development approximated 
in the German war-economy of the 1950*s and 1940*s) however, they are 
not, strictly speaking, aspects of the state itself. Such a 
complete appropriation is a historical possibility, but is neither, 
as Poulantzas would, despite himself, have it, inherent in the 
capitalist state as such nor existent in the contemporary advanced 
capitalist world*
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III ARMS AND THE STATE: A NEW STABILITY?
After the Second World War the capitalist world 
entered, against both Marxist and neo-Keynesian 
expectations, (1) into an extended cycle of generalized,
If uneven growth. Attempts to account for this phase of 
expansion have. In the main, centred on the role of the 
state, particularly In so far as It promotes Investment 
and, through the socialization of consumption, sustains 
demand. Two groups of interpretations, both claiming 
descent from the Marxist tradition of analysis and 
purporting to account for the growth In state expenditure 
during this period and throughout the twentieth century 
as a whole, may be distinguished. The first type of 
Interpretation explains the growth of state expenditure 
as a means whereby an otherwise unlnvestable social 
surplus may be "disposed". The second emphasizes' the 
provision by the state of services which are profitable 
for capital but which, for technical or other reasons 
Individual capital units or enterprises are unable to 
provide.
In general, the "univestable surplus" group of 
theorists tend to perceive Increased state Involvement 
to be a potentially stabilizing Influence on an otherwise 
crisis-prone capitalist system, whereas the second are 
primarily concerned with the problems that state expansion, 
and particularly Its Intervention In the capitalist 
economy, pose for accumulation and for the viability 
of the system as a whole. Within the first group of
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theories, however, we may distinguish between those which 
perceive state expenditure, particularly on military 
goods, as Inadequate to the task of surplus disposal, and 
those which claim, with more or less qualification, that 
the prevailing forms of state expenditure constitute 
a means to at least moderate the cyclical, crisis-tending 
movement of classical capitalism. Both, however, rest 
primarily on Keynesian rather than Marxist assumptions In 
explaining the economic dynamics of state Interventionism,
Keynes* Importance was that he was one of the first 
economists to attempt to formulate a systematic explanation 
of and remedy for the type of economic crisis that 
characterized the capitalist world In the 1920* and 1930*s. 
Recognizing that the previously influential supply and 
demand equilibrium model, expressed at Its simplest In 
Say * s Law, could not account for such developments ^ Keynes 
attempted to make a radical break with what he perceived 
to be the history of economic theory. He summarized the 
recent trends In that history, suggesting a more or less 
unquestioned acceptance of a narrow orthodoxy. In the 
following way;
**From the time of Say and Ricardo the
classical economists have taught that
supply creates Its own demand;- meaning
by this in some significant, but not
clearly defined, sense that the whole
of the costs of production must necessarily
be spent in the aggregate, directly
or Indirectly, on purchasing the product, (2)
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As against this perceived unity In economic thought
,/
through the nineteenth century and up until Plgore,
Keynes, In his General Theory, constructed a model with 
three major variables to determine the limits within 
which the capitalist system fluctuates. The variables 
he selected were the consumption function, the marginal 
efficiency of capital and the rate of Interest.
The consumption function, briefly, refers to the 
relation between movements in Income and In consumption.
As Income rises, Keynes contended, the average prosperity 
to consume diminishes, the gap between Income and 
consumption finding expression In Increased savings.
Thus
"men are disposed, as a rule and on 
the average, to Increase their 
consumption as their Income increases, 
but not by as much as the increase In 
their Income" (3)
Keynes referred to this as a "fundamental psychological 
law".
By the "marginal efficiency of capital" Keynes 
meant the anticipated return on any additional unit of 
capital Investment. When, Keynes reasoned, the anticipated 
or future perceived return fell too close to the rate 
of Interest, or the cost of borrowing money. Investment 
amd consequently addition to the existing stock of 
capital would tend to falter. Marginal efficiency, that 
Is to say. Is defined In terms of "the expectation of 
yield". (4)
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Keynes saw the rate of interest to he determined 
by two major factors; the ’’natural" desire to hold 
assets In a liquid form and the consequent necessary 
payment of Interest for the temporary borrowing of It, 
and the amount of money, determined by the Central Bank,
In circulation. That Is, the rate of Interest Is the
reward for parting with liquidity, while the quantity
of existant money determines the actual level of the 
rate In particular Instances, (ibid; 1 6 7-8 )
Keynes has been crltlzed for presenting an 
underconsumptlonlst Interpretation of capitalist 
stagnation and under-utlllzatlon of resources. J. Baton, 
for example, suggests:
"Keynes has much to say about the
’prosperity to consume’ but on the
’prosperity to accumulate .......
Keynes has nothing to say". (5 )
As Joan Robinson points out, however, Keynes’ 
analysis of capitalist crises derives from variations 
in the Inducement to Invest, this depending on the 
perceived prospect of future profit from new Investment. (6 ) 
In fact, Keynes believed the marginal efficiency of 
capital to be the most Important variable In the determination 
of capital Investment.
"The schedule of the marginal efficiency 
of capital is of fundamental Importance 
because It Is mainly through this factor 
(much more than through the rate of 
interest) that the expectation of the 
future Influences the present". (7)
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As with the rate of interest and the consumption 
function, however, marginal efficiency is essentially 
a psychological phenomen, subjective expectations 
about future profits being seen as the chief proximate 
determinant of investment. Thus Keynes emphasizes 
the close causal relationship between "changes In 
expectation" and "the violent fluctuations which are 
the explanation of the Trade Cycle". (8 ) This 
subjective orientation Is one aspect of a more general 
tendency by which Keynes’s analysis of Investment 
decision—making is abstracted from the actual, objective 
conditions of capital accumulation. (9) Another Is 
his treatment of the development of society’s productive 
material culture. Keynes Indicates that among "other 
elements in the economic system" he assumes as given 
the skill and quantity of available labour and technique, 
as well as of available equipment. (lO) Fundamental 
to capitalism, however, is its development of the means 
of production ("available equipment"), a process which 
Is central to Marx’s conception of the rising technical 
and organic compositions of capital. (ll) Skill, 
raorevoer. Is a far from static dimension of labour-power. 
Transformations in productive technique are typically 
accompanied by a change, upward or downward, in the level 
of technical expertise required of the labour force. 
Keynes’s model of the conditions of capitalist production 
is thus partial to say the least. Nevertheless he did 
attribute especial importance to the process of Investment, 
even if his account Is Inadequate both In terms of Its 
subjectivist bias and Itsahistorlcal character.
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The problems associated with the "gap" between 
increasing incomes and a less rapidly rising level of 
consumption are, nevertheless, essential to Keynes’s 
critique of Say’s Law ("Supply always creates its own 
demand"). He perceived consumption to be essentially 
a passive factor, in the main dependent upon the level 
of aggregate income. (1 2 ) Income, in turn, derives 
from previous investment and consequently consumption 
in Keynes’s model is by and large determined by investment 
decisions, to which the larger part of his policy 
recommendations were directed. In particular, he 
advocated that the state should take greater responsibility 
for investment, believing that the alternative would be 
"the destmiction of existing economic forms in their 
entirety. (13) Characteristically, he adds that 
such state intervention constitutes "the condition of 
the successful functioning of individual initiative".
Consumption, however, is also seen to be an important 
area for state intervention. While expressing caution 
concerning the optimal scale of intervention, Keynes view 
was that, in principle,
"the enlargement of the functions of 
govenunent involved in the task of 
adjusting to one another the prosperity 
to consume and the inducement to invest 
is desirable." (l4)
Demand management, or the adjustment of "effective 
demand" is thus,together with social investment, central
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to Keynes* advocated expansion of state economic 
intervention. Through this dual function Keynes 
envisaged state intervention, of "public works", as 
a means to offset advanced capitalism’s stagnationist 
tendencies, the result of a combination of increased 
savings and a reluctance on the part of capitalists to 
invest.
Methodologically, Keynes may be criticized for the 
individualistic orientation of his analysis. Essentially 
he begins with individuals and their decisions to save, 
invest, or consume. The main point we wish to make, 
however, is that the Keynesian perspective presents a 
model of the capitalist state which productively utilizes 
otherwise idle resources in the form of money, labour 
and productive equipment. The state is not, in Keynes’ 
model, perceived in class terms. He suggests, rather, 
that it embodies "the popular will". (15) In addition 
to its wider influence in the post-1930’s Depression 
period, nevertheless, the Keynesian model of the state 
has been formative for a number of nominally Marxist 
analyses that stress the state’s role as a means of 
disposing an otherwise uninvestable social surplus.
We will consider examples of both "pessimistic" and 
"optimistic" variants of this thesis.
Prominent among the former is Baran and Sweezy’s 
study Monopoly Capital. Central to their thesis, an 
analysis of contemporary American capitalism, is the 
contention that the tendential law for the rate of
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profit to fall has been replaced by a new "law of 
rising surplus". (l6), surplus being "the difference 
between what a society produces and the cost of 
producing it". Baran and Sweezy see this law to derive 
from two factors, both related to non-price competition.
The first factor involves what Baran and Sweezy term 
"the dynamics of market sharing", the latter the form 
that sales effort assumes in the producer goods 
industries. (17).
Concerning the division of the capitalist market,
Baran and Sweezy note that the firm with lower costs and 
higher profits enjoys a variety of advantages over higher 
cost rivals in the struggle for market shares. "The firm 
with the lowest costs holds the whip hand". They conclude 
from this truism (although they point out that economists 
have largely overlooked such an apparently obvious 
consequence of cost advantage) that :
"there is a strong positive incentive
for the large corporation in an
oligopolistic industry not only to
seek continuously to cut its costs
but to do so faster than its rivals." (l8)
Baran and Sweezy further observe that non-price 
competition in producer goods industries, the buyers 
of the products of which being primarily concerned 
to increase profits, is another factor ensuring that 
the costs of production will be minimized. The capitalistic 
practices of unit cost economy are thus causally the 
foundation of Baràn and Sweezy’s conception of a rising 
surplus•
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Basically, Monopoly Capital presents an under­
consumption! st theory of capitalist crisis. An 
increasingly large economic surplus is seen to be 
generated by advanced capitalism, a surplus for which 
that made of production is unable to provide profitable 
outlets. Baran and Sweezy summarize their thesis : 
"According to our model, the growth 
of monopoly generates a strong tendency 
for surplus to rise without at the 
same time providing adequate 
mechanisms of surplus absorption." (1 9 )
The unused surplus that results, they add, finds 
expression in unemployment and unutilized productive 
capacity.
On this assumption Baran and Sweezy examine, as 
potential modes of surplus absorption, capitalist’s 
consumption and investment, expenditure on sales 
effort, government civilian spending, and on militarism. 
They conclude that none of these factors, singly or 
combined, are able to generate investment outlets 
adequate to advanced capitalism’s requirements. Thus :
"The fateful question ’on what?’ to 
which monopoly capitalism confined 
no answer in the realm of civilian 
spending has crept subversively into 
the military establishment itself.
From all present indications there 
is no answer their either." (2 0 )
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Capitalism, in other words, is drifting and will continue 
to drift toward underconsumption and stagnation.
Specifically concerning state civilian expenditure 
Baran and Sweezy contend that the limits, imposed by 
the American power structure, had been reached by 1939* 
llie powerful vested interests of the "the oligarchy" 
impose narrow limits on the scale of expenditure of 
this type. Public housing, for example, encroaches 
on private enterprise, as does the extension of public 
education, education being a crucial support to the 
structure of privilege and inequality. State welfare 
expenditure in all forms is, in Baran and Sweezy’s 
account, curtailed by the influence of vested interest 
groups.
Military spending, by contrast, has expanded 
rapidly, especially since the 1930’s. Armaments are 
needed both to defend the American "neo-colonial 
empire" and also "to contain, compress and eventually 
destroy the rival world socialist system." (21) Such 
a strategy, moreover, is profitable and therefore 
acceptable to private enterprise. Baran and Sweezy note 
two limitations to the indefinite increase of military 
expenditure, however. In the first place, recent arms 
technology has reduced the power of such spending to 
stimulate the economy. An increasingly large amount of 
money spent in this sector goes to research and engineering 
expenses, a smaller portion going to actual arms production.
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Consequently, fewer people are provided with employment 
by a given level of military spending and its effect on 
investment is relatively smaller. Through the stock-piling 
of modem weaponry, moreover, militarism becomes self- 
defeating in so far as it becomes a threat to the existence 
of the system it is intended to serve. Militarism, like 
government civilian spending, thus offers no solution to 
capitalism's troublesome rising surplus.
Historically, Baran and Sweezy suggest, the two 
factors of "epoch-making" innovations which transform 
the pattern of the entire economy and thus create large 
new outlets for capital investment, and war, a "normal" 
feature of the present century, have served as counteracting 
forces to capitalism's stagnationist tendencies. (22)
In the post-war context, Baran and Sweezy point to the 
particular factors of capital replacement, high military 
expenditure, a second wave of "automobilization" and 
surburbanization, and the rapid growth of consumer and 
mortgage credit in creating investment opportunities.
With the growth of unemployment, the increased pace of 
automation and the limits of military spending apparently 
reached, however, they suggest that "the future of the 
United States economy hardly looks bright." ( 2 3 )
The basic theoretical contention underlying 
Monopoly Capital that a law of rising surplus has replaced 
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, is questionable, 
however. Baran and Sweezy suggest that the modern corporation,
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unlike its earlier competitive form, is not only less 
prone to take risks in its economic activities but is 
even characterized by an attitude of "live and let 
live". Both these qualities, they claim, derive from 
the internal structure of the firm itself. Baran and 
Sweezy thus identify as distinguishing features of the 
new type of business enterprise its relatively long-term 
mode of operation and its more "rational" methods of 
calculation. (24) Economic uncertainty, that is to 
say, is progressively removed with the consolidation 
of the corporate structure characteristic of monopoly 
capitalism.
J.M. Gillman, although unlike Baran and Sweezy 
maintaining the use of the Marxist categories of value 
as opposed to the less specific concept of "surplus", 
reaches similar conclusions in his study of American 
capitalism Prosperity in Crisis. Capitalism's cyclical 
movement of booms and depressions^ Gillman argués,JeriveS 
from the emergence of a social surplus which is unable 
to be absorbed in the expansion of productive assets on 
a continuing basis. (25) For Gillman the capitalist tendency 
toward overproductions finds expression
"in the form of the overproduction 
of capital in its initial form - 
in the form of overproduction of 
investment funds — in the form 
of the creation of surplus wealth 
together with surplus people." (2 6 )
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If savings from the current level of output are not 
Invested or disposed of through, for example, unproductive 
expenditures, the system not only fails to expand 
but fails also to maintain existing levels of production 
and employment# Since the 1930*s, Gillman specifies, 
military and other forms of unproductive expenditure 
and employment have moderated the effects of the 
recessionary periods# The general tendency toward the 
relative overproduction of investment funds, nevertheless, 
is identified as "the essence of secular stagnation 
of advanced capitalism#" (27) As with Baran and 
Sweezy, univestable profits, rather than an inability 
to realize an adequate rate of return from the existant 
mass of social capital, is for Gillman the source of 
capitalist crisis#
In his earlier statistical attempt to calculate the 
rate of profit in the United States over an extended 
period (28) , Gillman redefines the organic composition
of capital, or the ratio of the value of constant capital 
to that of variable capital, in such a way as to include 
unproductive expenditure in the constant portion of total 
capital# On the basis of this redefinition he reports 
a falling rate of profit, its effect being a drift 
toward economic stagnation# In Prosperity in Crisis 
Gillman does not repeat these calculations# Rather, his 
concern is to directly examine the mechanisms of surplus 
absorption and unproductive expenditure and to indicate 
their limits#
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Specifically, Gillman is concerned with government 
expenditure, "the ultimate of the Keynesian anti— 
depression weapons." (29) Military spending, he
suggests, is not a long-term solution to the problem 
of excess investment funds. Mainly unproductive, 
such expenditures consume economic surplus without 
replacing it. Rather than adding to productive 
capacity they thus "conceal the conditions which 
constitute an economic crisis". (30) Increased 
social consumption in the form of welfare expenditure 
is excluded because of the strength of capitalist 
opposition. As Baran and Sweezy also argue, Gillman 
suggests !
"Whereas capital will permit 
itself to be taxed for the 
purpose of the military, it 
will not tolerate taxation 
of the same magnitude for the 
social welfare." (3 1 )
The perceived extravagance of welfare spending thus 
raises powerful capitalist opposition to its increase. 
An increase in the level of personal consumption, 
through such means as higher wages, on the other hand, 
is unsatisfactory for capital because of its tendency 
to raise the value of labour power and undermine 
profitability. (32) Even if successful, Gillman 
adds, such policies, placing material prosperity 
above profitability as a priority, would result in 
inflation.
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Finding no permanent productive outlet for 
advanced capitalism's surplus investment funds,
Gillman, identifies the particular source of contemporary 
capitalism's overproduction of surplus wealth in the 
structure of monopolistic enterprise. With the growth 
of monopoly, he contends, come "new radically different 
economic problems," ( 3 3 )  Monopoly corporations’ 
command over financial, material and technological 
resources, an important aspect of what Baran and 
Sweezy term their more "rational" methods of calculation, 
enable them to produce an ever-increasing mass of both 
goods and profits which the restricted consumers* 
markets and the new capital outlets respectively cannot 
absorb on a continuing basis. In addition, advanced 
industrial technology, being both labour saving and 
capital saving, is unable to absorb profits on the scale 
that it can produce them. Gillman concludes :
"This means that under large - 
scale business organization and 
management the economy's profit- 
producing potentials are greater 
than its profit-coixsuming potentials. 
Profits then fail to get invested 
and production and employment 
fall to lower investment levels."
As in Baran and Sweezy*s thesis, that is to say, 
Gillman suggests that accumulation falters when an 
excess rather than a dearth of profits, or "surplus"
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in the former's terminology, is produced. In both 
studies, this tendency is exacerbated by the monopolistic 
features of advanced capitalism and its typical corporate 
forms. Both, however, misconstrue the nature as well 
as the extent of competition in contemporary capitalism, 
in the United States and internationally. Baran and 
Sweezy, we have seen, characterize monopoly capitalism 
in terms of a "live and let live" attitude. While 
Giliman's analysis of restricted markets and capital 
outlets implies a potential competitive struggle, it 
is predicted upon and subordinate to his central thesis 
of excess profits.
The degree or intensity of conpetition in the 
capitalist economy, however, is typically determined 
by and dependent upon wider factors than the internal 
structure and capacity of the individual enterprise, 
in particular, the prevailing rates of profitability 
and of expansion of the market. During the early 
and mid — 1960's, when both Gillman's and Baran and 
Sweezy*s studies were written, both production and 
the world market were still expanding, thus helping 
to cushion the effects of declining profitability 
in America and internationally. In the long-term, 
however, declining profitability is the primary 
stimulus to the type of cost—cutting and increased 
"rationality" through savings and economies of 
scale, or capital concentration, that has distinguished 
capitalism in the post-war period, A recent study
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by Nordhaus charts the decline in the rate of profit, 
adjusted for stock appreciation, in the United States 
as follows
YEAR PRE-TAX 
(per cent)
POST-TAX 
(per cent)
1948-50 1 6 . 2 8 . 6
1951-55 14.3 6.4
1 9 5 6 - 6 0 1 2 . 2 6 . 2
1 9 6 1 - 6 5 l4.1 8.3
1 9 6 6 - 7 0 1 2 . 9 7.7
1 9 7 0 9.1 5.3
1 9 7 1 9.6 5 . 7
1 9 7 2 9.9 5.6
1 9 7 3 10.5 5.4
(34)
Post-tax profitability in the United States thus fell 
by over a third between 1948—50 and 1973* In a later 
section we will document in detail a similar decline 
in British corporate profits* (35) The international 
squeeze on profitability has necessitated further 
technical development of the type described by Gillman 
and Baran and Sweezy, as well as increasingly competitive 
international goods and capital movements and restrictions.
Both Baran and Sweezy*s conception of a "rising 
surplus" and Gillman*s notion of "surplus wealth" are 
not, in themselves, incompatible with a falling rate 
of profit. Marx emphasized that a falling rate and
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a rising mass of profits are twin developments, the 
latter deriving from the growing social productivity 
of labour with the growing mass of total capital 
employed. 06) By giving primacy to this rising 
mass of profits, however, both studies are, in effect, 
leading society backwards, perceiving the consequences 
of a falling rate of profit and the resulting attempts 
by individual capitalist enterprises to counteract 
the decline by cutting costs and applying competitive, 
advanced technology, as the basis of a different 
historical tendency exaceribated by monopoly capitalism,
P.M. Sweezy, in an earlier work, pointed out that 
monopoly does not in itself increase the total value 
produced by the labour force. Monopoly profits, 
in so far as they are higher than the average rate 
of profit, must, he deduced, be drawn from the incomes 
of other members of society.
"The extra profit is a deduction 
from the surplus value of other 
capitalists or it is a deduction 
from the wages of the working 
class." (37)
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Discussing the rate of profit, Sweezy suggests that 
Marx’s "law" assumes that the rate of exploitation, 
or of surplus value, remains constant while the organic 
composition of capital rises. (38) Now while Marx, 
in formally presenting his thesis of the falling rate 
of profit did, for expository reasons, simplify his 
model by assuming a constant rate of surplus value, 
he did not maintain that this need necessarily be the 
case in all empirical instances. He points out, for 
example, that "a rising rate of profit may correspond 
to a falling or rising rate of surplus value". (39)
What Marx did in fact contend was that the rate of surplus 
value would rise slower than the organic composition of 
capital, at a rate inadequate to offset the fall in the 
rate of profit. Nordhaus’s calculations, reproduced 
above, suggest that this has been the case in the United 
States during the post-war period.
While not denying the existence of the tendency 
identified by Marx, Sweezy suggests that theoretical 
consideration alone cannot resolve the issue of the 
"law" of falling profits. He speculates that monopoly 
will tend to depress the average rate of profit, but 
insists that a consideration of actual empirical 
movements in profitability is essential, the formula 
for the rate of profit being in itself indeterminate. (4o) 
In Monopoly Capital, however, Baron and Sweezy do not 
undertake such an analysis, being concerned instead with 
the dynamics of a growing mass of economic "surplus".
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Data such as that reported by Nordhaus for the United 
States indicates a falling rate of profit, a decline 
posing acute problems for the continuation of investment 
with prevailing rate of exploitation. Investment, that 
is to say, is threatened by a paucity rather than an 
over-abundance of profits in proportion to the mass of 
existent, functioning capital. The model of the state 
form characteristic of advanced capitalism as a potential, 
if inadequate, agency to productively dispose of excess 
profitability assumes, by contrast, that the characteristic 
crisis of capitalism is one of under consumption rather 
than under-production of profits. As such it is based 
on a misleading conception of the dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation.
The thesis of the "permanent arms economy", by 
contrast to the Gillman—Baran and Sweezy theory of 
uninvestable surplus, offers and analysis of advanced 
capitalism which suggests that certain changes in its 
economic structure have guaranteed it a relative stability. 
Variants within this perspective differentially emphasize 
this dimension of stability, but their common assumptions 
allow us to consider them as different forms of a common 
thesis.
An early formulation of the "permanent arms economy" 
thesis was formulated by T. Cliff in 1957, although similar 
analyses had been made earlier, most notably by T. Vance in 
the American journal The New International. (4l)
Formative to the theory, however, were some elements of
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Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis of militarism and its implications 
for extended capital accumulation, Luxemburg’s analysis 
of capitalism, presented in The Accumulation of Capital (42), 
purported to demonstrate that there are economic limits 
to that system’s historical development beyond which its 
collapse would follow inevitably, "as an objective historical 
necessity". Luxemburg’s analysis did not in fact anticipate 
such a collapse, the seizure of power by the organized 
working class being decisive in her projection of actual 
capitalist development, (43) Abstracting political 
factors from the course of capitalist development, however, 
her prediction of economic breakdown rested on the assumption 
that accumulation requires access to both the markets and 
raw materials of a non—capitalist environment, while at the 
same time its imperialistic expansion undermines that 
relationship by progressively incorporating périmerai 
areas into the capitalist system. (44) This Luxemburg saw 
to be the mechanism whereby capitalism, abstracted from 
the political consequences of the class struggle, historically 
becomes its own grave-digger.
Luxemburg, conceived militarism to be an, albeit 
short term, counteracting influence to capitalism’s 
development toward breakdown. She attempted to outline 
militarism’s function in capitalist history, pointing to its 
decisive role in the process of primary accumulation as 
a means to conquer the New World and India, its later use 
to enforce the subjection of colonies, and its use as a 
weapon in the competitive struggle between capitalist
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countries for areas of non—capitalist civilization.
For Luxemburg, in other words, militarism is crucial 
to the imperialist stage of capitalism. She further 
suggests :
"In addition, militarism has yet 
another important function. From 
the purely economic point of view, 
it is a pre-eminent means for the 
realisation of surplus value; it 
is in itself a province of 
accumulation." (45)
Aims production, Luxemburg continued, is financed 
mainly from taxes which, falling mainly on the industrial 
working class and the peasantry, reduce their real 
purchasing power and thus constitute a mechanism of 
"forced saving". (46) In this way militarism serves 
as a means to realise surplus value or profits over and 
above the capacity of the unaided capitalist market, at 
the same time promoting accumulation by lowering the 
share of the aggregate social product accruing to labour. 
The problems of accumulation and surplus absorption thus, 
for Luxemburg, find a temporary solution in the form of 
armaments production.
T. Cliff’s early and seminal work on the "permanent 
war economy" (47) incorporates a similar interpretation 
of the boost to accumulation deriving from military 
expenditure. The permanent war economy, he suggests, 
stabilizes over-producing capitalism, since the new
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state demand for armcunents and related products, together 
with the increased purchasing power of those employed 
in armaments industries, provides "greater openings for 
capital investment". (48)
The "permanent arms economy" thesis is not, however, 
essentially a theory of state expenditure as such. Thus 
a sympathetic reviewer of M. Kidron’s Western Capitalism 
Since the War, the most elaborated version of this ' 
theory to date, points out that the growth of state planning 
and management "has lost much of its plausibility" and 
that these forms of interventionism "are probably, on 
balance, a destabilising factor for the Western economy 
as a whole. (49) Kidron himself, moreover, suggests 
that too much productive expenditure by the state would 
on the one hand constitute an invasion of the individual 
capitalist’s preserve and as such would be opposed by 
him, and on the other lead to a rise in the organic 
composition of capital, eventually lowering the average 
rate of profit to a level incompatible with further 
accumulation. (50)
The question of the relation between arms expenditure 
and accumulation will be central to our critique of Kidron*s 
thesis. The immediate point, however, is that in Kidron*s 
model actual state expenditure on armaments is not the 
crucial factor. Rather, its importance lies in the function 
of that expenditure within the economic processes which 
determine the rate of profit within the economy as a whole.
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Nevertheless, arms production clearly relates to and, 
in its present form, assumes and is unconceivable 
without the political and economic structure of the 
specifically capitalist state, the state having a 
monopoly of legitimate coercive power within its 
"own" territory. For this reason we are including it 
alongside our discussion of the under consumptionist 
model of the state, the theory of the state implied 
by the permanent arms economy thesis resting on a 
"special" conception of surplus absorption.
Kidron, as indicated, has formulated the most 
elaborate version of tjie permanent arms economy theory. 
His initial problematic is the pattern of relative 
stability in post-1945 Western capitalism.
"The loop itself needs to be
explained. In the thirties it was
one of unemployraent-stagnation-
instability; now it is one of
high employraent-growth-stability." (51)
Central to Kidron*s explanation of this changed pattern 
of capitalist development is the contention that arms 
production both reduces unemployment and creates outlets 
for investment, thus constituting a stabilizing force 
in the economy. The other side of this stability, 
however, is the increasingly anarchic relations between 
capitalist nations.
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"The distinction grows sharper between 
the national economy in which competition 
is heteronomous, one method of attaining 
goals set by international competition, 
and the international economy where 
primordial competition still holds." (52)
Kidron sees the consequence to be an international 
scenario of "Oligopolistic competition between whole 
economies." Within individual national capitalist 
economies, however, the pattern to be accounted for 
is one of relative stability and relatively even growth.
The section of Kidron*s study devoted to "Explanations" 
describes the growth of the state sector as an essentially 
ad hoc response to a series of short-term problems. (53) 
After the Second World War the first task for Western 
Europe was to restore the conditions of general disruption 
and devastation. Especially important was the modernization 
of the basic transport and energy services on which 
economic recovery depended. The need to coordinate 
these services on a national basis provided the impulse 
for the first post-war wave of nationalizations.
Other factors mentioned by Kidron include the enactment 
of welfare legislation to stem the 1eft-ward tide of 
popular opinion and the requirements for planning in the 
ever-larger private enterprises. Kidron*s principal 
thesis, however, concerns the stabilizing effects of 
specifically military production. To quote ;
mm 76 —
"The impact of arms expenditure on 
stability and investment is no less 
direct. It is heavily concentrated 
in the capital goods industries which 
are responsible for the big savings 
in the traditional business cycle.
It provides a floor to the downswings 
and hasi in the U.S., been deliberately 
used in this way." (54)
Kidron*s explanation of the perceived relation 
between arms expenditure and economic stability centres 
on what terms "leaks" in the process of capitalist 
production. The output of military spending, he suggests, 
consists of luxury goods which contribute neither to 
the expansion of the means of production nor the means 
of consumption and which consequently do not affect 
the rate of profit. Kidron cites the work of von 
Bortkiewiez and Straff a, purporting to show that the 
capital-labour ratio in such sectors of the economy 
plays no part in determining the rate of profit and, 
more generally, the workings of the system as a whole. 
Uncritically reporting these contentions, he summarizes
"Seen from the angle of the system, 
that is of pure theory, arms production 
is the key, and seemingly permanent, 
offset to the * tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall?" (55)
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Essentially the same thesis has been formulated in 
a different context by P.M. Sweezy. If, Sweezy 
suggests, the organic composition of capital in 
Department Three (luxury goods for consumption) 
rise", while it remains constant in the other sectors 
of the economy "the rate of profit remains unaffected". (5 6 ) 
Commodities effectively pass out from the production 
process do not, that is to say, influence the average 
rate of profit.
A systematic analysis of the relation between 
luxury goods production and accumulation, and it s 
implications for profitability and thus extended 
accumulation is, however, missing from this account.
This problematic is, we will suggest, crucial to the 
validity of Kidron*s analysis of contemporary 
capitalism, as it is to the earlier formulations of 
Luxemburg and Cliff.
In the first place, Luxemburg’s analysis of 
militarism, as we have seen, depicted arms production 
as a province of accumulation, finaneedly "forced 
savings" imposed on the working class mainly through 
the mechanism of taxation. Now accumulation, from the 
Marxist perspective which Luxemburg and the later 
"permanent arms economy" theorists purport to adopt, 
is the process whereby surplus value generated in 
specifically capitalist production is "realized" in 
the form of capital which functions for further rounds 
of production* (57) In the case of armaments, 
however, their particular qualities as use-values, 
or objects of utility, prevent their reconversion into 
capital except in cases where they are sold to overseas 
buyers as commodities. In such circumstances the
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purchaser exchanges them for value in its money 
from which, unlike that of the domestic state, 
does not constitute a deduction from the profitability 
of the particular national capital, although it 
continues to imply a destruction of values within 
capitalism as a global system. Luxemburg's twin- 
proposition that militarism is both a field of 
accumulation and financed primarily by taxation 
obscures the "drain" on surplus-value that the purchase 
of arms by the domestic state entails. Taxation for 
military spending may, as Luxemburg implies, serve 
in empirical instances, to lower the costs of the 
reproduction of labour-power, or its value, and 
thus increase the rate of profit. Nevertheless, 
whether its proximate source is a deduction from 
working class wages or from profits, the channeling 
of surplus-value into armaments where, with the 
exception mentioned, the output is unusable for further 
rounds of production within a national capital 
formation, represents a check to the process of extended 
accumulation. To designate militarism as a province 
of accumulation, in other words, is misleading if its 
implications for the prospects of continuing extended 
accumulation are not taken into account.
Kidron*s basically two—factor schema contends 
that if the organic composition of capital can be 
kept at a relatively low rate of increase by not 
investing productively, that is by not realizing 
surplus-value as capital, the fall in the rate of
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profit will be correspondingly slowed down. Extended 
accumulation, however, is conditional precisely upon 
an adequate level of productive investment, in so 
far as it accompanies and is dependent on the growing 
social productivity of labour. As Marx points out
"With the development of the capitalist 
mode of production.... the rate of 
profit falls while its mass increases 
with the f^rowing mass of the capital 
employed. (my emphasis - D.B.)." (58)
With insufficient productive investment, on the other hand, 
the result will be a downward pressure on the rising 
mass of profits, eventually finding expression in 
stagnating capital accumulation. As Mattick points 
out, "A non-accumulating capital....is a capital in 
crisis." (5 9 ) It is only through the expansion of 
capital that market demand, which may be sustained in 
the short-or medium-term through state arms purchases, 
suffices for the realization of profits made in 
production. If profitability is not to suffer, arms 
production, when orientated toward the domestic market, 
requires a proportionate increase of relative surplus 
value, derived from technical developments which reduce 
necessary labour time, or that time required for the 
worker to produce the value—equivalent of his own 
existence, within the capitalist economy as a whole. 
Consequently, to offset the brake imposed on accumulation 
imposed by arms production the rate of surplus value 
must be raised, primarily through the extraction of 
relative-surplus-value, thus raising the technical and
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at the same time the organic compositions of capital 
and further encroaching on the rate of profit, the 
regulator of accumulation* (6o)
The relationship between state armaments expenditure 
and accumulation that we have outlined assumes a particular 
interpretation of the categories of productive and 
unproductive labour. In Capital Marx used two dimensions 
of the category productive labour, the exchange of labour 
against capital and the assumed resulting augmenting 
of capital, interchangeably. Thus he wrote :
"The worker does not produce 
for himself, but for capital.
No longer, therefore, does it 
suffice that he should simply 
produce. He must produce surplus 
value. Only that worker is now 
’productive* who produces surplus 
value for the capitalist., and thus 
promotes the self—expansion of 
capital." (6 1 )
Marx thus noted the distinction between the two criteria 
but, as Kidron points out (6 2 ) did not feel it 
necessary to expand on it and incorporate it into the 
corpus of his work. When, however, substantial sectors 
of the labour force are employed in such a way that the 
surplus-value they produce does not augment total social 
capital through absorption into further accumulation, the 
distinction becomes crucial.
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I# Gough has suggested that the second criterion, 
the production of values which are materially incorporated 
into further rounds of reproduction^is "un-Marxist" in 
so far as it relates to the use-value aspect of commodities. 
(6 3 ) When considering the process of extended reproduction 
in advanced capitalism, however, this aspect of production 
becomes especially relevant. Extended reproduction 
requires that an adequate portion of surplu».value is 
realized as capital to more than maintain the total mass 
of existant capital. Consequently the formal criterion 
of the production of surplus—value alone is inadequate 
for a definition of productive labour in relation to total 
social capital. As P. Bullock has observed :
"To determine which concrete labour 
is productive or not requires fore-most 
that the analysis of total social 
capital and the consideration of the 
effects of the bodily forms of the 
products in the reproduction process." (64)
The criteria of productive labour in relation to 
extended accumulation for total social capital must, 
consequently, go beyond what Marx in the Theories of 
Surplus Value, drawing from Adam Smith, designates it’s 
"correct" definition.
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"Productive labour, in its meaning for 
capitalist production, is wage-labour 
which, exchanged against the variable 
patti of capital (the part of capital 
that is spent on wages), reproduces not 
only this part of the capital (or the 
value of its own labour-power), but in
addition produces suirplus-value for the
capitalist." (6 5 )
As against productive labour, which is exchanged against 
capital and produces surplus-value for the capitalist,
Marx specifies unproductive labour to be that exchanged 
directly with revenue, that is with wages or profit. (66) 
This interpretation, however, considers the relations 
between capital and labour in an atomized way, in so far 
as particular capital-labour transactions are not located
in the movement of social capital as a whole. It is,
essentially ahistorical, glimpsing a single moment of 
the total process of reproduction, that of the 
exploitative transaction at the point of production.
Marx was well aware that the production of luxury 
goods for consumption, neither augmenting constant 
capital nor contributing to the reproduction of labour- 
power, does affect the overall rate of profit. Specifically, 
he points out that it "enters into the equalisation process 
of the general profit rate." (6?) When Marx was writing
the scale of such production did not constitute an 
empirical challenge to Marx’s effective merger of the 
two criteria for productive labour. The large unproductive.
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in terms of the self—expansion of capital, sector 
that exists in the contemporary developed capitalist 
society necessitates the distinction, however.
The fully elaborated definition of productive labour 
which accounts for luxury goods production, such as that 
on armaments, has been formulated by J.M. Gillman as 
follows :
"To be productive......a worker,
must (a) produce surplus value
in the course of (b) transforming
labour-power and material
capital into material commodities
and productive services which
(c) can enter into a new cycle
of production of the means of
production or means of consumption. " (68)
Only the incorporation of the material end of 
commodities into a definition of productive labour, 
as in Gillman*s formulation, is adequate for an 
analysis of armaments production. Kidron, by contrast, 
while recognizing that the products pass out of the 
reproduction cycle, ignores the consequences of that 
destruction of value for the process of accumulation 
as a whole.
Now while clarification of the concept "productive 
labour" is essential for a general evaluation of the 
nature of armaments production in capitalist society, 
the actual form of its economic effects requires a 
consideration of the money-form of capital, an aspect 
of the circulation of capital that highlights Kidron*s . 
failure to relate luxury goods production to the cycle 
of extended accumulation. (6 9 ) The primary function 
of money within the capitalist economy is to serve
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as "a general equivalent among commodities at 
large#" (70) Only when one commodity is set apart
from commodities in general is it possible to equate 
their values, determined by the average socially 
necessary labour-time required to produce them, this 
process of comparison being a necessary process in 
the regulation of production and commerce in exchange- 
based societies. In The Grundrisse Marx identifies 
the four principal properties of money as measure of 
commodity exchange, medium of exchange, representative 
of commodities, and general commodity alongside 
particular commodities. All these properties, he adds 
"follow simply from its character as exchange value 
separated from commodities themselves and objectified." 
(7 1 ) Money, that is to say, is exchange value in 
its highest form, materially separated from the objects 
of utility or use-values that it mediates in exchange. 
In principle exchangeable for any commodity or human 
skill, Marx observes in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manus c rip t s that
"it therefore serves to exchange 
every property for every other, even 
contradictory, property and object; 
it is the fraternization of impossibilities. 
It makes contradictions embrace." (72)
The exchange of commodities that is essential to a 
society with a developed division of labour is 
inseparable from the objectification of value in the 
money form.
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Money, the consummate form of exchange value in 
commodity society, constitutes, that is to say, the 
objective form of the social characteristics of 
labour, "the alienated ability of mankind". (73)
Its quality of objectified labour-time is shared with 
all commodities. Money's distinguishing property, 
however, is its physical disembodimnht from the 
use-values that it mediates in exchange. The general 
measure of value, of "abstract" or general labour 
power, it is the necessary condition of the circulation 
of commodities. The circulation of commodities, in 
turn, is a necessary condition of capitalist production, 
The capitalist exchanges money for commodities (M-C) 
on the commodity—and labour-market. Having transformed 
them in the process of production (P) into a commodity 
of higher value than that of the original elements, 
he returns to the market to sell or exchange the new 
commodity for an increased sum of money with which to 
resume the process on an extended scale (C *-M*).
The whole process, represented by the formula M-C... 
P...C*—M* (74) is thus mediated by the money-form 
of capital at every stage of exchange. Without such 
a mechanism of exchange commodity production and 
circulation would be impossible.
Now as Kidron points out, the increase in 
armaments expenditure constitutes "a permanent 
unproductive capital drain from the system". Its 
end-products, that is to say, are not reconstituted 
in the production process. Nevertheless, they are 
produced for profits by the individual capitalist 
enterprises involved:^ and as such represent claims
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on the surplus-value produced by total social capital.
This applies to armaments as to all sectors vdiich produce 
luxury or, from the viewpoint of the production system, 
"waste" goods. The corollary of the expansion of such 
unproductive labour as a proportion of total social 
productivity has been the depreciation of the value 
of money, or monetary inflation. In particular, state 
expenditure on armaments, whether financed by taxation 
or by the increased printing of nominal money, entails, 
through sustaining unproductive enterprise, a deduction 
from the total mass of surplus—value derived from 
productive labour. The costs of armaments production 
are consequently distributed over society in the form of 
increasing prices, the expression of an excess of claims 
to profits in relation to realized surplus value.
We are not, of course, suggesting that the state is 
the only source of inflation in capitalist society.
Rather, the scale of unproductive expenditure that is to 
a large extent sustained by the state creates the structural 
conditions within which permanent inflation, the divergence 
of prices from values with the depreciation of money, 
becomes, without a corresponding rise in the rate of 
surplus—value, unavoidable. labile Kidron identifies 
military spending as one among a number of sources of 
inflation, he does not attempt to incorporate this almost 
incidental recognition of monetary depreciation into 
an analysis of capital accumulation and reproduction.
Instead he is particularly concerned with the price-fixing 
tactics of the large capitalist enterprises. (75) What 
is missing in Kidron*s account is an explanation of how 
the inflationary bias derives from the workings of the
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capitalist system. In addition to the tendency for 
the rate of profit to fall with the progressively 
diminishing role of labour power, the source of all 
new value, in the production process, an excess of 
"fictitious" claims to capital builds up in relation 
to the amount of surplus-value produced by specifically 
"productive" labour-power, monetary inflation being 
a persistent expression of this essentially social 
disproportion. Corporate price-fixing and other 
rationalizing tactics pursued through 'the economy of 
the plant" (78), practices discussed at considerable 
length, as we have seen, by Baran and Sweezy, in the main 
represent a response to pressured profits, which in 
turn derive from long-term tendencies in the movement 
of total social capital. Kidron*s empiricist account 
of inflationary corporate price-fixing, in summary, is 
inseparable from his failure to systematically relate 
the growth of unproductive expenditure, in particular 
that on armaments, to its effects on total social 
profitability and, through that, to the implications 
of increasing luxury goods production for future 
ac cumul a t i on •
Elsewhere Kidron explicitly attempts to relate 
his thesis of the "permanent arras economy to that of the 
falling rate of profit. In World Crisis, for example, 
he presents the outlines of the theory of the falling 
rate of profit and then examines, from a historical 
viewpoint, various "leaks" from the hypothetical "closed" 
capitalist system, leaks which have served to counteract
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the decline in profitability and moderate otherwise 
severe slumps. For the 30 or kO years prior to the 
1914-18 war, he suggests, imperialism constituted such 
a lealc. Since most overseas investment entailed further 
accumulation, however, thus renewing the need to "drain 
away" capital, it could only offset the rising organic 
composition of capital for a limited time. Specifically, 
Kidron contends that arms production replaced imperialism 
as the dominant means of offsetting the falling rate of 
profit.
"The drain provided by arms budgets since 
World War Two has constituted a far more 
effective mechanism for stabilising the 
system than classical imperialism ever 
could, for it has involved a sytematic 
destruction of values, not a relocation 
of their use, and it has acted in 
integrating the system far more effectively 
than any form of expenditure." (77)
This formal coupling of the "lealc" thesis with that of the
falling rate of profit does nothing, however, to resolve 
the central problematic of Kidron*s work, the contention 
that arms production constitutes a sector of luxury
goods production which, while providing a means for the
destruction of values, does not affect the rate of profit. 
An excess of claims to profits resulting from luxury 
goods production, again, represents an effective tax on 
total social profitability, a tax with clear implications 
for total social capital.
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If the "permanent arms economy" thesis did provide 
a correct theoretical explanation of the relative post­
war stability of Western capitalism, we would expect a 
rapid cut-back in arms expenditure in any national 
economy to be reflected in a re-ermengence of the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. An ideal test 
case is Britain in the years immediately following the 
Second World War, when total defence expenditure fell 
from around 40 per cent to about 20 per cent of total 
national spending. The early 1950 *s did not show the 
decline in profitability that the theory would predict, 
however. During 1950-54 the post-tax rate of profit for 
industrial and commercial countries was 6—7 per cent, 
rising to 7#0 per cent by 1955-9♦ substantially higher 
than that for the years of chronic decline from the 
mid-1960*s onward. (7&) Throughout the capitalist 
world as a whole, moreover, there is a lack of correlation 
between the decline in profits during the 1 9 6 0 *s and the 
military cut-backs that occured in the previous decade.
(79) By purely empirical criteria, that is to say,
Kidron*s abstraction of armaments expenditure from its 
implications for the profitability of total social 
capital does not correspond to the post-war capitalist 
experience.
Equally abstracted is Kidron*s account of the relation 
between aims production and the realm of international 
politics. Arms expenditure, for Kidron, while guaranteeing 
relative stability within particular national economies,
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at the same time exacerbates a competitive international 
arms race through a domino effect. (80) The anarchic 
international tendencies associated with specifically 
military production, that is to say, are deduced from 
its domestically stabilizing effects. Post-war re-armaments 
is, however, inseparable from the international context 
of the Cold War, a global confrontation of rival political 
systems. Kidron goes so far as to suggest that "the 
initial plunge into a permanent arms economy was random". 
(8 1 ) Historically, however, the heavy concentration 
on arms production in the capitalist world developed from 
the competitive build-up to the 1939—45 War, and in the 
ensuing period was sustained by the challenge of the 
non-capitalist bloc, in particular the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern European countries'. With the development of 
the Cold War, as S. Pollard has pointed out, "the 
economic prosperity of the West suddenly acquired 
strategic significance for the U.S.A." The response 
of the United States was Marshall Aid. The aid programme 
tapered off during the early 1950*s but by then, as 
Pollard notes, "had fulfilled its main function of carrying 
Europe over its critical deficit years." (82)
The process by which Kidron obscures the political 
context and source of the "permanent arms economy" is 
parallel to his abstraction of luxury goods expenditure 
from its consequences for profitability and accumulation. 
The stability he postulates is tenuous in the extreme, 
based on an erroneous conception of the relation between 
unproductive expenditure, the state, and accumulation. 
Kidron perceives the permanent
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arms economy to be vulnerable, but for reasons not 
associated with the problems it poses for accumulation. 
In addition to exacerbating the anarchic international 
relations between capitalist countries, he suggests 
that its stability is challenged by domestic class 
struggle. Kidron points to the post-war tendency 
for strikes to become increasingly removed from the 
institutional patterns of traditional trade union 
practice, a tendency finding expression in workers* 
"drive to control" as epitomized by the growth of 
.workplace committees. The contention that such 
developments constitute a challenge to the capitalist 
system rest on Kidron*s assumption that "mass reformism 
of this sort is liable to be suffused with revolutionary 
purpose". (8 3 ) A more or less autonomous political 
voluntarism, detached from the conditions and problems 
of capital accumulation thus becomes, for Kidron, the 
agency of the abolition of capitalism. We are not 
positing as against Kidron a mechanical relationship 
between developments in the productive infrastructure 
and the emergence of the type of "revolutionary 
purpose" of which he speaks. Nevertheless, conditions 
of capitalist expansion and relativxe prosperity are 
clearly less conducive to the development of overtly 
revolutionary, or even, militant economistifraovements 
than those of economic stagnation or contraction.
In post-war Britain, the intensification of the 
economistic struggle over wages and conditions developed 
rapidly during the mid-1960*s, when real wage and 
salary incomes began to stagnate in a context of
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declining profitability. (84) While the pattern 
of class relations at any given time cannot be simply 
and mechanistically reduced to developments in the 
economic sphere, it would be equally misleading 
to abstract them from prevailing trends in profitability 
and accumulation, and the perception of them and their 
effects on living standards by social actors. This, 
however, is the logic of Kidron*s observations on the 
transition from reformism to revolutionary aspiration 
in post-war capitalism.
Kidron himself, in summary, recognizes the growth 
of the unproductive sector in developed capitalist 
society. Thus, in Waste U.S. 1970 he writes :
"Millions of workers employed 
directly by capital produce goods 
and services which it cannot use for 
further expansion under any conceivable 
circumstances." (8 5 )
Armaments manufacture constitutes precisely such a 
sector in the capitalist economy. Kidron*s thesis 
that arms production offsets the falling rate of profit 
by providing a "leak" for surplus capital, the "productive" 
employment of which would engender a rise in the organic 
composition of capital, is misconceived however. Rather, 
through producing excess claims for profits, while at 
the same time undermining the process of accumulation, 
the condition and mechanism of the generation of those 
profits, it compounds and intensifies the structural 
difficulties of a capitalism already pressured by a
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rising organic composition of capital# The destruction 
of values that it entails, that is to say, cannot be 
separated from its effects on profitability, the 
dominant form of which in the first three decades of 
the post-war period has been inflation. The particular 
form of state—sustained demand examined by the "permanent 
arms economy" thesis, in other words, is primarily 
a force toward instability rather than stability.
Both the analyses of Giliman and Baran and Sweezy 
and the thesis of the "permanent arms economy" imply 
a model of the advanced capitalist state emphasizing
its function as a means by which an otherwise uninvestable 
or destabilizing surplis, a surplus of productive capital 
in the latter case, is disposed. For Baran and Sweezy 
the major problem of monopoly capitalism is a lack of 
investment outlets for the rising mass of economic 
"surplus". Gillman, identifying the source of capitalism’s 
tendency toward stagnation in a surplus of capital in 
the form of investment funds, reaches similar conclusions. 
Kidron’s analysis, more "optimistic" from the point of 
view of capital, sees largely state—sustained unproductive 
expenditure on luxury goods, and particularly on armaments, 
to be a factor adequately offsetting the rise in the 
organic composition of capital as a whole.
Both the Baran and Sweezy-Gillman and the Kidron 
theses, however, effectively abstract their analyses 
from the reproduction of total social capital. Baran 
and Sweezy, like Gillman, account for tactics such as
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price-cutting and the increasing corporate emphasis 
on economy of scale and the "rational" production of 
profits in terms of the internal structure and external 
opportunities of the monopolistic corporation itself, 
rather than of the problems associated with profitability 
and therefore accumulation which impose such a response 
on individual capital units* Kidron, on the other hand, 
overlooks or misconstrues the implications of an 
increasingly large sector of unproductive expenditure 
for total social profitability*
Although they evaluate the likelihood of a viable 
resultant economic stability differentially, both theses 
are primarily concerned with the state as a social organ 
which can raise "effective demand" in an attempt to 
overcome the tendency toward economic stagnation on the 
one hand and that for the rate of profit to fall on the 
other* This interpretation of state interventionism, 
together with the common abstraction of these practices 
from the actual cycle of capital reproduction, undermines 
their respective attempts to formulate a consistent 
and systematic theory of state economic policy in 
late capitalism. To present the outlines of such 
a theory was our concern in assessing Poulantzas* 
analysis of the capitalist state. The model formulated 
there will be applied in our analysis of the political 
economy of Britain in the post-war period.
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IV RALPH MILIBAND AND MARXISM.
Ralph Miliband is a well-established figure in 
the field of socialist scholarship. (1) His 
reputation alone demands that his recent work The 
State in Capitalist Society receives the serious 
attention of anyone with an interest in this area.
What Miliband attempts in this book is an examination 
of "the nature and role of the state in what are often 
referred to as ’advanced capitalist societies’". (2)
The social significance of the state, he observes, 
is now greater than ever before. Yet at the same time, 
by a "remarkable paradox", it has become "unfashionable" 
as a subject of political analysis. Miliband*s intention 
is to challenge theories such as those of "elites", 
"counterveiling power", and especially "democratic" 
pluralism", which maintains that power in contemporary 
Western societies is competitive, fragmented and diffuse. 
Against these ideaologies he poses "the challenge of 
Marxism". (3) Apart from Greunsci, however, he suggests 
that Marxists since Lenin have for the most part been 
content to repeat the formulae of the classic Marxist 
revolutionary works, without a consideration of the 
concrete reality of present-day capitalist societies.
"The State in Capitalist Society" is an attempt to 
contribute to the study of this particular area.
Miliband sets out to analyse the state structure 
of societies which, in his own words, lend themselves
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to "a general political sociology o f advanced capitalism." 
(4) He seeks to demonstrate that the agents of private 
economic power are also the holders of state power and 
thus constitute "an authentic ruling class". In order 
to do this Miliband considers questions such as the 
relationship between elites and classes, the purpose and 
role of governments, and the process of the legitimation 
of class rule.
Miliband discusses developments in the capitalist 
world including the emergence of giant, trans-national 
corporations and the growth of the public sector. Then, 
drawing from recent empirical studies of the distribution 
of wealth and property, the class bias in educational 
opportunity and the process of elite recruitment, he 
concludes that while advanced capitalist societies 
are characterized by the existence of a plurality of 
economic elites, these elites constitute a hegemonic bloc,
"a dominant economic class, 
possessed of a high degree of 
cohesion and solidarity, with 
common interests and common 
purposes which far transcend 
their specific differences and 
disagreements." (5)
Having empirically established the existence of a 
dominant economic class Miliband poses the question of 
whether or not this class exercises a decisive degree 
of political power. Initially he proposes that the
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state is not a concrete "thing", but rather a system 
of interacting institutions on behalf of which the 
government speaks. Examining the various elements of 
the state system Miliband identifies the political
process of economic management, the administrative !
and coercive elements responsible for the "management 
of violence", and the formally independent judiciary. |
In addition he mentions the Churches and mass media 
which, while aspects of the political system, are not 
actually the repositories of state power. The state 
elite, he observes, is, in relation to such institutions,
"a distinct and separate entity." (6)
Presenting empirical evidence from a number of 
capitalist countries, including Britain, the United 
States, Germany and Sweden, Miliband concludes that 
in terms of social origin, education and class situation 
the key command positions in these societies have been, 
in the main, filled by members of the property-owning 
and professional middle classes.
"Iniian epoch when so much is 
made of democracy, equality, social 
mobility, classlessness and the 
rest, it has remained a basic fact 
of life in advanced capitalist 
countries that the vast majority 
of men and women in these countries 
has been governed, represented, 
administered, judged and commanded 
in war by people draim from other,
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economically and socially 
superior and relatively distant 
classes." (7)
Miliband*s next section, "The Purpose and Role 
of Governments", seeks to explain the political 
dominance of the privileged economic classes. His 
answer is that political office-holders in capitalist 
societies never question the basic principles of 
free-enterprise and private ownership. They share a 
common "mode of perception" which, despite differences 
on minor issues, accepts the legitimacy of the 
capitalist system. Miliband exposes the reformist 
nature of the mass social-democratic parties by 
describing their class-collaborationist policies 
and practices in coalition governments, in the defence 
of capitalist property relations during the unsettled 
years after the I$l4-l8 War, and their characteristic 
moderation when elected to power with a clear majority, 
as in Britain after 1945. Even nominally socialist 
parties, in other words, have supported and even 
promoted the capitalist system when electorally placed 
in positions of political power. (8)
Other sectors of the state system, particularly the 
civil service, the military and the judiciary, are 
discussed by Miliband, and they serve to reinforce his 
contention that the possessors of private economic 
power are, on examination, also the holders of political
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power. In addition, two chapters are devoted to the 
legitimatism of capitalist rule, the process whereby 
unequal ideological competition reinforces the preservation 
of the status quo. Churches, the mass media, "safe" 
academic debate, and the particular ideology of 
nationalism are singled out for consideration. A 
composite picture emerges of pervasive political 
inequality in a context of ever-increasingly concentrated 
economic power, both legitimized by a complex of 
dominant ideologies and idealogical institutions.
Unequal economic power "produces political inequality 
on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the 
constitution may say". (9)
An assessment of Miliband*s analysis entails 
answering two distinct but related questions. Firstly, 
how successful is it as a theoretical reconstruction 
of the state structures in advanced capitalist society? 
Secondly, what method does the author use to arrive at 
the model he presents? If the method is found to be 
faulty or one-sided it may be expected that the conclusions 
will, on at least some points, represent an idealogical 
distortion of the social reality for which it purports 
to account. Our view is that Miliband fails to identify 
the dominant and characteristic features of advanced 
capitalist society and structure his analysis of the 
state on the basis of them. His thesis assumes the 
form of sociological and political description,
"political sociology" in Miliband*s own terms. It is.
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first and foremost, an empirical account of the visible 
structures and Institutions that perform state functions 
in contemporary capitalist societies. What theoretical 
analysis there is in The State in Capitalist Society 
displays, for the most part, the very formality and 
lack of originality for which Miliband criticizes 
post-Lenin Marxism. Above all, lacking a systematic 
theoretical overview from which to assess the weatlh of 
empirical material he reports, Miliband*s failure to 
relate his often formally correct impressions to the 
concrete, historically-specific conditions of contemporary 
capitalism results in a persistent tendency to overlook 
the actual significance of the processes and developments 
which he describes. We will examine particular examples 
of Miliband*s analysis of political structure and process^ 
but will stress at the outset that they all derive from 
an effective dislocation of the political sphere from the 
structural system of class relations in the particular 
conditions of late capitalism. Behind this essentially 
ahistorical and formalistic analysis stands the descriptive 
methodology that Miliband adopts,
Miliband, it will be noted, claims in the introductory 
pages of The State in Capitalist Society that his study 
is a contribution to the development of "Marxist political 
analysis". (10) Throughout this book, however, he 
persistently avoids even implicitly relating his political 
characterization of contemporary Western society to the 
basic Marxist categories for the analysis of capitalism 
in any but the most formal and general way. Miliband
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observes that advanced capitalism is
"an atomised system which continues 
to be marked, which is in fact more 
than ever marked, by that supreme 
contradiction of which Marx spoke 
over a hundred years ago, namely 
the contradiction between its 
ever more social character
and its enduringly private purpose"’. (ll) 
Again he writes ;
"the industrial armies of advanced 
capitalism, who ever their employers 
may be, continue to function inside 
organisations whose patterns of 
authority they had no share of 
bringing into being, and to the 
determination of whose policies 
and purposes they have made no 
contribution." (12)
Now Marx, in studying and developing political 
economy, was concerned in the first place to provide 
a scientific examination of the laws which govern 
production and distribution under capitalism, its 
"law of motion". Also, and simultaneously, he 
demonstrated that these laws, the most basic being 
the law of value, were not in any way- accidental 
or fortuitous, but are bound up with and inseparable 
from the social relations of production in commodity, 
and in particular, capitalist society. In the course 
of his analysis Marx identified the underlying and
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characteristic contradiction of capitalist society 
to be that, restated by Miliband, between the social 
nature of the production process and the private or 
class-structured mode of ownership and appropriation.
Among the most important aspects of the development 
of capitalist society that Marx examined are the 
concentration and centralization of capital, the 
increasingly purposive application of scientific 
technique to production in an attempt to raise the 
rate of exploitation, the progressively more powerful 
and "alien" domination of social wealth over living 
labour, and, above all, the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall, which Marx termed "a mystery whose 
solution has been the goal of all political economy 
since Adam Smith". (13)
Later Marxists developed this method and perspective 
by applying it to the changing reality of capitalist 
society as new or intensified tendencies unfolded and 
threatened that system with crisis and disruption. Lenin, 
for example, examined imperialism, what he termed 
the "highest stage" of capitalism, in terms of the 
concentration of production through the growth of 
monopoly, the union of banking and industrial capital 
with the rise of finance capital, the export of 
capital, and the division of the world among the 
capitalist combines and great powers. (l4) Trotsky, 
assessing the likely course of development of European 
capitalism predicted, in 1 9 2 8 , that ;
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' "..the further inexorable pressure
of the United States will reduce 
capitalist Europe to constantly 
more limited rations in world 
economy; and this, of course, 
implies not a mitigation, but 
on the contrary, a monstrous 
sharpening of inter-state relations 
in Europe accompanied by furious 
paroxysms of military conflict, 
for states as well as classes 
fight even more fiercely for 
a meagre and a diminishing 
ration than for a lavish and 
growing one." (15)
This anticipation of inter-state military confrontations 
on the continent of Europe, that is to say, was based 
on an analysis of the global pattern of capitalist 
development, in particular the rise of the United States 
as the dominant power on the world market and its 
implications for the increasingly displaced European 
economies. 8 years later Trotsky was to characterize 
the "mission", or social and economic content of the 
fascist state from which arose in Europe as "The 
compulsory concentration of all forces and resources 
of the people in the interests of imperialism." (l6) 
Marxism, including its theory of the state in no sense 
is, nor ever has been, a finished model from which to
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deduce the detailed working-out of the forms of 
capitalist development* The historical specificity of 
its subject matter prohibits this. Rather, Marxism, 
in so far as it fulfills its promise, constitutes 
the scientific study of the process and forms of 
the socialization of man, through a succession of 
modes of production, the objective and historical 
nature of which is emphasized by Marx’s characterization 
of economic change as "a process of natural history." (17) 
Perhaps Marx's most memorable single political study.
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, examiner 
the re^gime of Louis Philippe in terras of and on the 
basis of its reliance on the French peasantry. The 
poverty, the low division of labour, the low level of 
technique among the peasantry, Marx observes, were 
the basis of the apparent independence of the Second 
Bonaparte's state form.
"In so far as there is merely a 
local interconnection among these 
small-holding peasants, and the 
identity of their interests begets 
no community, no national bond 
and no political organisation
among them...... they cannot
represent themselves, they 
must be represented." (l8)
Thoroughly materialist, Marxism locates human social 
practice within the context of all the accumulated,
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existent productive forces and relations of previous 
history. "Men make their own history.••••.but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past." (19) The corollary of 
this standpoint is that it is only in their historical 
perspective that the distinctive character of social 
institutions, processes and practices can be understood.
Miliband*s analysis of the capitalist state, by 
contrast, is formal, ahistorical and partial. While 
listing such untroversial developments as economic 
imperialism, the growth of trans—national corporations 
and the rise of the public sector, Miliband nowhere 
brings these impressions into perspective to produce 
a unified, coherent and theoretically adequate model 
of the development of capitalism and its state form, 
in particular since the Second World War. His minimal 
characterization of capitalist production relations is, 
if formally correct, no substitute for the analysis 
of the specific conditions and features of contemporary 
capitalism, which is inseparable from Marxism.
Miliband writes :
"The economic and political life 
of capitalist societies is primarily 
determined by the relationship, b o m  
of the capitalist mode of production, 
between these two classes - the class 
which on the one hand owns and controls, 
and the working class on the other.....
In fact, the political process in 
these societies is mainly about the 
confrontation of these forces, and 
is intended to sanction the terms of 
the relationship between them." (20) 
i
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In other words, the capital-labour relationship is the 
fundamental determining relation of capitalist society.
Neither from this in itself highly abstract formulation, 
nor from his other in the main descriptive observations 
concerning the production relations of advanced capitalism, 
however, can or does Miliband structure his analysis 
of the contemporary state to produce a theoretically 
consistent construct with real explanatory power.
Rather, his method of analysis is essentially positivistic, 
registering and recording impressions of particular 
state-systems, without viewing them as aspects or moments 
of the totality of social relations grounded in the 
specificity of concrete, historical conditions. Miliband*s 
political sociology and the fragments of Marxist theory 
to be found in The State in Capitalist Society are 
mechanically paired rather than organically developed.
The basis of N. Poulantzas* critique of Miliband*s 
analysis of the capitalist state is that the latter 
does not make explicit the epistemological assumptions 
ifith which he works, that his method of procedure is 
to develop "a direct reply to bourgeois ideologies by 
the immediate examination of concrete fact." (21)
His objection is that Miliband*s categories are 
reducible to a problematic of social actors, at the 
expense of an analysis of classes and state as objective 
structures. We would contend Poulantzas* characterization 
of Miliband* s object of analysis to be '^concrete fact j " t»otuever. 
Another review of The State in Capitalist Society, by 
Charles Marat, also intended to be a Marxist critique,
— Ill —
assesses it, despite its theoretical wealcness, to be 
"a valuable concrete book." (22) The concept concrete, 
however, has a specific meaning for Marxism, a meaning 
which is obscured by effectively assuming it to be 
identical with empiricist methodology, the more or 
less rigorous reproduction of the visible forms and 
properties of a particular object of enquiry. Lenin 
wrote :
"Every concrete thing, every 
concrete something, stands 
in multifarious and often 
contradictory relations to 
everything else, ergo it is 
itself and some other." (2 3 )
The concrete, that is to say, lies in and constitutes 
the essentially relational properties of any particular 
"thing", that is its organic connection to the complex 
of relations of which it is a part. Knowledge of this 
relational totality, moreover, is possible only through 
a systematic theoretical reconstitution of the entire 
complex as a whole.
"..we can never know the concrete
completely. The infinite sum of
general conceptions, laws, etc.,
gives the concrete in its completeness." (24)
The concrete is, in addition, dynamic or developmental, 
involving movement as well as relational existence.
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"Theoretical cognition ought to 
give the object in its necessity, 
in its all-sided relations, in 
its movement, an-und fur-sich." (2 5 )
For Lenin, that is to say, the concrete constitutes a 
relational complex or totality, cognitively graspable 
only through a systematic theoretical reconstitution 
of the whole, and inseparable from movement, change 
and development. Lenin further specified the validating 
criterion of cognition of the concrete to be human 
practice, the activity by which theoretical knowledge 
attains contact ivith immediate actuality. He observes
"The result of activity is the test 
of subjective cognition and the 
criterion of OBJECTIVITY WHICH 
TRULY IS (Lenin’s emphasis)" (26)
Lenin thus depicts the complete path of correct 
cognition in terms of the theoretical reconstitution 
of the data of perception, confirmed by practice in the 
objective world, practice which in itself acts upon 
and changes the external conditions of human activity.
"From living perception to abstract 
thought, AND FROM THIS TO PRACTICE, - 
such is the dialectical path of the 
condition of TRUTH, of the cognition 
of objective reality. (Lenin’s emphasis)" (2?)
The entire process, perceived as the unity of
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theory and practice, is developed by Lenin as a 
distinctive "theory of knowledge." (28) Within 
this process, however, a distinct conception of 
what constitutes the "concrete" may be identified.
That the depiction of the concrete as both relational 
and developmental, subject to movement, change and 
transformation, is not an idiosyncratic philosophical 
exercise on the part of Lenin alone isaffarcnt from 
an examination of virtually every page of, for example. 
Capital. To take just one example, having, in 
Volume 2 of that work, examined the forms of money — 
capital, commodity-capital and productive-capital,
Marx summarizes the relationship between the three 
corresponding circuits as follows :
"Capital as a whole, then, exists 
simultaneously, spatially side by 
side in its different phases. But 
every part passes constantly and 
successively from one phase, from 
one functional form, into the next 
and thus functions in all of them 
in turn. Its forms are hence fluid 
and their simultaneousness is 
brought about by their succession." (2 9 )
Capital, both in terms of class relations and the forms 
of capital, is thus dynamic and changftivg, "can be understood 
only as motion, not as a thing at rest." (30) Capital’s 
concrete features, that is to say, can be theoretically 
reconstituted only through an examination of the different
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fbrras it assumes in the various stages of circulation, a
process itself resting on the basic relation between capital
and labour# Relation and change, thus conceived, are the
basis of the Marxist conception of "the concrete"# They
are, for example, at the heart of the basic contradiction
of capital identified by Marx and, as we have seen,
restated by Miliband, between the increasing socialization
of production and the private form of ownership and appropriation •
Another way of formulating this contradiction is to counterpose
the relative relational unity of capital and labour within
the capitalist mode of production to their absolute antagonism,
derived from the historical potential for non-alienated
communal life, the realization of man’s "species-being",
that the development of the systematically exploitative
capitalist epoch, opens up#
Despite this, perhaps technical, objection to Poulantzas* 
characterization of Miliband’s methodology, however, we consider 
his criticism of Miliband’s often implicit problematic of 
social actors to be valid and constructive# Miliband, for 
example, considering the not infrequent subjective distance 
of political leaders from the world of business, accounts 
for the former’s accommodation to the latter in terms of 
essentially sooio-psychological factors# He writes :
"All this, however, is of no serious 
consequence, given a fundamental commitment 
to the system of which businessmen are an 
intrinsic part# Because of that commitment
 governments naturally seek to help
business - and businessmen*" (31)
— Il4q—
At the same time, however, we have already indicated 
how Poulantzas’ own analysis of the capitalist state is 
confused and misleading as a theoretical model# (32)
The main contention of our critique is that Miliband’s 
study, like that of Poulantzas and despite the fundamental 
differences between the two, touches the political economy 
of contemporary capitalism at best at a tangent# Specifically 
we are concerned with Miliband’s positivistic approach 
to political structure and his formal, abstracted use of 
Marxist theory# An unbridged caesura divides his political 
analysis from what examination of recent capitalist economic 
change he does undertake# The consequence of Miliband’s 
formalism in political economy and impressionism in his 
general discussion of economic and political power is that 
his exposition of the state is de-oontextualized and, at 
key points, arbitrary# We will examine some instances of 
the effectively ahistorical analysis that results from this 
orientation, in particular Miliband’s discussion of trade 
unions and international capitalist relations#
Writing in the late 1930’s, Trotsky identified the 
dominant contemporary feature of trade unions internationally 
to be ’’their drawing closely to and growing together with 
state power#’’ (33) He drew this conclusion from his 
analysis of the way in which trade unions, compelled to 
confront a centralized capitalist adversary intimately 
bound up with state power are, as reformist institutions, 
objectively forced to "cidapt themselves to the capitalist 
state and to contend for its co-operation,’’ even if this
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adaptation, takes the form of goal-specific confrontations 
in particular instances# More specifically, Marxists have 
been particularly concerned to examine the relatively 
privileged "aristocracy of labour" within the unions, as 
the effective agents of capital within the working class 
movement. Lenin in this way observed that imperialism in 
particular :
"creates the economic possibility of 
bribing the upper strata of the proletariat, 
and thereby fosters, gives form to, and 
strengthens opportunism." (34)
The general framework within specific aspects for developments 
within the trade unions have been analysed by Marxists, however, 
is to be found in Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? Counterposing
"spontaneous" to "revolutionary" consciousness, Lenin characterized 
trade-union concerns to be essentially bound up with the 
economistic struggle to improve the terms of the sale of labour- 
power within the framework of capitalist property relations. (35) 
Rejecting the possibility of "lending the economic struggle 
itself a political character," Lenin advanced the thesis, 
derived in essentials from the traditional Marxist view as 
presented in, for example, the Communist Manifesto (36) 
that the objective political interests of the working class 
can best be advanced by a trained revolutionary vanguard party 
trained in Marxism, "an organization of revolutionaries 
capable of maintaining the energy, stability and continuity 
of the revolutionary struggle." (37) At the same time Lenin 
emphasized the importance of "the active and widespread 
participation of the masses," without which the democratic 
centralist revolutionary vanguard would degenerate into a
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purely conspiratorial and isolated Blanquist organization#
The working class alone, Lenin believed, is able only to 
develop trade-union consciousness# Revolutionary consciousness, 
by contrast, is inconceivable without a training in Socialist 
theory, initially developed and elaborated by bourgeois 
intellectuals. The spontaneous development of the working 
class, in other words, leads to its subordination to 
bourgeois idealogy, to "the programme of the Credo", (38) 
and only socialist idealogy, propagted by a trained vanguard 
organization, can sytematically present the revolutionary 
alternative.
What Is To Be Done was not written primarily as a 
theory of idealogy as such, and Lenin does not explicitly 
account for the dominance of bourgeois ideology, as finding 
expression in trade union consciousness, in terms of the 
political economy of capitalist society. Nevertheless, his 
thesis is consistent with Marx’s analysis of coramodity-or 
exchange—society, in particular his conception of the 
"fetishism of commodities." By "commodity fetishism"
Marx meant the objective appearance of the social 
characteristics of labour. The proportions of labour-time 
expended on commodities appear to their producers only in 
the external form of the magnitude of their exchange value, 
determined by the average socially—necessary labour time 
required to produce them. The commodity form, Marx wrote ;
"mirrors for men the social character 
of their own labour, mirrors it as an 
objective character attaching to the 
labour products themselves, mirrors it
-  117 -
as a social natural property of these 
things* Consequently the social relation 
of the producers to the sum total of 
their own labour, presents itself to them 
as a social relation, not between themselves, 
but between the products of their labour*" (39)
Social relations, in other words, appear to the agents of 
production in the form of set characteristics of material 
objects, their products, emphasizing that this ’’appearance” 
is not merely an ideational phenomenon but is directly a 
consequence of the conditions of a mode of production in 
which production exercises mastery over, rather than being 
controlled by, man* Although, as we have indicated, Lenin 
does not make this explicit in What Is To Be Done, his 
conception of a vanguard party, trained to conduct the 
revolutionary struggle, an integral aspect of which is 
the dissolution of bourgeois ideology in the working 
class, derives its rationale from the fetishistic character 
of commodities* The consciousness required to orientate the 
working class toward the direction and goal of the abolition 
of capitalism’s specific forms of alienation and domination 
corresponds to a theoretical understanding totally distinct 
from the immediate sphere of fetishistic appearances, of 
which the everyday economistic pratices of economism are 
a direct, if militant, expression* The theoretically 
trained vanguard organization is the necessary bearer of 
this consciousness and its corresponding practices*
This conception of trade union consciousness as 
inherently reformist and subject, in the last analysis, to 
bourgeois id^logy, has been contested by many non-Marxist 
socialists, but perhaps the most vigorous and consistently 
argued case has been put forward by J.A. Banks* In a 
historical study of British industry. Banks draws attention
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to what he sees to be effectively anti-capitalist consequences 
of trade union opposition to private ownership. Citing the 
nationalization of industries such as coal and steel,
Banks contends that militant trade union pressure for 
public ownership, if not typically derived from a Marxist 
analysis of capitalist property relations, has resulted in 
"the pieoe-meal erosion of the capitalist system of exploitation."
(4 0)
This thesis, however, while correctly recognizing that 
trade union strength is an important factor in determining 
the direction of development in particular sectors of the 
capitalist economy and, in some cases, in the system as 
a whole, confuses on the one hand the consequences of union 
militancy for the conditions of the reproduction of labour- 
power, and on the other the continuing subjection of the 
mixed economy to the specific dictates.' and imperatives of 
the capitalist mode of production. We will examine in a 
later section how the structural domination of the profit 
motive has stood behind and imposed limits on the form taken 
by the changes that have taken place both in working class 
conditions and in the scale of the public sector in post-war 
Britain. (4I) The increasingly statified capitalist 
production, of which, the growth of the public sector is an 
important aspect, does not, as Banks implies, correspond to 
its erosion. While the powerful British trade union movement 
has been instrumental in adjusting certain specific aspects 
of the capital—labour relation, in particular the commitment 
to full employment, these changes have not in themselves 
served to undermine the exploitative character of that 
relationship itself. Profitability is still the structurally
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imposed dominant criterion of production for capital as a whole, 
the nationalization of unprofitable but vital sectors such 
coal being a necessary if costly condition of national economic 
life.
Now Miliband formally reiterates the Leninist analysis 
of the trade union labour aristocracy. His particular concern 
is the trade union leadership’s almost universal acceptance 
of the legitimacy of capitalism.
"This has greatly eased the relations 
of trade union leaders with employers 
and governments and provided a firm basis 
for a process of collaboration with them 
which has turned these leaders into junior 
partners of capitalist enterprise." (42)
Miliband attempts to locate the recent attempts by capitalist 
governments to limited trade union independence in terms of 
"the recent evolution of advanced capitalism." The purpose 
of such measures, he observes, is to effect a general 
weakening of the bargaining power of wage—earners in the 
pursuit of policies "proclaimed to be essential to the national 
interest, the health of the economy, the defence of the 
currency, the good of the workers, and so on." (43)
Generally, however, Miliband writes as if this process 
were a more or less linear, sustained economic and political 
initiative on the part of state institutions.
"The history of trade unionism in 
capitalist countries is also the 
history of unending struggle against
— 120 —
the courts* attempts to curb and
erode the unions* ability to defend their
members* interests." (44)
State—initiated attempts to undermine trade union 
independence assume significance to different extents at 
different times, however, the typical motives for intervention 
being those of resort and perceived opportunity. The state- 
approved consolidation of arbitration mechanisms in Britain 
in industries such as hosiery and coal during the l860*s, 
for example, occurred during years when the markets for 
these products were expanding. An expanding market provided 
favourable conditions under which to obtain workers* 
support for industrial conciliation procedures to offset the 
costly effects of the strike and the lockout in the face 
of continental competition. (45) This development in the 
evolution of arbitration, in other words, had a rationale 
deriving from the form of class relations at a particular 
stage of the evolution of international capitalism.
The economic context of direct state attempts to 
impose incomes policies in the post-war period, by contrast, 
has been dominated by the decline in corporate profitability 
since the mid-1950*s. Miliband, however, limits his analysis 
to identifying the "official" motives of governments in 
attempting to gain support for the state regulation of 
wage-bargaining, again moving close to a socio-psychological 
account of state interventionism. The growing concern of 
the capitalist state, in Britain and internationally, to 
curb the independence of trade unions has an immediate 
source and purpose quite untouched by Miliband’s account.
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He does not, that is to say, analyse the pattern of 
relations between the state and the unions from the 
point of view of the specific historical conditions 
of contemporary capitalist society.
Of more serious consequence, however, is 
Miliband*s characterization of international capitalist 
relations. On this point Miliband actually misrepresents, 
in our opinion, the prevailing and dominant features 
of capitalist development. Miliband writes :
"Capitalism, as we have already
noted, is now more than ever an
international system, whose
constituent economies are closely
related and interlinked. As a
result, even the most powerful
capitalist countries depend, to
a greater or lesser extent, upon
the good will and co-operation of the
rest, and of what has become, notwithstanding
enduring and profound national capital
rivalries, an independent capitalist
* community *". (46)
Now capitalism is, and long has been, an international 
system, promoting the development of an international 
division of labour. What is missing from Miliband* s 
discussion, however, despite his almost parenthetically 
introduced recognition of international rivalry, is an 
analysis of how the course of post-war capitalist
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development, one of inflationary expansion with increasing 
pressured profits, implies a progressive exacerbation 
of this rivalry, finding expression in the use of 
trading and currency movements to gain tactical 
advantages for particular nation states. The most 
consequential forms of inter-state economic warfare 
have been the steps talc en by the United States to 
devalue in 1 9 7 1 and 1 9 7 3 » thus reducing the value of 
the important overseas pool of dollars. The American 
balance of payments surplus on goods, services, and 
investment income up until the 1 9 6 0 *s had been more 
than offset by a persistent outward flow of dollars, 
largely representing the expenses of American imperialism, 
and constituting claims on the American economy.
The devaluation of these claims amounts to a calculated 
attempt to transfer overseas the cost of American 
commitments throughout the world, commitments which 
had led to the emergence of an actual balance of 
payments deficit by the 1970*s. (47) While the 
major capitalist blocs in this scenario of emergent 
rivalry are the United States, Europe and Japan, 
the recent decisions by Italy and Denmark to raise 
tariff barriers in order to defend their balance of 
payments positions broke the E.E.C. provisions 
regarding the free movement of goods within the 
Community. While the E.E.C. has to some degree been 
successful in fostering a relative freedom of movement 
for European capital, its achievements in this area 
should not be overestimated. (48) Capitalism is 
still essentially tied to nation states and thereby
— 122 —
to national ruling classes as territorially-specific 
hegemonic groups within the inemational division of 
labour. The global imbalance between the international 
scope of the productive forces and their present 
subjection to the interest of national capital blocs 
recently prompted J. Knapp to identify "the system of 
nationalistic regulation of economies** which is designed 
to advance a particular state’s economic, political 
and military power in competition with rivals "as 
the most significant feature of the contemporary 
world". (49) That this development has already 
assumed considerable proportions is not,acknowledged 
by Milibandf however. The enduring international 
rivalry which he formally recognizes is increasingly 
becoming the dominant feature of the capitalist 
system on a trans-national scale, quite in spite of 
whatever "good will" and "cooperation" particular 
state incumbents may deem desirable. Miliband*s 
abstracted political sociology, in other words, 
simply misses the point.
Other examples of the way in which Miliband*s 
effective divorce of political analysis from the 
political economy of contemporary capitalism restricts 
the scope of and even trivializes his study could 
be given, but they all point toward the same essentially 
positivistic methodology. One more instance, however, 
ifill be mentioned. In his discussion of the elements 
of state systems Miliband points to the grooving
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prominence and influence of the military establishment 
in the United States. "Nowhere", he observes, "has 
the inflation of the military establishment been more 
marked since the second world war than the United 
States, a country which had previously been highly 
civilian-orientated." (50) This observation 
in itself, however, tells us virtually nothing 
about the relationship between the growth of the 
American military sector on the one hand and developments 
in the United States within the world economy on the 
other. During and for some time after the 1939—45 
war armaments production acted as a stimulus to the 
expansion of American capitalism by allowing 
accumulation to proceed without the attendant 
problems of realization. State demand, that is to 
say, guaranteed the profitability of unproductive 
military enterprise within the international context 
of the Cold War and its aftermath. In the longer- 
term the scale of military spending has been an 
important contributory factor to America’s relatively 
slow rate of economic growth and its deteriorating 
balance of payments position. Miliband*s exposition, 
however, is abstracted from the distinguishing features 
of post-war international capitalism, in particular 
America’s role as its leading global protagonist, 
that constitute the logic of developments such as 
the rise of militarism in the United States.
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And this, in the final analysis, is the fundamental 
weakness of The State in Capitalist Society. Miliband 
formally refers to the "profoundly destabilising 
forces at work in capitalist society". In a marginally 
more specific tone he observes :
"The point is not that ’bourgeois 
democracy’ is imminently likely 
to move towards old style Fascism.
It is rather that advanced capitalist 
societies are subject to strains 
more acute than for a long time past, 
and that their inability to resolve 
these strains meilces their evolution 
towards more or less pronounced 
forms of conservative authoritarianism 
more rather than less likely." (5 1 )
The precise nature of "strains" to which contemporary 
capitalism is subject is never explained, however.
The period udiich Miliband sees to be characterised 
by "crisis and challenge" (5 2 ) is at no point 
examined concretely in terms of capitalist development 
and class relations %-d.thin their particular historical 
context. From the combination of a highly formal, 
almost ritualistic minimum of Marxist theory and a 
poitivistic approach to economic and political 
structure there emerges an empirically thorough but 
hybrid work, brimming with data, academic references 
to Marxist and non-Marxist sources alike, but not 
attempting to examine, concretely and systematically
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the crucial and distinguishing features of late 
capitalism. The State in Capitalist Society is : 
perhaps most rigorous study in a tradition to 
which H.J. Laski, of whom Miliband, it may be 
noted, was once a student, contributed and to a 
large extent gave form in the British academic 
community. Couterposing his own perspective 
to the a priori, deductivistic theories of the 
state formulated by philosophers such as Rousseau,
Laski proposed :
"A realistic analysis of the 
modem state.... suggests that 
what we term state action is, 
in fact, action by government.
It is a policy offered to the 
people for acceptance. It 
becomes state-action when that 
acceptance is predominantly 
operative." (5 3 )
There is, that is to say, a logic in the actions of 
the state which may be discovered from an empirical 
analysis of the practices of governments and their 
incumbents, and the response of the governed to 
those practices. The actions of the state correspond 
to the interests and practices of those social actors who 
have access to and control it. Thus :
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"The truth is that in the process 
of politics what, broadly speaking, 
gets registered is not a will that 
is at each moment in accord with 
the state-purpose, but the will of 
those who in fact operate the 
machine of government," (54)
While Miliband would eschew some of Laski*s policy 
recommendations, in particular, his recurrent 
advocacy of corporatist industrial organisational 
forms (5 5 ), his study of the state methodologically 
follows the letter’s dictum that "the patient analysis 
of its practices" is the most fruitful means of 
ascertaining the nature of a state’s programme, (5&) 
Miliband, like Laski, recognizes the inherent 
antagonism between labour and capital. The absence 
of a unifying theoretical analysis of recent 
capitalism, inseparable from his positivistic 
approach to economy and polity lead Milliband, 
however, to produce an account of contemporary 
state structures which, despite its empirical 
rigour, is essentially ahistorical in form and, 
at a number of key points, misleading in content.
1.
2.
3.
4 .
5 .
6.
7.
8.
9 .
10,
11.
12,
1 3 .
1 4 .
1 5 .
16.
1 7 .
1 8 .
1 9 .
20. 
21. 
22.
23.
24.
25.
2 6 .
Prominent among his writings is his 
study Parliamentary Socialism (I9 6 1 ) 
Miliband is, in addition, co-colitor 
of the influential Socialist Register.
R. Miliband(1 9 7 3 b), 1.
Ibid., 6
Ibid., 22
Ibid., 4 5
Ibid., 5 1
Ibid., 6 2
Ibid., 1 0 6
Ibid., 2 3 7
Ibid., 7
Ibid., 33
Ibid., 37
K. M a r x ( l9 5 9 ) ,  209 
V.I. Lenin (1970b)
L. Trotsky (1954)
L. Trotsky (1971b), 4o6 
K, Marx (1972b)
K. Marx (1954) IO6  
Ibid,, 10
R, Miliband (1973b) 17 
N, Poulantzas (1 9 7 2 ), 24o 
C. Marat, "New Edinburgh Review", 5 
V.I. Lenin (I96la), I38
Ibid., 2 7 9
Ibid., 2 1 1
Ibid., 2 1 9
27. Ibid., 171
28. Ibid., 219
29. K. Marx (1967b), 107
30. Ibid., 108
31. R. Miliband (1973b) 70
32. See secion II of the present chapter.
33. L. Trotsky (1972b), 5
34. V.I. Lenin (1970b), 125
35. V.I. Lenin (1972) 6 9
3 6 . The Communist Manifesto states:— "The 
Communists....are on the one hand, 
practically, the most advanced and resolute 
section of the working-class parties of 
every country, that section which pushes 
forward all others; on the other hand, 
theoretically, they have over the great 
mass of the proletariat the advantage
of clearly understanding the line of 
march, the conditions, and the ultimate 
general results of the proletarian 
movement." (K. Marx and F. Engels, 1 9 6 7 a), 95)
3 7 . V.I. Lenin (1972), 129
3 8 . Ibid., 4 9
39. K, Marx (1972b), 45
40. J.A. Banks (1970), 111
4l* "Political Economy and the British State."
42. R. Miliband (1973b), l44
4 3 . Ibid., 7 4
44. Ibid., 1 2 8
4 5 . V.L. Allen (1971), 72
46. R. Miliband (1973b), 138
4 7 . H.L. Robinson (1974)
48. See E, Mandel (1970a)
4 9 . J. Knapp (1 9 7 3 ), 1 9
5 0 . R. Miliband (l973b), 48
51. Ibid., 239
52. Ibid., 2 3 6
53. H.J. Laski
54. H.J. Laski
55. In Liberty
See also H.J, Laski 
(1937), 56-61.
Laski advocated "a Parliament for the mining 
industry, in which capital, management, 
labour and the consumer should each have 
their due representation, and to which 
should be confided the determination of 
industrial standards on the model of 
professional self-government" (H.J.
Laski, 1937» 8?). See also K. Martin
(1 9 6 9 ), 153-4
H.J. Laski (1919), 31-2
SECTION TWO
WEBER ^ m m E T  SQGIOLOGIl^ 
TECMOCRACY. AND 
THE STATE
l?-7
I. MAX WEBER, CAPITALISM AND THE STATE. 
INTRODUCTION.
It is not without good reason that Max Weber has been 
referred to as "the sociologist ........ our contemporary". (1)
His influence on. later Sociology may be seen in such diverse areas 
as the study of social domination and authority (2), the debate on 
ethical neutrality (3)» and the statug:of materialism as a tool for 
historical analysis (4). More recently, his methodological writings 
have been acknowledged as formative by sociologists working in the 
area of Ethnomethodology (5)• Our concern here will be the 
influence of his analysis of capitalist social structure and its 
corresponding state form on some contemporary writers.
A number of recent studies of the clas s structure of 
capitalism bear the impression of Weber* s inspiration and share 
some of his key assumptions. We will be particularly concerned 
with three derivative groups of theories: attempts, most notably
those of A. Giddens and F. Parkin, to reconstruct the workings of 
the capitalist economy, in particular its power dimension, in terms 
of a positivistic concern with interaction and exchange at the level 
of the market: Dahrendorf*s model contending the primacy of
authority relations in conflict group formation, a model structured 
around the Weberian concept of the imperatively co-ordinated 
association: finally, a heterogeneous group of theorists, linked
through their common formal Weberian equation of rationality at the 
level of social practice and at that of wider social structure and 
organization and their common concern with bureaucratization and 
technocracy.
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We vjill first of all consider Weber’s analysis of 
capitalist social structure as a whole, and its relation to his 
conception of Verstehen sociology. Particular aspects of his 
work will be examined in rather more detail in the following sections 
in the course of elaborating the derivative theories with which we 
are concerned. Central to the discussion as a whole is the question 
of the relevance of Weberian conceptual tools for an analysis of the 
class and state structures of advanced capitalist society, in 
particular those of post-war Britain. The perspective from which 
we will critically assess the various aspects of the Weberian theses 
is that of Marxism.
Both Marx and Weber, through their concern with the 
structure of domination in capitalist society, were led to the 
analysis of "homo hierarchicus" as opposed to the narrower model 
of "homo economicus". This common preoccupation, has led to much 
confusion on the part of later commentators. A. Giddens, for 
example, suggests that Weber, like Maine, saw that "ownership versus 
non-ownership of property is the most important basis of class 
division in a competetive market" (6). Our view, in contrast, is 
that for Weber, as against Marx, class is first and foremost defined 
at the level of market interaction, is primarily a distributive 
concept, and that this perspective may be shown to derive from his 
methodology of "Verstehen" Sociology.
Weber initially defines "class situation" as the typical 
probability of procuring goods, gaining a position in life, and 
finding inner satisfaction. It is seen to derive from
"... relative control over goods and skills and..... 
their income producing uses." (7)
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"Class" itself is defined as the totality of people in the same 
class situation, and Weber* s three-fold typology of classes 
(property, commercial and social classes) is explicated accordingly. 
Weber* s "market" conception of class is apparent in his discussion 
of "commercial** classes. There he includes workers who hold 
’’monopolistic qualifications and skills" in the positively privileged 
category (8). The concept of entrepreneurial activity is used by 
Weber in an idiosyncratic way which directs analysis to the 
monopolization of attributes which effectively command priveleged 
treatment at the level of market interaction. Whereas for Marx the 
working class is an exploited and subordinate class because it is 
objectively (structurally) compelled to sell its labour-power to 
capital, Weber*s criteria for "negatively privileged commercial 
classes" is quite different. The classes he locates in this category 
are skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labourers, and as such are 
empirically close to Marx’s class of productive workers. Neverthe­
less, Weber*s analytical equation of a particular sector of workers 
with merchants, shipowners, entrepreneurs and bankers indicates how 
he locates class in the sphere of the market, a single "moment" 
which he abstracts from the total process of production and 
reproduction. His criteria for property and social classes are 
similarly posed (9)•
This market-interactive orientation flows directly from 
Wener’s methodological starting point, the interpretation of social 
action, or conscious behaviour orientated directly or indirectly 
toward the behaviour of others. Social action is viewed "only as 
the behaviour of one or more individual human beings." As such
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it constitutes "the subjective meaning-complex of action". Weber 
accordingly designates to social collectivities such as states and 
associations the status of being
"... solely the resultants and modes of 
organization of the particular acts of 
individual persons, since these alone 
can be treated as agents in a course of 
subjectively understandable action." (10)
While commending the functionalist frame of reference as convenient 
for purposes of practical illustration and for provisional orientation, 
he warns against the illegitimate reification of these concepts. He 
uses, that is to say, the individualistic "Verstehen" methodology, 
rooted in the motives of social actions. Weber* s conception of class 
is, appropriately,articulated at the level of direct patterns of 
market interaction and distribution, as is his generic notion of 
economic action. (11)
As regards Weber’s historical analysis, it will be my 
contention that Weber* s conception of class as outlined and 
explicated above in fact permeates and, in an important sense, 
structures his concern with "rationalization" as the central develop­
mental feature of contemporary society. Consideration of Weber* s 
notion of rationalization is therefore necessary at this point. Weber 
noted
"The fate of our times is characterised by 
rationalisation, intellectualisation, and 
above all by the ’disenchantment* of the 
world." (12)
By this he meant a stage of social development where there are no
mysterious forces at v/ork and in which it is possible, at least in
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theory, to master all things by rational calculation. Weber 
identified a key feature of this process to be the conscious 
pursuit of individual interests, or
"... the substitution for the unthinking 
acceptance of ancient custom, of deliberate 
adaption to situations in terms of self- 
interest." (15)
Weber sought to elucidate the historical foundations of rationalisation
and to show how it may historically assume different forms. He
contended, for example, that the very "direction" of the action
described as rational may vary; it may proceed positively as "a
conscious rationalisation of ultimate values", negatively at the
expense "not only of custom, but of emotional values", or finally in
favour of "a morally sceptical kind of rationality" (14). Thus the
direction of rationalisation is just as significant in Weber*s v/ork
as its degree or tempo-
In addition, he elsehwere explicitly rejected the notion
that rationalisation is a linear process. History, he notes, is
not a parallel development "in the various departments of life" (15)•
As an example Weber cites the backwardness of law, by the criteria
of ratlona]ity, in a number of countries, including Britain, with a
high degree of economic development. Weber*s view, then, was that
"Rationalism is an historical concept which covers a whole world of
different things." (I6)
A crucial example of the conflicting forms of rationality
identified by Weber is that between the "formal" and the "substantive"
types. In particular, an economic system is defined as formally
rational "according to the degree to which the provision for needs,
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which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being 
expressed in numerical calculable terms and is so expressed." (17)
Even with such a "formal" expression of economic activity in 
monetary, calculable terras, however, one must take into account 
that that activity is oriented to ultimate ends, whether they be 
ethical, political, hedonistic or whatever. Thus "substantive" 
rationality cannot be measured in terms of "formal" calculation 
alone, but also involves a relation to absolute values or the 
content of a particular end. Action in the interest of a hierarchy 
of class distinctions, or in furtherance of the power of a particular 
unit are, among many other possible standards of value, "of potential 
’substantive* significance" in Weber*s scheme. (Ibid., l86)
Thus, for Weber the "formal rationality" of money 
calculation is dependent upon a certain quite specific substantive 
condition. In particular he identifies speculation, which he sees 
to be an important source of crises in modern economies, job control 
by the workers, which prevents their appointment solely on the 
grounds of technical efficiency, and movements promoting planned 
economies. The latter, Weber claims, weaken the incentive to 
labour, since a worker and his dependents would not suffer the full 
consequences of his lack of productive efficiency, at least in so 
far as there was "a rational system of provision for wants."
Now Weber*s analysis of rationality, with its assumption 
of calculability and its individualistic orientation represents the 
particular rationality of capitalist society. Capitalist social 
relationships, he argues, are for technical reasons a vital 
precondition of a rational economy. We will quote in full a central.
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if lengthy, passage from Economy and Society.
"The expropriation of workers in general, 
including clerical personnel and technically 
trained persons, from possession of the means 
of production has its economic reasons above 
all in the following factors:
(a) The fact that, other things being equal 
it is generally possible to achieve a higher 
level of economic rationality if the management 
has extensive control over the selection and the 
modes of use of workers .....
(b) In a market economy a management which is 
not hampered by any established rights of the 
workers, and which enjoys unrestricted control 
over the goods and equipment which underlie its 
borrowings, is of superior credit-worthiness ....
(c) From a historical point of view, the 
expropriation of labour has arisen since the 
sixteenth century in an economy characterised by 
the progressive extensive and intensive expansion 
of the market system on the one hand, because of 
the sheer superiority and actual indispensability 
of a type of management oriented to the particular 
market situations, and on the other because of the 
structure of power relationships in the society," (l8)
While viewing rationalization as a diversified process, 
characterised particularly by calculabilty and efficiency Weber thus 
conceived it to be particularly characteristic of, though not 
absolutely unique to. Western capitalist society. His analysis of 
capitalism as a form of social and economic organisation is thus of 
relevance to his analysis of the historical process of rationalisation.
In the first place, rational calculating activity is the 
"ideal type" of subjective meaning attributed to social action by
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Weber in his causal account of capitalist class structure* In 
the Protestant Ethic he defines capitalism as
".... identical with the pursuit of profit, 
and forever renewed profit, by means of 
continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise." (19)
Distinguished from the mere impulse to acquisition and gain, it excludes
consideration of the wider, historically-bound and historically-
developing determinants of class structure* This epistemological
barrier, it has been argued, follows directly from his conception of
"Verstehen" sociology. The relevance of this for what Weber terms
the historical process of rationalization, and in particular for his
analysis of the contemporary state will now be examined.
Now, while Weber’s formal definitions of the various aspects 
and properties of class are brief almost to the point of terseness 
(Economy and Society, 302-7, 926-40) the concepts themselves are of 
great importance for the interpretation of his historical analysis. 
Sociology, Weber argues, is concerned with the formulation and 
presentation of general principles and generic or ideal concepts in 
relation to social action. History, by contrast, "is directed 
towards the causal analysis and explanation of particular, culturally 
significant, actions, structures, and personalities." (E. and S., 19). 
The formulation of sociological general principles, while an 
important and valid intellectual process in its own right, thus 
at least in part takes the form of a means towards the end of 
reconstructing actual, causal historical sequences. Thus he 
indicates that the sociological task he sets himself in Economy and 
Society constitutes a *’very modest preparation" for the study of
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specific historical phenomena. "It is then the concern of history 
to give a causal explanation of these particular characteristics". 
(Letter to George van Belau, 1914, quoted from Giddens, p.l46.)
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber 
defines capitalism as "identical with the pursuit of profit, and 
forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic 
enterprise, as distinguished from the mere impulse to acquisition and 
gain" (17). It has, he observes, been developed in new directions 
and to new extents in the modern Occident. Identifying its major 
requisit as the "rational capitalistic organization of (formally) 
free labour", Weber indicates that in terms of cultural history, the 
problems of the origins of capitalism is that of the "origin of the 
Western bourgeois class and of its peculiarities" (Ibid., 24). This 
problematic is explored in considerable detail in Weber*s General 
Economic History.
In that work, capitalism is described as involving the 
"method of enterprise". In particular, Weber indicates that this 
consists principally of "capital accounting", or caluclation by 
means of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a kralance" in 
undertakings concerned with the provision of satisfaction for 
"everyday wants" (275-6). As aspects of this mode of accounting 
he lists the institution of private property, freedom of market 
exchange, mechanized technology, "calculable" law, formally free 
labour, and the commercialization of economic life.
In order to clarify his account of rational capitalism,
Weber counter-poses it to tax farming, the financing of war, trade 
speculation and money-lending as "non-rational" forms of capitalist
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enterprise. They all, he observes, relate to "spoils, taxes^ 
the pickings of office of official usury, and finally to tribute 
and actual need*" No "rational" system of labour organization, 
he claims, has developed out of such arrangements. Rational 
capitalism, rather, is
"... organized with a view to market 
opportunities, hence to economic objectives 
in the real sense of the word, and the more 
rational it Is the more closely it relates 
to mass demand and the provision for mass 
needs." (Ibid., 334)
"Rational" capitalism is thus seen to be at the heart of modern 
economic activity rather than in any way being accidental to or 
parasitic upon it. Moreover, the quality of calculability which 
Weber ascribes to particular capitalist activities is percieved to 
engender a rationality in the system as a whole in the form of a 
correspondence between production and (mass) needs. The contra­
diction identified by Marx between the dual nature of the commodity 
as use value and exchange value, with is implications for the 
inherent tendency of capitalism toward crises (Grundrisse, ) 
is thus overlooked by Weber. As with his formal discussion of 
class, his discussion is dominated by the basically subjectivist 
(with the qualifications made above) notion of "Verstehen" 
sociology: only this time the consequence is that the (empirically
existent) dominance of calculability of particular capitalist 
activity is theoretically reproduced at the elvel of the socio- 
productive system, at the level of capital as a whole. As with 
his formal discussion and definition of class, his conception of
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social major requisite is the ’’rational capitalistic organization 
of (formally) free labour”. Weber indicates that the problem of 
its origins is that of the origin of the bourgeois class itself#
This problematic is explored in considerable detail in Weber’s 
General Economic History.
In that work capitalism is described as involving the 
’’method of enterprise”. This, according to Weber, consists 
principally of ’’capital accounting", or calculation by means of 
modern bookkeeping and the "striking of a balance” in undertakings 
concerned with the provision of satisfaction for everyday, wants. (20) 
As aspects of this mode of accounting he identifies the institution 
of private property, freedom of market exchange, mechanized technology, 
"calculable” law, formally free labour, and the commercialization of 
economic life.
A theoretical transposition of this rationality from the 
form of behaviour of individual capitalists to the level of the 
system as a whole takes place in Weber’s work, however. Counter- 
posing rational capitalist enterprise to "non-rational” forms such 
as tax farming and trade speculation, he contends that the former is
”... organized with a view to market opportunities, 
hence to economic objectives in the real sense of 
the word, and the more rational it-is the more 
closely it relates to mass demand and the 
provision for mass needs.” (21)
"Rational" capitalism is seen to be at the heart of modern
economic activity rather than in any was being accidental to or
parasitic upon it. Moreover, the quality of calculability that
Weber ascribes to particular capitalist enterprises is perceived to
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engender a rationality in the system as a whole in the form of a 
correspondence between production and (mass) needs. The contra­
diction identified by Marx between the dual nature of the commodity 
as use value and exchange value, with its implications of the 
inherent tendency of capitalism toward crisis is thus overlooked in 
Weber’s inductivist systems-analysis• As with his formal discussion 
of class, his model of rational capitalism is dominated and 
structured by the basically subjectivist methodology of "Verstehen” 
Sociology; only this time the consequence is that the empirically 
existent dominance of calculability of particular capitalist activity 
is theoretically reproduced at the level of the socio-productive 
system, at the level of capital as a whole. In both cases, Weber’s 
conception of social action acts as an epistemological barrier to 
the understanding of capitalist socio-productive relationships. It 
limits the concept of class to the sphere of direct, immediate 
market interaction. In the case of the wider system it results in 
a mystified portrayal of the workings of capitalist society, 
essentially reformulating the empirically false equilibrium model 
expressed, at its simplest, in Say’s Law. (22)
Class, state, and capitalism in toto are attributed with 
the "rational” essence that Weber finds in the conscious action of 
their individual incumbents, the modern state being the rational 
Weberian bureaucratic organization par excellence. Social power, 
its distribution, source and social meaning, i^ , of course, the 
central problematic of this dimension of Weber's work. Weber
himself defines power, in its most general sense, as
"... the possibility of imposing one’s will 
upon the behaviour of other persons;” (23)
His rather more limited notion of domination, however, has two 
particular aspects, namely domination by virtue of a constellation 
of interests and domination by virtue of authority. Weber is 
concerned specifically with situations involving "authoritarian 
power of command" or, viewed from the opposite perspective, of 
"obedience". Every highly privileged group, Weber adds, develops 
its own myth of natural superiority. For long periods of time 
this myth is accepted almost unquestioningly, but when, as in our 
own time, the class situation and its power to determine every 
individual’s fate becomes unambiguously apparent, it becomes the 
target of "powerful attacks".
Within this framework (into which is built, we will later 
contend, the assumption of the universality of social relations of 
dominance) Weber identifies the three "pure" or "ideal" types of 
charismatic, traditional and legal rational authority. While the 
latter is of particular relevance for Weber’s study of the modern 
state, the former two will be sketched briefly in order to indicate 
the scope of Weber’s typology.
Bearers of charismatic authority are seen to be endowed 
with specific gifts of body and mind that are considered "super­
natural" and to satisfy all "extraordinary" needs, that is those 
which transcend the sphere of everyday economic routines. (24) 
Charisma, for Weber, is a highly individual quality which "is 
self-determined and sets its own limits".
Traditional domination, on the other hand, is derived 
from norms which are sanctified by tradition and custom. Weber 
quotes the Talmudic maxim "Men should never change a custom" as 
an illustration of this power of tradition (ibid., IOO8), Within
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this category Weber devotes most space to patriarchal domination 
which, he claims, is ultimately based on "nothing but purely 
subjective rights and privileges" (Ibid., 973). It thus lacks 
the more objective "matter-of-factness" of bureaucratic domination, 
Weber’s third type.
Weber lists the characteristics of bureaucracy as the 
division of the field in question into official "jurisdictional" 
areas which are generally ordered by formal rules, the establishment 
of "office hierarchy" and of corresponding channels of appeal in 
order to stipulate a clear system of super- and sub-ordination, and 
the preservation and use of written documents ("the files"). There 
is a staff of subaltern officials and scribes, whose official 
activity is segregated from their private lives. In addition,
Weber identifies thorough training in a field of specialization, 
the demand for the full working capacity of the official during 
office hours, and the presence of more or less stable and 
exhaustive "general rules" as characteristics of bureaucratic 
organization.
As a consequence of these factors, the office constitutes 
a "vocation" and the position of the official is of the nature of 
a "duty" in return for the grant of a secure existence. Officials 
are appointed rather than elected, and this functions to preserve 
the rigidity of the hierarchy of subordination. Their positions 
are held for life, their salaries are fixed according to rank, and 
there is an established line of career promotion in terms of, for 
example, seniority or examinations.
Weber lists as examples of bureaucracy the system of rule
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in Egypt in the period of the "New Kingdom", the later Roman 
Principate, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, China from the time of 
Shi Huangti, the modern European states and the large modern 
capitalist enterprise# He argues that bureaucratic status 
incentives tend to be superior to physical coercion in that they 
are more likely to promote "steadiness"# Nevertheless, degree of 
bureaucratization and, for example, the expansionary force of a 
state need not of necessity correspond. The Roman and British 
Empires, for example, had little bureaucratic foundation during 
their most expansive periods.
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucracy for 
Weber, however, is always its "technical superiority over any other 
form of organization". In particular, he points to its precision, 
speed and unambiguity, as well as the reduction of material and 
personal costs. (25) Thus, the more perfect it becomes, the more 
it is ’’dehumanized" of personal, irrational and emotional elements.
Weber observes a "levelling" process in the context of 
bureaucratic administration (26), and argues that with its ascendancy 
it becomes increasingly necessary and increasingly determines "the 
material fate of the masses". It promotes, he suggests, a 
"rationalist way of life", (Ibid., 998), and adds that it brings 
the system of "rational examinations for expertise "to the fore 
and is accordingly epitomisedly the "specialist" rather than the 
"cultivated man" of, for example, the traditional English 
administration by notables. Clearly Weber is pointing to a 
profound and crucial relationship between the development of modern 
Western rationality on the one hand, and the growth of bureaucracy, 
a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon in its more developed forms.
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on the other* The Weberian notion of rational bureaucracy, to use 
Parson's terminology, is characterized by values of universalism, 
achievement, specificity and affective neutrality (27), qualities 
which, in Weber's formal analysis, govern the modern world. Implicit 
throughout this analysis is the notion of the official as accountable 
to his superiors within the context of a rigid system of hierarchical 
subordination.
This perspective of bureaucracy guides Weber*s political 
analysis of the modern state. In Economy and Society he contends
that "the large modern state is absolutely dependent upon a
bureaucratic basis". The "rational state", he elsewhere argues, is 
unique to the Western world. (28) On the basis of this rational 
state, characterized by "an expert officialdom and rational law", the 
trained official makes decisions on the basis of "law which can be 
counted upon, like a machine: ritua!listic-religious and magical
considerations must be excluded." (Ibid., 342) Weber'counterposes 
this form of state organization to that of ancient China, where the 
mandarins played no important role in the way of political service, 
the view that their perfection in literary culture "keeps things in
order in normal times" being essentially a magical theory. Weber
historically e)cplains the creation of such a body of rational law 
in terms of the alliance between the modern state and the jurists 
for the purpose of making good the former's claims to power. This 
alliance, he observes "was indirectly favourable to capitalism", and 
he identifies fourteenth century English Mercantilism as "the first 
trace of a rational economic policy".
Weber characterizes Mercantilism as the carrying of the
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point of view of capitalist industry into politics: the state is
handled "as if it consisted exclusively of capitalist entrepreneurs" 
(ibid., 347-9)• Noting that few of the industries created by 
mercantilist policies survived that period, however, Weber argues 
that capitalism proper developed not as an outgrowth of national 
mercantilism, but rather alongside it. A stratum of entrepreneurs 
which had developed independently from the political administration, 
secured the systematic support of Parliament in the eighteenth 
century after the collapse of Stuart fiscal monopoly policy.
In this way "rational" and "irrational" capitalism faced each other 
in a relationship of conflict, the former type progressively gaining 
ground as the latter lost it. (Ibid., 530-2).
For Weber, the "rational state" thus emerged in eighteenth 
century Britain as the embodiment and political expression of 
"rational" capitalist activity. In Economy and Society Weber lists 
the primary formal characteristics of the modern state as an 
administrative and legal order subject to change by (bureaucratic) 
legislation, the possession of legitimate authority with powers of 
coercion on a territorial base, and the monopoly of legitimate force, 
Elsewhere in the same work he graphically restates the last 
characteristic, in relation of official action in response to both 
human acts and also "natural" contingencies (such as geographical 
disasters):
"Today legal coercion by violence is the 
monopoly of the state. All other groups 
applying legal coercion by biolence are today 
considered as heteronomous and mostly also as 
heterocephalous. This is the outcome, however.
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of certain stages of development. We shall 
speak of "state" law, i.e., of law guaranteed 
by the state, only when legal coercion is 
exercised through the specific, i.e., normally 
directly physical, means of coercion of the 
political community." (29)
This recognition of the coercive dimension of state activity is
consistent with and occupies an important position within Weber*s
model of the class nature of capitalist society. In the first
place, he notes that law, through the political organ of the state,
acts as a guarantor of a wide variety of particular interests, both
economic and otherwise.
"Law (in the sociological sense) guarantees 
by no means only economic interests but 
rather the most diverse interests ranging 
from the most elementary one of protection 
of personal security to such purely ideal goods 
as personal honor or the honor of the divine 
powers." (30)
At the same time, however, Weber argues that economic interests are
the strongest single factor contributing to the creation of legal
systems.
"For, any authority guaranteeing a legal 
order depends, in some way, upon the 
consensual action of the constitutive 
groups, and the formation of social groups 
depends, to a large extent, upon constellations 
of material interests." (31)
Weber identifies the major "functions" of the state today to be
those of law enactment, protection of public order and personal
safety, protection of vested rights and "cultural interests", and
protection from outside attack. (Ibid., 905)- He relates these 
functions directly to the above-discussed conception of class society 
by indicating how the actions of the state benefit certain class 
groupings more than others, especially in the modern period when the 
expansion of the market has cut away the basis for a "community of 
interests". Thus, the state
".,., obtains a powerful and decisive support 
from all those groups which have a direct or 
indirect economic interest in the expansion 
of the market community, as well as from the 
religious authorities. These latter are 
best able to control the masses under conditions 
of increasing pacification. Economically, 
however, the groups most Interested in pacification 
are those guided by market interests, especially 
the burghers of the towns, as well as those who 
are interested in river, road, or bridge tolls 
and in the tax-paying capacity of their tenants 
and subjects. These interest groups expand 
with an expanding money economy," (32)
The "rational" capitalist state is thus, for Weber, both expression
of and vehicle for the particular rationality of capitalist society.
Weber's conception of the modern state, in other words, is in the
last analysis bound to his analysis of the class relations of
capitalism. These class relations, it will be remembered, are
primarily market-orientated: the market, in turn, is seen to embody
and be the stage for economic actvity of a particularly rational,
calculable nature, this being the ideal-type of subjective meaning
attributed by Weber to social actors in his account of the class
structure of capitalist societies: the state is a political
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expression or dimension of this system of class relations and 
consequently both reflects and promotes its Inherent rationality*
The position and role of the state within Weber* s overall conception 
of capitalism assumes, as Weber assumes, that the "rational", 
calculating nature of immediate economic action is directly 
reproduced at the level of the system as a whole* There is no 
suggestion, as in Marx*s analysis, that capitalist extended 
reproduction has a dynamic of its own which imposes direct 
imperatives on the actors who at the level of direct production 
fulfill the tasks necessary for that reproduction to take place* 
Whereas Marx, in other words, set out to discover the law of motion 
of capitalist society on the basis of the production of commodities 
within historically specific class relations (defined at the level 
of relations of production), Weber constructs an ideal-type of 
rational, capitalist economic activity and via a conceptual 
transposition theoretically reproduces the rationality he finds 
there at the level of the system itself. The principal mediating 
concepts in this structure are the definition of classes at the 
point of market interaction and the assumption that, in its most 
rational form, capitalist production will correspond closely to 
"mass demand" and "mass needs". Th&t these various aspects of 
Weber* s analysis of capitalist society are mutually reinforcing is 
expressed perhaps most concisely in the following passage from 
Economy and Society:
"Above all, it (rational bureaucratic 
administration - D.B.) was influenced 
by the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 
towns which had an organization perculiar 
to Europe. It was in addition aided by
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the competition for power by means of 
rational - that is bureaucratic - 
administration among the different states.
This led, from fiscal motives, to a crucially 
important alliance with capitalistic interests." (33)
Glass, state and capitalism as a system are thus theoretically
reconstructed in terms of the guiding Weberian concept of rationality,
a concept which in turn is grounded in the methodology of "Verstehen"
Sociology. For Weber, as for Hegel, the rational thus becomes the
actual. The realization of the rationality of capitalist economic
calculation is rendered conditional upon the presence of certain
substantive conditions (market struggles, capital accounting and
"effective demand"), (34), but these conditions are in fact no more
than aspects of the capitalist environment itself (in so far as it
is rational in the Weberian sense (35)).
If, in summary, a single error may be isolated as the 
overriding flaw which permeates Weber’s work, it is the displacement 
of the concept of rationality and its illegitimate transposition into 
sectors of social reality, in particular those of the determination 
of classes and the overall functioning of capitalism, where quite 
different laws and principles hold sway. His inductivist "Verstehen" 
methodology in this way produces a model of capitalist society which 
serves to mystify both its characteristic class structure and the 
mode of development of the system as a whole.
At the same time, Weber’s methodological principle of 
eithical neutrality is undermined within his own analysis, his 
"sociology of domination" generating effectively prescriptive 
conclusions which are incompatible with his advocated division
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between facts and values, between science and politics# Concerning 
ethical neutrality Weber contends that
"... the investigator and teacher should 
unconditionally separate the establishment 
of empirical facts (including the 'value- 
oriented* conduct of the empirical individual 
whom he is investigating) and his own 
practical evaluations." (36)
In order to grasp Weber’s theory of rationality, however, 
it is necessary to view it in the context of his immanent conception 
of domination, as Marcuse indicates when he points out that the 
"formal analysis of capitalism" becomes, in Weber's work, "the 
analysis of forms of domination". (37) Weber himself asserts that
"Without exception every sphere of social 
action is profoundly influenced by 
structures of dorainancy." (38)
He adds that historically domination has played "the decisive role",
particularly within the most important economic structures of the
manor and the large-scale capitalist enterprise.
Weber’s analysis is, in fact, pervaded by an assumption 
that domination is a necessary feature of any form of social 
organization. It is on this basis that C. J. Friedrichs questions 
the "authoritarian norms" which are embodied in his intended value- 
free work. (39) For Weber, bureaucratic administration is, other 
things being equal, technically the most rational type and 
indispensable for the needs of contemporary society. (40) He also 
notes, however, that
"Bureaucratic administration means 
fundamentally domination through 
knowledge." (41)
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Domination thus enters M s  discussion as an iron, historical 
necessity* This, clearly, is indicative of anything but a 
position of ethical neutrality* An effective value-endorsement 
co-exists with Weber’s attribution of rationality to capitalist 
social organization, both these factors being graphically under­
lined by his scepticism towards the possibility of any qualitative 
as opposed to purely quantitative change with a transition to 
Socialism* (4-2) The profound sociological pessimism that 
underpins this scepticism re-emerges, we will suggest in the 
following section, in both Gidden’s and Parkin’s recent works on 
the class structure of capitalist society. Our Intention up to now, 
however, has been to demonstrate the market-orientation of Weber’s 
concept of class, its roots in his social action theory, and the 
consequence of this for his perception of the capitalist system as 
a whole, including its state form* Weber’s work as a whole, we 
concluded, is structured by a pervasive inductivisra* Our concern 
in the following section will be to critically discuss the Weberian 
conception of class as a market category*
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II. CAPITALISM, SOCIAL CLASSES AND "MARKET SOCIOLOGY".
The last few years have witnessed something of a revival of 
the Weberian approach to the study of industrial behaviour, a central 
preoccupation of which has been to affirm and specify the rationality 
of social action in that context, (l) Much of this work may be 
viewed as the development and consolidation of a tradition that 
derives largely from Weber’s empirical work on the economic rationality 
of workers and management, in particular that whereby workers 
"regulate their output according to plan for material gain". (2)
Our concern, however, will be with two particular attempts 
to construct a model of capitalist social structure which rest on 
Weberian criteria of class, those of Parkin and, more recently, Giddens. 
We will suggest that as with Weber these authors, through adopting an 
essentially static and ahistorical, one-sided definition of class are 
unable to advance beyond the perspectives of what Marx over a 
century ago termed "vulgar economy", the systematization of what is 
directly and behaviourally visible in the sphere of market relations.
The first variant we will consider is the analysis of 
stratification in terms of structured patterns of unequal distribution. 
Frank Parkin, adopting this approach, contends that
"... stratification implies not simply inequality 
but a set of institutional arrangements which 
guarantee a fairly high degree of social 
continuity in the reward position through 
generations." (3)
Parkin thus initially identifies the two crucial characteristics 
of social stratification in toto as inequality of rewards and temporal
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continuity. As against th&^ vie#, the origins of which he 
locates in Weber’s work, that social stratification is a "multi­
dimensional" phenomenon with a heterogeneous network of 
determinants, he identifies the occupational order as the key to 
the class structure of capitalist society. (4) He then seeks 
to account for the inequalities of power that are implied by the 
differential distribution of rewards in terms of the market.
Relative scarcity in the market-place, he contends, is the chief 
determinant of occupational reward and consequently the central 
element of the system of class inequality. Professional and 
managerial positions, for example, are allocated a more favourable 
share of resources than manual labourers primarily because
".... they command the type of skills 
whose scarcity-value furnishes them 
with the power to stake larger claims." (5)
Traditional or customary ideas of occupational status, Parkin adds,
may complicate the distribution of rewards. Such fabtors are
viewed as of secondary importance, however, being "not usually
sufficiently powerful in' themselves to run counter to market
forces in the long run" (Ibid., 23).
Reward hierarchy, both in terms of differential income and 
long-term or concealed advantages is thus, for Parkin, the primary 
criterion of class structure. Although this hierarchy is 
characterised by a blurring between different occupational 
categories. Parkin locates the major line of class cleavage between 
the manual and non-manual groups (Ibid., 24-5)• Social and symbolic 
elements interact with the directly material inequalities between 
these categories. The former, while derived in the last analysis
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from the latter, have a degree of determining autonomy and 
"react back" upon the reward hierarchy itself. They are thus 
not, for Parkin, simply epiphenomenal. The normative and 
social components of class constitute, rather, the social 
mechanisms by which the dominant class seeks to preserve its 
rewards and privileges within the sphere of distribution. Class 
struggle, accordingly, represents an attempt to gain access to or 
control over the social institutions which govern the distribution 
of advantages. Such institutions, eclectically listed, include 
the educational and productive systems and the various elements of 
the state (ibid., 26).
Now in addition to the inequalities associated with the
differential scarcity-value of occupational categories within the
division of labour. Parkin identifies a source of inequality stemming 
from the ownership of property (Ibid., 23 and 123)« As we have 
seen, however, the significance of or social stratification of the 
market is, for Parkin, that it is through it that the incumbents of 
occupational categories are able to exploit the scarcity-value of 
their skills and thus gain advantageously differential rewards, this
being the measure of class position.
It is clear that there is an unresolved problematic in 
Parkin’s thesis. On the one hand, occupational categories are 
seen to be the crucial element of social stratification, "the 
backbone of the class structure" (Ibid., l8). On the other hand, 
the ownership of property is presented as a quite separate source 
of inequality in the structure of differential rewards, as is 
apparent when Parkin notes that income from property is more unevenly
ISS"
distributed than that from occupation. Both are assessed in 
terms of a common factor; their implications for the reward 
hierarchy# Nevertheless, Parkin makes no attempt to 
theoretically account for the relationship, if any, between the 
two sources of inequality. The relationship between them is 
left unexplained, is not even recognised as a problem to be 
theoretically resolved.
The source of this ambiguity lies precisely in Parkin’s 
attempt to locate classes in the sector of distribution and in the 
very bifurcation of property ownership and reward structure that 
this interpretation assumes. Class structure, for Parkin, is a 
structure of unequal rewards, the roots of which lie in the 
occupational order, together with the institutional and political 
arrangements which reinforce it. Property ownership is 
effectively appendaged as an auxiliary determinant of rewards.
This theoretical impression is epitomized in his characterization 
of "the present system based on private ownership of productive 
property and a free market economy" (Ibid., 123)* The methodological 
eclecticism that Parkin criticizes at the level of the elements of 
stratification (age, sex, etc.)(Ibid., l6-7) thus re-emerges in his 
own work in the context of its sources. Property and occupation 
assume the form of independent determinants, related only through 
their effects on a common reward hierarchy.
In fact, Parkin’s identification of class with the 
differential distribution of rewards through the market is 
essentially a variant in the Weberian model discussed above. It 
also recalls J. S. Mill’s statement that "The lav/s and conditions
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of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical 
truths", whereas "the distribution of wealth depends on laws and 
customs of society". (6) The common factor is the primacy or 
autonomy attributed in all three cases to distribution in the 
analysis of class structure.
In the broadest sense, however, it is misleading and 
erroneous to radically separate the social relations of property 
ownership and the distribution of "rewards" on the other in this 
way. In capitalist society, that is to say, the means of 
subsistence accrue to labour in the form of wages, profits being 
initially distributed among industrial capitalists, financiers 
and landlords. Without the wages system and the private ownership 
of property on which it rests, such a form of distribution of 
rewards between labour and the various fractions of the capitalist 
class would be impossible.
In this sense distribution may be said to be determined 
by the social relations of production, by the prevailing and 
dominant form of property ownership. Within the given context, 
empirical variations in the relative distribution of rewards both 
between and within the broad categories of wage-earners and property 
owners can and do take place. Marx thus observed that
"... the periodical resistance on the part 
of the working men against a reduction of 
wages, and their periodical attempts at 
gaining a rise of wages, are inseparable 
from the wages system." (7)
The 1960’s, for example, saw a decline in the real proportion of 
total national income going to wages and salaries in Britain. (8)
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Such variations, however, concern adjustments within an 
enduring structure of distribution, the character and limits of 
which are circumscribed by the prevailing form of capitalist 
ownership,* To isolate reward hierarchy as the primary element 
of class structure, as Parkin does, is to abstract that structure 
of visible Inequality from its wider context. And to identify 
occupational categories and property ownership as totally 
differentiated and independent sources of reward is to further 
mystify that relationship between distribution and consumption on 
the one hand, and property ownership on the other.
At the heart of Parkin's model of capitalist class 
structure is, in fact, a particular conception of social power.
To his credit. Parkin views power as immanent in the structure of 
social inequality rather than exogenous or independently determined. 
At:the same'time, however, it is conceived in terms consistent with 
and reflecting his distributional model of social stratification. 
Thus he notes
"...  power need not be though of as
something which exists over and above 
the system of material and social 
rewards; rather, it can be thoUght 
of as a concept or metaphor which is 
used to depict the flow of resources 
which constitutes this system. And 
as such it is not a separate dimension 
of stratification at all." (9)
The conception of power defined in this way, however, can proceed
no further than a descriptive account of the market flows of
distribution in any given situation. As a result Parkin can only
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conceive of and interpret a transformation of the structure of 
social power in terms of a change in the distribution of society’s 
products. He writes, concerning the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states
"... the party has been able to bring 
about a thoroughgoing transformation 
in the reward structure of former 
capitalist societies". (10)
Parkin generalizes this observation into a thesis which, holding
consistently to the view that reward hierarchy is the primary
criterion of stratification, conceives of a dichotomy between
socialist egalitarianism on the one hand and characteristically
Western political pluralism on the other.
"Egalitarianism seems to require a 
political system in which the state 
is able to continually hold in check 
those social and occupational groups 
which, by virtue of their skills or 
education or personal attributes, 
might otherwise attempt to stake claims 
to a disproportionate share of society's 
rewards". (11)
The most effective way to do this. Parkin addis, is to deny such
groups the right ot organize to pursue their claims. Through the
various state agencies the dominant class has a greater ability to
"govern the allocation of rewards than have members or representatives
of the subordinate class" (Ibid., 27)*
Both Parkin’s models of class and state, as well as his
conception of the range of possible historical alternatives are
thus circumscribed by his identification of social stratification
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with "reward hierarchy" or the structure of unequal distribution.
Marx spent a great deal of time, however, explaining that these 
"rewards" are in themselves an objectified expression of the 
social relations of production characteristic of the society in 
question. The material products of a commodity-producing society, 
that is to say, reflect the basic production relations of that 
society in so far as, through the exploitation of labour-pov/er 
by capital, they reproduce that relationship in the form of a 
relationship between things. Parkin's distributionist conception 
of class thus portrays the social relations of capitalism, but in 
a mystified form. His failure to adequately incorporate property 
ownership into his model, his attribution of a high degree of 
determining autonomy to the occupational structure, and his 
conception of the primacy of relative market scarcity in the 
determination of class structure together produce an inverted, 
static, ahistorical picture of the dynamics of capitalist society.
The capitalist market, a structure and vehicle of inequality, is 
depicted as the source of that inequality itself. It is as if 
money were attributed with the power to "multiply" independently 
of its character as an externalized, fetishized form of the 
exchange relations of commodity production* We will return to 
and draw out some of the implications of this essentially static 
model of capitalist social structure, and in particular its 
relation to Giddens' thesis^in our concluding Summary.
In the case of Giddens, a different aspect of the 
market is abstracted from the totality of the capitalist production 
and reproduction process. Like Parkin, Giddens attaches considerable
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importance, for the emergence of common class situations, to the 
scarcity-valye of the various attributes that social actors bring 
to the market encounter. He does not, however, make Parkin’s 
error of assessing class itself primaril y in terms of the 
resultant structure of unequal reward. Rather, he is concerned 
directly and more consistently with actual social relations in the 
sphere of market interaction. The scope of preoccupations of 
his study call for a more systematic assessment than does the work 
of Parkin, and we will accordingly give more detailed consideration 
to his thesis.
Giddens initially sets himself the ambitious task of 
analysing "the problem in sociology; the question of classes and 
class conflict". (T2) Now whereas Marx was primarily concerned 
with the social relations of production that characterize 
capitalism, a sociological interpretation of class will focus 
attention on "social relations" in general, and in particular on 
the level of immediate (market or otherwise) interaction. (13)
Giddens’ principal problematic in The Class Structure of Advanced 
Societies is what he terms "the structuration of class relationships". (l4) 
In explicating this process he adopts Weber’s notion of "social 
class", which he re-formulates as
"... a cluster of class situations which 
are linked together by virtue of the 
fact that they involve common mobility 
chances, either within the career of 
individuals or across generations." (15)
Giddens’ concern with "class situation" leads him to focus attention 
on the market capacity of members of particular "social classes" in 
so far as they struggle within the market structure of competitive
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capitalism for "scarce returns". (Ibid., 104) It will be our 
contention that it is Giddens’ eclectic criteria for analyzing 
"class structuration" that lead him to locate class at the point 
of encounter in the capitalist market in this way.
In his model of the structuration of class relations 
Giddens distinguishes its "mediate" and "proximate" aspects. The 
former refers to the "overall connecting links" between particular 
market capacities on the one hand and the actual formation of 
identifiable classes on the other: the latter concerns more "localised"
factors, the distribution of mobility chances in particular. (Ibid., 10?)
Concerning mediate structuration, Giddens identifies three 
types of "market capacity" that are of particular determining 
importance. These are the ownership of productive property, the 
possession of educational or technical qualifications, and the 
possession of manual labour-power. Giddens relates these three 
factors to the upper, middle and lower or owrking classes of the 
"basic three-class system in capitalist society". He further 
locates three sources of proximate structuration in the division of 
labour of the productive enterprise, the authority relations within 
the enterprise, and the influence of distributive groupings relating 
to the consumption of economic goods#
Now, while he at one point posits that the "central focus 
of class relations" is "founded in production" (16), it is apparent 
that Giddens principal concern is the definition and analysis of 
class at the level of market encounter. Individuals confront one 
another on the market with diverse attributes which have a greater 
or lesser degree of scarcity value. The possession or non-possession
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of these marketable attributes, along with the proximate factors 
noted above, determine the way in which common class situations 
emerge. The "structuration” of classes and their relations thus 
becomes contingent upon a number of unevenly located determinants, 
as is clear in Giddens' claim that it is "facilitated to the 
degree to which mobility closure exists in relation to any specified 
form of market capacity". (17) As with Parkin, Giddens thus 
reveals eclecticism in his account of the sources of class structure.
Through this model Giddens systematically shifts attention 
away from the Marxian view of class as rooted in the social relations 
of production, a view to which, as we have seen, he pays formal lip- 
service. This becomes explicit when he asserts that Marx
"...failed to recognize the potential 
significance of differentiations of 
market capacity which do not derive 
directly from the factor of property 
ownership." (18)
Market capacity, in Giddens* usage, refers to "all forms of relevant
attributes which individuals may bring to the bargaining encounter.".
In fact, however, Marx was well aware of the importance of 
explaining how the different elements or moments of the production 
cycle, including the various aspects of exchange, are related to 
one another. His view was that their relationship is of an 
essentially unitary nature* Thus, in the Grundrisae he writes
"The conclusion we reach is not that 
production, distribution, exchange 
and consumption are identical, but that 
they all form the members of a totality, 
distinctions within a unity." (19)
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Unlike Giddens, however, Marx, while maintaining the relative 
determining power of the other moments, drew consistent conclusions 
from his identification of the source of the whole cycle, and 
consequently the roots of classes, in production.
"Production predominates not only over 
itself, in the antithetical definition 
of production, but over the other 
moments as well. The process always 
returns to production to begin anew." (20)
For Marx, productive industrial capital is the primary determining
moment of the total process because it is only at this point, as
against the stages corresponding to money-capital and commodity-
capital, that not only the appropriation but also and simultaneously
the creation of surplus value is a function of capital. (21) Only
here in actual production, in other words, are the elements, both
in terms of materiality and of value, for further rounds of the
whole cycle of extended reproduction actually generated. And it is
on this productive function that the other aspects of the cycle are
absolutely dependent.
Specifically concerning the type of market attributes with 
which Giddens is concerned Marx wrote
"It is clear that the exchange of activities 
and abilities which takes place within 
production itself belongs directly to 
production and essentially constitutes it." (22)
Given the primacy of production in the total cycle, in other words,
particular skills and attributes should be viewed as aspects of the
labour-power of their "owners" within a specific historical mode of
production. To take Giddens* example of the formal qualifications
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of the middle class, for example, Marx prophetically, it may he 
said, located their source of material support in the rising mass 
of profits that he saw to accompany extended competetive capital 
accumulation and the increase in social productivity. (25)
The conditions necessary for the support of the middle 
classes, in other words, and for their characteristic mode of 
involvement in the capitalist market are dependent upon and in the 
last analysis determined by the degree of development of the 
productive potential of that society. The "recognised skills" 
which Giddens correctly, if a static moment of the accumulation 
process is being considered, sees to be important in influencing 
market capacity are, we repeat, aspects of labour-power, which in 
turn draws its particular character from its relation to production. 
Giddens* market-encounter orientation toward "class structuration" 
is, in the last analysis, indicative of confusion concerning the 
question of determination in society. Its roots, moreover, may be 
detected in his earlier, "non-applied" study Capitalism and Modern 
Social Theory which should be considered as a compani on or at 
least preparatory work.
In Capitalism and Modern Social Theory Giddens correctly 
stresses the importance that Marx attributed to the importance of 
the market forces of supply and demand in the determination of 
prices. (24) In the later work, on the other hand, he contends, 
as we have seen, that Marx underestimated the significance of the 
**market capacity" of economic actors in the bargaining encounter.
This capacity, central to the structuration of class relations, is 
seen as used to secure economic returns on the basis of the "scarcity*
value" of individual’s "attributes" for which there is a demand*
The logic of Giddens* argument is that the price of, for example, 
labour-power, the "attribute" of the worker, is determined by its 
scarcity-value, thus understood, as he brings it to the market at 
a given level of demand*
Yet this in fact is precisely what Marx contended.
Writing generally of commodities, hiw view was that "Supply and 
demand create the market-pr&ce". (25) The price, as distinguished 
from the value, of labour-power, is, he argued, like that of any 
other commodity, determined in this v/ay.
"Supply and demand regulate nothing but 
the temporary fluctuations of market 
prices. They will explain to you why 
the market price of a commodity rises
above or sinks below its value ......
The same holds true of wages and of the 
prices of all other commodities." (26)
Yet Giddens, in his later work, claims to be correcting an under­
estimation of the importance of this aspect of the working of 
capitalism on Marx*s part.
A key to Giddens* inconsistency can be found, we feel, in 
his discussion of Marx*s theory of alienation. Here Giddens, 
albeit cautiously, isolates alienation in the labour process and 
that of the worker from his product as two sources of alienation 
in capitalist society. He terras them "technological" and "market" 
alienation respectively. (27) While locating the source of both 
in the capitalist division of labour, he suggests that for Marx it 
was only through the overcoming of the latter that the former would
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be abolished.
Now this distinction in fact corresponds With Marx*s own 
distinction, developed in Capital, between the Division of Labour 
in Manufacture and that in Society. (28) In Giddens* Class 
Structure, however, "technological alienation", seen in the earlier 
work as associated with occupational specialization and work 
fragmentation, and as essentially dependent upon and subordinate 
to "market alienation", assumes autonomy in the determination of 
the capitalist class structure. We will attempt to identify the 
ontological assumptions in Giddens* work which structure this 
effective bifurcation of Marx*s concept of alienation and, to 
express the same process differently, lead Giddens to a revision 
of his model of determination.
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx 
identifies four aspects of alienation; the alienation of the 
workers from his product, from the act or process of labour itself, 
from his species-being, and from other men. (29) All four 
aspects are, for Marx, expressions of "the act of estranging 
practical human activity, labour". Alienation is seen as the 
process whereby man objectifies himself in practice in the world 
in conditions under which his products become external powers in 
relation to himself. It is, that is to say, a unitary phenomenon, 
deriving its unity from the capitalist mode of production, a 
consequence of the very conditions of production.
"We took our departure from a fact of 
political economy - the estrangement of 
the worker and his production. We have
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formulated this fact in conceptual terras 
as estranged, alienated labour. We have 
analyzed this concept - hence analyzing 
merely a fact of political economy." (50)
Alienation is, in this way, conceived in terms of Marx’s materialist
ontological model of human essence and practice, the elements of
which are succinctly expressed in this Theses on Feuerbach. Man
makes history, but not in conditions of his own choosing.
Giddens, by contrast, endorses L. Mumford's view of man 
as a "mind-making, self-mastering and self-designing animal". (51)
In order to illustrate this voluntaristic, "consciousness-orientated" 
characterization of man's social being, Giddens, echoing Weber's 
interpretative analysis of capitalism, specifies "industrialism" 
as the application of calculative rationality to production. 
Gounterposing this interpretation to Marx's view of "tool-using 
and production" as the basic element of specifically human life, he 
rejects the "myth" that "industrial man was made by the machine".
It is at this point, however, that Giddens' seriously 
misrepresents Marx's analysis. Marx was not primarily concerned 
with "industrial man", nor with any other such non-relational 
abstraction per se. His theoretical concern was to lay bare the 
social relations of production, the relations of ownership and 
exploitation, together with the law of motion that characterize 
specifically capitalist industrial society.
Now Giddens offers a definition of "industrial society"
(a social order in which "industrialism", or the transfer of 
inanimate energy sources to production through the agency of
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factory organization, predominates in the production of marketable 
goods)(52) which is neutral as regards social relations of 
production. His accompanying definition of capitalism, on the 
other hand, incorporates some of the key features of Marx's analysis 
(in particular, the pursuit of profit, private ownership of the 
means of production, and the existence of a market).(53) His
idiosyncratic characterization of contemporary Western society as 
"post-Marxist", but neither "post-capitalist" nor "post-industrial” (34) 
is, when unravelled, particularly revealing. Giddens'contention, 
essentially, is that the Marxist association of the exploitation of ■ 
wage-labour and its potential for revolution no longer holds. He 
suggests that
"The revolutionary potential of the working 
class depends on the initial encounter with 
capitalism, not upon the maturity of the 
capitalist mode of production." (35)
While Giddens hold open the possibility of a renewal of
class conflict in a political form (36), he considers that the
development of social democracy, oligopoly and long-range state
planning together constitute changes deep-going enough to speak of
the present period as one of "neo-capitalism". (37) Keynesian
state intervention, he suggests, is able to transform capitalism's
crisis-pnoneness into a relatively minor series of economic
fluctuations, while a whole series of inter- and cross-class
"tensions" are seen to undermine the potential for a transition
from working class economism to overt revolutionary confrontation. (38)
Again, however, we are brought back to the same "static",
abstracted interpretation of capitalism that we saw in Giddens' 
analysis of class structuration* The pursuit of profit, correctly 
perceived by Giddens as inseparable from capitalism, is 
conceptualized in total isolation from the obstacles it encounters 
in the actual historical development of that system* The present 
global recessionaiy tendencies attendant on a now well-documented 
international profitability crisis, the demise of the post-war 
system of liberal trade, the collapse of fixed exchange rates in 
the monetary sphere, and the last decade's experience of an 
intensification of the wages struggle within leading capitalist 
countries tell a tale quite different from the relative stability 
of Giddens' neo-capitalism. What is absent from that model is 
precisely the anarchic features of capitalist society that, if 
ignored, leave the present condition of the Western world quite 
inexplicable. Profits, we must stress, are not simply an 
"essential trait" of capitalism, as Giddens suggests. They are 
specifically the life-blood of extended capital accumulation and 
are increasingly under pressure on an inter-national scale. The 
qualitative transition of class struggle from economism is not, 
as Giddens correctly points out, unproblematic. What is totally 
unproblematic, however, is the utopian character of his general 
characterization of late capitalism as more rather than less 
stable than its earlier forms.
We will conclude our assessment of Giddens' theses with 
a summary suggestion that two closely related sources of 
mystification converge in his discussion of "industrial" and 
"capitalist" society.
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Firstly, a voluntaristic and consequently indeterminate 
model of human species-being.
Secondly, an interpretation of capitalism which, while 
formally conceptualizing some key characteristics of capitalist 
social structure, views it as an abstraction, but above all 
statically rather than concretely as the developing, conflict- 
ridden system that it so transparently is.
The connection we see between these two features of 
Giddens' work is as follows. His market model of class structure, 
in the first place, is essentially individualistic, the totality of 
incumbents of a "class situation" being basically a numerical 
aggregate rather than a socio-economic category. In this context, 
his identification of labour-power as a commodity (39) IS undermined 
by his characterization of "social class" as a cluster of class 
situations with common mobility chances. This aggregative- 
individualistic model of class structuration is clearly consistent 
with Giddens' image of man, "mind", "self", etc., being individual 
properties, albeit socially located and determined (or, as Giddens 
has it, "governed" (4o)).
Furthermore, his Keynesian-influenced model of "neo­
capitalist" stability assumes the triumph of rationality at the 
level of systeras-raanagement. Man's "self-mastering", that is to 
say, includes the peaceful conquest of his social environment 
despite the continued hegemony of essentially unplanned capitalist 
property relations.
A primarily voluntaristic image of social man can thus be 
seen to underpin and direct Giddens' analysis of the structure of
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capitalist society. We will suggest in a later section ("Political 
Economy and the British State") that the contradictions of that 
structure are rapidly undermining the central contentions of 
Giddens’ study.
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SUMMARY.
Both Giddens' and Parkin's accounts of the class 
structure of contemporary capitalism, we have argued, divert 
attention away from the more fundamental structuring relations 
of production by their respective bases in variants on the 
Weberian exaggeration of the autonomy of the capitalist market*
In the case of Parkin, a model of class structure is elaborated 
which locates stratification within and in terms of the 
differential distribution of rewards# With Giddens, the 
centrality attributed to market-scarcity, together with an 
explicitly-stated image of social man, results in a model of 
social structure determined first and foremost at the point of 
market encounter.
For both, however, the positivistic concern with 
particular aspects of observable market relations serves to 
obscure the source of the differential patterns of inequality 
that they discover there. Both the occupational reward hierarchy 
and the structure of market "bargaining", we suggest, reflect and 
are expressions of an already existent class structure.
In the first case, differential distribution, mediated 
and reinforced by ideologies of skill and responsibility, both 
between and within classes, is by and large in correspondence with 
the actual structure of capitalist ownership and command, as is 
amply demonstrated in the wealth of empirical studies on economic 
inequality. (4l) The ideological importance of preserving the 
present pattern of distribution is, moreover, apparent from the
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negligible redistributive effects of government incomes policies 
in, for example, post-war Britain* Such a pattern, essentially 
unaltered by past and present Social Democratic governments, is 
a major obstacle to the systematic transformation of economism 
and sectionalism into a thorough-going critique of and struggle 
against the root source of inequality# Such a development would 
constitute a specifically political counter-part to the prevailing 
dominant form of "market" confrontation that has been theoretically 
transformed by Giddens from a form of class struggle characteristic 
of a long economic "boom" period into a major determinant of class 
structure itself.
The possibility and actuality of both "market capacity" 
and "reward hierarchy", we will conclude, assume and are structured 
by the determining prior existence of the capitalist mode of 
production. By abstracting their analysis from this underlying 
necessary condition, the exponents of "market sociology" are, in 
effect, reproducing the mystifications of neo-classical economics. (42) 
The need to develop a critique of this approach is underlined and 
given urgency by the dilemmas of contemporary capitalism, and it 
is as a contribution to such a critique that this section is 
intended.
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of surplus value and configurations of 
capitalist production do not confront one 
another as alienated forms, but as 
heterogeneous and independent forms, merely 
different from one another but not 
antagonistic. The different revenues are 
derived from quite different sources, one 
from land, the second from capital and the 
third from labour. Thus they do not stand 
in any hostile connection to one another 
because they have no inner connection 
whatsoever."
(K, Marx, 1972c, 503)
The contemporary relevance of Marx's comments derives from 
the recent revival of the specifically market-orientated 
sociological positivism epitomised by Giddens' work.
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III SOCIAL CLASS AM) AUTHORITY, THE CASE OF HALF MHRENDORF.
I N T R O D U C T I O N .
Inseparable from Weber's sociology is the fatalistic 
assumption of the necessity of domination, in one form or 
another, in social structure. At the same time, however,
Weber's analysis of the class structure of capitalist 
society is articulated specifically in terms of and at a 
particular level of economic action. Half Dahrendorf, by 
contrast, has abstracted the conceptual field of authority 
from the totality of Weber's work and elaborated a 
comprehensive theory of class structuration wholly in terms 
of it. It will be our contention that Dahrendorf*s social 
theory, while having superficially responded to the massive 
social changes in the capitalist world during the last 
decade or so is, as a corpus of work, flawed by its metaphysical 
assumptions concerning this primacy of authority relations in 
conflict group formation.
Central to his mystified representation of social reality 
is Dahrendorf's persistent failure to examine the class 
formations which emerge from the interaction of man with nature 
through particular historical modes of social production.
In order to demonstrate this we will identify the misleading 
evaluation of Marx's work which pervades Dahrendorf's analysis 
and the liberal ideological influences which, at vital points, 
structure it and divert from the actual sources of power 
and conflict in capitalist society. Finally, it will be 
argued that Dahrendorf's scheme cannot be adequately revised 
on the basis of his own initial assumptions, as a recent 
paper by J.H. Turner has suggested. (l) Rather, the
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metaphysical nature of his contentions can only he critically 
assessed from a diametrically opposed viewpoint which 
systematically identifies and examines capitalism as a form 
of society in which the principal structural cleavage 
derives from the private ownership of productive property 
and not as Dahrendorf holds, the possession of authority#
DAHRENDORF AND MARX# THE TACTICS OF MISREPRESENTATION.
In Class & Class Conflict in Industrial Society 
Dahrendorf presents his theory of "integration and values" 
on the one hand, and "coercion and interests" on the other, 
as the embodiment of "the two faces of society." (2)
He argues that two schools of sociological thought, each, 
claiming the ability to explain the problem of how 
societies cohere, have historically stood in conflict#
Both the "Utopian" school, stressing concensus of values, 
and the "Rationalist" school, stressing force, domination 
and constraint, thus "advance claims of primacy for their 
respective standpcints."
Dahrendorf asserts that both models have, for the 
solution of particular sociological problems, equal explanatory 
validity. He proceeds to argue, however, that in recent years 
sociological thought has been excessively dominated by integration 
theory. In particular, he criticizes Parsons for the essentially 
one-sided nature of his "Utopian" analysis.
Citing the East Berlin revolt of 1953 as evidence of an 
aspect of society quite inexplicable on terms of such theory, 
Dahrendorf similarly challenges the universal explanatory
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power of coercion theory as a sociological approach# The 
two models, he claims constitute complementary rather than 
alternate aspects of social structure# The model of a "Janus­
headed" society, in other words, is Dahrendorf*s methodological 
starting point#
His principal concern in "Class & Class Conflict, however, 
is to explain the aetiology of organized antagonistic social 
"on the assumption of the coercive nature of social structure." (3) 
Dahrendorf*s intention is to explain a particular set of 
problematic social phenomena in terms of the Rationalist 
constraint, as opposed to the Utopian or Consensus model# His 
main thesis is that the coincidence of economic and political 
conflict, as stressed by Marx, has ceased to exist in "post­
capitalist" societies. The theoretical basis of this claim is 
Dahrendorf*s redefinition of class in terms of an aggregate 
of incumbents of similar or identical positions of authority, 
within particular associations. A\ critical assessment of this 
thesis, we will argue, entails the application of Marxist 
analysis to social reality, in order to expose the metaphysical 
nature of Dahrendorf*s proposition. His case, however, rests 
largely on a confused and confusing interpretation of Marx.
Marx must thus be initially rescued from Dahrendorf if the 
letter's work is to be meaningfully evaluated#
In his discussion of the essential equivalence of 
Rationalist and Utopian social theory Dahrendorf cites Marx 
as an example of the Rationalist school# "He assumed",
Dahrendorf notes, "the ubiquity of change and conflict as well 
as domination and subjection." (4) As a prelude to a
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critical examination of Dahrendorf'b own theory of class conflict, 
we will look at his account of Marx's analysis of social class#
We will argue that in this presentation Dahrendorf completely 
misinterprets the essence of Marx's work, giving analytical 
primacy to his political sociology, an aspect which in the 
context of Marx's work as a whole is predicted (though by 
no means in a mechanical way), upon his political economy*
To examine Marx's formal statements on the formation of economic 
classes in capitalist society without serious consideration 
of his theories of commodity production, surplus-value and 
exploitation is, on a fundamental sense, to miss the central 
point of Marx's life work# This, however, is precisely 
what Dahrendorf does#
Dahrendorf lists the factors which he sees to be of particular 
importance in Marx's theory of class# He identifies the 
dupposedly heuristic nature of the theory, its "basic characteristic* 
of being an essentially two-class model, and the source of classes 
in the ownership and non-ownership of the means of production.
In addition he notes the identification of economic: and 
political power, the historical emergence of two major "class 
situations", the realization of classes as such when and only 
when they are organized in political conflict, a view of class 
conflict as the dynamic of social change, and finally an image 
of society in which systematic conflict is "an essential 
feature". (5)
As indicated, however, these factors are when examined 
primarily concerned with what may be termed the political 
sociology of Marx# While Dahrendorf correctly identifies Marx's 
view that classes derive their existence from the ownership 
or non-ownership of the means of production, (6) he
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persistently avoids any detailed analysis of Marx's body of 
work on the production and market dynamics of capitalist society.
A rare and formal reference to the way in which Marx emphasized 
the "free" sale of labour, the production of surplus value, 
mechanized factory production "along with private property 
and the existence of social classes as fundamental to capitalist 
society" (7), does little to alter or augment this absence of 
analysis. Neither does Dahrendorf*8 selected quotation from 
Capital, the essence of which is the equally formal statement :
"The specific economic form in which
unpaid surplus labour is pumped out
of the immediate producers determines
the relation of domination and
subjection as it grows directly out
of and in turn determines production." (8)
While adequately identifying Marx's overall assumptions concerning 
systems of social production in general such selective quotations 
simply indicate the theoretical starting point for Marx's 
analysis of capitalism as a concrete mode of production with 
concrete features. Dahrendorf's analysis, however, at no point 
goes beyond this level of generality and abstraction.
That Dahrendorf sees Marx's theory of class to be an 
essentially heuristic device, for example, ignores the fact 
that Marx also saw classes as historically bound, "objective" socio­
economic formations arising from the social relations of production 
in particular societies. Thus capital, essentially a relation 
of production :
"arises only where the owner of the 
means of production and the means
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of subsistence find in the market 
a free worker who offers his labour 
power for sale." (9)
To view Marx's theory of class as essentially heuristic is, 
in fact, quite consistent with Dahrendorf's effective divorce 
of Marx's polical economy (to which Dahrendorf only briefly 
and formally refers) on the one hand, and analysis of class 
formations on the other. Both, for Marx, were intimately 
related theoretical explanations of actual patterns of social 
relations. Dahrendorf, however, by effectively severing them, 
reduces Marx's notion of class to a speculative and unlocated 
sociological category, upon which the other "features" of his 
work (such as the identification of political and economic 
power) appear mechanically predicated* His almost exclusive 
concern with Marx as a political sociologist thus serves to 
shatter the internal consistency of IMarx's theory. In addition, 
it diverts attention away from Marx's analysis of commodity 
production in capitalist society, the starting point of Capital 
and clear evidence of his concern to explain, in theoretical 
terms, actual social relations of production. (lO) That 
Dahrendorf attributes to Marx's concept of class a purely 
heuristic status thus serves to conceal the one—sidedness 
of his account of that concept.
The same one-sidedness of analysis is apparent in 
Dahrendorf'a comments on the tendencies of change supposedly 
identified by Marx in his analysis of capitalist society.
The processes in question may be termed those of class 
polorization, proletarian pauperization, progressive 
intra-class "levelling" and the tendency of capitalism towards 
revolutionary supercession.
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In the first place, Dahrendorf quotes and comments on a 
passage from the Communist Manifesto which refers to the 
polarization of capitalist society into the "two great hostile 
camps" of proletariat and bourgeoisie, (ll) Dahrendorf, 
however, ignores the evidence that in his later work, 
informed by a mature political economy, Marx's model of 
advanced capitalist society had developed radically to 
incorporate "the constant increase of the middle classes." (l2)
This theoretical advance derives from the labour theory of 
value as applied to long-term tendencies within capitalism.
In particular, Marx predicted that with the growing social 
productivity of labour there would be simultaneous rise 
in the mass and decline in the rate of profit. The rate of 
profit tends to fall because, while labour power is the source 
of all value, the inherent competetiveness of capitalism 
generates a steadily rising proportion of constant capital 
(machinery) to variable capital (wages), thus persistently 
(though not necessarily without interruption), diminishing 
the relative size of the value producing component of 
production. It was on the basis of the rising mass of 
profit that the expanding middle class sector could, for 
Marx, be supported. Dahrendorf's brief remarks are, however, 
untouched by such considerations. As such they are unable to 
seriously consider, let alone challenge, Marx as a politcal 
economist.
Dahrendorf cjuotes from Capital to assert that as the two 
"great hostile camps," polarize, their class situations become 
"increasingly extreme." He deduces that according to the 
"so-called theory" (sic) of pauperization, "the poverty of the 
proletariat grows with the expansion of production by virtue of 
a law postulated as inherent in a capitalist economy." (l3)
- 184 -
Again, Dahrendorf» s conclusion is invalidated 
by a more careful examination of Marx's work. In 
Capital Marx' wrote ;
"In manufacture the enrichment of 
the collective worker, and therefore 
of capital, in the matter of social 
productivity, is dependent upon the 
impoverishment of the workers in 
the matter of their individual
powers of production." (my emphasis D*B.) (l4)
The context of this observation is Marx's analysis of 
large-scale industry, which detaches science from 
labour, making the former an independent force of 
production and "pressing it into the service of 
capital". He goes on to quote approvingly a passage 
from Fergusen, comparing the workshop to "an engine, 
the parts of which are men". Ifhat Marx is discussing 
thus emerges as the qualitative deterioration of the 
life-situation of the working class as, ivith scientific 
and technological development, it becomes more and more 
subject to the specifically scientific exploitation 
of its labour power by capital.
Furthermore, Marx elsewhere speaks of a worker's 
wages as that part of his product ;
"required for the maintenance and
reproduction of (his) labour power,
be the conditions of this maintenance
and reproduction scanty or bountiful,
favourable or unfavourable." (my emphasis D.6 .)
(15)
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Even in the narrow sense of wages, then, pauperization 
for Marx is relative rather than absolute. This 
formulation is consistent with and derives from Marx's 
materialist view that human needs are essentially 
historical products to use Marx's terminology, the 
value of labour power includes "ahistorical and a moral 
factor." (1 6 ) While the working class has, in a 
number of countries, suffered an absolute decline 
in its living standards (1 7 ), this is not what 
"pauperization" in its broadest sense meant for Marx.
His concern was to depict the contradiction between 
the developed nature of the means of production and the 
increasing alienation of the direct producers in the 
face of them. This insight is quite different from 
Dahrendorf's mechanical and simplistic interpretation.
When Dahrendorf considers the question of the 
increasing homogeneity within the two major classes 
of capitalist society he attributes to Marx a prediction 
concerning "the reduction of all workers to unskilled 
labourers by the technical development of production." (I8 )
Ifhat Marx in fact argued, however, was that with 
the development of the "automatic factory" there is :
"a tendency towards the equalisation 
or levelling down of the work which 
the assistants of the machinery have to 
perform." (1 9 )
"In so far as the division of labour reappears" (my emphasis 
D.5.) in this situation, however, Marx locates it »n the
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distribution of workers among the specialized machines.
He identifies the "main cleavage" to be that between 
the minders of machines and their attendants. In 
addition, he speaks of a scientifically trained 
"superior class of workmen." While referring to this 
emerging division of labour as "purely technical,"
Marx thus at no point postulates the general and all- 
embracing de-skilling of the working class incorrectly 
attributed to him by Dahrendorf. In the first place, 
"equalisation" is specified by Marx to be a tendential 
development. And secondly, Marx never imagined that 
either capitalism or its historical successor would 
do away with technology, requiring skill and training, 
as vital to production. Dahrendorf, in short, attributes 
an unwarranted utopian element to Marx's analysis.
More recently, Dahrendorf has asserted that in 
Marx's work :
"the terminology of economics serves 
above all to express disgust in a 
seemingly objective manner and thus 
to impress those other dreamers of 
a world without all the nasty 
realities of economic life, without 
capital and wage labour, without the 
alienated reality of money and the 
exchange value of human effort, 
without even a division of labour 
to speak of, the unpolluted world 
of non-economic man." (2 0 )
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To merely list some of the key concepts of Marxist 
analysis in this mechanical way, however, is not to 
examine their theoretical validity in relation to social 
reality, let alone to offer a systematic critique of 
them* As with the question of the "equalisation" of 
labour, he unjustifiably accuses Marx of a fundamental 
utopianism. Marx, in fact, was concerned with the 
analysis of historical societies, capitalism in particular, 
on the basis of their structure and tendential movements 
as they derive from underlying patterns of socio-economic 
relations. His occasional remarks concerning the nature 
of hypothetical social relations in communist society 
are informed by the assumption that the anarchy of capitalist 
production on the one hand, and the crippling effects 
of capitalism's division of labour on the other, will 
have been abolished in the historical act of revolution. 
Alllthis, in turn, assumes a high development of the 
material forces of production. Or, in Trotsky's 
succinct formula, " a society which from the very 
beginning stands higher in its development than the most 
advanced capitalism." (2 1 )
To identify Marx with "those other dreamers of a 
without all the nasty realities of economic life” 
is to ignore, for example, his comments in the l8 ?0 's 
on the Eisenacher socialist faction. In the Critique 
of the Gotha Programme he criticized their utopian 
notion that workers should directly receive the 
"undiminished proceeds" of their labour on the grounds 
that deductions are necessary to cover replacement 
costs of the means of production, expansion of production.
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and any unexpected expenses that may arise. (22)
Perhaps one need only agree with Dahrendorf*s comment 
on the passage quoted above (23) that "This is a 
caricature, to be sure." Ttie basis of* this caricature 
is a view of Marx as primarily a political sociologist 
at the expense of any serious analysis of his political 
economy. Dahrendorf's formal allusion to Marx's 
notion of a classless society (24), thus fails to 
examine Marx's claim to have discovered, on the basis 
of the labour theory of value, actual developments 
within capitalism which determine its tendency towards 
crises and breakdown. Within this questionable 
focus of attention, moreover, Dahrendorf commits a 
number of serious misreadings and misunderstandings 
concerning key and important sectors of Marx's analysis. 
Particularly relevant for this critique are the distortions 
discussed above concerning class in Marx's work.
CLASS REVISITED.
While unsatisfactorily offering a critique of 
Marx's usage of class, however, Dahrendorf seeks to 
preserve and develop the concept as such. He defines 
class as a category for the analysis of conflict- 
orientated formations with systematic roots in the 
structure of society. (25) Hfhereas Marx::held that 
classes are rooted objectively and materially in the 
social relations of production, Dahrendorf's innovation 
is to view classes as aggregates of the incumbents 
of identical or similar positions within particular 
relations of authority. (26) For Dahrendorf the 
identification of particular authority roles and their
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characteristics constitutes "the first task of 
conflict analysis." (27) His basic unit of theoretical 
analysis is the Weberian "imperatively co—Ordinated 
association, "characterized by internal relations of 
legitimate authority, and within which the dominant 
and subjected groups have difference and opposing 
interests. (Ibid., 1?6 ) Using a scheme incorporating 
"quasi-groups" and "interest groups". Dahrendorf 
constructs an elaborate and systematic model of the 
transition from "latent" to "manifest" interests.
This model both augments and flows from the logic 
of his initial assumption concerning the primacy of 
legitimate relations of authority as a determinant 
of class interests and conflict. It is on this 
theoretical assumption that Dahrendorf *s analysis of the 
class dynamics of "industrial society" must stand or 
fall.
A recent work by Giddens (28) contains a 
critique of Dahrendorf*s thesis as outlined above.
His critical comments,while on the whole of value, 
ignore, or barely touch upon important weaknesses 
in Dahrendorf*s work, weaknesses which Gidden's book 
in fact shares. Nevertheless, they are useful as 
a starting point for discussion, and idLll be -used in 
this context for that purpose.
Giddens challenges Dahrendorf*s model in terms of 
both its claims to account for the social reality of 
class conflict and its internal consistency. (2 9 )
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Concerning the former, Giddens attacks both the 
Dichotomous nature of Dahrendorf*s model, and its 
inherent tendency to shift attention away from the 
problem of "classlessness". Giddens further points 
out that Dahrendorf*s model neither implies that 
there is any necessary conflict of interest between 
dominant and subordinate authority groups, nor that 
special attention should be paid (as it is in Class 
and Class Conflict) to the areas of the state and 
industry. These weaknesses on Dahrendorf*s exposition 
all share a common source in his initial attempt to 
substitute authority for property ownership as the 
key determinant of class relations. They all raise 
substantive problems of sociological method, however, 
and as such must all be considered independently.
At the same time, it is their common linlc with Dahrendorf *s 
assumptions concerning the nature of social class that 
gives them special relevance and significance for the 
concerns of this critique.
Giddens* initial criticism challenges Dahrendorf*s 
assumption of the dichotomouS nature of authority 
relations. He seeks to correct what he sees to be the 
theoretical erudity of Dahrendorf*s rigid dichotomy 
between possession and non-possession of authority 
by postulating "a graded hierarchy of relationships." 
(Ibid., 72 )
While this criticism is essentially correct, it
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it should be pointed out that Dahrendorf does empirically 
recognize the widespread delegation of authority in 
many associations, such as the states. (30) His 
comments remain at an empirical level, however, and thus 
leave his fundamentally dichotomous model of authority 
relations unaltered. They do not fundamentally alter 
the polarized nature of his revised model of class.
Further, Dahrendorf's analysis of authority 
relations in no way implies the necessity of conflict 
of interest over authority which he posits. (31)
Whereas for Marx the opposition of interest between 
classes derives from the generation and appropriation 
of surplus value, Dahrendorf*s theory allows the 
sociological possibility of permanent, voluntary and 
consensual cooperation around a set of fundamental 
and enduring shared interests. His model of society 
as conflictual and his image of class as an aspect 
of a relationship of authority are, in other words, 
mechanically and arbitrarily paired and have no 
intrinsic connection.
Dahrendorf*s notion of class, moreover, implies 
and even posits an indeterminate plurality of classes, 
corresponding to the interest aggregates in each and 
every imperatively coordinated association. (32)
His effective restriction of analysis to "the two great 
associations of the state and the industrial enterprise (33) 
is an intuitive and arbitary decision and, as -with his 
assumption that classes are inherently conflictual,
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constitutes a major hiatus in his theoretical edifice.
As Giddens points out, Dahrendorf's view of class 
"directs attention away from the contrast between 
'class* and 'classlessness* as conceived in Marxian 
theory. " (34) ('i.l ) Dahrendorf »s image of society
and the classes which compose it assume the a priori 
necessity of relations of authority, and since he defines 
classes in terms of such relations the notion of 
"classlessness becomes both a logical and a sociological 
immpossibility. Gidden's ensuing claim that "we do 
not make any significant theoretical gains by substituting 
* authority* for 'class'" (35) is an understatement. 
Dahrendorf's shift of emphasis, I will argue, represents 
a mystification at the theoretical level* His conceptual 
myopia as regards the notion of classlessness, however, 
follows directly from his view of class and is quite 
consistent with it.
DAHRENDORF AND CAPITALISM.
Ifhile Gidden's remarks constitute a useful corrective 
to some of Dahrendorf*s theoretical weaknesses, 
inconsistencies and ambiguities, ai more thorough-going 
critique requires a shift of attention to aspects of 
social reality quite untouched by the former's analysis.
In particular, Dahrendorf*s decision to sever his 
analysis of imperatively coordinated associations, 
especially when he considers industrial enterprises.
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from the broader economic context in which they operate, 
results in a decontextualized and mystified portrayal 
of the constraints which persistently operate on those 
associations.
Concerning the analysis of societies as totalities 
Dahrendorf notes :
"total societies can present the 
picture of a plurality of competing 
dominant (and, conversely, subjected) 
aggregates." (36)
But what, it must be asked, does this really mean?
At its simplest, different associations may at certain 
times find themselves in competition or, by extension, 
conflict with one another. To state this, however, 
is to state a mere truism. VTiat is lacking is an 
explanatory account of the concrete conditions and 
forces which make actual dominant groups compete 
Afith their equivalents in other associations at 
particular points in time,
Marx described how the general functioning of 
social production and the market under capitalism is 
quite independent of that system's individual components, 
whether human individuals or industrial enterprises 
are selected as the units of analysis,
"Idiereas, on the basis of capitalist 
production, the mass of direct 
producers is confronted by the 
social character of their production
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in the form of strictly regulating 
authority and a social mechanism of the 
labour process organised as a hierarchy 
among the bearers of this authority, 
the capitalists themselves, who 
confront one another only as commodity 
owners, there reigns complete anarchy 
within which the social interrelations 
of production assert themselves only 
as an overwhelming natural force 
in relation to individual free will." (37)
That Dahrendorf at no point gives either empirical 
or theoretical consideration to the fundamental autonomy 
of capitalism indicates the narrowness of his field 
of analysis when measured against the range of factors 
operant.
Within this anarchic economic framework, competition 
is and remains a key feature, even with the progressive 
centralization of capital. As Marx notes :
"The development of capitalist production 
necessitates a continuous increase 
of the capital invested in an industrial 
undertaking; and capitalism 
subjects every individual capitalist 
to the immanent laws of capitalist 
production as external coercive laws. 
Competition forces him continually 
to extend his capital for the sake 
of maintaining it, and he can only
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extend it by means of 
progressive accumulation," (38)
Dahrendorf*s liberal image of a plurality of competing 
dominant interests both appears and is quite metaphysical 
when faced with the actual structural imperatives 
imposed by capitalism, the general scenario of productive 
activity in societies where ownership of the means 
of production rests in private hands. Capitalism and 
the historically bound patterns of social relationships 
that derive from it, in short, represent a dimension 
of social reality left unexplored in Dahrendorf*s work.
ON THE QUESTION OF POWER.
The central proUematic in Dahrendorf's work, 
we will now suggest, is his treatment of the phenomenon 
of power in society. Dahrendorf's own view is that 
scientific research is characterized by what he terms 
"problem consciousness". Ifhat I mean, he explains :
"is that at the outset of every 
scientific investigation there has to 
be a fact or set of facts that is 
puzzling the investigator." (39)
At no point in Dahrendorf's work, however, is power 
systematically treated as a problem to be examined by 
scientific methods. Parallel and intimately related 
to his reduction of class relations to authority 
relations is his notion of stratification as ultimately 
derived from normative evaluation. Metaphysics in this
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way replace science as the methodological basis of 
Dahrendorf»s analysis. This mystification at the 
level of methodology underlies the major errors and 
inconsistencies in his analysis of, to use his own 
terminology, "industrial society."
Throughout his Work Dahrendorf repeatedly refers 
to the divergent interests which characterize modern 
society. At the outset, it will be noted that after 
he wrote Class and Class Conflict an important shift 
of emphasis took place in the model he used for the 
analysis of authority relations. Briefly, he came 
to argue increasingly for the essential superiority 
of the coercion or conflict model. (4o)  This 
recognition of the importance and centrality of social 
conflict itself reflects the increasing militancy of 
workers which characterized the whole developed capitalist 
world in the late 1960's and, to an even greater extent, 
the early 1970*s.
The notion of "the plurality of interests in society 
and their contradictory character" is a recurrent theme 
in Dahrendorf*s work. He introduces a quite different 
element of finality and what I will term sociological 
absolutism, however, when he posits the inherent inequality 
of society. In On the Origin of Inequality among Men, for
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example, he argues that social stratification is a universal 
phenomenon,"Htiman society", the logic goes," always means 
that people's behaviour is being removed from the randomness 
of chance and regulated by inescapable expectations". These 
expectations or norms, based on the operation of sanctions 
imply for Dahrendorf that
"there must always be at least that 
inequality of rank which results from 
the necessity of sanctioning behaviour 
according to whether it does or does 
not conform to established norms." (41)
For Dahrendorfjthen, social norms and sanctions are the 
basis not only of "ephemeral individual rankings" but 
also of "lasting structures of social positions." This, 
in its bare outlines, constitutes Dahrendorf*s explanation 
of the empirically correct observations that s
"Even in the most affluent society it
remains a stubborn and remarkable
fact that men are unequally placed." (42)
The enduring nature of the particular inequalities 
of capitalism is inexplicable in terms of this theory, 
however. In the first place, Dahrendorf*s assertion is 
incorrect: it is in fact behaviour that is subject to
sanctions, although all human behaviour takes place 
within and is mediated by a system of more or less 
visibly coercive social relations which find their 
expression in "positions". The significance of Dahrendorf*s
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view that norms are, in the last analysis, the basis of 
ranking, emerges when it is remembered that he attacks 
Parsons for presenting an almost identical explanation. (43) 
Even within his own assumptions, therefore, there is a 
profound and unresolved inconsistency in Dahrendorf *s 
work concerning the relationship between norms and social 
ranking.
The fundamental weakness of Dahrendorf*s theory becomes 
apparent when he attempts to identify the primary obstacle 
to the realization of the "pure" market model of society.
"Plainly there is some force 
that persistently interferes with the 
pure realization of market-rational 
principles, something that makes 
it impossible to play the market- 
rational game according to purely formal 
rules. This force can be identified; 
it is power, and the social consequences 
of power." (44)
At no point, however, does Dahrendorf attempt to explain 
in theorectical terms precisely what constitutes the 
source of power itself. He defines power as :
"the ability, by virtue of social 
roles, to make and enforce norms 
influencing the life chances 
of others." (45)
On the question of how and why such structured relations of
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legitimate authority emerge Dahrendorf ia persistently 
silent. A circular^tautologous argument explains power 
in terms of the authority relations which it was introduced 
to explain. Power, in short, is left unaccounted for.
It is, rather, defined in terms of Dahrendorf * s assumption 
of the nature of social institutions as imperatively 
coordinated associations and introduced, in a quite 
enigmatic and mysterious manner, seemingly above or beyond 
theoretical analysis.
When, perhaps unaware of the circular nature of his 
explanation, Dahrendorf does offer a solution to the 
problem of power-as-a^problem, the result is unconvincing 
and, in terms of its sociological content, arbitrary.
"Perhaps we must indeed assume 
something like Kant's 'unsociable 
sociability* of man in order to 
find a convincing argument for 
the: universality of ruling and 
serving." (46)
This "explanation" is rendered inadecpiate on at least two 
grounds. Firstly, it is ahistorical. Any explanation 
of power which fails to account for both the different 
modes of rule (in terms of the social composition of the 
dominant and subject groups) and types of rule (for example 
relying on accepted authority, or on a more or less 
widespread use of violence) is neither of operational use 
nor of .explanatory power. Secondly, it is metaphysical 
in so far as it seeks to define the "essence" of man 
in an abstractly-formulated concept which relates 
concretely neither to aspects of his biology nor to 
features of his social and/or natural environment.
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Dathrendorf, in fact, defends his analysis of power 
and social stratification on the grounds that its 
presuppositions, the existence of norms and the necessity 
of sanctions, "may be regarded as axjiomatic." (47)
These norms cannot be "regarded as aX:iomatic" if they 
are to have any genuine explanatory as opposed to purely 
definitional and assertive content, however. The fallacy 
which sustains the whole myth of "power" in Dahrendorf*s 
work is exposed when he asserts :
"In the last analysis, established 
norms are nothing but ruling norms, 
that is norms defended by the 
sanctioning agencies of society 
and those who control them." (48)
Where, one may ask, does this differ from Marx's view 
that the ruling ideas in any society are those of the 
ruling class? Since, for Dahrendorf, conflict between 
different ruling groups within the same society is a 
feasible situation, "the expression 'ruling class' is, 
in the singular, quite misleading." (49) In the 
same work, however, he actually identifies a political 
ruling class in the form of the state administrative 
staff, the governmental elites at its head, and those 
"interested parties" represented by them. (50)
This schema.cannot, however, account for the 
"most general authority" from which it claims bureaucracies 
borrow or are delegated their authority. Dahrendorf argues 
that the governments of Western societies are often "mere 
switchboards of authority; decisions are made not by 
them but through them." (51) This logic leads him to
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conclude that the ruling class is fundamentally a changing 
body of interest groups and individuals assuming power 
on a transient, often electoral basis.
What this argument misses, however, is the basic
fact that in capitalist society (private ownership of
the means of production remains its fundamental structuring
feature) the same structurally rooted interest groups 
typically preserve and maintain their positions of relative 
strength or weakness over time no matter which party or 
"veto group" is in power. The following table, spanning 
almost half a century, demonstrates this continuity*
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN BRITAIN, 
1911-13 to I960
YEAR PROPORT101
....... .....
 ^OF WEALTH OWNE 
%
D BY THE TOP 
10^
1911-13 69 87 93
1924-30 62 84 91
1936-38 56 79 88
1954 43 71 79
i960 42 75 83 (52)
These figures indicate a small but persistent decline 
in the proportion of reported wealth of the top 1^ and, 
to a lesser extent, the top 5^ of the population over the 
period in question, although the same tendency is less 
conclusive when the top 10^ is considered. Glyn and
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Sutcliffe have similarly demonstrated that when the period 
1870 - 1970 is viewed as a whole, the position of labour 
has improved relative to capital using changes in the share 
of wages in output as an index. (53) This shift in the 
pattern of distribution has taken place within the context 
of continuing capitalist property relations, however, and 
as such represents no change in the overall structure of 
social relations of production, in the structured relations 
between individual social actors "in so far as they are 
personifications of economic categories, representatives 
of special class relations and class interests." (54)
, The social reality of capitalism thus gives the lie 
to Dahrendorf*s account of the ruling class. Renner has 
demonstrated how, after the decline of feudalism the transition 
from simple commodity production to the accumulation of 
capital as such was accompanied by a change in the function 
of property, even while the laws relating to property 
underwent no corresponding change. As the social process of 
production increasingly derived its unity from capital, 
the legal detention of the means of production was progressively 
transferred to the employers of direct producers. These 
employers, at the same time, progressively ceased to perform 
any productive labour themselves. (55)
Social patterns increasingly assume a systematic 
nature with the labou]>-capital relationship as the basis of 
the new synthesis. In particular, the private owners of 
productive property preserve their structural position as 
an exploiting class as long as that property remains in 
private hands. The sanctity of private property is maintained by
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the law and its agencies, as Renner has demonstrated, and 
is idealogically reinforced in a variety of ways. Quito 
in contradiction to Dahrendorf*s view, authority is in this 
way derived from factual relations of production. Thus, 
in his celebrated discussion of Homo Sociologious. he at 
no point attempts to explain the genesis of roles, the 
general theory of which he elaborates at some length. (56) 
His discussion totally lacks an account of the nature of 
the societies in which particular roles operate. On a 
rather more concrete level, he asserts, in Class and Class 
Conflict, that :
"For the industrial worker, the labour 
contract implies acceptance of a role 
which is, inter alia, defined by the 
obligation to comply with the commands 
of given persons." (57)
To, admittedly bluntly, demystify this contention, Dahrendorf 
brakes his analysis before the point at which an explanation 
of the way in which an employer (capitalist) buys on the 
market the labour power of a worker (propertyless labourer) 
and of how this economic relationship determines their 
mutual role expectations, becomes necessary. This abrupt 
analytical halt is consistent with and determined by 
Dahrendorf's conception of class, a conception which is 
myopic to the way in which the relationships he examines are 
circumscribed and, in the last analysis, determined by wider, 
especially market; patterns of structured influence and 
constraint. By abandoning the analysis of the range of
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types of authority which reinforce and legitimize particular 
types of social relations of production, (58) Dahrendorf 
abandons the theoretical problem of the roots of authority 
in social power and, as a consequence, the source of that 
power itself* The key to this mystification is the reification 
of authority as a sociological category. And its consequence 
is an imsige of society as a structure of mutual and reoiprocol 
legitimate expectations for which no origin or source is 
indicated.
DAHRENDORF, KANT, AND THE GHOST IN THE MARKET PLACE.
Parallel and closely related to Dahrendorf*s failure 
to systematically examine power as a social phenomenon are 
the liberal philosophical and political assumptions which 
permeate and, in a vital sense structure his work. The 
essence of the liberal world—outlook is the fundamental 
right of the individual to develop his own personality and 
potentialities with the minimum of repressive interference 
from outside agencies. Or, as Mill expressed this leading 
idea :
"To give any fair play to the nature of 
each, it is essential that different persons 
should be allowed to lead different lives." (59)
This principle is taken up by Dahrendorf when he asserts :
"Only one thing remains certain; that 
if the new rationality is to be compatible 
with human freedom, it must be market 
rationality." (60)
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Since he has already specified the "market" or "liberal" 
pattern to be that which seeks "a maximum yield at a minimum 
cost - for example, a maximum of individual happiness with 
a minimum of political decision", (ibid., 21?) the 
liberal basis of his choice of preference is clear and 
unmistakable. His revealing example relates directly 
to the oethics of political liberalism.
Now while such an ethic may ideally (that is under a 
set of hypothetical "ideal" social relationships) be a 
liberating principle, its validity as a methodological 
tool for sociological analysis is marginal. In particular, 
it is oblivious to the asymmetrical distribution under the 
capitalist form of production.
In Unoertaintly, Science and Democracy, for example, 
Dahrendorf asserts the fundamentally uncertain nature of 
human knowledge and draws the corollary that "freedom for 
conflict" is a necessary precondition of "the just society". (6l) 
But while he formally accepts that science concerns the 
realm of the true and, he stresses, is a verifiable procedure, 
Dahrendorf*s analysis fails in key areas to operationalize 
his implicit dictum of the desired objectivity of sociological 
explanation. In particular, he fails to examine the observable 
regularities in the social relations of production. His 
notion of "freedom for conflict" neither recognizes nor 
explains the labour-capital relationship which directly and 
materially reveals the central conflict of bourgeois society.
Similarly, he suggests that the rules of conflict
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regulation can only "serve their function" when the two 
sides are able to compete "on an equal footing". (62)
The outstanding structural feature of capitalist society, 
howeveb, is that the two major classes, property owners and 
the propertyless, do NOT compete on an equal footing.
Dahrendorf proceeds by constructing an ideal-typical model 
of "equal" conflicting groups and then formally-virtually 
in parentheses - suggests that in some instances this may 
not in fact be the case. A more transparent case of 
idealogical exposition would be difficult to find in his 
work. The reality of social exploitation is systematically 
and persistently ignored.
Dahrendorf*s liberalism shows itself, in a quite different 
way, in hie critique of role theory in Homo Sociologious.
Having outlined the essential elements of role theory, he 
argues that man is "not merdly the sum of his characters". (63) 
Dahrendorf polemically raises the philosophical issue of 
free will versus determinism and posits the Kantian solution 
that both views are :
"simply different ways of comprehending
the same subject, ways that derive
from different sources of knowledge." (64)
He reiterates, in other words, Kant's notion that the two 
aspects of man, the noumenal and the phenomenal arç 
complementary rather than mutually contradictory. (65)
What Dahrendorf has done here, however, is to introduce 
into his analysis a speculative and highly intuitive
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assumption which posits a fundamental dualism inherent in 
human nature. This assumption in no recognizable way 
relates to either his model of conflicting class aggregates, 
nor his assumption that authority is the determink^element 
of those classes.
Why, we may ask does he do this? The answer may be 
implied in his suggestion that Sociology, with its deterministic 
image of man, may have become ,s
"a promoter, or at least an
unprotesting supporter, of unfreedom
and inhumanity." (9) (66)
Dahrendorf*B uncomfortable reiteration of the Kantian view 
of human nature, it becomes apparent, provides a theoretical 
framework with which to rescue human freedom, without 
which he would be left with only "the horrible phantom of the 
totalitarian society." (67) This random image is introduced 
as a deus ex machina, an ontolological assumption quite 
unrelated to his underlying model and image of society.
It is systematically related to neither his structural 
analysis of society on the one hand, nor his image of man 
in society on the other. It is, however, both compatible 
with and evidence of his underlying liberal values, values 
which are linked to his Sociology in a purely mechanical 
way. As such it is directly analogous to his acceptance of 
the uncertainty principle and his preference for the "market" 
model of society. And as such it both suffers from and 
evidences the same fundamental weakness: a partial and 
inadequate account and explanation of power in society. (66)
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THE SPECIFICITY OF ALIENATION.
Critically assessing the "hypostalized regularities" 
of sociological theory, Dahrendorf ooncludes :
"This is why an image of man may 
be developed that stresses man's 
inexhaustible capacity for overcoming 
all the forces of alienation that 
are inherent in the conception and 
reality of society." (69)
The basic problem with this plea for human liberation is 
that it is predicted on a fundamentally unsatisfactory 
explanation of the social forces which produce the assumed 
condition of alienation in the first place. Dahrendorf, 
it will be remembered, revised Marx by identifying the 
dynamic of class conflict in relationships of authority,
Marx began Capital with an account of the social production 
of commodities and, throughout that work, traced and outlined 
the functioning of capitalism as a particular historical 
mode of social production. In depicting the process of the 
"self-expansion of capital", he elaborated, in terms of a 
scientific account of the social relations of production 
under capitalism, his conception of the alienation of man from 
himself, his products, nature and humanity.
To posit, however, as Dahrendorf does, that differential 
"rudimentary inequality" has its source in differential 
social sanctioning is merely to describe one aspect of social 
reality at the expense of scientifically examining its 
nature as a system of social production. Thus he can write :
%
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"I am ...making an arbitrary decision
here when I distinguish the distributive
area of stratification — the explicandum
of our theoretical discussion - from
non-distributive inequalities such as
those of power. According to this
distinction, wealth and prestige
belong to the area of stratification,
even if they are assembled to a
considerable extent by one.person; property
and charisma, by contrast are nondistributive." (?0)
In this short but vital passage Dahrendorf identifies his 
concern to be the essentially descriptive account of the 
distributive sector, rather than the analysis of the dynamics 
of the social relations of production which underlie, though 
by no means mechanically, the distributive realm and provide 
the framework for whatever autonomy (via, for example, state 
intervention) it may have. In the process of doing this he 
somewhat arbitrarily associates property with charisma.
The essential point, however, is that Dahrendorf*s failure 
to deal adequately with social stratification derives from 
his substitution of metaphysical assumptions concerning 
authority relations for historically grounded causes of 
stratification. (?l) Marx identified the genesis of 
specifically capitalist stratification in the process of 
primary capital accumulation. On the basis of this 
accumulation capitalism with its special laws of motion, 
developed into a sui genesis system of social production, 
truly explicable only in terms of itself. (72) Dahrendorf*s 
account, by contrast, hangs on a transparently metaphysical 
reification of authority as the key determinant. It is this 
feature that gives his work, in the last analysis its mystified 
character.
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THE REALITY OF CLASS CONFLICT.
And how, finally, do Dahrendorf*s theories square up 
with the social experience of the last decade? While 
diplomatically conceding the existence of "countertrends", 
he contends ;
"I4y thesis is that in post-capitalist 
society industrial conflict has become 
less violent because its existence has been 
accepted and the manifestations have 
been socially regulated." (73)
The reality of the late 1960’s and early 1970's, 
however, has been one in which increasing labour militancy 
has been a key feature of the capitalist world. Since 
1969, in particular, the incidence of strikes suddenly 
doubled across most of Europe after having remained more 
or less static for two decades. In Britain, for example, 
the number of days per year lost through strikes since 
World War Two are as follows:-
(•000)
1945-54 2,073
1955-64 3,889
1965 2,932
1966 2,395
1967 2,783
1968 4,719
1969 6,725
1970 10,908
1971 13,558
(7)
(74)
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Rising labour militancy has intensified this trend, 
both in Britain and in the developed capitalist world, 
throughout the early 1970*s. Of particular interest is the 
case of West Germany. Dahrendorf has argued that in that 
country the practice of co-determination would tend to increase 
rather than diminish industrial conflict as labour leaders 
became increasingly involved in management tasks. (75)
Industrial conflict has intensified in West Germany, 
but for quite different reasons. Co-determination has raised 
the issue of workers* control but in a manner quite unforseen 
by Dahrendorf. A recent Federal Court proposal, applying 
to the largest 600 or so companies would reduce the proportion 
of shareholders representatives on their supervisory boards 
vis-a-vis workers* representatives from two-thirds to one-half. 
While still at the draft stage, these proposals were denounced 
and opposed by leading employers as "backdoor nationalization" 
and even "a threat to the free pluralistic social order in 
which private property played a decisive part." (?6)
The context of this development is a fall in the rate of 
growth of the German economy since the late 1960*8 and an 
outbreak of strikes and militancy in the engineering, printing, 
public and other sectors. It is these developments in German 
society as a primarily capitalist country that have led to 
pressure from the working class to increase their representatives 
in individual companies* supervisory boards. Capitalism, 
both nationally and internationally, still rests on the private 
ownership of productive property. Within it, the structurally 
opposing groups of labour and capital more or less consciously 
and coherently confront one another with their rival claims, 
c laims ultimately rooted in opposing and irreconcilable
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interests* It is the fundamental structural contradiction 
of capitalism and not, as Dahrendorf asserts, the tendency 
for workers* representatives to become conscious or unconscious 
agents of the **dominant group", defined in terms of authority 
relations, that ultimately renders co-determination irrelevant 
for the resolution of industrial conflict.
Once this has been established, Dahrendorf*s attempt to 
separate the areas of industrial and political power becomes 
meaningless. "The political state and industrial production," 
he argues :
"are two essentially independent
associations in which power is
exercised; and their interrelations
are a subject for empirical research." (77)
That there is no simple and mechanical relation between 
the two spheres was pointed out some twenty years earlier, 
when Trotsky wrote :
"The social domination of a class 
(its dictatorship) may find extremely 
diverse political forms. This is 
attested by the entire history of the 
bourgeoisie, from the Kiddle Ages to the 
present day." (78)
What is lacking in Dahrendorf*s proposition that is present 
in Trotsky’s analysis is the recognition that, since a 
class is defined by its "independent roots in the economic 
foundations of sooiety^(Ibid., 30), whatever conflicts or 
developments take place in the formal political institutions 
of a society, its class nature remains fundamentally unchanged 
without a conscious and revolutionary shift in the relations 
of ownership of the means of production.
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Thus, little if any redistributive and egalitarian 
restructuring occurs in capitalist society even when the 
state is manned by nominally socialist parties, A comparison 
of variations in the level of real wages in Britain under 
the Labour government of 1966-70 and the Conservative 
government of 1970-73, for example, shows that a mere change 
of ruling party had little effect.
Real wages rise (adjusted to retail 
price index) (Yearly), Sector
Labour Conservative
Lowest paid manualZfo 1.75?
z.efo yfo Top industrial 
management (79)
The variations, it is clear, are small, and the overall 
pattern indicates the marginal impact of social democratic 
rule on the distribution of wealth within capitalist society. 
The owl of wisdom may well fly after sunset, but it certainly 
has not flown yet.
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CONCLUSION,
For the notion of power as objectively and historically 
grounded in the ownership of the/ncans of social production 
Dahrendorf substitutes a metaphysical and reified explanation 
of authority relations as the prime determinant of conflicting 
class formations# For analysis he substitutes, in key areas, 
selective description# And the overall incompleteness 
of this description is the source of the mystified nature of 
his image of how the world looks and works# Dahrendorf's 
claim to have presented a superior explanation of conflict 
in industrial society to that of Marx rests largely on his 
distorted and misleading caricature of the Marxist model ; 
a caricature with invalid claims to represent the real thing. 
The real proof of its weakness, however, lies in its failure 
to theoretically grasp the nature of capitalism, the 
fundamental structuring principle of advanced Western society# 
The consequence of such a perspective, as we hope we have 
shown, is mystification at the level of theory. Ephemeral 
representations of social structure, class conflict and the 
capitalist state parody their originals in the theories of 
Ralf Dahrendorf#
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IV. BUREAUCRATIZATION TECHNOCRACY AND THE STATE. 
INTRODUCTION. BUREAUCRACY AND VON MISES ; THE PROBLEM POSED
The group of writers whom we shall term collectively 
the theorists of the "technocratic state" all adopt,either 
as actuality or as a historical potential, the formal 
Weberian equation of rationality at the level of social 
action on the one hand and at that of social structure 
and organization on the other. In addition, they share 
an interpretation stressing the further reproduction 
of this rationality both within the state institution and 
between it and wider society. A further common 
characteristic is the explicit or implicit assumption 
of a changed capitalism, the crux of which is the more 
or less total surpassing of that system’s crises and the 
related "irrational" ruptures in the historical process. 
Co-existent with this view, however, is a recurrent note 
of sociological pessimism.
By contrast, Von Mises radically rejects Weber’s 
characterization of the contemporary world as one of a 
general secular trend towards increased rationalization 
and a more systematically bureaucratic organization of 
social life as a ivhole. Blau has suggested that the 
importance of Von Mises lies in his attribution to the 
rise of bureaucratic government the growth of bureaucratic 
tendencies, as well as of crises and disproportion, in 
industry, (l) V/hile Von Mises did hold this view, 
however, a more central aspect of his work is the radical 
analytical division that he draws between the two sectors 
of private property and government.
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In the former, the major structuring principle is 
"management directed by the profit motive". (2) The 
only imperative within the hierarchical structure of the 
capitalist enterprise is to seek profits and this.
Von Mises suggests, imposes strict rationality on 
branch managers and other key policy-makers. The 
cash-neXUS between employer and employee, as well as 
between buyer and seller, is purely "matter of fact" 
and impersonal. It is, that is to say, in principle 
subject to calculation.
In the case of public administration, there is 
no such necessary connection between expenditure and 
revenue. What is involved is the management of 
administrative affairs, "the result of which has no 
cash value on the market." (Ibid., 4?) Such provisions 
may have a "value", measured by other interia, but 
they have no market cash price, can be neither implemented 
nor assessed by economic calculation, and consequently 
cannot be judged by the interia of a profit-seeking 
enterprise.
Von Mises in this way radically differentiates two 
types of activity, the capitalistic and the bureaucratic, 
their respective qualities deriving from their respective 
structural contexts. To quote :
"The quality of being an entrepreneur 
is not inherent in the personality of the 
entrepreneur, it is inherent in the 
position ivhich he occupies in the 
framework of market society." ( 3%
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The activities of the bureaucrat, by contrast, are 
determined by rules and regulations which are "beyond his 
reach." Efficiency in government and in industry are, 
consequently, qualitatively different and incommensurable.
At the same time, however. Von Mises does recognize 
that state expenditure is ultimately, circumscribed 
and limited by the degree of profitability of the private 
capitalist sector. He observes :
"The truth is that the government 
cannot give if it does not take from 
somebody. A subsidy is never paid 
by the government out of its own funds; 
it is at the expense of the taxpayer that 
the state grants subsidies." (4)
In addition, he concedes that contemporary society 
requires bureaucrats, who are a crucial and necessary 
feature of the capitalist order. Bureaucratic tendencies 
if unchecked, however, constitute a threat to that order, 
and Von Mises accordingly characterizes bureaucratic 
management under democracy as "management in strict 
accordance ifith the law and the budget." (ibid., 43)
Nevertheless, the radical analytical division 
between bureaucratic and profit orientated management 
is central to Von Mises* thesis, and it allows him to 
avoid the pessimism of many theorists of the Weberian 
school. Despite his concession that capitalism requires
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a controlled bureaucratic element, Von Mises explicitly 
and polemically characterizes the undesirable and even 
destructive consequences of its unchecked development 
in the following terms.
"Bureaucratization is necessarily rigid 
because it involves the observation 
of established rules and practices. But 
in social life rigidity amounts to petrification 
and death." (5)
Since, however, for Von Mises bureaucratization is not 
a general law or tendency of contemporary social 
development, and since its inherent sphere is that of 
controlled expression ifithin the specifically state 
apparatus, he can perceive a means to contain it and 
thereby avoid its supposedly undesirable consequences 
for economic life. This means constitutes effectively, 
a repudiation of the "mixed economy" and an endorsement 
of competitive, laissez-faire capitalism (1 1 8 -9 )
It is through his radical differentiation between the 
rationality of capitalist enterprise and the structuring 
principles of the bureaucratic state apparatus that 
Von Mises effects this defence of an "ideal", unconstrained 
capitalist economy, and thus avoids the conclusions of 
Weberian pessimism and fatalism,
FATALISM, TOTALITARIANISM, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
It is precisely this note of fatalism that has
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characterized much of the political thought of the 
last century on bureaucratic state organization.
Central to this work has been the question of the 
compatibility between an ascendant mode of bureaucratic 
administration and domination on the one hand, and 
democratic political organization and procedure on the 
other, 3 major positions have been adopted concerning 
this relationship.
The "Liberals" "pluralist" interpretations have 
tended to stress, that, given an adequate counter veiling 
tendency, usually either in the form of a system of 
checks and balances or more specifically of the democratic 
vigilance of the electoral public at large, there is no 
inherent problem in securing a civil service or state 
bureaucracy that will carry out, as a more or less 
neutral instrument, the will of its elected political 
masters. (6)
The "Marxist" accounts have, adopting the perspective 
outlined in Marx & Engels* **German Ideology" and Lenin*s 
"State and Revolution", by and large viewed the state 
bureaucracy as effectively under the control of the 
bourgeois ruling class in capitalist society, and 
consequently with a low degree of social independence 
and autonomy. (The exceptional case of Bonapartism, 
especially as discussed by Marx and Poulantzas is 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis).
The "Pessimistic" line of thought, by contrast, lays
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greater emphasis on the growing importance of the 
bureaucracy, in particular though not exclusively in 
the state sector, as an independent social and political 
force. Largely deriving from Weber * s analysis of the 
prevailing development of "disenchantment" in the 
contemporary world and the parallel ascendancy of 
bureaucratic organization and domination, the proponents 
of this school of interpretation have tended to view 
bureaucratic power as a central fact of modern life 
about which little can be done. Whether evaluating 
this development favourably (Galbraith), critically 
(C.W. Mills), or rather more ambiguously (Weber), the 
"given" datum of bureaucratization is commonly viewed 
as tendentially inherent in contemporary social structure 
and development.
The direct focus of attention and concern of these 
theorists has varied considerably. Michels, for 
example, was particularly concerned with the concentration 
of power in democratic mass political parties. (7) 
Central to his thesis is the view that this consolidation 
of power is effected largely through the relative strength 
of full-time "professionals" ifithin such organizations 
in relation to their wider membership. The "pessimistic" 
conclusions that he drew from his observations are 
most succinctly expressed in his celebrated "iron law" of 
oligarchy". Mosea, on the other hand, attempted to 
show the more or less inevitable centralization of power 
in a specifically socialist state, a centralization 
resulting in a freedom from control by the mass democratic
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institutions for those in the elite positions within 
the political apparatus. (8)
C.W, Mills was concerned to demonstrate the 
inability of both traditional liberal and Marxist 
explanations to account for contemporary political and 
cultural developments. He speculates :
"Great and rational organizations - 
in brief, bureaucracies - have 
indeed increased, but the substantive 
reason of the individual at large 
has not. Caught in the limited 
milieux of their everyday lives, 
ordinary men often cannot reason 
about the great structures - 
rational and irrational - of 
which their milieux are subordinate 
parts." (9)
Mill’s analysis, then, centred on the consolidation of 
power in bureaucratic, centralized organisations and 
structures, dominant over and alienating the individual.
He saw this development as common to both capitalist 
and Soviet-type societies. (10)
Despite such variations and differences, however, 
the theorists in question share a view of the consolidation 
pf bureaucratic power as a social and political force 
in the contemporary world. On this point they are closely 
related to the theorists of "totalitarian" and "mass" 
society, a perspective which stresses the governing of
- 222 -
masses by an inaccessible political elite. To a large 
extent impressed by the experience of 20th Century 
Fascism and Stalinism, the proponents of this view 
frequently grounded their analyses in a theory of 
social and structural change. S. Newmann, for example, 
identifies the two principal sources of 20th Century 
dictatorships as the rise of "mass democracy" with 
the extension of suffrage,and the parallel breakdown 
of traditional social institutions. Despots, he argues, 
aim both to gain leadership in the "mass state" and 
also to provide substitutes for the institutions 
undermined in the procedd of the breakdown of a fixed 
social order with the of industrialization and
urbanization. (11) Arendt, similarly, stressed the 
social, atomization resultant upon the degeneration of 
the traditional bourgeois order. V7ith the effective 
collapse of the capitalist social structure, society 
is transformed into an atomized and unorganised mass, 
vulnerable to mobilization by totalitarian movements. (12)
In general, the "totalitarian" theorists lay great 
emphasis on this supposed transition from a class-based 
society to one characterized primarily by masses.
This perspective has a long and influential theoretical 
tradition, finding expression in Durkheim* s analysis 
of moral poverty and social disintegration (anomie) 
as well as in Tonnies conceptual distinction between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Tonnies discussion 
of social actors* orientation towards the social 
collective is of particular relevance to the concems
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of the totalitarian theorists. Gemeinschaft - 
structured associations, he suggests, are those in 
which "natural will" predominates. In the Gesellschaft 
type, by contrast, "rational will", or the predominance 
of intellect or reason, is the primary characteristic. (13) 
Now for Tdnnies, the "collective" is both an objective 
phenomenon and an aspect of consciousness. It is 
manifested in diverse ways, such as forms of life, 
customs and religion. It is, Tdnnies argues, Gemeinschaft- 
like if members see the social grouping as a gift of 
nature or as the will of God, the Indian caste system 
being his chief example. On the other hand, it is 
Gesellschaft-1ike if members' consciousness is primarily 
directed towards the attainment of ends which they 
perceive to be and claim as distinctively their own.
Tonnies cites as an illustration the situation in 
which different social strata stand against one another 
as classes. In such a situation no "natural masters" 
are acknowledged. (l4)
Tonnies attaches particular importance to the 
development of capitalism. Previously, he suggests 
the whole life of the social collective was nurtured by 
and arose from the "profoundness of the people (Volk)".
With the emergence and spread of capitalist social 
relations, however, bourgeois society cannot, ifithout 
betraying itself, admit or acknowledge its uniqueness 
as a Gesellschaft collective in contradistinction to 
the mass of people. It can only claim to be representative 
of society as a whole. Consequently, the hiatus between 
this Gesellschaft of the wealthy and the pverty of the
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majority, while it may be narrowed, cannot be essentially 
changed. (1 5 )
It is from such theoretical models that the 
"totalitarian" theories derive their overall perspective. 
The supercession of community-based society by one 
in which atomized and particularistic interests and 
orientations come to dominate is, as we saw in the cases 
of Neumann and Arendt, central to the historical schemas 
constructed by the "totalitarian" school. The collapse 
of community is a condition of atomization and mass 
mobilization.
The chief objection which we would raise against 
this type of analysis is its tendency to often mechanically 
identify the absolute primacy of political over economic 
totalitarian movements. A polarity is perceived between 
the atomization of the masses on the one hand, and their 
mobilization by despotic or totalitarian individuals 
or groups on the other with the disintegration of a 
traditional social order.
The "totalitarian" theorists often draw attention 
' to the importance of economic factors in the functioning 
of the decaying social structure. Arendt, for example; 
indicates the typically capitalistic character of the 
pre-totalitarian social stinicture. (l6) The actual 
structuration of totalitarianism itself, however, is 
perceived largely, and often crucially, as a primarily 
political process, quite abstracted from economic forces 
and interests. This is especially the case in Neumann's
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study Permanent Revolution. A more satisfactory and adequate 
approach is adopted in F, Neumann's study of the social 
structure of Fascist Germany, Behemoth. (17) F. Neumann 
is concerned to examine, among other aspects of Hitler's 
Germany, the "totalitarian monopolistic economy." He 
concretely examines the organization of business in the 
Third Reich, documenting some of the central features of 
monopoly capitalism. Also, he examines the role of the 
Nazi Party and State in the German economy, identifying 
the dominance of "party industrialists" combines, and the 
state control of production, prices and investment. Such 
controls, it may be noted, are characteristic of any 
capitalist war economy, a similar degree of state economic 
involvement having developed in Britain during World War Two.
A picture emerges from "Behemoth" of a society 
characterized by a remarkable political structure, but a 
structure the major decisions of which were for the larger 
part motivated by economic, and in particular capitalistic, 
interests and forces. This interpretation, consistent 
with the now well—documented close relations between big 
business and the political structure during the Nazi 
period (l8), calls into question the primacy attributed 
to politics and political processes inS.Neumann* s earlier 
study and more generally in a idLde range of variants on 
the dictatorship-masses thesis.
Now Lenin often used the formula that politics is 
"concentrated economics". IVhat he meant by this was that 
when economic interests and processes assume a conscious
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and generalized character they enter into the field of 
politics and, in fact, constitute its essence. The sphere 
of politics, that is to say, both expresses and rises 
above the everyday, atomized and frequently unconscious 
forms of economic activity. In this way, different class 
interests find their expression in and may materially 
support favourable political movements and tendencies. 
Critically commenting on the early experiences of the 
Russian Social Democratic movement Lenin observed :
"The principal sin we commit is 
that we degrade our political and 
organizational tasks to the level of the 
immediate, "palpable", "concrete" 
interests of the everyday economic 
struggle." (19)
Different social classes, that is to say, have different 
objective interests which correspond to different and 
conflicting forms of political programme. Within the 
working class, in particular, the common status of wage 
labourer defines and reveals the interests of its incumbents 
as against those of the property-oiming class. The 
appropriate political programme of the working class, the 
socialization of the means of production, accordingly 
"unites" the various "differentiated" elements within 
that class which otherwise characteristically find 
expression in sectionalism and economism. It is in this 
sense that a Marxist analysis of class formations views 
politics as "concentrated economics". The primacy of the 
former derives from its relationship to, and its character 
as a means to express and give organized coherence to, 
the prevailing structure of socio-economic relations which
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sustain and are a necessary condition of political 
action • This perspective in no sense implies a 
fetishistic conception of politics as a fully autonomous 
sphere; independent from the network of class and 
economic interests. It offers a more adequate explanation 
of "totalitarianism" movements such as those of twentieth 
century Fascism than the abstracted political analyses 
that we have discussed above. We will return to this 
point in the context of the social basis of "bureaucratic 
domination" in our critical discussion of the "technocratic 
state" theorists.
BUREAUCRACY. IRRATIONALITY AND THE TECHNOCRATIC STATE.
Our particular concern, however, is to indicate the 
central elements of the Weberian and neo-Weberian 
bureaucratic and technocratic theories of state 
organization, and to assess their relevance for an 
evaluation of the post-war pattern of state and class 
relationships in the advanced capitalist societies, 
in Britain in particular. In order to do this we will 
abstract the key features of the general perspective, 
draifing on the works of a number of theorists. It 
should be stressed that not all the theorists in 
question would endorse some of the particular positions 
which we identify, but only by producing a composite 
picture in this way can an adequate characterisation of 
the frame of reference as a whole be effected.
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Central to this perspective is the notion of 
bureaucratization as underlying the major social and 
economic developments of moder<>, advanced societies.
Blau, drawing heavily on Weber's work, characterizes 
bureaucracy as :
"the type of organization designed 
to accomplish large-scale administrative 
tasks by systematically coordinating 
the work of many individuals." (20)
Xt is, he observes, an aspect of "the secularization 
of the world thatr spells its disenchantment." Contemporary 
Iving standards, Blau elaborates, are not due simply to 
technological developments. Rather, he stresses, again 
echoing Weber, the introduction of mass production 
methods, an aspect of increasing "rationalization in 
administration." The four basic factors which he sees 
to distinguish bureaucracy as a qualitatively unique 
mode of authority, a system of rules, and a general 
character of impersonality. (Ibid., 19 )
This overall portrayal of rationality and calculability 
is central to the body of "technocratic state" theorists.
At the same time, however, a number of analyses counterpose 
to this ascendant rationality a parallel and contradictory 
dimension of irrationalism. For Weber, the general 
secul'-ajf drift of rationalization and bureaucratization 
was periodically punctuated by social movements distinguished 
by charismatic leadership. More specifically, he contended
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that the bureaucratic permanent civil service must 
have, at its head, a parliamentarily risen charismatic 
political leader able to dominate the bureaucracy and 
check its tendency to consolidate its pwn power position 
on an independent social basis. With widespread 
"Disenchantment" masses become particulary susceptible 
to charismatic leadership.
"Experience shows that the pacifist 
interests of petty bourgeois and 
proletarian strata very often and 
very easily fail. This is partly 
because of the easier accessibility 
of all unorganized 'masses* to emotional 
influences." (21)
In adopting this position Weber is associating 
his analysis closely with that of the "totalitarianism" 
theorists. The common element is the perceived duality 
of rational administration and irrational or unorganized 
masses. That charismatic leadership, preferably of 
high calibre, is located at the head of the apparatus 
of bureaucratic administration constitutes the non- 
rational counterpart to Weber's "secularization" 
thesis. At the same time, however, he tended to perceive 
charismatic leadership as inherently short-term, as his 
discussion of the "routinization" of charisma demonstrates. 
(22) Weber's concern with charismatic leadership, that 
is to say, should not lead to an underestimation of the 
importance he attached to social institutions and their
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dynamics. His analysis of charisma routini zation into 
the form of either traditionalism of bureaucratization 
implies, as Gerth and Mills have pointed out, the 
attribution of a heavy causal weight to institutional 
routines. (23) Nevertheless, this very concern with 
the problematic relation&hip between rational-bureaucratic 
and charismatic elements in social structure and process 
indicates that Weber's thesis of "ongoing rationalization", 
while often presented as a general and perhaps irreversible 
secular trend (24), is counterposed and augmented by 
a conception of contradictory social pressures towards 
irrationality.
Arendt similarly observes a fundamental irrationality 
in the goal of totalitarian movements to transform the 
world and, above all, human nature. For Arendt this 
irrationality is grounded in the basis of such movements 
in ideology and "logicality", or the attempt to explain 
everything in terms of a single premise, as opposed 
to "free" thought. (25) Again, Neumann emphasis 
the irrationality of totalitarian society's drive to war. 
Numerous factors, he suggests, combined to bring about 
the emergence of the "total state". Nevertheless there 
is a common factor!
"there has been one recurrent theme: 
boundless dynamics. The dictatorial 
regimes are governments at war, 
originating in war, aiming at war, 
thriving on war...war is inseparable 
from their meaning." (2 6 )
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For Neumann the irrationalism of twentieth century 
dictorship reflects the incalculability of armed conflict. 
He identifies a dominant quality of negativity in the 
social structure and ideology of such societies, 
particularly in the form of their anit-parliamentary, 
anti-capitalist, anti-individualist and anti-rationalist 
character. Neumann suggests "this sheer negativism 
represents a focal point of crises elements in modern 
society." (ibid., 4) This emphasis on the irrationality 
and negativity of contemporary mass political movements 
is a recurrent theme in the works of the "totalitarian" 
theoriests. (2 7 )
While this dialectic of rationality and irrationality 
pervades much of the work within the broad "technocratic" 
fields, however, the assumption of a central dimension 
of calculable, rational activity is characteristic 
of this perspective. The specificity of bureaucracy 
to the area of state structure and activity is identified 
by La Palombara, who defines it as "encompassing all civil 
servants." (28) Civil servants, in this context,
are all persons employed in public or governmental 
activity. The theorists with whose work we are concerned, 
however, for the most part relate their model of the 
bureaucratic technocratic state to a wider portrayal 
of social structure and, in many cases, social change.
It is this interrelation between bureaucratic state 
tendencies and related features of broader social structure 
in the theses in question that will be our concern. We 
will indicate what we see to be the crucial elements of 
the resultant model, both generally and more specifically
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in the case of Galbraith, the technocratic synthesizer.
Finally we will critically assess the composite thesis 
as a whole, indicating its inability to account for 
key aspects of contemporary capitalism, and suggesting 
the source of its explanatory weakness.
ELEMENTS OF THE THESIS.
In addition to the central notion of bureaucratization 
itself, four particular themes or hypotheses characteristically 
recur in the various versions of the "technocratic state" 
thesis* These are: a general technocratic perspective
which sees the present state structure and its relations 
with wider society as more or less inherently and 
inevitably rooted in the imperatives of "industrial 
society": the increasing social requirements for systematic
provision of intelligence and information with a 
progressively more complex social organization; the 
theory of managerialism, which identifies a qualitatively 
new ruling class of administrators and planners whose 
hegemony derives in the large part from control of the 
state apparatus; and the thesis of working class 
"incorporation" into the structure of advanced capitalist 
society, an incorporation which involves the abolition, 
suppression or concealment of earlier forms of class 
conflict.
As already suggested, these diverse hypotheses are 
by no means common to all the theorists with whom we are 
concerned. In fact, a fundamental problem in constructing
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this essentially "ideal-typical’' model is the obvious 
heterogeneity of overall perspectives adopted by the 
authors in question. Nevertheless, we feel thatthis 
approach has a value in so far as it abstracts from 
the diversity of analyses the central elements of a 
consistent "technocratic state" thesis,and in doing so 
helps to explain the logic of the model, its often 
implicit assumptions and implications, A degree of 
methodological formalism is a consequence of this 
approach, but our intended purpose recognises this 
possible weakness and is developed accordingly.
TECHNOCRACY
The thesis that technology has autonomy from the 
social relations within and by which it is applied has been 
a central claim by the proponents of the "convergence" theory, 
(2 9 ) Kerret^ al. hasfe examined technology as a force fostering 
unity between diverse and different social systems. At 
any particular time, they suggest there may be a choice 
of possible social arrangements, but there is only one 
"best technology". The same technology, moreover, 
requires "much the same occupational structure around 
the world." (30) Occupational order, in other words, 
is determined directly by the optimal use of technology, 
independently of the social relations of ownership 
that may accompany it, Kerrel^ al, emphasizes both the 
influence exercised by occupational role on individual’s 
behaviour and the increasing diversity of occupations 
ifith the specialization inherent in industrial development.
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The reification of technology and the specifically 
capitalist division of labour becomes complete when 
they suggest that with the revolutionary transformation 
of technology that accompanies advanced industrialism there 
are :
"no really clear-cut dividing lines 
v i s i b l e  air all. The occupation takes 
the place of the class." (31)
Individual’s self-identification, that is to say, 
becomes centred on occupation role rather than socio­
economic position within the framework of property 
o^mership and control. This, moreover, is no accident 
or "false consciousness." For Kerretal, self-identification 
on the basis of occupational role is derived from 
real developments in the sphere of technology which 
condition a particular occupational and social order.
That technology is viewed as the "prime mover" of 
social structure by the authors is apparent from their 
assumption of a universal pattern of social organization, 
to which technology intrinsically corresponds,
"Social arrangements will be most
uniform from one society to another
when they are most closely tied to
technology; they can be more diverse
the farther removed they are from technology." (3 2 )
We woill criticize this thorough-going technocratic 
position in our overall assessment of the "technocratic 
state" thesis. Our purpose in reviewing it here has
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been to indicate the internal logic of the perspective^ 
in particular its reification of industry and the 
capitalistic division of labour, "Social arrangement^', 
while at one point viewed as variable, are in general 
seen to be structured by the imperatives of the 
industrial system.
The technocratic view of the contemporary state 
as a more or less necessary companion of developed 
industrial society per se has been elaborated by 
E, Strauss, The modern state in almost all its 
forms, Strauss suggests, derives its character from 
"two main influences - the needs of an industrial 
society and its own historical development," (33)
f^hile recognizing the importance of the development 
of a capitalist class and the different outcomes of the 
resulting power struggles in different national contexts, 
Strauss emphasizes the importance of the purely technical 
imperatives imposed by an increasingly complex social 
organization. The growth of bureaucratic tendencies 
in Britain, for example, especially in the context 
of state expansion, are attributed to that state’s 
response to a variety of new functions required of it, 
(Ibid., 97)• These functions are identified from 
an essentially technocratic perspective. Thus Strauss 
contends that industrialism everywhere has common 
"basic needs and requirements," In particular, he 
identifies a social revolution in the countryside^ 
to satisfy the demands of towns for food and raw 
materials or to provide for a lucrative export market.
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and the development of industry in towns. In these 
ways a national and international economic system 
develops, and the original revolution in economic 
conditions extends to all spheres of social life.
The contemporary state form is, for Strauss, 
appropriate to and supportive of this primarily 
"industrial" society.
"Only a rationalized and modernized State 
could cope with the new tasks thrust 
on it by the social and economic revolution 
due to the progress of modern industrialism.
This force was embodied in the new middle 
class of businessmen and their allies 
among the professional classes who 
were clamouring for a share in political 
power," (34)
Strauss considers the struggles for power between 
different social groups in a number of countries.
His rationale for doing this is that political institutions 
are "fundamentally machines for the conservation and 
transmission of power." Nevertheless, the power 
relations between these various groups are seen to be 
supportive and derivative of^rather than essential 
to,the development of industrial technique and organization, 
This becomes apparent in Strauss* discussion of situations 
of social strain. Social tensions, in particular those 
between capital and labour, are seen as related to the 
gro^ fth of bureaucratic tendencies. If, Strauss 
elaborates, the power of the predominant group is
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permanently weakened by strong and persistent opposition, 
the result is a change in "the political balance of the 
system and the position of the administrative machine 
of the government" (ibid,, 98-9), In particular, 
the scope for majority rule after free discussion 
diminishes, and the potential for dictatorship and 
"bureaucratic degeneration" grows, bureaucratic 
degeneration being fostered by a relative equality 
of strength between conflicting parties in particular 
organizational situations. (Ibid., 282-3)•
For Strauss, then, the sphere of political relations 
influences the form of state structure, but as a secondary 
factor. Primary importance is attributed to the 
imperatives of industrialism per se which, as noted, 
is associated with a set of universal "needs and requirements". 
The task of the state, whatever its class composition 
or social biaSj is to fulfill essentially economic functions 
in relation to that industrial base. By viewing the 
political realm as essentially auxiliary to the purely 
technical sphere of production in this way, Strauss 
constructs a model of the relationship between state and 
society that we have characterized as the "technocratic" 
type. It has obvious affinities with Restaw's model of 
economic growth, but the similarities, as well as the 
differences, between the two will not be elaborated here. (35)
A rather more complex analysis of the relations 
between the industrial order and the realm of politics 
is elaborated in the work of Raymond Aron, A full
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assessment of Aron * s many-sided and often illuminating 
work will not be attempted here. Rather, we will draw 
attention to a number of aspects of his ongoing 
commentary on the character of the advanced societies, 
and attempt to demonstrate why, with qualifications, 
we associate him with the technocratic theorists.
Aron has consistently attributed particular 
importance to the concept of "industrial society".
In his 1 8 Lectures on Industrial Society this generic 
term is simply and, it may be added, tautologically 
defined as ;
"a society in which large-scale
industry, such as is found in the
Renault or Citroen enterprises, is
the characteristic form of production." (3 6 )
From this initial definition, Aron infers a number of
other typical characteristics, including the separation
between the family unit and the workplace, a technological
division of labour, a pervasive influence of rational
calculation, and the concentration of labour. A siqiilar
set ofcrinteria: are presented in Aron's more recent work
The Industrial Society, where he suggests that it is a
type of society which, while not being historically
unique, "appears to open up a new era in human experience." (37)
Aron has, however, persistently eschewed an 
unqualified technocratic perspective which would identify 
the industrial infrastructure as the unmediated determincint 
of a qualitatively unique historical type of society. He
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suggests, in particular, that i
"A strictly technological point of 
view is inadequate, because different 
forms of ownership of the means of 
production and class relations grow 
out of the same technology." (3 8 )
History, Aron elaborates, demonstrates that it is 
impossible to relate every social change to a change 
in technology, and that the use of technological Criteria 
offers the possibility of only the most broad and vague 
sociological propositions. In particular, he suggests 
that the unprecedented energy potential characteristic 
of contemporary advanced industrial societies can be 
socially organized and applied in different ways. The 
general characteristics of the generic "industrial 
society" characterize, for Aron, both Soviet and Western 
capitalist economies. Their principal points of 
divergence, however, concern the ownership of the means 
of production and the mode of economic regulation. State 
ownership and centralized planning on the one hand, and 
private ownership and the decisions of individuals in 
the market characterize these two "varieties of industrial 
society" respectively. (Ibid., 8l).
The structural differences between Soviet and 
capitalist societies are stressed even more pointedly 
in The Industrial Society. Replying to Lefebure's 
charge that he "launched the somewhat confused idea of a 
single or world—wide industrial society", Aron explicitly 
attacks the thesis attributed by Lefebure to him in the
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following terms ;
"the fact that both societies (The 
U.S.S.R. & the U.S.A.-DB) can be 
classed as industrial does not mean 
that the Western and the Soviet (or, 
if you like, capitalist and socialist) 
systems are in any sense identical.
Only a technological interpretation of 
history would allow us to assert that 
all societies that use atomic energy 
and computers are the same. It is 
absurd to state as a foregone conclusion 
that what they have in common is more 
important than the differences between 
them." (39)
The essential features of all variants on the "industrial 
type of society" are the predominance and centrality 
of science and technology in the determination of their 
other features, such as the steady increase in national 
output and the, at times, obsessional impulse of economic 
expansion. (4o)  In addition, the typically accompanying 
emphasis on calculation in the large industrial enterprise 
requires that all the elements of the balance sheet must 
be accessible to assessment in terms of a common, 
quantifiable factor. To this extent, "not only capitalist 
but any society treats man as if he were a commodity or 
as an instrument of production." ( 4 l )
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Nevertheless, Aron emphasizes the absence of a 
"common aim" shared by all industrial societies.
In particular, the contrast between private and 
state ownership is viewed as the primary distinction.
Aron suggests, furthermore, that this distinction 
is unlikely to alter in the forseeable future.
"As far as the ownership of the 
instruments of production is concerned, 
nothing justifies an assertion that 
the Western and Soviet systems will 
come to resemble each other." (42)
Also likely to remain divergent are the alternative 
patterns of distribution of the national income. (ll4) 
Aron further emphasizes his view of the essentially 
socially indeterminate character of industrial society 
per se by indicating its inherent open-endedness. 
"Industrial society has no inherent finality." (Ibid., 1 3 0 )
Again, in Progress and Disillusion Aron attempts 
to weigh both the similarities and the differences 
between the two forms of industrial society. Industrial 
society as such is differentiated and stratified, 
these two characteristics together constituting an 
"inherent tendency" immanent in the industrial type. (43)
-  242 -
Another common feature is the substitution of a 
number of social hierarchies for one or a few in 
previous social types. (37) Furthermore, as 
industrial society develops it tends to reduce, 
though it never eliminates, social unrest.
"Conflicts are never eliminated but 
revolution seems anachronistic. The 
economic system, whether capitalist 
or socialist, is consolidated by 
changes common to both systems." (44)
As against these shared characteristics, however,
Aron contends that the Soviet and capitalist varieties 
of industrial society, the two "ideal types of social 
order", represent "two contradictory solutions, 
intelligible in their very contradiction, to the immanent 
problems in industrial civilization." (37) Political 
pluralism as opposed to the primacy of the Communist 
Party and the familiar distinction between patterns of 
property ownership are the central variations identified, 
Aron's attempt at an all-round evaluation of the two 
forms of industrial society is made explicit in his comment
"We have attempted to stress not 
only that which is common to the two ideal 
types of society but also the ways in 
which they differ." (45)
Yet precisely through this eclectic tendency to 
shift his focus of analysis in order to evaluate both 
the elements of convergence and divergence between the
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two types of* economy, Aron leaves unresolved a number 
of central ambiguities which give his work as a whole 
an often indeterminate character. On the one hand 
Aron consistently identifies the alternative patterns 
of property ownership as a source of fundamental 
divergence. At the same time, however, "industrial 
society" persistently emerges as his central theoretical 
concept. Thus, in his concluding section of the 
1 8 Lectures he observes :
"Instead of capitalism I have chosen 
industrial society (or technical, 
scientific or rationalised society) 
as the principal historical concept." (46)
Again, in Progress and Disillusion while, as always, 
stressing the sources of variation, he contends that 
the Soviet and Western industrial regimes together 
constitute "an unprecedented social type". They are, 
that is to say :
"societies that strive to produce as 
much and as efficiently as possible 
by renewing the instruments and 
organization of work in accordance 
with the progress of science," (47)
\Vhat this recurrent tension indicates is a 
reluctance on Aron's part to decisively structure his 
analysis of advanced societies primarily in terms of 
either socio-economic or technocratic criteria, a
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hesitancy which allows a series of ambiguities and, 
at times, theoretically "loose" contentions to enter 
his work. We will draw attention to what appear to 
be the most important expressions of this tendency ;
Aron's ambiguous treatment of the category "class", 
and his often mechanical conception of the nature of 
capitalism.
As we have seen, Aron identifies the private 
ownership of the means of production as a central 
distinguishing feature of capitalist society, and in 
doing so implicitly at least adopts a Marxist conception 
of the concept of class. From the Marxist perspective, 
of course, awareness of class position and actions, 
both economic and political, to consolidate or further 
the interests of that position are viewed essentially 
as rational, full political consciousness characterizing 
a developed "class-for-itself." In Progress and Disillusion 
however, Aron effectively denigrates such political 
development to the sphere of the irrational, a sphere 
it shares with the violence and ideological degeneracy 
of racism and national chauvinism. The following 
passage is particularly revealing :
"Under certain stresses, the same 
individuals who in normal times apparently 
enjoy the pleasures of home, television, 
a car, weekends in the country, suddenly 
behave wildly. They see themselves only 
as Frenchmen, or proletarians, or whites.
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War, crisis, foreign despotism, 
revolt of a scorned ethnic minority, 
tear them loose from their habits, 
and we see them quite ready to die 
for a cause; agitators of a party, 
soldiers of their country, heroic and 
cruel, forgetful of themselves, but 
also of the rights of others." (48)
Thus, in the same work in which he draws attention to 
the'^gap between the egalitarian ideal and present-day 
realities in even the most advanced industrial societies." (9) 
Aron characterizes working class solidaristic action 
as one particular manifestation of a more general 
pattern of demonic and destructive collective irrationality. 
The formal usage of Marxist concepts coexists uneasily 
with the classically liberal appeal to the abstract 
"rights of others".
In addition, there is a tension in Aron's work 
between the same emphasis on the private ownership 
of the means of production as the major determinant of 
classes in capitalist society, and a recurrent tendency 
reminiscent of Marcue's analysis of working class 
institutionalization in "One Dimensional Man", to 
exaggerate the influence of the consumers of industrial 
products. For example, in capitalist society ;
"The influence of consumers over 
the allocation of national resources 
is dominant in the long run." (49)
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In the same work Aron points out that under capitalism 
"The profit motive predominates" (Ibid., 8l). The 
discrepency between these two conflicting criteria 
for the allocation of capitalist resources reflects 
the ambiguity discussed above ; in the one case 
the primary determinant is private profitability, 
in the other the preferences of consumers. The question 
of the manipulation of public needs in accordance 
with the requirements of capitalist profitability is 
thus ignored, the power of capital being counterposed 
by the requirements and demands of consumers. An 
agnostic view of social determination emerges from this 
ambiguity.
Directly related to this Unresolved dilemma in 
Aron's work is his depiction of the capitalist system 
as a whole. In The Industrial Society Aron, consistently 
with his preoccupation with the influence and importance 
of the patterns of consumption in advanced capitalist 
societies, suggests that "the obvious aim of the economy 
is to raise the standard of living, and prices are 
recognized as being a necessary mechanism and, indeed, 
as a measure of rationality." (112) Again, the 
capitalist variant of industrial society is attributed 
with "the purpose of spreading material prosperity or 
raising the standard of living." (Ibid., l42)
What emerges from these observations is a view of 
late capitalism which embodies a voluntaristic and
-  247 -
essentially benevolent conception of the allocation of 
resources, both in production and consumption. While 
Aron emphasizes the anarchical character of the international 
power structure, (5 0 ) he views individual capitalist 
economies as subject to the profound influence of conscious 
decisions to administer to human needs on fundamentally 
humanitarian criteria. The following passage is 
particularly indicative of this tendency in Aron's thought.
"Western nations are now pausing to 
reconsider the aim of material prosperity 
which they have pursued more or less 
consciously; they are wondering if the 
maximization of any particular kind of 
consumption is any better a criterion 
than the maximization of growth rates." (51)
The international profitability crisis which deepened 
throughout the advanced capitalist world during the igGO's 
and early 1970's, however, has transparently led to a 
series of attempts to impose restraints on the rate of 
increase of specifically working class income, restraints 
necessitated by the classical criteria of capitalist 
profitability and accumulation. (52) The logic of 
international capitalist competition and its impact on 
state policy has again emerged from the sparcity that 
characteristically obscures its primacy during periods of 
relatively unproblematic economic expansion. The 
imperatives of profitability rather than ideational activity, 
that is to say, typically structure the allocation of 
resources to consumption.
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Aron's model of a relatively stable and "adaptable" 
capitalism largely derives from a mechanical interpretation 
of its political economy. In the l8 Lecutures he 
identifies the crucial distinguishing features of the 
capitalist economy as private ownership of the means 
of production, decentralized economic regulation, 
separation of employers and employees on the basis of 
the sale of labour power, the predominance of the profit 
motive, and the operation of supply and demand in the 
determination of prices, (53) Aron's principal 
objections to the Marxist theory of capitalist social 
structure and development are, when his work as a whole 
is viewed, that a direct process of class polarization 
has not developed^§nà that the long-term survival of 
capitalism is a viable historical possibility, since 
Marx gave no convincing demonstration of the purely 
economic self-destruction of capitalism, (55)
As we saw in our discussion of Dahendorf's thesis, 
however, Marx explicitly rejected the nation of a crude 
polarization of clàsses in his mature political economy.
The cataclysmic view of a single, world—historical 
economic crisis to definitively abolish the epoch 
of capitalism, moreover, has more in common with a 
Luxemburg!st perspective than that of Marx, For Marx, 
a crucial function of capitalist crises is to restore 
the conditions for future extended accumulation on 
a profitable basis through the destruction of capital 
values and, on occasions, the reconsolidation of the 
political hegemony of the capitalist class.
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More fundamental I however, is Aron's discussion of 
the dynamics of surplus appropriation and allocation in 
capitalist and socialist societies respectively. That the 
distinction between private and state ownership of the 
means of production is not, for Aron, as crucial as 
might appear from the passages cited above is suggested 
by the following comments from the l8 Lectures :
"Marxism makes use of the idea 
of surplus value: the difference
between what is paid to the worker 
as wages and the value produced by his 
work. I have not used this notion 
of surplus value, but I have found 
the identical phenomenon in every 
economic system; namely that the 
worker is only paid, directly, a 
part of the value which he creates 
by his work, while another part goes 
to the social fund which is available 
for investment...... In either case
(capitalist or socialist society — D.B.) 
a part of the surplus value is consumed 
by privileged groups." (5 6 )
The style, it may be said, is the man. A basically 
pragmatic comparison equates the socialist and capitalist 
types on the basis of a common or shared economic surplus 
which funds investment on the one hand^and inequality 
through the differential distribution of rewards on the 
other. This is a recurrent theme in "refutations" of 
Marxism, most recently refurbished in Giddens' The Class 
Structure of the Advanced Societies (97)* Marx was, 
of course, well aware that in socialist societies not 
all the proceeds of labour would flow directly to the
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community of workers in the form of payment, an insight 
which Dahrendorf, among others, failed to recognize.
The essential point, however, concerns the criteria for 
the collection and application of the economic surplus 
in particular societies. If, as under capitalism, 
it is dependent upon exchange value and the criteria 
of profitability, there exists accordingly a structured 
source of both systematic inequality and a long-term 
unpredictability in the development of the economy*
If, on the other hand, it is determined by the evaluation 
of priority on the basis of use value there is at least 
the potential for a consciously planned economic 
system adapted to human needs rather than greed or 
proft—seeking. Aron's not purely terminological decision 
to avoid the use of the term "surplus value" serves to 
obscure this distinction, a distinction which is 
fundamental to an understanding of the dynamics of 
capitalism, however benevolent or paternalistic some 
of its forms may dpjp ear.
This failure to adequately draw out and demonstrate 
the implications of his largely ritualistic recognition 
of the continued private oimership of the means of 
production in capitalist societies also finds expression 
in Aron's observation that "different forms of ownership 
of the means of production and class relations grow out 
of the same technology." (57) In saying this, Aron 
demonstrates that he is effectively reading history 
backwards. The class relations of the Western capitalist 
heartlands did not "grow out" of some existent and
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and advanced technological infrastructure, although 
a relatively high degree of development of the division 
of labour as well as of the material conquest of nature 
was an essential precondition. Rather, the ascendancy 
of the bourgeoisie and its progressive relationship 
with the newly emergent proletarian class served to 
engender a stage of history in whih the forces of 
production, including the working class itself, 
developed to an unprecedented degree. Similarly, the 
pattern of state ownership of the means of production 
and its monopoly of foreign trade in the Soviet Union 
constituted the basis on which that country, despite 
the bureaucratic distortions of the planning process, 
emerged as a major global power in the space of half 
a century. (58) Class relations are not, as Aron 
suggests, somehow epiphenomenal or auxiliary to the 
industrial system. Rather, they are at the heart of 
historical change and, whether suppressed or manifest, 
of the dialectics of human development, from which the 
transformation of nature to human requirements through 
industrial application is inseparable.
This assessment of the work of Raymond Aron does 
not, as we pointed out at the outset, claim to be 
exhaustive. We are not suggesting that he has examined 
the structure of the advanced "industrial societies" 
in terms of any simple or unambiguous technological 
reductionism. Nevertheless, there are in his work 
elements which lead us to associate him with the
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"industrial society" theorists and we have accordingly 
discussed his ^fritings in the context of the "technocratic" 
thesis. To conclude, we will draw attention to his 
discussion of Comte on Progress and Disillusion.
Citing Comte's comparison of the social hierarchies 
charasteric of both industrial and military institutions, 
Aron observes :
"This allusion is to a hierarchy which 
is immanent and indispensable to 
industrial enterprise, which itself 
is continually expanding, and Auguste 
Comte's analysis of this decisive 
point holds true today." (59)
The imperatives of industrialism thus figure prominently 
in Aron's theses, quite in spite of the formal recognition 
of the importance of private property. The sociology 
of domination, by extension, becomes the study of the 
social effects of the industrial infrastructure, 
effects which, while having a relative autonomy, are 
essentially epiphenomenal. Aron's work, we suggest, is 
to a large extent technocratic quite in spite of itself.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE CULT OF "INTELLIGENCE".
The complexity of the advanced capitalist social 
structure requires an historically unparailed increase 
in the sector of the td(al work force concerned with 
information processing and the general allocation and 
distribution of technical knowledge within industrial, 
service, and administrative organisations. Within 
Marxist and neo-Marxist circles this development has 
engendered debate around the question of the middle 
classes. (60), and, more generally, the relationship 
between mental and manual labour, (61) At the same 
time a number of non-Marxist ifriters have suggested 
that the growth of the middle classes consequent upon 
long-termckaft^ es within capitalist societies have 
somehow invalidated Marx's supposedly dichotomous 
model of class polarization. (See later section,
"An Integrated Working Class"),
Our particular concern is the contention, assumed 
in the "technocratic state" thesis, that the requirements 
of complex organizations as such necessitate a new and 
unique primacy for the function of knowledge—based 
activities in state and other institutions which is 
relatively unproblematic as regards the social purposes 
of such activities and their relation to class structure. 
One extreme variant of this thesis suggests that the 
technical and economic developments of recent history 
have brought the advanced capitalist societies to a 
point where they are now on the verge of a transition to 
a new "post-industrial" form of social organization (62),
— 253 —
The displacement of traditional manufacture by service 
industries together with the key position held by the 
universities and theoretical knowledge in the advanced 
societiesgin America in particular, indicate the 
character of the social transformation that these theorists 
perceive to be taking place. Technocrats are progressively 
coming to occupy the policy formation positions previously 
held by more orthodox and recognizable capitalist figures^ 
as industrial and economic decisions increasingly assume 
a technical character, Galbraith's "technostructure" 
and his analysis of the "systematic application of 
scientific or other organized knowledge to practical 
tasks", (6 3 ) is a popular variant on these themes.
Some neo-Marxist writers (64) have presented related 
arguments, although their concern has tended to give 
greater attention to the problems posed by the 
technological aspects of late capitalism by the workers 
movement.
A, Giddens has indicated some of the major 
shortcomings of the "post-industrial society" thesis 
as a body of work (6 5 ), Its underlying economic and 
technological determinism, along with its typical 
minimizing of the importance of politics and the state, 
lead its proponents to abstract what are frequently 
valuable and perceptive observations from their context 
of still ende:vmic class conflict, Touraine's particular 
variant, perhaps the most challenging yet presented, 
characterizes the new society emerging from classical 
capitalism in terms of its post-industrial, its 
technocratic and especially its "programmed" qualities, (66)
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Economie decisions and struggles, he contends, are 
no longer as autonomous or important as they were in 
earlier capitalism. While still driven by the 
imperatives of growth, economic mechanisms alone are 
no longer at the "centre" of social organization and 
activity. Factors other than the accumulation of capital 
become increasingly essential if economic growth is 
to be maintained. In particular, Touraine points to 
the importance of knowledge in "post-industrial" 
society.
"All the domains of social life- 
education, consumptions, information, 
etc. are being more and more integrated 
into what used to be called production 
factors. This is true of scientific 
and technical research, professional 
training, the ability to programme 
change and regulate its elements, 
the management of organisations with 
multiple social relationships, and 
the communication of attitudes 
that favour the mobilization and 
continual transformation of all 
these production factors." (6?)
These new "production factors", however, far from being 
aspects of economic growth additional to capital 
accumulation, are in fact aspects of accumulation in the 
conditions of advanced capitalism. This is particularly 
true in the case; of social knowledge and research and
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development, as we suggest later in our discussion 
of Mandel*s thesis of the "third industrial revolution".
; , ; Touraine contends that the
economic and social changes characteristic of the 
emerging "programmed society" transform the centre of 
antagonism away from the traditional conflict between 
capital and labour.
"The great social conflicts 
transcend the firm and the 
whole arena of production and are 
situated, like programmed change itself, 
on a much broader plane. They are 
multidimensional - social, cultural 
and political - much more than * 
strictly economic." (68)
Central to Touraine's conception of "multidimensional" 
social conflicts is his view, derived directly from 
his model of contemporary economic growth, that 
"alienation" is a more appropriate terra than "exploitation, 
to account for the emergent forms of social domination. 
Social domination, he suggests, now increasingly assumes 
the three principal forms of social integration, cultural 
manipulation and political aggressiveness. (ibid., 7-8) 
Touraine stresses that taken together these forms of 
social domination do not simply constitute a new stage 
of capitalism. Contemporary alienation, rather, finds 
expression in what Touraine terms "dependent participation." 
By this he is referring to the substitution of the 
relatively simple conflict between capital and labour by 
that between the structures of economic and political
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decision-making and those persons reduced to a position 
of conformism and marginal dependency within society 
as a whole. The traditional working class, in consequence, 
is no longer a "privileged historic agent." The trade 
unions are still engaged in conflict with capital and 
management, but conflict no longer relates to the centres 
of "real social power". Rather, the wider conflict 
between the structures of decision-making and those 
reduced to dependent participation, elsewhere expressed, 
in terms of the opposition between "development" 
and "consumption" (ibid., 45), is identified by Touraine 
as the central social conflict. The new ruling class is 
accordingly not defined in terras of profit from private 
investment. Its ruling status derives from their 
relation to the process of programmed growth, seen by 
Touraine as qualitatively distinct from the earlier form 
of capital accumulation. The new ruling class consists 
of ;
"Those who identify themselves ifith 
collective investment and who enter into 
conflict with those who demand increased 
consumption or whose private life 
resists change." (6 9 )
Having in this way rejected the centrality of the 
labour-capital conflict for an eclectic conception of 
economic growth fed by inputs from a heterogeneous 
complex of sources, it is a logical step for Touraine to 
posit, drawing on Parsons and Dahrendorf, the existence 
of problems connected with "society in general" rather 
than the class system. (Ibid., 7 6 ) Specifically he 
suggests that the raising of living standards, the
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increase in leisure ("free") time, and the important 
sphere of family life contribute to and constitute 
determinants of professional behaviour which are 
increasingly independent of the firm. A parallel 
development is the rising importance of extra-firm 
roles. Touraine significantly supports these propositions 
by referring to the Luton studies of Goldthorpe of 
Lockwood. As we will contend in a later section ("AN 
Integrated Working Class"), however, Goldthorpe and 
Lockwood et al, like the cmider theorists of 
embourgeoisement whose work they are concerned to 
criticize, fail to identify the crucial relationship 
between the processes of privatization that they 
identify and the traditional struggle between capital 
and labour, the former being inseparable from, an 
aspect of, and a reinforcement to the latter. It is at 
this point that the ideological character of Touraine*s 
thesis becomes apparent. The "new" factors of production 
contributing to economic growth are, in fact, aspects 
or dimensions of the capital accumulation process which 
they are claimed to augment.
Effectively, moreover, the process of accumulation 
is seen by Touraine as essentially non-problematic.
A tension arises between social investment and development, 
no longer associated with a specifically capitalist class, 
on the one hand, and the demands for immediate consumption 
on the other. (ibid., 45) When viewed in abstraction 
from its foundation in the exploitative relations of 
production, however, the question of the distribution
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of the proceeds of production has no inherent dimension 
of antagonism. Touraine, in fact, does not attempt 
to explain the "necessary" character of the conflict 
he identifies between the structures of decision­
making and the periphery of dependent social actors.
It is, rather, taken for granted. A consensual 
agreement on a "just" allocation of the proceeds of 
industry both within classes and between consumption 
in general and programmed investment is, however, an 
equally feasible theoretical possibility. Touraine, 
indeed, hints at this himself ;
"Mass movements are less turned 
toward properly institutional action 
and call rather for self—management, 
that is, for revolt against power." (70)
But on the basis of Touraine*s assumptions, there is no 
conceivable reason why the new ruling class of technocrats 
should not, in order to facilitate the smooth—functioning 
of the "programmed society", allow or even encourage 
the "dependent" strata to manage their oim practices 
ifithin the firm. The systematic conflict posited by 
Tduranne between these two aspects of the "programmed" 
society, presumably refracted from the Marxist conception 
of class conflict,represents little more than an act 
of faith. It rests, moreover, on an abstracted conception 
of social power, a conception which locates the source 
of power in the imperatives of economic growth as discussed 
above, its result rather than its source being social 
antagonism and conflict. Touraine explains that the 
stratum of technocrats acts ;
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"for the benefit of a self-devouring 
technical development, which transforms 
itself into the non-rational accumulation 
of power and thus creates social 
conflicts. Their appropriation of an 
excessive share of the collective 
product is relatively infrequent and of 
no real concern, whereas the capitalist 
invests only after he has deducted a 
certain, sometimes very important, 
portion of his resources for his 
private consumption." (71)
At no point, however, does Touraine attempt to 
actually demonstrate that and how the systematic and, 
within the context of capitalist society, essentially 
rational basis of power in the ownership of capital 
has been or is being superceded. The new aspects of 
"growth" which he Impressionistically identifies are, 
again, aspects of the accumulation process. Touraine 
suggests that the organizations of programmed growth, 
while on the one hand vast and impersonal, are also 
"centres for particular interests," t'Ibid, , 53)
The nature of these interests is not convincingly 
elaborated, however. Touraine*s antagonistic model 
of technocracy and the strata reduced to "dependent 
participation" is adequate neither at the level of 
a description of the workings of society nor, as we 
have suggested, in purely logical terms. Even were 
it to correspond to the social reality it purports 
to explain, its antagonistic quality would be neither
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necessary nor inevitable, as Touraine indicates.
Our starting point, however, was the centrality 
attributed by Touraine to the increased importance of 
social knowledge in the workings of the advanced 
societies. To a large extent, this theme is a different 
dimension of the "technological imperatives" thesis 
discussed above. In both cases the organizational 
forms associated with the complexity of contemporary 
industry-based institutions are viewed as more or less 
autonomous from the primarily economic interests that 
stand to benefit to different degrees from the prevailing 
institutional order. The distinction between an 
emphasis on the economic aspects of industrialism on 
the one hand and on the consequences of the resultant 
organizational aspects of information processing on 
the other leads us to consider them separately, however.
We will look at the work of Wilensky, considering this 
to be representative study,
Wilensky*s concern is **the ways in which knowledge 
shapes policy". (72) "Intelligence" and its application 
are central to his analysis of the functions of knowledge 
in large-scale organizations. He defines intelligence as :
"the information - questions, insights, 
hypotheses, evidence - relevant to policy.
It includes both scientific knowledge 
and political or ideological information, 
scientific or not." (73)
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Wilensky adopts a broad definition of intelligence 
which incorporates both scientific and non—scientific 
information, the crucial criterion being a relationship 
between "ideas", broadly interpreted, and organizational 
policy. A discrimination is made, however, when he 
specifies "high quality" intelligence to be that which 
is clear, timely, reliable, valid, adequate and wide- 
ranging. This discrimination allows Wilensky to draw 
attention to the "dysfunctional" aspects of information- 
processing.
^Information is now, as before, a source 
of power, but it is increasingly a source 
of confusion. The proliferation of 
both technical and political ideological 
information and a chronic condition 
of information overload have exacerbated 
the classic problems of intelligence." (?4)
For Wilensky, that is to say, administrative technico- 
rationality is rendered problematic precisely by the 
inherent conditions and ambiguities of contemporary 
information— management. On the basis of this insight 
Wilensky identifies a number of sources as well as 
typical effects of "intelligence failures", deriving 
from both "structural" and "doctrinal" locations. He 
suggests that gains in the quality of intelligence in 
organizations are possible through the management of 
the intelligence function. Success in this field is, 
however, conditional upon the top executive’s attitude
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towards knowledge (his "capacity to break through 
the wall of conventional wisdom") on the one hand, and 
the capacity of the specialist to influence policy 
discourse on the other* With these two conditions in 
mind Wilensky pessimistically suggests that "intelligence 
failures are built into complex organisations"(Ibid*, 179).
Despite these "realistic" qualifications, however, 
Wilensky constructs a paradigm to account for the 
relationship between organizational complexity and the 
demand for systematic intelligence. He suggests :
"Briefly, the more complex the 
structure, the more use of experts." (75)
This formula, applicable to both government and industry, 
is the essential element of Wilensky*s thesis. 
Organizational size, centralization,and heterogeneity 
of membership and goals are identified as aspects of 
institutional complexity. They all generate the need 
for experts in so far as they increase the number and 
variety of social units in their environment, aggravate 
problems of internal control, and intensify the "search 
for uniformity" through a proliferation of formal rules. ^
As supportive evidence Wilensky points to the 
relatively high expenditure on staff experts and 
consultants in the largest, most centralized and most 
rapidly expanding*and government-connected institutions 
within a number of sectors. In the economic sphere, 
he identifies the aerospace, oil, chemical and electrical 
equipment industries. The Ifhite House, the C.I.A. and
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the Departments of State and Defence are similarly 
noted in the polity. In addition, Wilensky points 
to the universities and mass media networks within the 
fields of education and entertainment.
Generalizing from these sectors, Wilensky attempts 
to relate the increasing requirements for organizational 
intelligence to a theory of the contemporary power 
structure.
"there is a shift in power to 
administrative leaders — in the economy, 
to coalitions of top managers and experts 
each acquiring some of the skills of the 
other; in government, to the Executive 
Branch, gaining at the expense of the 
legislature," (7 6 )
Ifhile in this way explicitly dissociating his thesis 
from the more overtly "managerialist" theories of 
Burnham and others, Wilensky identifies a political 
corollary of the increased demand and need for intelligence 
in the form of a sharing of power between its carriers 
and the more traditional incumbents of power positions. 
Wilensky views the question of the successful application 
of intelligence in policy as problematic for the reasons 
discussed above. Nevertheless, he identifies the 
increased salience and influence of "experts^ both ifithin 
industry and government, as a generalised secular trend. 
Thus, he predicts as among the most likely outcomes of 
the "new managerial revolution" an increase in the numbers
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and influence of information technologists,and a 
widening social gulf between that strata together with 
top executives on the one hand, and "men whose work 
is more programmed" on the other. (Ibid., 155-6)
An objection we wish to make to Wilensky*s thesis 
is that it views the application of knowledge to policy 
as essentially interest-neutral* ( 77 )  It becomes a 
purely technical problem, divorced from and not concerned 
with the conflicts which characteristically accompany 
large-saale social institutions and the antagonistic 
interests which they embody. This orientation is 
closely related to Wilensky*s central preoccupation, 
which is to examine the position occupied by intelligence 
within single organizations. While not explicitly stated, 
the implication is that these organizations are effectively 
autonomous, their internal structure not being intrinsically 
related to and dependent on the nature of their 
relationship with other "organizational" spheres. Thus, 
Wilensky proposes that his paradigm is applicable to 
the spheres of both industry and government, but does 
not attempt to account for the pattern of relations 
between these two institutional orders. Within capitalist 
societies, however, a central function of government is 
to provide a suitable environment within which individual 
firms, structured internally according to a clearly 
identifiable hierarchy of power and authority, can operate. 
Wilensky*s atomistic model of organizational functioning, 
however, is inherently blind to the basis of the persistent
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struggles between management and labour,and the
political significance of those economic conflicts. ^
When Wilensky does discuss the question of conflicting 
interests and values he suggests that in cases where 
the conflicts are made explicit they tend to generate 
a polarization of positions, and furthermore to prompt 
the administrator to withhold information, thus 
widening "the credibility gap".
Wilensky contends, however, that such conflicts 
of interest are amenable to resolution through rational 
X ^systems analysis". In particular, he advocates a 
cost-benefit approach,using an example concerning 
government expenditure on outdoor recreation. Wilensky 
suggests that funds can be allocated on the basis of 
assessed *'merit-weighted user—days", incorporating 
such factors as the "marginal utility of additional 
recreation." This principle of interest and value 
conflict resolution is generalised in Wilensky*s 
claim that "There is no problem that cannot be approached 
in this rational way." He recognizes that a dimension 
of "evaluation** may often enter into this essentially 
rational method of resource allocation. To illustrate 
this dimension, however, he presents the emotive example 
of the higher value of **a child in the wilderness, 
absorbing the visual tactile and aural delights of 
nature** than that of **an adult * s picnicking in a
crowded, noisy, fly-ridden, garbage-strewn park**. (Ibid, ,189-90)
This example, however, suggests a beguilingly simple 
choice between alternative modes of allocation which, it
-  266 -
is implied, is at least potentially universably held, 
thus reinforcing Wilensky*s assumption that conflicts 
of interest are in all cases resolvable through a 
rationally arrived at solution which satisfies the 
objective requirements of all parties involved.
Wilensky*s ultra-rationalist solution is, however, 
inapplicable to the central conflicts of capitalist 
society, in particular, that between labour and capital 
over the proceeds of production. Here, within the 
confines of capitalist production relationships, 
both groups have an objective interest in organizing 
separately in order to attempt to maximize their 
respective advantages from an inherently antagonistic 
relationship. The tensions which have undermined many 
of the state-instigated incomes policies in the advanced 
capitalist countries throughout the 1960*s and 1970*s 
bear witness to this inherent antagonism. (7 8 )
Wilensky*s model of organizational intelligence, along 
with the rationalist technocratic state thesis of which 
it is a part can only treat such cases as a "failure" 
of intelligence, an accident or contingency, rather than 
a pattern of relations deriving from a situation where 
a divergence of interests has primacy. This is apparent 
in the "convergence thesis" implications of his claim 
that :
"^fhatever the national variations 
in idealogies justifying economic 
activity, whatever the degree of 
pluralism in political life, there 
is a universal increase in information -
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consciousness at the top; elites 
in every rich country are moved to 
break through mere slogans and grasp 
reality." (79)
Under capitalist social relations of production there 
does not exist such a "reality" through which the dominant 
conflicts of interest can be reduced to a single, unproblematic 
resolution. In the first place, the labour-capital antagonism 
transcends the spatial and relational unity that may exist within 
any particular industrial enterprise. Furthermore, in 
capitalist society the use of information, and of scientific 
information in particular, is an aspect of a relationship 
of domination grounded in the private ownership of property.
In a class-divided society knowledge, whether applied in the 
industrial context or in more overtly and transparently 
political decision-making, cannot be regarded as neutral.
Even in conditions where the capitalist and working classes 
may temporarily co-exist on a relatively peaceful basis, 
knowledge which does not, consciously or accidentally, serve 
to question or undermine the hegemony of private property 
will in fact reinforce or consolidate it. Information and 
its application do not have a special immunity from the 
divisive affects of class structure, a structure which is 
obscured by Wilensky*s "cost—benefit" formula for conflict 
resolution together ifith his atomized portrayal of 
organizational autonomy, A full account of the social 
significance of information, as we shall elaborate in our 
critical assessment of the "technocratic state" thesis as 
a whole, must incorporate both its economic and political
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dimensions through an analysis structured in terms of political 
economy.
MANAGERIALISM.
A related aspect of the "technocratic state" thesis is 
"managerialism". By managerialism we refer to the particular 
attention paid by these authors to the strata of administrators , 
planners and sometimes engineers in advanced capitalist societies. 
Aron, although this phenomenon is by no means central to his work, 
indicates the of this theory when he suggests :
"If we use the term 'management* for that
organisation of a firm in which the managers
are experts in management — not engineers
but men who have a gift for administration
and organisation — then all the large
industrial enterprises of our time, in
Wesjfem Europe and perhaps in all the
developed capitaltist and Communist
countries, have a 'managerial* organisation." (8l)
This "authoritarian structure", Aron suggests is inherent in and 
"bound up with the very essence of " the modem industrial 
organization.
The most radical and thoroughr-going version of the 
managerial thesis is, of course, that of iks James Bumham, 
however. Bumham contended that the 1940*s were witnessing
a "social revolution" throughout the capitalist world, a
revolution finding expression in changes in the major economic,
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political and cultural institutions, as well as in the 
personnel of the leading positions of power and privilege.
In particular, classical capitalism, based on private 
ownership of the means of production with the bourgeoisie as 
the ruling class, was seen to be undergoing a transformation into 
a new type of society in which a strata of managers occupied 
the ruling position. Managers, Burnham argued, are coming to 
increasingly exercise control over the instruments of production 
and the distribution of material privileges.
The political philosophy underlying Burnham’s thesis 
is outlined more clearly and consistently in "The Machiavellian 
Defenders of Freedom". Bumham reviews "the main principles 
of Machiavellianism" as expressed in the works of Mosca,
Michels, Pareto and other political theorists. Drawing on 
their analyses, be suggests that every society has a recognizable 
elite that manages public affairs for the primary aim of 
conserving its own power and privileges. These elites 
establish their supremacy through force and cunning, but their 
hegemony is persistently challenged in the process of class 
struggle. Rapid, revolutionary shifts consequently occur 
periodically in the structure and composition of elites. 
Burnham’s endorsement of the Machiavellian thesis is summarized 
in his observation that î
"The Machiavellian analysis, confirmed and 
re—confirmed by the evidence of history, shows 
that the masses simply do not think scientifically 
about political and social aims; and that, 
even if they did, the technical and administrative 
means for implementing their scientific 
thought would necessarily be lacking. Beliefs, 
ideals, do sometimes influence the political 
actions of the masses; these are not, 
however, scientific beliefs and ideals, but
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myths or derivations," (82)
This is essentially the political framework within 
which Bumham interprets the rise to power of the managerial 
strata. Their ascendancy is viewed on an international 
scale as "the first genuinely international revolution" (Ibid., 171) 
Bumham predicts that when their power is consolidated 
it will be exerciei not directly through actual property 
rights, but indirectly through control of the state and its 
various institutions. (83) Their power, while involving 
economic domination, and exploitation, thus finds its crucial 
expression in the state apparatus.
Burnham’s thesis emphasizes in particular the experiences 
of Fascism in Germany, Stalinism in the Soviet Union, and the 
New Deal in the United States, (ibid., 219). It generalizes 
the managerialist interpretation of these three countries into 
a global secular trend, however, and in doing so prompted 
Paul Sweezy to point to "its superobjective tone of fatalistic 
inevitability". (84) The managerial "re—newed elite" is 
a world historical phenomenon, based on "state control of the economy 
and centintentai or vast regional world political organization". (85)
While Burnham’s characterization of the dominant economic 
and political features of classical capitalism (86) is relatively 
comprehensive, however, his account of the transition to 
managerial society, as well as its political structure, is 
obscure. The managers, the ascendant dominant political strata, 
are defined by virtue of their function of guidance and 
organization of the process of production, (ibid. 70).
Concerning their actual rise to power Bumham, having identified 
a social tension in the supposed separation of ownership and
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control, writes the following :
"Historical experience tells us that 
such a lack of correlation between the 
two kinds of control (the 2 basic rights 
of property) cannot long endure# Control 
over access is decisive, and, when 
consolidated, will carry control over 
preferential treatment in distribution 
with it: that is, will shift ownership
unambiguously to the new controlling, a 
new dominant class. Here we see, from 
à new viewpoint, the mechanism of the 
managerial revolution*" (87)
Precisely how such a transformation is to be effected and 
how it will affect the pattern of economic crises associated 
by Bumham with classical capitalism remains unclear however.
His assessment that capitalism "has entered its final years" 
is accompanied by an adequate account neither of how it 
will be Ôuperceded, nor of the means by which its inherently 
destabilizing tendencies will be reversed.
Assessing Burnham’s thesis three decades later, we can 
point to the survival of the profit-motive in the capitalist 
world and the consequent re-emergence of recessionary tendencies, 
indicating that capital accumulation and consequently industrial 
production are still subject to the conditions and constraints 
of private profitability. That this anarchic dimension of 
capitalism, and Burnham’s perception of the problem associated 
with its supercession,underlies his thesis is apparent from his
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Letter of Resignation from the American Workers Party, written 
in 1940* There, sketching his theory of the "new form of 
exploitative society" associated with the managerial revolution 
Bumham observes :
"It is certainly the case that I am
influenced by the defeats and betrayals
of the past twenty years and more. These
form part of the evidence for my belief
that Marxism must be rejected: at every
single one of the many tests provided by
history, Marxist movements have either failed
socialism or betrayed it. And they influence
also my feelings and attitudes, I know that." (88)
Biographically Bumham, by his own account, rejected 
the Marxist solution to the transformation of capitalism on the 
grounds of historical experience. This rejection was later 
to be generalized in the form of a Machiavellian view of the 
primacy of elites in social change. Burnham’s theory of 
managerial ascendancy, however, is both erroneous, in that it 
inaccurately predicted an immanent transcendance of effective 
private ownership, and, even in its own terms, inadequate in 
so far as the mechemism of transition, and in particular the 
demise of the capitalist "function", is implied to be evidenced 
in such contrasting contexts as New Beal America and Stalin’s 
Russia. (89).
While this thesis is the most radical and extreme version 
of the managerialist tendency, its weaknesses, assuming and 
resting on the supposed ascendancy of a distinctive managerial
-  273 -
strata, are characteristic of that tendency as a whole. (90)
The view of that group as having an independent power base 
within capitalist society entails, in the last analysis, a 
denial of the imperatives that the requirements of capital 
accumulation impose on production and to which, especially 
when profits are squeezed, managerial and adminstrative 
groups are subordinate. As such it is unable to adéquatelyac(ovÂÜ 
either the social and politcal significance of the managerial 
strata or the form and functions of the state in late 
capitalist society#
AN INTEGRATED WORKING CLASS.
The final characteristic feature of the "technocratic state" 
thesis that we wish to consider is the recurrent theme of the 
incorporation of the working class into the structures of the 
state and economy of advanced capitalist society. This 
incorporation has been explained and interpreted in a variety 
of ways, three major positions being identifiable on the 
basis of differential emphasis of the dimensions of abolition, 
suppression and concealment of class conflict.
At one extreme, Von Mises, stressing the "natural" 
character of the capitalist division of labour argues for the 
inherent one—ness of workers and indeed of all economic 
actors within the institutions of capitalist ownership (9I). 
Capitalism, according to this radically favourable interpretation, 
is governed by "the sovereignty of the consumers and democratic 
operation of the market" (Ibid., 36). Capitalist ownership is, 
consequently, compatible with the interests of all its 
constituent members and groups through the function of
consumption and the constraints it exercises on the allocation
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of resources* "The profit-motive pushes every entrepreneur
to acoomplish those services that the customers deem the
most urgent" (Ihid., 6o), From this perspective the
question of the integration of the specifically propertyless strata
of wage-labourers is basically unproblematic* The system
is, assuming the "democratic" character of the bureaucratic
sector as discussed earlier, inherently integrated* For
Von Mises the abolition of class conflict is an essentially
technical accomplishment, not bound up with the intrinsic
nature of capitalism, because the elements of its typical
context — economic crises, unemployment, the growth of
monopoly etc* — derive from an exogenous source* They are
"the inescapable consequences of government interference with
big business as recommended by the advocates of the third
solution (the mixed economy - D.B.)"* (ibid*, II9).
A more common interpretation of working class 
incorporation, however, views the decline of class conflict 
historically against the realistic background of economic struggle 
and political dissent* Such views were common in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s and provided the academic impetus for the 
sociological debate of the supposed "embourgeoisement" process*
The provisions of the liberal welfare state, together with 
the wider involvement of government in the economy, are 
typically seen to be central to the moderation of class 
conflict as traditionally understood* Lipset, for example, 
suggests :
"the workers have achieved industrial 
. and political citizenship; the conservatives 
have accepted the welfare state; and the
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democratic left has recognized that 
an increase in over-all state power 
carries with it more dangers to 
freedom than solutions for economic 
problems*" (92)
The corollary of this interpretation of the bénéficiant 
influence of the liberal state is a relatively high degree 
of political harmony s
"This change in western political life 
reflects the fact that the fundamental 
political problems of the industrial 
revolution have been solved*" (93)
More specifically, the electoral defeats of the British 
Labour Party in the 1950's manifested, Lipset suggests, the 
desire of affluent workers to express their new sense of 
improved status in appropriate voting patterns* This 
shift towards political gradualism, he elaborates, is 
related to economic development and the consequent rise 
in worker’s incomes* In particular the distribution of 
consumption goods tends to become more equitable as the size 
of the national income rises and society is farced by a 
"dearth of goods"* (Ibid, 65) Lipset cites the abundance of 
cars and washing machines in the United States and optimistically 
suggests that there is relatively little difference between 
the standards of living of adjacent social classes. Politically, 
increased education and wealth serve democracy by increasing 
the lower classes’ exposure to cross-pressures, thus reducing 
their commitment to particular idealogies* The democratic 
liberal state, through its humane eind rational involvement
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in wider society, is an important aspect of this supposed 
changed reality*
Kerr et al in their version of the convergence thesis,
■ ?
similarly identify the state as an active factor encouraging 
uniformity in industrial societies* As industrialization 
advances, the authors suggest, the "age of idealogy" recedes 
into the past* Even where parties still contend, they tend 
to draw closer together on major issues^and are likely to 
replace an idealogical by a pragmatic approach* Thus ;
"Industrial man is seldom faced with 
'real idealogical alternatives within 
his society." (94)
Social and political life becomes dominated by an essentially 
conservative status quo* The labour force, in particular, is 
increasingly "committed to and settled into industrial life*"
Kerr et al’s thesis, rests on a basically technocratic in­
terpretation of recent social development. One particular 
unifying factor that they identify is the "omnipresent state". 
Industrialization is accompanied by the growth of the directing, 
guiding, managing state" as never before so universally in 
history."
"The complexity of the fully developed 
industrial society requires, in the name 
of efficiency and initiative, a degree 
of centralization of control, particularly 
in the consumer goods and service trades 
industries; but it also requires a large
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measure of central control by the state 
and the conduct of many operations by 
large-scale organizations# Industrialism 
cannot function well according to either 
the monistic or atomistic models"# (95)
To an even greater extent than Lipset , Kerr et al 
identify the technocratic state as a central factor contributing 
to the embourgeoisement process# Grounded in and reinforcing 
the industrial economy, it contributes to the development of 
political pluralism on the one hand and the incorporation of the 
working class on the other#
In general, however, the "incorporâtionist" theorists do 
not postulate the total abolition of class conflict either as 
a present or as an immediately attainable accomplishment#
Lipset, for example, distinguishes between the end of idealogy 
debate and .that of embourgeoisement by suggesting that some 
intellectuals err in mistaking the decline of idealogy in the 
domestic politics of Western society for "the ending of the 
class conflict which has sustained democratic controversy#" (96)
Nevertheless, the excesses of class conflict are seen by the 
embourgeoisement theorists to be removed more or less 
permanently and the presence of a distinctively mal-integrated 
working class accordingly transformed# Kerr et al succinctly 
observe "Class lines are softened#" (273) More specificalljr 
a middle class life-style and ethos is becoming increasingly 
prevalent and
"Both the managerial and the working 
classes converge toward the upper and 
lower ranges of the middle class in 
their habits and beliefs#" (97)
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Thus, while surviving material and staus distinctions are 
acknowledge^^ these theorists typically minimize their divisive 
and above all revolutionary potential or implications. The 
close relationship between embourgeoisement thus perceived, 
industrialization, and the development of the liberal 
democratic state is perhaps most concisely expressed in the 
following quote from Parsons. The article from which it 
is taken, we may observe in retrospect, was written a mere 
decade before it became apparent that the United States, 
with which it is largely concerned, was entering into the 
deepest recession in the post-war period# Parsons, with 
an almost tragic tone of complacently, suggested that :
"Through industrial development under 
democratic auspices, the most important 
legitimately-to-be expected aspirations of the 
’working-class* have, in fact, been realized." (98)
The trinity of advanced industrial development, supervisory 
democratic state, and working class incorporation are 
attributed with a unity and complecnentarily comparable only 
with those of its theological counterpart# The utopian nature 
of the incorporatioh thesis is here complete and apparent# We 
will attempt, in the remainder of this section, to indicate 
the contours of a critique of this thesis through a consideration 
of Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s variant#
Much of the inspiration for the various versions of the 
embourgeoisment thesis came from the relative affluence of some 
sections of the working class and the general, if not total^ 
ethos of economic expansion and social stability whtch
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characterized much of the advanced capitalist world in the early 
post-war years# Thè distinctive pattern of class relations 
which emerged required, and still calls for, sociological 
description and explanation# Nevertheless, the embourgeoisement 
theorists* account was misleading for at least two reasons#
In the first place, it seribusly underestimated the extent of 
poverty^ and more generally of class differentials^which survived 
and even became more pronounced in the period in question# (99) 
Secondly, and related, the pervasive emphasis on the "privatization" 
of working class activities and ambitions, and the radical 
analytical distinction between work and private or family 
life that this' assumes, is one of the major means by which 
the still essentially capitalistic structure of class relations 
and social activities is obscured in these works#
In Lipset*s thesis for example, the supposed abundance of 
consumer goods intended for and mainly used by individual 
family units, is crucial to the process of working class 
incorporation# Similarly Zweig*s study of factory workers stresses 
factors such as the rise in security-mindedness and "home— 
centredness", a movement towards "personalization" and individualization 
and a quest for "respectability" in his portrayal of their new, 
assimilation—orientated social outlook and life-style# (lOO)
The examination of such developments only becomes meaningful , 
however, when it is understood that these material and symbolic, 
but primarily material, aspirations of "private" life are 
precisely the substance and object of working class organization, 
traditionally pursued in Britain through trade union activity
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and political support for the Labour Party# Zweig in fact points 
to the "revolution of rising expectations", which he explains 
in terms of a steep rise in acquisitive desires and expectations# (lOl) 
At no point, however, does he consider the possibility that these , 
expectations will not be met, that capitalism may not be able 
to "deliver the goods" to match workers customary standards 
of living# The distinctively "bourgeois" process of 
privatization accordingly assumes the form of a taken-for-granted 
datum of the new affluent workers* process of assimilation#
Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s critique of the embourgeoisement 
thesis, while repudiating the notion of an unambiguous 
convergence between the working and middle classes in toto  ^
rests to a large extent on the same assumptions# Thus they 
present their findings in terms of "world of work", "pattern of 
sociability" and "aspirations and social perspectives". While 
rejecting the embourgeoisement thesis in its cruder forms, they 
report significant changes in the affluent sector of the 
working class# In particular they identify privatization 
centred on home .and family interests, in the context of a 
decline in class solidarity# On the one hand they suggest 
that within the world of work :
"a fairly distinctive working class 
can still be readily identified, even when 
attention is concentrated on progressive 
industrial sectors and modem establishements." (102)
Elsewhere, however, they criticize Mallet and others who have 
claimed that modern, technologically advanced, capital intensive
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industrial plants are capable, in the long-run of
revitalizing the labour movement. Such speculations, the authors
suggest, derive from an over-preoccupation with nature of
work tasks and roles at the expense of the out-of-plant
lives of workers, (ibid., I84)
Specifically concerning the non-work pattern of sociability 
of the manual workers studied, Goldthorpe et al discovered 
that when compared with white-collar couples, they reported a 
similar average number of overall relationships, but fewer 
joint—friendships. In particular manual workers* wives 
were found to have a comparably high proportion of "independent" 
friends, drawn from the characteristically working class sources 
of family and neighbours. Furthermore, a majority of manual 
workers reported a preference for "people with the same 
background and outlook" as the most desirable category of 
friends. The authors conclude that there remain i
"important areas of common social experience 
which are still fairly distinctively working 
class." (103)
Nevertheless, like the "embourgeoisement" theorists whose 
work they are concerned to refute, Goldthorpe et al do not 
attempt to relate their portrayal of a relatively privatized 
sector of affluent workers, and their material aspirations to 
the ability of contemporary British capitalism to sustain and 
satisfy their expectations. A later section of this thesis, 
concerned with the relations between the main classes and the 
state in the post-war period, is centrally intended to demonstrate 
that it was precisely stagnating real wages for significant 
sections of the British working class which came into conflict 
with the "revolution of rising expectations” and led to the
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wave of strikes and class struggles of the late l^ôO's, The 
secular decline of corporate profitability throughout that decade 
led both Conservative and Labour governments to attempt to 
implement incomes policies designed to restore private 
profitability and resolve the acute balance of payments 
problems. Yet Goldthorpe et, al, suggest, in the final pages 
of their study, that :
"The possibility of the Labour Party 
adopting and officially pursuing radical 
objectives is not in fact denied by any 
lessons of history nor by any results of 
sociological investigation or analysis," (104)
The utopian character of this speculation is demonstrated 
both by the continuation of substantial inequalities of income, 
wealth and property ownership under successive past Labour 
governments and by the pro-capitalist policies of the present 
Labour administrations.
Despite the sophistication of their otherwise valuable 
study Goldthorpe et al offer little or no theoretical advance 
beyond the embourgeoisement theorists* failure to relate their 
observations concerning "privatization" among the working 
class to the present stage of development of British capitalism, 
and its long-term ability to satisfy their new and continually 
rising level of material expectations. Viewing the state as 
a central means whereby the working class is progressively incorporated 
in the one case, and as a possible vehicle for radical social 
reform by the Labour Party in the other, both theses are unable
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to account for the persistently pro-capitalist character of 
state activity, as expressed in taxation and incomes policies 
as well as in more direct forms of economic intervention,
Goldthorpe et al, in summary, do not identify the dual
character of the process of workers* affluence and privatization ;
its weakening effect on traditional, parochial working class solidarity,
hut also the implications for widespread disaffection if
capitalism is, for economic reasons, unable to satisfy workers
high levels of expectation and aspiration. The liberal,
integrative state of Lipset and Kerr et al is inadequate for
such conditions, (IO5)
AN OVERVIEW. GALBRAITH AND THE TECHNOSTRUCTURE.
J.K. Galbraith, in a series of studies, has incorporated 
the preceding theses into a thorough-going technocratic model 
of social, economic and political organization. His most 
developed analysis, The New Industrial State, attempts to 
develop a sytematic theory to account for the changes which 
have taken place in the advanced capitalist economies since the 
Second World War. He sees to be of particular importance 
the increasing development and application of technology in 
production, increased state economic activity, the rise of 
large-scale business organization involving new forms of 
planning, and the regulation of overall demand by the state.
The result of these developments, Galbraith proposes, is a 
qualitative transformation of economic life, the central 
features of which is the effective abolition of the market 
with the rise of the great corporations.
*'.,,we have an economic system which, 
whatever its formal hilling, is in 
Buhstantial part a planned economy,** (106)
—  284 “
The new forms of planning, characteristically effected 
through the larger productive firms, overcome the dictates 
imposed by the market by such means as its outright abolition, 
its control by sellers and buyers, and its suspension by 
means of contracts. Galbraith further elaborates a version 
of the "convergence" thesis, suggesting that the division 
of labour associated with advanced technology impose common 
imperatives on all forms, "capitalist" and "socialist", of the 
developed industrial economy. (10?)
Galbraith is effectively positing the historical demise 
of capitalism in post - "managerial" society, as examined by 
Burnham and others. At an earlier stage, he contends, power 
lay with capital to which the other factors of production were 
subordinate. Even earlier, the dominant role of agriculture in 
total social production resulted in the "eminence of land".
Galbraith's thesis is that historically any given "factor of production** 
aspires to a position of dominancy by virtue of its relative 
scare ity-value•
"Power goes to the factor which is 
hardest to obtain or hardest to replace.
In precise language it adheres to the 
one that has the greatest inelasticity of 
supply at the margin." (IO8)
Galbraith proposes that a new shift of power, corresponding 
to that from land to capital, has occured. Capital now being 
a freely available fadtor, the dominant contemporary problematic 
concerns the field of technology, "the systematic application
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of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical 
tasks." (ibid., 23) Accordingly the locus of power is 
now to be found in "organized intelligence." Symptomatic of this 
transition, for Galbraith, are the loss of power by stockholders, 
the consolidation of the position of corporate management, the 
declining social significance of the banker, the newly gained 
prestige of education and educators, and above all "the 
increasingly energetic search for industrial talent." (Ibid., 67)
Galbraith refers to this new centre of economic power as 
the'%eohnostruoture". With the rise of the modern corporation, 
technology and planning necessitate the emergence of a specific 
type of productive organization. The entrepreneur no longer 
functions as an independent economic actor in the mature 
economic corporation. Group decision-making, rather, is the 
typical mode of corporate organization. This decision-making 
process incorporates various strata of corporate personnel, 
including all those who as participants contribute information 
to group decisions. It extends from the most senior officials 
of the firm to the white and blue collar workers who conform 
more or less mechanically to instruction or routine. In sum :
"It embraces all who bring 
specialized knowledge, talent 
or experience to group decision­
making." (110)
This heterogeneous "technostructure", its heterogeneity 
reflecting the diversity of the division of labour that 
accompanies the freigmentation of work tasks with advanced 
technology, is, for Galbraith, the dominant factor of production
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or loous of power in the modem enterprise#
One particular area where Galbriath sees decion-making to 
have overcome the imperatives of the capitalist market is 
that of the application of savings to investment decisions#
"The decisions on what will be saved are made 
in the main by a few hundred large corporations#
The decisions as to what will be invested 
are made by a similar number of large firms 
to which are added those of a much larger 
number of individuals who are buying 
dwellings, automobiles and household 
appliances# No mechanism of the market 
relates the decisions to save to the 
decisions to invest." (ill)
Galbraith suggests that the process of centralized group 
decision-making within and by the technostructure imposes 
particular imperatives on the corporation. In particular, the 
apparatus of group decision is vulnerable to intervention by 
external authority, especially by the state and by stockholders. 
Independence from the former is guaranteed by the corporate charter, 
while that from the latter derives from the distribution of 
corporation stock to an increasing number of hands. (Ibid., 86) 
Corporate autonomy takes the form of self-financing and 
protection of profits by planning, removing the control of 
the banking system from industry. Galbraith is offering an 
interpretation which denies a central aspect of Lenin's 
characterization of the present epoch as that of Imperialism 
("finance capital"). Industry is seen as self-financing,
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underminging the merger of industrial and finance capital 
through the institutions of hanking that Lenin identified 
early in the twentieth century# Galbraith himself indicates 
the importance of this contention when he observes :
"Pew other developments can have
more fundamentally altered the character
of capitalism." (112)
Closely related to Galbraith's model of self-financing, 
autonomous corporations is his optimism concerning the 
long-term viability of the big corporations. How, he asks, 
can the technostruoture guarantee its autonomy by not 
making economic losses and consequently being compelled to 
appeal to bankers? His answer is, quite simply, that 
"the big corporations do not lose money." (ibid., ^O)
The organized part of the economy, that is to say,
has a developed technostructure that is able to protect its
profits by planning. This claim,as an assessment of the 
longk-term viability of corporate capital ism, will be examined 
later* For the present, it will be noted that it corresponds 
to anicomplements Galbraith's view that "organized intelligence" 
is the distinctive feature of the modem corporation and that, 
as a corollary, problems such as that of profitability are 
amenable to a "rational" organizational solution.
As indicated, Galbraith's analysis of the technostructure
and its place in wider society at least implicitly contends the
demise of classical capitalism. The central justification of 
this claim, for Galbraith, is that the autonomy of the corporation
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in relation to influence Toy the market undermines the 
basic mechanisms which previously compelled firms to 
pursue profit—maximization as the primary organizational 
goal.
"So far from being controlled by the 
market, the firm, to the best of its 
ability, has made the market subordinate to 
the goals of its planning." (113)
The goal of these planning decisions could. Galbraith
observes, still be the greatest possible profit. His
claim, however, is that this need not be so. "The
market is no longer specifying and enforcing that goal." (ll8)
Galbraith challenges Berle and Means* concern over irresponsible
managerial abuse of position. He suggests :
"The danger of abuse, through personal
profit maximization, disappeared as
power passed into the technostructure." (II4)
In order to support this claim, Galbraith draws an analogy, 
quite consistent with his notion that power resides in the 
factor of production which has the greatest scarcity value.
When capital was decisive in this way he contends, the
/
capitalist through his control of the corporation, maximized 
that item which he provided, namely money. The now dominant 
technostructure, on the other hand, supplies specialized 
talent and organization rather than capital. As a consequence 
"organizational success" is the primary goal of the economic 
corporation. The organization involves first and foremost 
co-ordination. This means that :
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"all individuals are persuaded to
set aside their individual purposes or
goals and pursue those of the organization." (11$)
The means of inducement to such co-ordination constitute 
the sphere of motivation. Possible means to promote this 
motivation identified by Galbraith are compulsion, pecuniary 
means, identification with the organizations goals, and the 
harnessing of aspirations to change those goals to the 
structure of the organization itself. Galbraith contends 
that the two operative motivations for the technostructure are 
the latter two, those of**identification" and "adaption", (ibid.,145-6)
When examining what types of specific goals these motives 
serve, Galbraith orientates his work with an assumed consistency 
between the goals of the corporation, those of wider society as 
a whole, and those of the individuals who comprise it. As he 
elsewhere polemically (and questionably) suggests : "As 
always, reality is in harmony with itself", (ibid., 136)
On this basis, he observes that the chief concern of the 
technostructure is the manufacture of goods and of the demand 
for them. Once the corporation thus productively involved 
has, through the attainment and development of its autonomy, 
guaranteed its own survival, however, some choice between rival 
goals becomes possible. Particularly powerful and pervasive goals, 
are those of economic growth and "technological virtuosity". A 
whole variety of lesser goals are then open, ranging from 
political support, to endowments to educational institutions.
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The Oalhraithian corporation, in short, is planned, no 
longer primarily structured by the pursuit of maximum profits, 
and dominated by the technostruoture. It is, further, associated 
with a stabilized economic order, qualitatively distinct from 
the earlier epoch when corporate power belonged unequivocally 
with capital. As a corollary, the development of the 
"industrial system" has led to the demise of the independent 
existence of the labour movement, its incorporation into a 
wider set of processes and relations.
"The industrial system has now largely 
encompassed the labour movement. It 
has dissolved some of its most important 
functions; it has greatly narrowed its 
area of action ; and it has bent its 
residual operations very largely to its own 
needs." (ll6)
Consequently, revolutionary socialism is unattainable in the 
advanced technocratic industrial societies. The key and 
distinguishing features of classical capitalism - dominance of 
the profit-motive, cycles of economic expansion and contraction 
(boom and slumpand class conflict - are conspicuously and 
'systematically absent from Galbraith's theoretical reconstruction 
of The New Industrial State. Before critically assessing the 
thesis we will finally look at Galbraith's evaluation of the role 
of the contemporary state in relation to the technostructure.
Weber, it will be remembered, constructed a model of 
capitalist society in which the state, at least in the 
ideal-typical case of "rational" capitalism, reflected the 
rationality that he found at the level of day-to-day, calculable
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, capitalist activity* Now while on all important points 
Galbraith's view of contemporary industrial society is one 
of a "post-capitalist" form, a similar theoretical transposition 
is made in his work# The state and the industrial system, he 
observes, are inextricably associated :
"Given the deep dependence of the
industrial system on the state and the
nature of its motivational relationship
to the state, i.e. its identification
with public goals and the adaptations of
these to its needs, the industrial system
will not long be regarded as something apart from
government. Rather it will increasingly
be seen as part of a much larger complex
which embraces both the industrial systems
and the state." (ll?)
Galbraith notes four particular services that the state 
performs for the industrial system : the education necessary
for required qualified manpower î finance and provisions for 
scientific and technical innovation î the regulation of 
aggregate demand : and the regulation of wages and prices for
overall stability, (ibid., 300) Whereas the relationship 
between the entrepreneurial corporation and the state was 
essentially a pecuniary one, the technostruoture has less 
scope for direct political control and action. Yet, Galbraith 
observes, the state is consistently favourable to the 
technostruoture, generally accommodating to its needs. Thus, 
although it has no direct political power, the technostruoture 
must have "other methods of influencing social action of far, 
far greater significance." (ibid., 309-IO)
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Galbraith's solution lies in the already—mentioned 
"principle of consistency", in this case referring to a 
correspondence between the goals of the state and those of 
the technostruoture within the industrial system. The 
state's goals, in particular economic stability, expansion and 
growth, education, scientific and technical advance, and 
national defence, all have their counterparts in the needs and 
goals of the technostruoture.
"At each point the government has goals 
with which the technostruoture can identify 
itself. Or, plausibly, these goals reflect 
adaptation of public goals to the goals ôf the 
technostruoture." (ll8)
The notion of a rigid dividing line between government and 
private firms is "imaginary". Galbraith depicts a symbolic, 
complementary relationship between the state and the essentially 
undivided if not empirically homogenous, system of social 
production. "To a remarkable extent", he observes :
"...the industrial system embraces and 
absorbs these class interests. It does so 
partly by minimizing the reality of conflict and 
partly by exploiting the resulting malleability 
of attitude to win control of belief. The goals 
of the industrial system, in this process, 
become the goals of all who are associated 
with it and thus, by slight extension, the 
goals of the society itself." (II9)
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Despite such neo-Hegelian "illuminations" (given Galbraith's 
analysis of the "industrial system" and its relations with 
the state it would not be inconsistent for him to identify 
state employees as the "universà-i class" Galbraith is not 
altogether unaware of the at least potential conflict points in 
contemporary societies. Thus, for example, he urges the 
desirability and even inevitability of a system of wage and 
price restraint (ibid., 263) In general, however, Galbraith's 
analysis portrays a qualitatively new type of productive system, 
no longer characterized by the dominance of the profit motive 
crisis or even the structural significance of rivalry and 
competition. This system, moreover, is seen to be largely 
structured by and in relation to a type of state which, 
for Galbraith, is essentially indeterminate in terms of 
class content or bias. This is the thesis that we will now 
critically assess.
Galbraith's portrayal of contemporary society, as we 
have stressed, assumes as a central element that the classic 
capitalist cycle of expansion and contraction has, with the 
emergence and consolidation of the big corporation dominated 
by the technostruoture, been overcome. Planning has ensured that 
corporate profitability is guaranteed, and consequently new, 
non-profit-maximizing motives have gained ascendancy in the 
organized corporations. Directly related to this contention is 
Galbraith's portrayal of the large corporation as autonomous, 
self-financing, and consequently independent from the banks and 
other external money supplies.
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The contemporary Western industrial world hard ly 
fits this picture, however. Internationally, almost if 
not all these countries juck entered a phase of recession during 
the mid-1970's* An extended period characterised by a fall 
in corporate profitability in Britain, for example, has been 
largely responsible for a collapse of liquidity which has 
produced a series of bankruptcies or near bankruptcies (120)
1974, for example, saw a 15 per cent rise in the total 
number of company liquidations. Among those firms which have 
been saved from bankruptcy only by immediate and substantial 
government financial aid are Ferranti, a major electrical 
engineering firm, and Aston Martin motor manufacturers.
Britain's largest privately owned exporting company British 
Leyland, moreover, has for some time been in a near-bankrupt 
condition. Faltering economic expansion, empirically challenges 
Galbraith's assessment of corporate profitability^and consequently 
his overall assessment of the character of contemporary Western 
industrial societies.
At the same time, his view of corporate autonomy is 
seriously questioned by the recent history of enterprise 
profitability. A recent assessment indicates that the corporate 
debt in the United States amounts to a total of one trillion 
dollars. (I2l) In such conditions, banks become increasingly 
a supply of corporate funds for investment, interest and 
repayment charges constituting a considerable corporate expense (l22) 
The tendency towards self-financing, which was characteristic 
of the post-war expansionary period has thus been reversed.
Lenin's observation that in the epoch of imperialism "the
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industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the 
bank" (123) constitutes a more adequate description of the 
present relationship between the banking and corporate industrial 
spheres than does Galbraith's "atomic" model, as the figures 
for corporate debt in the United States and industrial financing 
in Britain clearly indicate.
Galbraith's depiction of the present condition of the 
labour movement in these countries is equally erroneous. The 
industrial system, it will be remembered, is seen to embrace and 
absorb the various class interests, in which context Galbraith 
specifically mentions those of capital and labour. The 
advanced Western countries, however, have witnessed an increasing 
wave of working class militancy during the late 1960's and 
early 1970's, a militancy which has developed to a considerable 
extent outside the unions which, in Galbraith's view, have 
lost their independent basis for action. The British figures, 
for example, evidence a rise in both the scale and the length 
of strikes. (l24)
There is, in fact, a contradiction in Galbraith's thesis 
concerning wage and related struggles. In the first place, 
he claims as fact the demise of class conflict of the traditional 
pattern with the incorporation of the working class into the 
"industrial system" (125). At the same time, he recommends as 
policy what are essentially class collaborationist strategies 
of restraint : "all associated with the industrial system
also benefit substantially from restraints on prices and wages.*’ 
(ibid., 257)" Were the working class as integrated as 
Galbraith suggests, and clearly this is not the case, it would
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hardly be necessary to urge festraint in wage demands in this 
way. Far from supporting or being compatible with his 
analysis of the technostruoture, Galbraith's warning 
concerning the destabilizing effects of the wage-price spiral 
indicates precisely that the economistic struggle over the 
proceeds of labour that characterizes capitalist society is 
still visibly, indeed strongly, operant. (126)
Galbraith, in short, not only fails to adequately 
establish the historical transcendance of classic capitalism , 
but in fact tacitly concedes its continued existence.
"Reality" may always be "in harmony with itself", but Galbraith's
New Industrial' State is not. Capitalism is still characterized
by the dominance of the pursuit of profits. Galbraith's
location of the centre of corporate power in "organized intelligence"
constitutes a mystification. Scientific, technical and
managerial skills are undoubtedly required on a progressively
increasing scale by modem technology, but Galbraith offers no
convincing account or explanation of the demise of capitalism
and the power of capital. In fact its scarcity in the
recent period has been obscured by the creation of an ever-
increasing scale of inflationary or "fictitious" capital.
Galbraith's thesis of the corporate dominance of the 
technostruoture is quite speculative, without theoretical 
demonstration. What Galbraith fails to distinguish is the 
proximate form of the division of labour and expertise within 
capitalist firms, and the raison d'etre of those firms, as 
imposed by the property relations and profit-orientation of 
the capitalist system. In effect, he abstracts the former 
from its context within the latter.
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Given this, Galbraith's analysis of the state itself 
is immediately rendered questionable. If capitalism, as the 
profit—directed mode of private ownership survives, as is 
the case, the patterns of state involvement should not be 
expected to be "interest-neutral" in the way that Galbraith 
suggests. In Britain the "nationalized" industries have in 
fact been the source of cheap supplies to the privately-owned 
productive sector, and government demand management has been 
by and large a function of a declining national capitalism 
in the context of a competetive international system. The 
state, that is to say, functions as an agency supportive of 
private property and consequently the dominance of capital (127). 
Weber's "systems rationality" emerges in a distinctive form in 
Galbraith's technostruoture—dominated society. Rational 
corporate planning is seen to generate a stable, calculable, 
integrated industrial system. This model, we suggest, is 
neither theoretically nor empirically adequate as a 
characterization of the contemporary capitalist world*
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CRITIQUE; THE SOCIAL BASIS OF BUREAUCRATIC DOMINATION (AND 
ABSTRACTED HUMANISM).
Inseparable from the "technocratic state" thesis, is the 
assumption of a correspondence between rational corporate planning 
and the complementary state structure, the relationship between 
the two institutional orders constituting an essentially 
unproblematic unitary symbiosis. What this model, epitomized 
by Galbraith's "technostruoture^ but a recurrent feature of the 
thesis as a whole, does not consider is the way in which the 
advanced capitalist economy, including its characteristically 
interventionist state form, is still encumbered and constrained 
by the imperatives of capital accumulation. Bohn Bethel's 
distinction between "economy of plant" and "economy of market", 
with the state acting as the conscious "head" of the production 
and reproduction process, identifies an important source of the 
severe constraints imposed on corporate rationality in the 
still unplanned capitalist market as a whole. Scientific 
management in the plant economy coexists with the market 
form of private appropriation in the advanced capitalist 
economy. There is, however, no intrinsic or necessary correlation 
between the maximized output associated with continuous flow 
technology on the one hand, and the profitable "realization" 
of that output in the market on the other. (l28)
In the sector of motor car production, for example, 
an industry almost synonymous with the post-war phase of economic 
expansion, there was a world-wide decline of between a quarter 
and a third in the market demand for products in the year 
following the December 1973 rise in oil prices. Leading
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sections of this industry, such as General Motors, Ford and 
' Chrysler have been compelled by this fall in demand to cut 
production by means of redundancies and at least temporary 
factory closures* (129) This particular development illustrates 
in concrete terms the essentially anarchic influence that the 
capitalist market exerts on the individual, rationalized 
productive units which comprise its commodity source* The 
contradictory relationship between these two structural tendencies 
is graphically expressed in the reality and prospect of idle 
productive machinery and an unemployed workforce*
The specifically capitalistic character and source of this 
contradictory relationship between corporate rationality and an 
unplanned market is obscured by the concept of "urban" or 
"industrial" society on which the technocratic model of contemporary 
state and society rests, "Industrial", in fact, refers to and 
describes a pervasive aspect of the culture of capitalist society 
rather than the society itself. (l30) "Industrial" refers to 
technology, involving sources of power and the material 
organization of men and machinery. Technology, however, is 
applicable to different types of society, both historically and 
potentially. The capitalist dislocation between organized and 
planned, often large-scale industrial enterprises and the overall 
uncoordinated relations between them at the national and global 
levels is not inherent in or "natural" to the contemporary forms 
of technology as such* The body of techniques and skills that 
constitute the elements of advanced technology is the historically 
consolidated residiium of human society's mode of relationship
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with the natural world. The particular patterns of social relations 
within which this transaction is effected, on the other hand, 
constitute: the social structure which characterizes the particular 
type of society within which men live. A conceptual distinction 
can thus be drawn between "industrial society", which refers 
to a form of technological development and application, and 
capitalist society, which describes the application of labour 
power to the transformation of the elements of nature into 
commodities for profit within the specific social context 
of privately owned means of production.
The effect of the technocratic theorists* central 
preoccupation with the theoretical concept of "industrial" 
society has been to abstract that complex of cultural 
phenomena from their context of the nexus of social relations 
which circumscribes and, in doing so, determines their 
application. To posit a corresponding state form,the essential 
features of which derive from its relationship to the industrial 
economy which it supervises or coordinates, is to further 
compound this reification of technique# The extended pursuit 
cf profits, the central dynamic of capitalist society, has no 
place in such a technocratic model. Similarly, class conflict, 
traditionally expressed in the form of the wages struggle, is 
either effectively denied on the basis of a calculable optimal 
resolution (Wilensky, Galbraith) or viewed as actually or 
immanently transcended (Burnham).
Thus deprived of the possibility of the libérâtive 
political potential of the subordinate working class, the 
"technocratic state" theorists characteristically identify 
intellectuals or an abstract "humanity" as the countenforce 
to the oppressive aspects of technocracy. Wright Mills suggests :
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"At this point in human history, 
the role of intellectuals might well 
be crucial, for there is much evidence 
that political ideas could now become 
crucial••••Ideologies and programmes, 
arguments and critiques, handled by 
intellectuals can make a difference 
in the shaping of our epoch and in 
the chances to avoid World War Three*" (131)
\fhile disclaiming a belief that intellectual workmen will 
inevitably "save the world", Wright Mills argued with 
passion and conviction the view that a serious attempt 
to re-assess the political nature of their collective 
endeavour could constitute an important counteracting 
influence in the bureaucratic era of total war.
Rather less determinate is Aron's humanistic concern 
at the prospect of an increasingly scientific and 
technological order not derived from and applied in the 
punsuit of conscious and positive human purpose. Aron 
speculates :
"If the time should ever come when
a few men were, or believed themselves
to be, 'masters and possessors of
social nature,* then perhaps the
drama would be over. But the individual
would have forfeited his sense of
liberty. Would a life subjected
to a rational and puarposeless organization
still be human?" (1 3 3 )
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The analytical source of such "abstracted" perceptions 
of the counterveiling forces to the "blind" imperatives 
of technology, as well as of the "technocratic state" thesis 
as a*whole, may be found in the failure of its proponents 
to adequately demonstrate the independent foundations of 
bureaucratic domination that the thesis assumes. The 
reification of authority as the primary determinant of 
patterns of structured social domination was criticized 
in our earlier discussion of Dahrendorf, The thesis of 
bureaucratic domination by the representatives and 
spokesmen of a technocratic state apparatus constitutes 
a particular case x>f this tendency to abstract a mode 
of social domination from a demonstrable social basis 
for its overall ascendancy and chief beneficiaries in 
particular. Weber's discussion of bureaucratic domination,, 
which was our starting point, identified an inherent 
affinity between a formally rational mode of social 
domination and a formally rational economic structure.
This affinity, moreover, was expressed in terms of a 
causal relationship, although Weber was especially 
cautious to avoid a position of absolute economic 
determinism. Thus, discussing the relationship between 
economy and mode of domination he suggests :
"the structure of dominancy is in 
many cases both a factor of great 
economic importance and, at least 
to some extent, a result of 
economic conditions," (134)
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In addition Weber saw bureaucratic political domination 
to have a base in mass democracy (Ibid., 9 8 3 ). Technically, 
it is impossible for the idiole population of developed 
industrial societies to gi)vem themselves. Consequently, 
representative political parties will tend to organize 
themselves in a "rational" or bureaucratic way when 
presenting their respective policies and demands.
With his methodological conception of "formal" 
rationality Weber was able to view the bureaucratic 
structure as a purely technical instrument, neutral 
towards social "ends" and goals. (Ibid., 990) "Substantive" 
rationality, on the other hand, involves the consideration 
of goal-orientated rational calculation in relation to 
ultimate ends. That is, it involves the sphere of 
value—judgements and ideology, the arena of concrete 
conflicts over different values and interest-complexes,
Weber, of course, recognized the historical possibility 
of a divergence between the formal and substantive 
rationality within industrial enterprises, resulting in 
conflict and antagonism between different class formations. 
(Ibid., 9 8 ) The formal system of rational social action, 
that is to say, may engender highly "iirrational" substantive 
forms and developments.
As we have seen, however, Weber's discussion of 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic domination views the activities 
of the private entrepreneur and the separation of the 
worker from the means of production as aspects of the general 
rationalization of the modem Western world. Socialism,
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moreover, if technically possible, would simply constitute 
an extension of this process rather than a transition 
to a qualitatively different type of social organization. 
The developments which Weber identifies in the process 
of "ongoing rationalization" are viewed as technological 
necessities in an advanced industrial system and constitute 
the cornerstone of Weber's analysis of legitimate 
bureaucratic domination. In fact they are specific to the 
particular rationality of capitalist society. We saw 
in our earlier discussion of Weber how the structural 
conflicts, norms and values of capitalist society are 
smuggled into his construct of bureaucracy and in fact 
become transformed into substantive components of formal 
bureaucratic organization and domination.
This problematic relationship between formal and 
substantive rationality arad, more specifically, between 
bureaucratic organization and charismatic leadership, also 
constitutes the theoretical scenario of his analysis 
of bureaucracy's o'lm power-base. Weber envisaged a 
parliamentary arisen charismatic political leader as a 
check to the independent power consolidation of the 
bureaucracy. Weber's discussion of the renaissance of 
patrimonialism after feudalism, and of the tendency of 
patrimonialism to move closer towards the ideal-type of 
pure bureaucratism in the period of absolute states (135) 
establishes his conviction that the bureaucracy is a 
serious contender for state power which can, if not 
controlled, become an effective ruling class itself, 
no longer the simple technical apparatus of another social
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group. The substantive interests of the bureaucratic 
strata in other words may, for Weber, undermine its 
role as an element central to the formal rationality 
of an advanced economy.
This contention is crucial to the question of whether 
the bureaucracy occupies an independent or supportive 
position in the structure of technocratic organization.
For if the ascendancy of a supposedly dominant social 
strata cannot be accounted for in terms of its position, 
source and basis in the overall pattern of social structure, 
the attribution of dominance to it will be at best 
descriptive and at worst rhetorical. The general hiatus 
in post-Weber analyses of the social source of technocratic 
domination is highlighted in the work of Blau. Blau's 
general model of authority relations emphasizes their 
primarily interpersonal character, draining particular 
attention to the willing compliance of subordinates 
in authoritative situations. To quote :
"Complementary role expectations 
arise in the course of interaction 
between superior and subordinates and 
become crystallized in the course of 
interaction among subordinates." (136)
This general, "all—situation" account is essentially 
agnostic concerning the sources of the structures of 
authority which thus emerge, however. The closest that 
Blau comes to an account of the structural origins of the 
socially—legitimized hierarchical relationships within
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organizations is in his discussion of the distinction 
between informal and bureaucratic leadership. Informal 
leadership is seen to freely and spontaneously emerge 
among a group of peers. It is initially the result of 
personality differences which become "socially magnified" 
and crystallized into established patterns of behaviour. 
The bureaucratic type $ by contrast, is the consequence 
of an already-established hierarchical structure which 
prevents the social group itself from conferring the 
status of leadership upon members of their own choice,
"The bureaurcratic mechanism that 
makes this state of affairs a predictable 
occurrence is the superior's power 
to impose sanctions, typically in the 
form of periodic ratings of the 
performance of his subordinates," (137)
Blau's dichotomy of informal and bureaucratic 
domination does not, however, imply a resolution to the 
question of the latter*s structural source, A Weberian 
pessimism concerning the possibility of self-government 
in large organizations is apparent in Blau's suggestion 
that, for technical reasons inherent in the attempt at 
coordination, their members cannot be fully equal in 
status and power, (Ibid., 80) An attempt to account 
for the specific determinants of bureaucratic domination 
is conspiciously absent, however. Rather, Blau draws 
a positivistic portrayàl of bureaucratic structure as 
a "given", taken—for—granted datum of contemporary social
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life and abstractedly identifies it as a challenge to 
democracy and democratic objectives, (ibid., 115—6)
A money economy, the prevalence of large-scale organizations, 
and the pervasive influence of capitalistic economic 
calculation are identified as historical conditions 
favourable to the development of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, 
technocratic domination is treated as a threat to democratic 
organization rather than as a particular manifestation 
of prevailing power relations. It is, that is to say, 
discussed as a conceptual tool for analyzing political 
forms, rather than as an organizational tendency which 
mediates relationships between competing interest groups 
in class societies. Thus Blau suggests that to administer 
a social organization according to purely technical criteria 
of rationality is, in the last analysis, irrational, 
since it ignores the "nonrational aspects of social 
conduct." (Ibid., 58) By this Blau is referring partly 
to the various exigencies which may arise with changes 
in the exogenous influences on organizations. In addition, 
however, he also draws attention to the impediments 
to operational efficiency due to subjective anxieties 
and feelings of "anomie" which "often arise among the 
lower echelons of bureaucratic hierarchy."
Blau does not attempt to account for these subjective 
obstacles to bureaucratic efficiency in terms of the 
structure of power which characterizes the labour—management 
relationship in specifically capitalist societies. The 
relative lack of power in the context of production of the
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worker in such a society renders quite rational the experience 
of anomie I* defined by Blau as "a state of feeling isolated 
and disoriented," Through not tracing the material source 
of workers* subjective disaffection in bureaucratic 
capitalist structures, Blau's analysis tends towards 
psychologism. To designate it "nonrational" is to obscure 
its genesis in their characteristically unequal relations 
of ownership and control. When Blau does discuss the 
perception of inequality in these structures, moreover, 
it is in the context of the contingent and non-necessary 
relation between bureaucratic authority and the recurrent 
exercise of arbitrary sanctions and supervision, (Ibid,, 8l)
The inherently structured inequality of the economic 
transaction between capitalist and wage-labourer is 
left unexamined,
Crozier's analysis of bureaucracy, while attempting 
to demonstrate a relationship between power and bureaucratic 
organization, similarly obscures the objective structural 
can't ext of specifically capitalist domination, Crozier
rejects the thesis that bureaucrats are, or are likely to become,
a new ruling class, (138) , The institutional routinization 
of the economic contributions of managers and technical 
experts, Crozier suggests, prevents this.
"The rationalization process gives 
him power, but the end results of 
rationalization curtail this power.
As soon as a field is well covered,
as soon as the first intuitions and
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innovations can be translated 
into rules and programmes, the 
expert's power disappears," (139)
Crozier shares idLth the technocratic theorists an 
essentially ideological agnosticicism concerning the 
social groups and classes which stand to particularly 
benefit from technological innovation in capitalist societies. 
This is especially apparent in his discussion of 
**bureaucratic rigidity," Seeking to account for the 
emergence of "vicious circles" in bureaucratic organizations, 
Crozier suggests "that bureaucratic rigidity develops when 
a failure or breakdown in institutional communication is 
exploited by individuals or groups "for improving their 
position in the power struggle id.thin the organization."
(Ibid., 19^) The norm against which Crozier assesses 
such a failure of communication is the "Industrial 
Monopoly" plant in which the extension of rules and, as 
a consequence, stability and predictability is characteristically 
accompanied by the ascendancy of "cordiality" and the 
effective decline of the power and control function,
"The over-all extension of the 
rules, the stability and predictability 
of all occupational behaviour, and 
the lack of interference across 
hierarchical echelons, all we ale en the 
chain of command considerably. Power 
is we ale do%m the line, and in its 
absence there is relative.- cordiality 
and lack of concern." (l40)
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The existence of this hierarchy, however, is accepted 
by Crozier as inherent in the industrial organization.
It is, as with Blau, a datum for description rather than 
for analysis and explanation. In industrial organizations 
X he suggests, the control of some individuals over béhers 
is inseparable from its institutional context. "It is 
man made and socially created, but it is nevertheless 
not arbitrary. It is the indirect result of the power 
struggle within the organization." (Ibid., l62)
TWO types of power emerge from this situation: that
of the expert, and .that which serves to counteract the 
expert's othendse monopoly of power. An unchecked power 
struggle would produce organizational paralysis. 
Consequently, a structure of dominancy is required to allow 
an optimal degree of organizational efficiency to emerge. 
Crozier observes in this context :
"Were it take place idthout any 
check, the power struggle would bring 
paralyzing conflicts and unbearable 
situations. It is thus necessary 
that a hierarchical order and an 
institutional structure impose 
discipline on the different individuals 
and groups, and arbitrate between 
their claims." (l4l)
The source of these different claims, derived in the 
last analysis from the ownership of property on the one hand 
and of labour power on the other is not examined, however.
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Crozier*s account of organizational power rests on the 
differential ability of social groups to predict each 
other's behaviour. %fhere such predictability is 
generalized and perfect, Crozier suggests, power relations 
are a sociological impossibility,
"In such a system, we belive, there 
is only one rational choice to be made 
by each protagonist in a collective 
endeavour. Provided the goals are 
given, there is only one best way 
at each level to achieve the assigned 
task, and one best way also to arrange
the hierarchical levels and to assign
the necessary tasks." (1^2)
With full predictability,that is to say, no individual
or group would be able to alter the behaviour of any other,
and the dimension of power would be accordingly absent.
This model views power as determined essentially by 
ideational rather than structural factors. Without 
discontinuities in the process of communication within 
organizations, and %fithout their differential perception 
by the various groups involved, differential predictability 
and consequently the emergence of the "power function" 
would not occur. Social psychology thus replaces the terms 
for àhd conditions of the sale of labour-power as the 
primary determinant of industrial conflict, Ifhile 
dissociating his views from those of the "managerial ruling 
class" thesis, Crozier shares the technocratic assumption 
that the capitalist social relations of production do not 
inherently engender a structure of power. Rather, the
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industrial hierarchy made necessary by the imperatives 
of large-scale production organizations is essentially 
one of cordiality, departures from this norm being 
attributable to contingent discontinuities and their effect 
on actors* perceptions. In this way Crozier transparently 
demonstrates the management-oriented character of the 
technocratic thesis. Disturbances of industrial consensus 
are "accidental" and therefore, in principle at least, 
remediable.
SUMMARY : THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY.
Technology, contrary to the logic of the technocratic 
theorists, is, in the context of capitalist society, an 
aspect of an already existent mode of economic and political 
domination,rather than the source of a new, distinctive 
form of domination on the one hand, or a "power-neutral" 
instrument on the other. Within capitalist societies 
production is organized on the basis that the worker's 
actitfties are subordinated to the decisions of management, 
whose activities are in turn orientated toward the interests 
of capital and profitability. Not least of all, technological 
innovation is, in the last analysis, a political process.
The application of innovation in capitalist societies is 
subordinate to the prosperity and, in some circumstances, 
survival, of the ruling property-oiming class. Delays 
in application are explicable primarily in terms of the 
profitability potential of the innovation in question, (l43)
In addition, whether serving as a means to increase supervision 
and control of the work force, to improve working conditions
- 313 -
in order to remove sources of possible conflict, or to 
blaclonail sections of the workforce into particular tasks, 
the rationalization associated with technological innovation 
has an essentially capitalistic character. Ideologies 
which purport to discover in technology itself a standard 
of value for the determination of social priorities (l44) 
or a scientific rationality which has superceded previous 
religions or political forms (l45) typically obscure the 
ways in which that rationality, seemingly above social 
relationships, is used to consolidate and further particular 
interests within them.
The managerial and technocratic experts who administer 
or supervise the increasingly sophisticated means of 
production and their relations with the progressively 
skilled direct labour force operate in a context where 
"efficiency" and "rationality" are consonant i^ ith and supportive 
to the criteria of profitability. The "human relations" 
orientation of management practice, for example, while 
it has passed through a number of stages characterized by 
different emphases and requirements, has been a specifically 
twentieth century phenomenon. Its context has been an 
increasingly capital intensive industrial sector in which 
hold-ups and discontinuities due to equipment breakdoivn, 
worker's industrial action, or high labour turnover can 
quickly lead to enormous financial losses. Key sectors 
of the work force can, niith relative ease, rapidly bring 
to a standstill unprecedented concentrations of capital 
equipment with resulting bottlenecks and tensions for 
other, related productive sectors. In this situation
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profitability is threatened if the managerial skills 
requisite to the task of developing a social organization 
in the workplace compatible with the more or less
uninterrupted functioning of modern technology are not available
The "human relations" approach to industrial relations 
developed largely as a response to the perceived failure of 
the strategies developed and advocated by F,W, Taylor to 
achieve their intended purposes. Taylor's system, designed 
to raise productivity levels through improved organization 
of production andthe maximum utilization of the workers* 
strictly physical capacities, explicitly assumed and 
related to the profitability criteria of capitalist society.
Thus he observed that each shop or plant "exists for
the purpose of paying dividends to its owners". (l4$) It 
was this aspect that led Lenin to characterize the Taylor 
system as a manifestation of the "brutality of bourgeois 
exploitation." (l4?) As a number of commentators, including 
D.S. Beach, have observed, this system probably on the 
idiole worsened labour-raanagement relations and lost more 
through the resulting industrial disputes than it gained 
through increased productivity. (l48) Its crude emphasis 
on the "one-best way" to structure work taks consequently 
gave way to the increasing influence of the "human relations" 
approach which was, and remains, more sensitive to the 
problems associated with the "social organization" of the 
work process.
It would be a mistake, however, to radically differentiate 
the structural significance of the "production engineering" and
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the "social organization" approaches to workplace control. 
Both, in the last analysis, derive their rationale from 
the problems associated with labour productivity and 
discipline in a competitive capitalist environment, from 
/  what M. Hales has termed "working out in scientific tejr/Ms 
the logic of domination over work and praxis in particular 
historical conditions". (l49)
The application of technological and managerial skills 
in such a context is far from politically neutral, as is 
frequently claimed in management—orientated social science. 
The desire of workers to achieve a steady wage and that of 
management to sustain controlled and reliable production, 
Anne Shaw has argued, both find expression in the system 
of measured daywork, where a fixed bonus is paid in addition 
to basic wage rates in exchange for additional effort. The 
coercive basis on which this seemingly class-neutral method 
of regulating payment for labour power expended in the 
application of technology within the capitalist enterprise 
is indicated, however, when Shaw points out that management
"retains a sanction because if the 
operator fails to meet the required 
target for any reason for which he 
is responsible the bonus can be 
withheld." (150)
Such uses of technological and managerial skills are first 
and foremost an aspect of specifically capitalist social 
relations and serve primarily to reinforce the dominant
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interests within that relationship.
This political role of technology is especially 
transparent when, as at the present time, the state plays 
an Increasingly prominent part in the financing of research 
and development. (151) The institutions of government, 
industry and universities become increasingly linked in 
a single system whose primary purpose is to ensure the 
economic growth and the political stability of industrial 
capitalism. The financing of research, industrial research, 
by the state is especially developed in the United States 
where, combined with the relatively high levels of corporate 
funds available for research financing, state involvement 
in this sphere has given American capitalism an international 
advantage in competitive technological development, (1 5 2 )
The same process, deriving largely from the increasingly 
competitive capitalist market of the post-war period,has 
characterized the Western world as a whole to an increasing 
extent in recent years, (153)
A critical consideration of Mandel*s thesis of the 
"third industrial revolution" will help to clarify the 
importance of considerably state-engendered technological 
development for the political economy of post-war capitalism.
This thesis is an aspect of Mandel*s analysis of "neo-capitalism". 
Mandel argues that while the "central contradiction" of 
capitalism, the survival of the private form of appropriation 
in the context of the effective socialization of production , 
remains, a structural change, originating during the 1929-32 
period or since the Second World War, has introduced a new 
stability, Mandel identifies a number of developments which
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together wàt'rant the use of the term "neo-capitalism".
In particular, he points to the supposed independence 
of industrial capital from the banlcing system, the 
forward-looking pricing strategies of the modern capitalist 
enterprise, and the extent to which the state has moderated 
the business cycle. To quote from Mandel's widely-read 
Marxist Economic Theory :
"The capitalist economy of this 
phase tends to ensure greater 
stability both of consumption 
and of investment than in the era 
of free competition, or than 
during the first phase of monopoly 
capitalism; it tends towards 
a reduction in cyclical fluctuations 
resulting above all from the 
increasing intervention of the state 
in economic life." (154)
It is within and as an aspect of "neo-capitalism" that 
Mandel elaborates his thesis of the third industrial 
revolution. He observes :
"In the current period of expansion, 
we are witnessing an accelerated 
technical progress, a genuine 
technological revolution for which 
the expression 'second industrial 
revolution' or 'third industrial 
revolution* hardly seems adequate.
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We find ourselves, in fact, 
before an almost uninterrupted 
transformation of the techniques 
of production." (155)
The close connection between Mandel's theories of 
neo-capitalism and the, technogical revolution is especially 
apparent in his 1964 paper The Economics of Neo-Capitalism. 
There he identifies the decade following 1954 as the 
"heyday of neo-capitalism," The economic growth which 
characterized the advanced capitalist world during this 
period was not, he suggests, simply the consequences of 
post-war reconstruction. Rather, it was the expression 
of a "Kondratieff", or a long-wave of economic expansion 
involving several normal or shorter economic cycles.
Connected with the arms race, it constitutes a 'third 
industrial revolution* with a'tendency to become 
permanent." (l86)
Mandel stresses, however, the problematic character 
of this long-wave of expansion with the increased 
bargaining power of the trade unions. He even suggests 
that with the development of this contradiction the 
increased rate of economic growth would be no longer 
sustainable. Nevertheless, as late as 1971 Mandel 
predicted that the downturn in world economic activity would be 
slow and protracted.
"The international capitalist system 
as a whole has emerged from a 
long cycle of expansion to begin 
a long cycle of much slower growth 
and many more crises....... The
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merry-go-round has only begun*
The long cycles last on the 
average twenty to twenty-five 
years." (1 5 7 )
The emergence of not merely slower economic growth but 
actual decline in production and trade within the 
capitalist world (within four years of this prediction) 
raises a serious question mark over Mandel*s characterization 
of the post-war period as one of neo-capitalism* Our 
particular concern, however, is Mandel*s conception of 
a "third industrial revolution", based on nuclear energy 
and electronic machinery. As we have seen, this revolution 
is perceived in terms a "transformation of the techniques 
of production," is characterised as an "uninterrupted 
technological revolution." (I5 8 )
From a Marxist perspective, however, technique is 
a single and not the primary aspect of the productive 
forces. Marx, in this context, observed that "of all the 
instruments of production the greatest productive power 
is the revolutionary class itself," (159) The significance 
of this statement is apparent if the industrial revolution 
of thé eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries 
is considered. That revolution was bound up with the 
toal transformation of the previously existent social 
structure. In particular, it saw and expressed the 
consolidation of capitalism as a global system, and 
especially the emergence of the industrial working class.
The technical transformations of the mid-twentieth 
century identified by Mandel represent the accelerated
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development of a tendency recognized by Marx in the 
Grundrlsse : the decreasing relevance of labour power
for the production of wealth, the use-value aspect of 
commodities, with the development of industry. In a 
now rightly celebrated passage in that work, Marx predicted
"But to the degree that large industry 
develops, the creation of real wealth 
comes to depend less on labour time and 
on the amount of labour employed than 
on the power of the agencies set in 
motion during labour time, whose 'powerful 
effectiveness' is itself in turn out 
of all proportion to the direct labour 
time spent on their production, but 
depends rather on the general state 
of science and on the progress of technology, 
or the application of this science to 
production." (l6 0 )
As Marx elaborates, this tendency testifies to and 
embodies the increasing role and indespensibility of 
knowledge in capitalist production :
"The development of fixed capital indicates 
to what degree general social knowledge has 
become a direct force of production, and 
to what degree, hence, the conditions 
of the process of social life itself 
have come under the control of the 
general intellect and been transformed 
in accordance with it." (l6l)
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Neijbher this increased role of* social knowledge 
in the production process nor the progressively diminishing 
importance of direct, living labour power in the creation 
of wealth are expressive of a fundamental transformation 
in the social relations of production such as that which 
occurred in the l8th and 19th centuries, however. The 
extraction of surplus value from labour remains the 
corner-stone of capitalist enterprise and, while the 
objective conditions classically identified by Marxists 
as compatible with the abolition of private o^mership 
of the maans of production are intensified, this 
transformation in,no sense is effected on the basis of 
the existing property relations. Mandel♦s "third 
industrial revolution", relying exclusively on transformations 
in the sphere of technique,is a serious misnomer to say 
the least. Within Mandel*s work it serves to reinforce 
his depiction of the relative stability of post-war 
capitalism. But when a wider interpretion of production 
forces is adopted a quite different picture emerges. The 
transformation of technique of which Mandel speaks 
represents a further development of the tendency for 
science to be applied*'in the service of capital in its 
domination over the labour force," (l62) With the growth 
of constant in proportion to variable capital the alienated 
character of the labour process accordingly assumes a 
more chronic and acute form :
"the objective conditions of labour
assume an ever more colossal independence,
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represented by its very extent, opposite
living labour, and that social wealth
confronts labour in more powerful portions
as an alien and dominant power. The
emphasis comes to be placed not on the
state of being objectified, but on the
state of being alienated, dispossessed, sold." (I6 3 )
In such alienated conditions, the development of 
nuclear energy and automation, the corner stones of Mandel*s 
"third industrial revolution", pose the threats of nuclear 
war and unemployment at least as much as the prospect of 
relative economic stability. Mandel is, of course, aware 
of this. He explicitly relates the post-war expansionary 
"Kondratieff" wave to the arms race, and elsewhere refers 
to the risk of atomic war. (l64) Nevertheless, we would 
stress that his conception of a "third industrial revolution" 
is erroneous because of tds exclusive reliance on purely 
technological factors. While that transformation of technique 
is an important aspect of post-war capitalist development, 
it is a single aspect of the total complex of productive 
forces. Those productive forces, moreover, are activated 
increasingly against the interests of the great mass of the 
world's population, and to attempt, as Mandel does, to 
assess the recent "flowering" of technique in terms of and 
in comparison ivxth the progressive, revolutionizing socio- 
technological transformations of the previous two centuries 
is to directly or indirectly obscure the repressive and, 
as recent history from Hiroshima to Saigon demonstrates,
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destructive forms of its application.
Technical knowledge is unquestionably an increasingly 
important factor in the economic and political functioning 
of advanced capitalist societies. As Meynaud has 
pointed out, however, the claim that either technology 
or its human representatives operate in a politically 
neutral manner in such societies ignores the reality 
that one group holds effective power and is materially 
privileged in relation to the majority of members.
"In reality, in the present social 
context, whether or not social 
deomocrats are in the government, 
technocracy is a direct or indirect 
factor of conservatism." (1 6 5 )
The imperatives of accumulation in capitalist 
societies deny the technocratic social strata an 
independent power base from which to develop the social 
characteristics of a ruling class with a corresponding 
and distinctive state form. With the unlikely exception 
of practicing sabotage against their capitalist employers, 
they are subject to the logic, imperatives and rationality 
of the capitalist structure of domination. The political 
economy of late capitalism, in other words, defines the 
context and social significance of scientific knowledge 
and its technological application in contemporary Western 
societies. It is the inescapable scenario of the practices 
of the managerial and technocratic strata. The notion of
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a distinct social type of technocratic state is an 
optical illusion,suggested by the increasing adoption and 
application of technocratic strategies and techniques 
by the specifically capitalist state form. (l66)
bureaucratization, technocracy and the s t a t e.---------------- ^ ,--------  ÿ
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capitalism, characterized by the division of 
interest between "absentee owners" and "the underlying 
society," typically generates a high level of waste 
and sectional obstruction practices# Business 
enterprise is directed toward maximizing the role 
of return on capital, while the opposing interests 
of the majority of society lie in increasing the 
output and distribution of consumer goods. Veblen 
identifies the major wasteful consequences of this 
structural conflict to be unemployment of materials 
and manpower, the proliferation of parasitic 
salesmanship practices, the production of spurious 
and superfluous luxury goods, and the systematic 
dislocation of the production process for sectional 
gain by both employers and sectors of the working 
classes (107-8). Rejecting the possibility of a 
Socialist solution to this anarchic situation on the 
grounds of the deferential attitudes of the population 
at large, Veblen looked to the trained industrial 
technicians and engineers as the new ruling class, 
although again he was sceptical as to the likelihood 
of this development in the near future.
Veblen*s thesis is based on the contention that 
the development of industry has raised the technical 
efficiency of the productive system to the level of the 
primary concern of advanced societies. As a result of 
this development the trained technicians "who now are 
in possession of the requisite technological information 
and experience are the first and instantly indispensable
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factor in the everyday work of carrying on the 
country's productive industry*" (133) The "General 
Staff" of the production system, they alone can, if 
organized for control, guarantee the material welfare 
of society as a whole*
Ifhile Veblen's comments on industrial "sabotage", 
under which he includes strikes and factory lockouts, are 
often highly perceptive, however, he does not draw the 
logical corollary of the structurally generated conflict 
he identifies between the interests of entrepreneurs in 
profits and those of the underlying population in material 
welfare. Rather than view the dominant struggle for 
control to correspond to the cleavage between these two 
broadly defined groups Veblen, for unclear reasons, identifies 
skilled technicians as the only group capable of 
administering a rationally-organised society. His repeated 
thesis that technicians are necessary for industrial 
production is unconvincing, as the same applies to the 
body of productive employees as a whole. Neither does Veblen 
attempt to explain their nature as an incipient ruling class 
in terms of their preparedness for revolutionary change.
In fact he characterizes the technicians as "a harmless and 
docile sort, well-fed on the ivhole, and somewhat placidly 
content." (1 3 5 )
Veblen's isolation of this sector of the total labour 
force as the hearer of material welfare and the historical 
alternative to the capitalists for the position of ruling class 
is arbitrary and speculative. In the event of their 
ascendancy, Veblen suggests that the technicians' powers
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and duties "will be of a technological nature," (l4l) 
While this conception of a rationally organized 
production system approximates^interestingly* to the 
Marxist notion of the "administration of things" in 
Socialist society, Veblen*s thesis rests on a 
mechanistic parallel between the technologicial 
day-to-day practices of technicians and the purely 
administrative and technical form of organization 
in a hypothetical rationally—ordered society, Veblen's 
new ruling class,like that of Burnham,is misconceived, 
deriving from the purely technical work-tasks of skilled 
industrial operators rather than from their social 
role or function in the process of production. In 
this sense it is a variant, if idiosycratic, on the 
"technocratic" or "industrial society" thesis,
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process of "Introjection", by which the individual "transposes 
the *outer* into the 'inner'", these two realms referring 
respectively to society and public opinion on the one hand 
and individual consciousness on the other. Consciousness 
is in this way invaded by "technological reality". Mass 
production and distribution dominate and claim the individual, 
and as a consequence he comes to identify with his immediate 
social environment and, through that, ;fith society as a whole. 
Marcuse's critical pessimism is epitomized in his contention that :
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' "domination - in the guise of affluence
and liberty - extends to all spheres 
of private and public existence, integrates 
all authentic opposition, absorbs all 
alternatives." (31)
Marcuse suggests that the supposed "equalization of 
class distinctions in contemporary capitalist society 
evidences not the disappearance of class, but rather the extent 
to which the needs and satisfactions that serve to preserve 
the Establishment are shared by the underlying population,(24), 
Marcuse's concern with production and technology, however, 
centres on the marketing and consumption of commodities rather 
than on the social relations within which they are actually 
produced. A corollary is his "pessimistic" prediction 
concerning the future of the capitalist system. Marcuse 
suggests that Western capitalism will continue to be :
"capable of maintaining and even 
increasing the standard of living for 
an increasing part of the population in 
spite of and through intensified production 
of the means of destruction, and methodical 
waste of resources and faculties." (42)
The re-emergence of cyclical and now openly recessionary 
tendencies in the post-war United States and world capitalist 
economy renders such a prospect of long-term expansion and 
stability problematic. As with his less "critical" counterparts, 
Marcuse's incorporated working class is abstracted.from and 
viewed in isolation from the political economy of late
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capitalism. In place of the concept of the "negative 
totality" developed in jREason and Revolution (1955)*
One Dimensional Man promises, sociologically and politically 
little more than a prospect of toal negativity. Far from 
constituting the grave-digger of capitalism, Marcuse's 
working class is abandoned to a repressive, if happy , 
alienated existence. This thesis is, we suggest, essentially 
the critical equivalent of the theory of embourgeoisement, 
sharing its weaknesses as discussed above.
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SECTION THREE
FUNCTIONALISM AND TEE STATE
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The functionalist school of theory, in addition 
to offering a distinctive model of social organization 
in general, implies an equally distinctive corresponding 
conception of the sociological nature of the state.
The theory of social stratification and power that 
functionalism provides has been explicitly elaborated to 
incorporate an analysis of the state by, among others, 
Durkheim and Parsons, the two principal writers with 
whom we will be concerned* Their studies of the 
state and, more generally, of the nature of social 
power as such, are inseparable from the basic 
assumptions concerning the structure and workings of 
society that they hold.
We will firstly examine and offer a critique of the 
analysis of Durkheim, the father par excellence of 
contemporary functionalist theory. We will then 
consider the theoretical work of some more recent 
representatives of the functionalist perspective, 
paying particular attention to that of Talcot Parsons. 
Parsons's theories will be central to this section both 
because of the prominent position he has occupied in 
twentieth century sociological thought, particularly 
but not only in North America, and because of his 
concern to explicitly relate his model of social 
organization to the problems of the state and social 
power in the specific conditions of advanced capitalism.
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Finally, we will critically examine a number of attempts 
to apply the functionalist perspective to the crises of 
social relations that have characterized the Western 
world during the present century. Our conclusion is that 
Functionalism, constrained by the limitations of its 
initial assumptions of the nature of social organization, 
is unable to provide an adequate theoretical account 
of social power and, more particularly, that of the 
state in "advanced" societies.
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I. DURKHEIM. SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND THE STATE.
FUNCTKDNALISM AMD HISTORY.
Durkheim*s analysis of the "advanced" state is elaborated 
within the theoretical perspective of Functionalism. His early 
works written during the l880*s, were particularly concerned 
with the corpus of German "organicist" social theory. In 
particular, he supported and approved of Shaffle's metaphorical 
use of the organic analogy in the study of societies, (l)
Durkheim repeatedly stressed that his comparison of living 
organisms and functioning societies did not imply a literal 
identity between the two types of entity. He contrasted, fqr 
example, the relative constancy of species within the biological 
realm to the potential for the rapid development of new types 
of organization within the social sphere. (2)
Durkheim explains his use of the organic analogy as an 
analytical and expository device in terms of the early stage 
of development of Sociology as an independent science. The 
existent sciences, and in particular Biology, he observes, "contain 
a treasure of experiences which it would be foolish to ignore." (3) 
His analysis of societies with a developed division of labour 
accordingly emphasized the interrelation of parts within the 
social whole. At such a stage of social development the individual 
comes to increasingly depend upon and perform a particular 
functional role within the social organism at the same time as 
he becomes progressively distinguished from it in his personal 
activity. Durkheim*s conception of the "organic" nature of a
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society integrated through the division of labour is quite explicit, 
as the following passage indicates ;
"The members are united by ties which 
extend deeper and far beyond the short 
moments during which the exchange is 
made. Each of the functions that they 
exercise is, in an fixed way, dependent 
upon others, and with them forms a 
solidary system." (4 )
Organic solidarity thus conceived is informed in Durkheim*s 
analysis by the problematic of social change. Giddens thus 
identifies his central concern to be the analysis of "the 
changing forms of social solidarity over the course of societal 
development." (5) In particular, Durkheim is concerned in 
The Division of Labour in Society to document and examine the 
historical movement from mechanical to organic solidarity. In 
the former solidarity is based on the "likeness of consciences".
There is a relatively undifferentiated division of labour within 
which individuals resemble one another, engage in more or less 
uniform beliefs and practices, and are consequently mutually 
replaceable. (6). Organic solidarity, by. contrast, involves 
a progressive differentiation of individuals and functions.
Each individual has a sphere of action peculiar to himself, 
and there is correspondingly more scope for the free play of 
initiative. The division of labour increasingly becomes the 
dominant integrative principle, displacing the "collective conscience" 
from this position, and constitutes "the principal bond of social 
aggregates of the higher type". (7) On the basis of this distinction
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Durkheim postulates an "historical law" of the sequential 
relation between the two types of solidarity,
"Mechanical solidarity which first stands 
alone, or nearly so, progressively loses 
ground, and organic solidarity becomes, 
little by little, preponderant," (8)
Organic solidarity is thus essentially conceived as a 
historical product, emerging with the development of the 
division of labour and the growth of functional specialization 
in society* This historical dimension is also embodied 
in Durkheim*s criteria for distinguishing "normal" from 
"pathological" social phenomena* He differentiates between 
sociological forms which, with narrow variations, are 
distributed throughout the whole species, and the exceptional 
cases, which are often short-lived. The former briefly, are 
"normal", the latter "pathological". The healthy, for Durkheim 
is "the norm par excellence and can consequently be in no way 
abnormal•" (9)
Adopting an essentially Darwinian conception of evolution, 
Durkheim suggests that the most widespread forms of organization 
must, at least in their aggregate, be the the most advantageous 
and offer the greatest chance of development. As in Biology, 
however, a social form can only be normal or pathological in 
relation to a particular species at a particular stage in its 
development :
..it is not enough to observe the form 
it takes in the generality of societies 
belonging to this species; we must also
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take special care to consider them 
at the corresponding phase of their 
evolution." (lO)
The historical schema presented in The Division of Labour is 
Durkheim*s major study of the emergence of a new "normal" 
form in the process of social evolution.
THE MORAL BASIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.
Durkheim*8 historical Functionalism is underpinned and 
structured by a positivistic conception of "social facts", 
where society has a fundamentally "moral" character. In order 
to radically distinguish Sociology's subject matter from that 
of the other sciences Durkheim posits the existence of phenomena
which are exclusively sociological. He identifies in particular
c ' - ■■ ■ y \
laws currencies-I languages and customs. Such phenomena are 
not only external to the individual, but also endowed with 
coercive power. The proper domain of Sociology, they above 
all have the positive properties of "facts".
"Here, then, is a category of facts with 
very distinctive characteristics : it
consists of ways of acting, thinking and 
feeling, external to the individual mid 
endowed with a power of coercion, by reason 
of which they control him," (ll)
Durkheim elaborates the distinction between society and 
the individual in terms of a formal conceptual dualism. He posits 
two distinct levels, the actual sociological phenomena ("collective 
states") and their "reincarnation" when they are refracted 
through particular social instances. Sociology, he repeatedly
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emphasizes, is not a corollary of individual psychology.
Social facts exert pressure on individuals by virtue of their 
fundamentally external nature. They fashion individuals from 
without, surpassing them in time and space. Strictly speaking, 
Durkheim observes, individuals are the origin of society, but 
the system formed by their association "represents a specific 
reality which has its own characteristics." (12) The social 
realm, in other words, is seen to have a sui generis existence, 
not simply the sum of its parts and constituent elements.
At one point in The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim 
suggests that this view of society is essentially an expository 
device, deriving partly from the immaturity of contemporary 
Sociology and partly from a desire to orientate his work 
from an objective standpoint. If, he anticipates, the 
assumed exteriority of social phenomena proves to be illusory, 
it will be replaced by a superior conception. For the present, 
however, Durkheim proposes "we must study them objectively as 
external things, for it is this character that they present 
to us." (13) Giddens has attached primacy to the methodological 
significance of Durkheim*s conception of social facts. He writes
"This is obviously a methodological postulate 
rather than an ontological one, and has to 
be understood in terms of the conception of 
the mode of development of science which 
Durkheim takes over from Comte." (I4)
Now it is undoubtedly the case that Durkheim, like Comte, 
emphasized the urgency of the need for the science of society
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to radically break with pre-scientific conceptions and to attain 
the rigour and precision of natural science. It is apparent 
from the body of Durkheim*s work as a whole, however, that his 
identification of an exclusively sociological realm does in 
fact constitute an ontological proposition concerning the nature 
of society and its relation to individuals. He repeatedly speaks 
of the "objectivity" and "ascendancy over the individual" of 
social facts. (15) In a Preface to Suicide Durkheim reiterates 
the thesis that social facts "must be studied as things, that 
is, as realities external to the individual." If no reality 
exists outside of individual consciousness, Durkheim contends. 
Sociology lacks any distinctive subject matter of its own.
Opposing psychological reductionisra, he suggests :
"It is not realized that there can be 
no sociology unless societies exist, and that 
societies cannot exist if there are only 
individuals." (I6)
The second part of this proposition in particular, it appears 
to us, constitutes a logical defense of a dualism between 
society and the individual within the world rather than simply 
in Durkheim*8 theory. Sociology, he adds, can and must be 
objective since it deals with "realities as definite and substantial 
as those of the psychologist or the biologist." (l?) Clearly 
his notion of the "social fact" is no mere methodological or 
expository device,
Durkheim*s intention, as expressed in the paper Individual 
and Collective Representations is to develop a science characterized
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by "sociological naturalism". (18) Just as individual representations 
exist "in themselves", with their own laws, within psychic life, 
so the social world has for its base a "mass of associâtiated 
individuals," from the relations among whom arise collective 
representations which acquire the qualities of independence 
and externality in relation to individuals. This distinctive 
social realm has an essentially moral nature. Moral rules, 
for Durkheim, are both obligatory and lesirable. Their object 
is the sui generis collective of individuals within particular 
social formations. The only other conceivable object of 
moral activity is God, whom Durkheim views as a transfigured 
symbolic expression of society itself. Individuals are thus 
bound to each other through and by society, "the superior end 
of which they are the servants or instruments." (19) Society 
in other words, is for Durkheim a moral entity, distinct 
from and qualitatively superior to the individuals who comprise 
uts original elements.
Morality is thus viewed as a collective social property 
in Durkheim*s analysis. Material interest alone is inadequate 
as a basis for abiding social solidarity.
"There is nothing less constant than interest.
Today, it unites me and you; tomorrow, it
will make me your enemy." (20)
Depicting a hypothetical morally unstructured human existence 
as one of Hobbesian atomization and universal combativity,
Durkheim distinguishes between "egoism" and "moral individualism". 
Whereas egoism derives from the appetites of the individual organism, 
the source of moral individualism is the collective authority.
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The development of the division of labour requires and 
constitutes the foundation of an appropriate morality. (2l) 
It is the basis, Durkheim suggests, of the cult of the 
individual, moral individualism deriving directly from the 
increasing differentiation within society.
THE DIVISION OF LABOUR AND ORGANIC SOLIDARITY.
While immanent in individuals and experienced:as such (22), 
society for Durkheim, we have seen, is characterized by its 
quality of externality. It gives us "everything that matters," 
even though as individuals we receive only a fragment of its 
"moral riches". (23) This orientation, both methodological 
and ontological, of dualism structures Durkheim*s analysis 
in all his major works. (24) It is, however, in the 
Division of Labour that Durkheim*s conception of society and 
his programme for Sociology are of particular relevance for developed 
industrial societies and their corresponding state form.
For Durkheim the totality of beliefs and sentiments common 
to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system, 
the conscience, which has an existence of its own. Qualitatively 
different and distinct from individual consciences it can, however, 
only be realized through them. The historical relativism that 
pervades Durkheim*s theory informs his definition of a criminal 
act as one which offends strong and defined states of the 
collective conscience.
In the early stages of social development, Durkheim elaborates 
punishment is above all a passionate reaction to such offences.
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While an element of vengeance survives with the growth of 
the division of labour, punishment is increasingly a social 
mechanism of defence, performed with a greater understanding 
of its significance and consequences. The social nature of the 
reaction derives from the collective character of the moral 
object subjected to criminal attack# Durkheim observes "it 
is surely society and not ourselves that we avenge, and 
moreover, it is something superior to the individual." (25)
Historically the two typical forms of punishment, termed 
repressive and restitutive, correspond to the two types of mechanical 
and organic solidarity, as outlined earlier. (26) The relationship 
between these two sets of concepts indicates Durkheim*s conviction 
that legal codes are an observable index.of moral phenomena, 
themselves bound up with a progressive increase in the complexity 
of and differentiation within the social organization. The 
simplest type of society, which Durkheim concedes to be a 
hypothetical entity, is the "horde". Defined as "the veritable 
social protoplasm, the germ whence would arise all social 
types" (27), the horde is characterized by mechanical solidarity 
based upon absolute resemblance and non-differentiation.
Durkheim identifies a clan to be a horde which, while solidarity 
is still based on the likeness of consciences, has lost its 
independence by becoming an element in a more extensive complex 
of social groups. Association of clans, in turn, constitute 
what Durkheim terms "segmented societies with a clan—base."
Such societies, again dominated by the mechanical solidarity 
of likeness, embody Durkheim*s conception, antithetical to 
that of Marx, of Communism* Their purely aggregative mode of 
cohesion "absorbs the individual in the group, the part in the
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whole." (28) As against Marx's conception as Communism as 
a form of social organization based on the abolition of the 
division of labour with the historical accomplishment of material 
abundance, Durkheim thus locates it at the dawn of social 
evolution, its hallmark being thepoverty rather than the 
enrichment of individual development. (29)
The organic solidarity characteristic of developed societies, 
by contrast, is bound up with and inseparable from the social 
division of labour.
"In effect, individuals are here grouped, 
no longer according to their relations of 
lineage, but according to the particular 
nature of the social activity to which 
they consecrate themselves." (30)
Since the Middle Ages in particular, Durkheim observes, the earlier 
form of segmental organization has been in decline. Integral 
to this process has been the development of an inter-regional 
division of labour and the growth of city specialization.
At the same time, occupational organization becomes 
increasingly dominant within the social structure. The 
'Siatural milieu" of individuals is "no longer the natal milieu, 
but the occupational milieu." The ascendancy of this form of 
social organization entails the progressive demise of all 
earlier forms. Durkheim accounts for this development in 
terms of the growth of the material size of societies on the 
one hand and of their moral density", the mutual actions and 
reactions individuals on one another, on the other. (3l) 
This"progressive condensation", for Durkheim, is the result of
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the increasing concentration of population, a tendency compounded 
by the emergence of cities, and the improvement of communication 
and transport facilities. The result of this process is a 
social type of "species" with increasingly differentiated but 
mutually supporting and complementary functions.
"If society no longer imposes upon 
everybody certain uniform practices, 
it takes greater care to define and regulate the 
special relations between different social 
functions, and this activity is not smaller 
because it is different." (32)
Durkheim, as we shall see, devoted particular attention 
to "abnormal" forms of the division of labour where such 
organic solidarity is not achieved. His thesis, however, is 
that the decline of traditional moral beliefs does not in itself 
imply social decomposition. Rather, the "normal" state of a 
society with a developed division of labour is that of organic 
solidarity, or social cohesion based on the functional 
interdependence of the constituent elements.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE STATE.
Within his historical account of the ascendancy of 
organic solidarity, Durkheim attaches particular importance to 
the role of the state, its nature and its significance. Basically 
his thesis is that the state is the expressive medium of the 
spontaneous moral consensus of the various functions within the 
division of labour. Its different organs and parts are
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co-ordinated and subordinated to one another around 
a central organ, which exercises a moderating influence 
over the organism as a whole. With the growth of 
functional differentiation in society a system of rights 
and duties emerges around the new patterns of 
unprecedentedly complex interaction. Such a web of 
obligation is necessary in order to guarantee social 
continuity and at least a minimal level of stability. (33)
Material interest alone compels the various contracting 
parties to acquire a maximum of rights in exchange for a 
minimum of responsibility beyond self-advancement. Contract 
alone, that is to say, is vulnerable to subversion by 
literally disintegrative molecular antagonisms. Consequently 
to become an integrative principle it requires in addition 
a form of regulation of a social and moral nature. The 
particular instrument of this regulation is administrative 
law, the totality of rules which determine both the 
functions of the central organ and their co-ordination, 
and the relations of those functions with the functions 
of the hetergeneous organs that comprise society as 
a ifhole. Adopting a biological metaphor Durkheim 
proposes that these rules determine the functioning of 
the cerebro-spinal system of the social organism. This 
regulatory system, he concludes, "in current parlance is 
designated by the term, State." (34) Far from being 
accidental or the consequence of a badly-functioning 
society, it is a normal phenomenan, assuming more and 
increasingly varied functions with the growth of the 
division of labour.
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Considerable autonomy, however, remains in 
other social organs in so far as they have "special 
functions" outside the state's sphere of influence. 
Alongside the state Durkheim envisages a complex of 
functions with relative autonomy :
"a world of organs which, without 
being completely independent of the 
first, nevertheless function without 
its intervention, without its even 
being conscious of them, at least 
normally." (35)
The sheer complexity of economic life in particular, 
Durkheim observes, prevents the state from regulating its 
day to day variations and activities. Durkheim*s main 
reason for ascribing a limited regulatory role to the 
state, however, is the natural mutual co-ordination 
of the various social organs, rather than the purely 
empirical complexity of particular functional sectors.
"XVhat gives unity to organized societies, 
however, as to all organisms, is the 
spontaneous consensus of parts." (36)
In other words, the primary integrative principle 
in societies with a developed division of labour is its 
immanent form of organic solidarity. The state expresses 
rather than creates this social cohesion and unity. It 
is the directive organ, but the mutual dependence and 
co-ordination of the various functions and parts of society 
is grounded directly in the mode of operation, in "the 
very practices," of each special function. Patterns of
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mutual reaction, appropriate to the differentiated structure 
of developed society, are repeated and become habitual.
The resultant social habits, in turn, are transformed 
into rules of conduct,
"The rule does not, then, create the 
state of mutual dependence in which 
solidary organs find themselves, but 
only expresses in clear-cut fashion the 
result of a given situation," (37)
The state, for Durkheim, is thus immanent in society, 
in its functional unity, based on the division of labour, 
and in its normal corresponding form of organic solidarity, 
VTiile, that is to say, the state has a moral character, its 
sovereignty is relative, both in terms of cause and effect, 
to the moral structure of society as a whole.
CLASS CONFLICT, ECONOMIC CORPORATIONS AND THE 
DIVISION OF LABOUR.
A number of critics, including J. Horton, have 
accused Durkheim ignoring intermediary social relations 
between the levels of society as a whole and the individual 
in so far as they relate to the dynamics of class conflict,(3 8 ) 
A considerable and important part of Durkheim*s work is, 
however, concerned precisely with the nature and sociological 
significance of intermediary social institutions. In 
particular, Durkheim attributed especial importance to 
the role of economic corporations in promoting and engendering
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organic solidarity in societies with a developed division 
of labour. Corresponding to the progressive domination 
of restitutive law he thus saw the emergence of "an 
occupational morality for each profession." (39) This 
theme is dealt with most fully in Durkheim*s analysis 
of the abnormal forms of the division of labour. Such 
conditions are characterised by the recurrence of 
industrial and commercial classes and the emergence 
of class conflict. The growth of antagonism between 
labour and capital, especially since the fifteenth 
century, indicates, for Durkheim, that relations between 
employer within large scale industry are "in a sickly 
state,*' (40)
Since, however, the weakening of the collective
conscience is a "normal" development with the growth of
the division of labour it cannot be the course of this 
pathological development. The problem, Durkheim explains, 
is that there are no longer any operative regulations
in the sphere of the economy, a condition that Durkheim
terms "anomie", or normlessness. (4l) The drawing together
of previously local markets into a single, interconnected 
web of economic relations results in a dislocation between 
the process of production and the distribution and 
consumption of industrial output. Production accordingly 
becomes unbridled, unregulated and arbitrary. (42)
In this anomic state the worker is reduced to a 
mechanical component of the production process. He can 
relate his economic activity to no identifiable end, is
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no longer a living cell of a living organism. Such an 
existance, Durkheim observes, constitutes a "debasement 
of human nature" and fosters antagonism between different 
social groups. Class conflict, characteristic of the 
anomic state, thus represents a partial break in organic 
solidarity.
The s e c o n d  abnormal form of the division of labour, 
identified by Durkheim^the "forced" form, derives directly 
from the prevailing system of rules themselves. Class 
conflict in this case indicates that the lower classes are 
no longer satisfied with their customary position and 
aspire to functions traditionally closed to them. 
Constraint, rather than regulation, characterizes the 
mode of law in such conditions and is symptomatic of a 
discrepancy between natural and social inequalities. 
Durkheim*s discussion of the forced division of labour 
highlights his basically liberal political commitment 
to the ideal of radical meritocracy, an ideal which he 
sees to derive from and be realizable within the division 
of labour. For the division of labour to produce an 
enduring solidarity each individual must have a task 
which is "fitting to him". With external constraint as 
the only link between individuals and their functions 
only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is possible. 
Effective organic solidarity, by contrast, entails 
"the free unfolding of the social force that each carries 
in himself," (43)
Contractual relations, the basis of the juridical
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form of exchange, become, Durkheim continues, an
increasingly important factor in social consensus with •
the growth of the division of labour. This tendency
reinforces the need for a truly equivalent or equal 1
pattern of exchange, Durkheim defines the social 
value of objects of exchange in terms of their use-value 
in a moral sense, clearly distinguishing this criterion 
from that for exchange-value in the labour theory of 
value. Social value
"represents the quantity of useful 
labour which it (the object of exchange - D,B.) 
contains. By that must be understood, not 
the integral labour which it might have cost, 
but that part of the energy capable of 
producing useful social effects, that is, 
effects which reply to normal needs," (44)
Social value, that is to say, is understood by Durkheim 
in terms of an objects capacity to satisfy human needs 
corresponding to the system of moral regulation at a 
particular state of social evolution. It derives from 
the dimension of historical relativism that pervades his 
analysis of social solidarity.
The task of the "higher" societies within Dur#heim*s 
historical schema is to achieve liberty, justice and 
equality, principles which cannot be discovered in nature 
and the potential for which is unique to social life,
Durkheim’s programme for the reconstitution of social
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solidarity on the basis of the organic type is thus 
informed and structured by an essentially liberal but 
consistently radical commitment to meritocracy. Organic 
solidarity inherently entails "doing away with external 
inequalities as far as possible." (45) VThile the 
"perfect spontaneity" that would distinguish pure 
meritocracy is conceded by Durkheim to be "never met 
with anywhere as a realized fact", a close approximat ion 
to it is an essential and inseparable aspect of the 
"normal" form of the division of labour. (46)
The particular way in which Durkheim sees economic 
corporations to play a central role in the realization 
of organic solidarity is elaborated in his discussion of 
the third abnormal form of the division of labour. The 
major factor here is thaiitoffers inadequate material 
for individual activity. Movements, Durkheim observes, 
are necessarily badly adjusted when employees in a 
business enterprise are insufficiently occupied. Incoherence 
and disorder, rather than solidarity, are the effects such 
an underutilization of individuals’ abilities. "Operations 
are carried on without any unity." (4?) Durkheim’s 
solution is the development of a mode of regulation which 
will suppress useless tasks and distribute work in such 
a way as to keep each individual sufficiently and 
appropriately occupied and organized. A double function 
is in this way served, order being achieved at the same 
time as work is more economically managed.
A primary function of economic corporations, for 
Durkheim, is thus to reinforce and foster moral regulation 
at a crucial point in developed society, that is in the
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sphere of economic activity, and thereby help promote 
the realization of organic solidarity. They would have 
a relatively high degree of autonomy within their own 
sphere, but would come under the general supervision 
of the state, constituting secondary or intermediary 
groups between the state and the individual. Their 
active role within the social organism does not conflict 
with Durkheim's conception of the state. The state 
remains the crucial expression of the internal unity of 
societies characterized by a solidarity of the organic 
type. This model of the state is integrated with 
Durkheim's conception of the external, thing-like quality 
of social facts through his historically-informed 
functionalist perspective. His principal theoretical 
contentions are mutually consistent, and our following 
critique, while primarily orientated toward his model 
of the nature and role of the state, will consider that 
particular aspect in terms of and in relation to 
Durkheim*s work as a whole.
CRITIQUE. METHODOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY.
In developing his thesis that Sociology constitutes 
a science in its own right, that a distinct group of 
uniquely sociological "facts" exists, Durkheim typically 
assembled a considerable body of social data to support 
his contentions. His analysis of the tendency of the 
suicide rate to remain stable in a given society is a 
point in question. (48) Nevertheless, to refer to the 
unifying factor in a social collective as a "force" or
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"current", as Durldieim does, constitutes an abuse of 
anaological reasoning# Nothing that is normally associated 
with these terms applies to the social phenomena in 
question. They are not independently observable, nor do 
they have a tangible ("thing-like") material existence. 
Neither, as we shall discuss in more detail below, are 
they adequately or convincingly theoretically deduced 
from the observable data of social existence. As such, 
these designations can in fact tell us little if anything 
about actual social cohesiveness and the ways in which 
it functions.
Generally speaking, group cohesion refers to the 
observable fact that particular social actors comprise 
a pattern of interaction that is manifested in group- 
orientated activities. Thus stated, however, this 
proposition is ambiguous. It could mean literally that 
group-orientated activities are the consequence of 
cohesion, and in this sense manifest it. It could also 
mean, however, that group cohesion is not a cauise, but 
an aggregate effect of these activities. In the first 
case cohesion would constitute an ontological presence 
in itself, would have ah existence of its oim which 
may be inferred from observable social activities, in 
a similar way as atoms, electricity and radio waves are 
inferred "entities". In the latter case cohesion would 
have no independent existence and would reside merely 
in its manifestations.
For Durkheim cohesion is a force with a sui generis 
existence, a force that determines, for example, the type
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and rate of suicide. Even with this assumption, however, 
the possibility remains that cohesion is a mental construct, 
an abstructum that can influence and determine the direction 
of human conduct. In this case it would represent the 
individual's response to the quality of the collective 
social life, a subjective response to the state and 
condition of social existence. Throughout Suicide and 
in a number of other contexts Durkheim hints at the 
possibility of such an interpretation by using terms 
such as "the coefficient of preservation", the "immunity 
of married men" and "the prophylactic effect of tradition". 
Such terms suggest that the correlation between suicide 
and cohesion is due to the presence of social conditions 
that prevent suicide rather than to conditions that 
actually promote it and make a certain rate of suicide 
inevitable. This explanation would assume that when there 
is strong cohesion there will be relatively fewer negative 
evaluations of the social milieu and more positive—emphasis 
on available life-chances than nvhen cohesion is weak.
Social actors* active evaluation of their cultural 
environment is central to this conception of social practice. 
It has been elaborated in P. Winch's influential philosophical 
study of social science. Winch contends :
"The only mode of life which can
undergo a meaningful development
in response to environmental
changes is one which contains within
itself the means of assessing the significance
of the behaviour which it prescribes." (49)
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As against the more consistently phenomenological 
perspective developed by the Ethnomethodologists (50)
Winch's proposition implies a contextualized view of human 
activity, the individual's social milieu influencing his 
behaviour in virtually all its manifestations. Meaningful 
or purposive activity, that is to say, is context-specific.
"...the concepts in terms of which we 
understand our own mental processes and 
behaviour have to be learned, and must, 
therefore, be socially established, 
just as much as the concepts in terms of which 
we come to understand the behaviour of other 
people." (51)
Durkheim*s hypothetical "external facts", "currents" and 
"social forces", constituting ontological rather than 
methodological postulates, have, by contrast, a purely 
conceptual existence, and do not aid the theoretical 
reconstruction of the objective conditions and distinguishing 
features of social life. Rather, they hinder that 
reconstruction by focusing attention on speculative, 
sociologically dubious "entities", reifying Durkheim's 
conceptual constructs in to the basic data for the analysis 
of social experience. Reificatiôn, in fact, is encountered 
in a particularly pure and complete form in Durkheim's 
Sociology.
A related criticism which implies the basis of a more 
positive critique, that is, which embodies an alternative, 
more adequate theoretical interpretation of social structure,
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concerns Durkheim*s methodological inconsistency• We 
will contend that while Durkheim claims to work with an 
inductive methodology he in fact uses a deductive 
procedure to construct a morphology of social types based 
on a decontextualized analysis of social relations.
In The Rules Durkheim repeatedly distinguishes 
between his own "scientific" work from the ideological 
analyses of earlier sociologists, in particular Comte and 
Spencer. Behind this claim to scientific status lies 
Durkheim*s assumption that there exists a specifically 
social realm, with autonomy from the consciousness of 
individual social actors, which can be objectively analysed 
through the application of scientific method. Specifically 
he contends that the major principle which distinguishes 
science from other intellectual activity is the development 
of adequate and systematic theory from the observation of 
the empirical or particular data corresponding to the 
object of analysis. Science, that is to say, refers to 
a method of theoretical elaboration rather than a 
distinctive way of observing data. To quote ;
"From sensation all general ideas 
flow, whether they be true or false, 
scientific or impressionistic. The 
point of departure of science, or 
speculative knowledge, cannot be 
different from that of lay, or practical, 
knowledge. It is only beyond this 
point, namely in the manner of elaboration 
of these common data, that divergences 
begin." (52)
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Durkheim's conception of scientific activity embodies 
the Baconian inductive method of procedure; gathering 
observable empirical data and postponing the formulation of 
a theory until the relevant data is appropriately assembled.
This for Durldieim is the methodology by which Sociology can 
pass from the subjective to the objective stage. He 
enumerates three major rules to promote the discipline of the 
scientific sociological mind. These are the Cartesian 
eradication of all preconceptions, a clear and precise 
definition of the entities under investigation in order that 
the subject matter of Sociology may be known, and an 
endeavour to consider the objects of analysis from an aspect 
independent of their individual manifestations. Social facts, 
that is to say, correspond to and are specific to particular 
social species at a determinate point in their evolution. (53)
Despite the Baconian character of his dicta for scientific 
analysis, however, Durkheim draws attention to the inability of 
sociologists to experiment in the manner of the natural sciences 
"Since", he elaborates, "social phenomena evidently escape 
the control of the experimenter, the comparative method is 
the only one suited to sociology." (5,4) Durkheim insists 
that the sociologist must, like any Stiérifist, assume 
the logic of the causal relation and apply it with rigour 
"A given effect has always a single corresponding cause". (55)  
Because of the complexity of social life, however, the 
"method of residues", by which every aspect of the object in 
question is considered, is inapplicable. Rather, Durkheim 
recommends the method of concomitant variations, or correlation.
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two phenomena are seen to vary directly with one 
another in a sufficient number of cases, this, for Durldieim, 
evidences a causal relation between them, even if one is 
sometimes present without the other.
"As soon as one has proved that, in 
a certain number of cases, two phenomena 
vary with one another, one is certain 
of being in the presence of a law." (5 6 )
Noting that a comprehensive enumeration of a societyis traits 
is an unachievable task, Durkheim poses the problem as to 
which principle its "essential" characteristics may be 
identified. He proposes that societies are composed of 
various parts in combination, and that the nature of the 
aggregrate depends upon the character and number of the 
component elements and their mode of combination. (57)
Durkheim thus develops the foundations of a social 
morphology, based on the structure of internal relations 
within society.
The polar types of this morphology, as we have seen, 
are the horde and the society characterized by a high level of 
development of the division of labour. As in Parson's 
schema (5 8 ), Durkheim's morphology is concerned with 
specifically social relations, radically distinguishing this 
sphere from the other sectors or levels of analysis (Biology, 
Psychology etc.) What Durkheim does not do, however, is 
examine how these patterns of relations, the purely inter­
personal and inter-group structure of society, are 
circumscribed and, in the last analysis, determined by the
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relations of human beings ^  society with nature. His 
analysis while formulated in historical, developmental 
terras, is decontextualized. It relates only tangentially 
to labour, the human activity which, through the progressive 
transformation of the natural world, provides the necessary 
basis for the other elements of social life, including the 
structure of social differentiation.
Durkheim's sociological studies rest on and assume a 
cpnsistent, if mechanical, materialistic conception of 
historical change. The growth of society's "moral density", 
for example, is explained in terms of the increasing 
physical concentration of population, reinforced by the 
growth of cities and communication facilities. (59) More 
generally, Durkheim's conception of social facts, which 
is crucial to all his major studies is, as we have seen, 
informed by the assumption of universal causality. His 
attempt to transform Sociology into a scientific discipline, 
based on the observation and theoretical understanding 
of the material composition and movements of social 
organization, is fundamentally misconceived, however. As 
a consequence of his radical dislocation of the sociological 
sphere from the objects and sectors studied by established 
sciences, Durkheim avoids the implication of Marx and 
Engels's premise that "men must be in a position to live in 
order to be able to 'make history'". (60) Minimal human 
existence requires an at least rudimentary mode of 
transaction ^fith the natural world, the satisfaction of even 
the most basic needs being conditional upon the appropriation
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and transformation of external objects for human reproduction.
From this basis social development rests on the emergence 
and satisfaction of progressively more complex and extensive 
human needs, through the struggle to transform and, literally, 
humanize man's material environment, Durkheim's preoccupation 
with an exclusively social sphere directs attention away 
from the primacy, both historically and structurally 
within any social formation, of this basic and necessary 
relationship between social man and the natural world.
The crucial concept in the Marxist perspective which 
is absent in that of Durkheim is that of the social 
relations of production. While Durkheim recognizes the 
existence of different class strata, they are conceived 
in terms of strictly social differentiation. Inter-personal 
relations as such, or "social relations in general", however, 
are at all times sustained by the specific social relations 
of ownership which mediate the transaction between man 
and nature. By constituting the basis of and framework 
for the reproduction of social life, the relations of 
production circumscribe and give a particular character 
to social relations in the wider sense in every historical context. 
Durkheim's analysis, by contrast, presents as a total 
protrayal of man'5 social being what is in fact a decontexualized 
model of one conceptually Abstracted aspect of the totality 
of human activity,
Durldieim's conception of organic solidarity rests largely 
on a metaphorical comparison with living organisms in the 
natural world. khen he considers the actual relations
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between society and the natural world, however, his account 
is structured by a one-sided, dichotomous conception of 
their mode of interaction. "Liberty", Durkheim contends 
"is the product of (social - D.B.) regulation," Unique to 
social life, it constitutes "a conquest of society over 
nature". (6l) The essence of this proposition is that it 
is only through the subordination of nature , to social control 
of human affairs that liberty can be realized, (62) Liberty 
in this sense, is a supra-natural quality of human existence. 
It can be realized :
"only in so far as man raises himself 
above things and makes law for them, 
thus depriving them of their fortuitous, 
absurd, amoral character; that is, in 
so far as he becomes a social being.
For he can escape nature only by creating another 
world where he dominates nature. That 
world is society." (63)
Liberty and social development, the latter conceived 
in evolutionary terms, are in Durkheim's historical schema, 
twin tendencies, two aspects of a single process in which the 
autonomy of society in relation to the natural world is 
progressively realized through the growth of the division of 
labour. This theoretical interpretation the relation between 
nature and society, emphasizing the progressive conquest of 
the former by the latter is inseparable from Durkheim's 
methodological proposition that there is an exclusively 
sociological sphere of reality. In both cases, he effectively 
drives a wedge between society and nature, substituting a
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formal evolutionary schema of their mode of relation as 
qualitatively discreet sectors of the world for an analysis 
of the way in which man transforms his material environment 
through the medium of specific structured production 
relations,
The methodological and ontological severance of society 
from nature that Durkheim posits, prevents his analysis 
from attaining the understanding of the significance of 
social production, in its different stages, for the wider 
structure of social relations that the Marxist perspective 
offers. Instead of active man, developing his unique 
species-being through the structured social transformation 
of his material environment, Durldieim sees a largely 
passive human individual, dependent upon and subordinate to 
his social world. Social facts are "external to the individual 
and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which 
they control him." (64) Along with and parallel to his 
decontextualized analysis of social organization, that is 
to say, Durldieim presents a version of what D. Wrong has 
termed "the oversocialized conception of man." (6 5 )
Both are aspects of Durkheim's sociologism and derive
from his omission of an analysis of social production as such.
One revealing expression of Durkheim's mechanical 
conception of the relation between society and its material 
environment is the similarity between his portrayal of the 
supposedly intrinsic features of social existence and 
Marx's analysis of the conditions of commodity society in 
terms of alienation and the fetishism of commodities.
Marx examined alienation as the condition and process whereby
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mans species-activity, free, conscious labour, is 
estranged by and through the exploitative structure 
of commodity-produeting societies. In Capital he 
depicts this process more rigorously, in terms of 
political economy. In the process of commodity 
production labour assumes an abstract form in so far 
as it is embodied equally, in equal spans of time, in 
objects of differing use-value. The social relations 
of the producers appear to them as relations between 
the products of their labour, products which, as 
commodities, are produced by individuals and groups of 
individuals working independently of one another and 
then sold (exchanged) on the market. Capitalist 
society perfects this process by transforming 
labour-power itself into a commodity.
The basis of Marx's analysis of capitalist society 
is an examination of its unique social relations of 
production, the primary feature of which is the private 
ownership of the means of production, or productive 
property. For Durkheim, by contrast, property is defined 
partly in terms of the fetishistic appearances examined 
by Marx. In The Division of Labour Durkheim observes, 
"Property is definitive only of the extension of the 
person over things." (66) Property, that is to say, 
refers to the relations between persons and objects, 
rather than between person and person or class and class. 
The production relations %diich underlie and sustain all 
social life thus become obscured by a fetishistic 
conception of property as a relational bond between human
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and non-human parties. Its basis in a determinate 
structure of social production is e££ectiviely obscured.
Marx, in fact, critically anticipated Durkheim in 
a memorable passage in The Grundrisse concerning the 
apparent and actual objective character of the emergent 
global capitalist system. Commenting on what many 
economists had viewed as "this spontaneous interconnection, 
this material and mental metabolism which is independent 
of the knowing and willing of individuals", Marx caustically 
observes :
"....it is an insipid notion to conceive
of this merely objective bond as a
spontaneous, natural attribute inherent
in individuals and inseparable from
their nature (in antithesis to their
conscious knoifing and willing). This
bond is their product. It is a historic
product. It belongs to a specific phase
of their development. The alien and
independent character in which it presently
exists vis-a-vis individuals proves only
that the latter are still engaged in the
creation of the conditions of their social
liefe, and that they have not yet begun,
on the basis of these conditions to live it." (6?)
The very terms that Marx uses ("spontaneous", 
"metabolism", "independent", "interconnections^ recall 
those used by Durldieim to depict his conception of organic 
solidarity. As Marx's passage implies, however.
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Durkheim's analysis fails to locate this model of 
moral integration to the social relations which distinguish 
the productive infrastructure of commodity society, and 
in particular its capitalist stage# The class—divided 
nature of such societies renders the organic integration 
that Durldieim envisages problematic, but because of the 
inherent structural antagonisms that it engenders rather 
than because the division of labour has assumed an 
abnormal form#
Durkheim's analysis of social organization, in 
summary, produces a partial and decontextualized account 
of the conditions and forms of human activity# Concerned 
with a hypothetical exclusively "sociological" sphere, 
it views the relations between society and nature, the 
necessary and sustaining condition of all human existence, 
as a progressive and evolutionary conquest of the latter 
by the former. The mutual transformation of both in the 
process of human history is reduced to at best a secondary 
phenomenon. Durkheim's conception of the state, as the 
expressive medium of the spontaneous moral integration 
of developed societies, is inseparable from his theory as 
a whole. While consistent ivith his interpretation of the 
division of labour, it embodies the theoretical 
misconceptions that underlie Durldieim's historical schema. 
Even if the meritocracy that Durldieim envisaged were 
achieved, the sale of labour-power to capital for profits 
would constitute an axis of structured inter—class 
antagonism that the state, as the "cerebro—spinal system 
of the social organism" (68), would be called upon to 
moderate. In performing such a role the state, far
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from expressing an existent condition of societal 
integration, would be attempting to resolve conflicts 
inherent in the division of labour itself. Durkheim's 
functionalist view of the state as the expressive 
medium of organic solidarity thus reveals its ideological 
character when the ideological nature of the ifider theory 
of social organization that it croims becomes apparent.
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II PARSONS ON THE STATE. FUNCTIONALISI^ l, POWER AND INEQUALITY.
INTEGRATION AND THE STATE. THE TWO TRADITIONS.
Among the theories which view the state as the central 
institutional form of a wider relational complex of social unity, 
it is possible to distinguish those which emphasize its role^ 
as the more or less active expressive instrument of an existent 
integrated social organism from those which, while teELeologically 
assuming a similar potential social unity, identify the state’s 
essence as a moral or coercive ccunterforee to the conflicts 
of an inherently antagonistic social structure. The former 
conception of an organic relationship between the state and an 
essentually consensual community is expressed by H. Krabbe in 
the following terms :
"The ultimate law-making power is nothing 
but human judgement itself acting upon 
human interests and deciding with reference 
to their relative value. The state, therefore, 
is the community acting in its collective 
capacity to recognize values." (l)
The state, tjiat is to say, represents a collective social 
endeavour to implement shared values in the pursuit of common or 
societal goals. It is perceived, in R.M. Maciver’s words, as 
"a particular form of organization, itself sustained and controlled
by that greater thing. ..the community itself." (2) For
Maciver the unity of the community itself derives from and is 
inseparable from the inherent expression of the individual social 
member.
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"The deeper bond of community is the 
character of class nor of nation, but of free 
human personality which from within its own 
small circle is capable of reconciling in one 
community the whole world," (3)
Maciver thus identifies the state’s unifying potential to be based 
on its nature as the expression of a prior social and individual 
organic freedom rather than on its adoption of coercive means. (4 )
This conception of the relationship between state and society 
is a recurrent, if sometimes implicit, assumption of much sociological 
and political analysis. A. Shonfield, for example, observes that 
the post-war capitalist states have implemented economic policy 
largely through "more subtle pressures" and techniques,than 
that of "the bludgeon". Shonfield envisages an active, pragmatic 
state which serves as the instrument to engender and guide a 
consensus corresponding to the existent complex of private economic 
interests. (5)
The rationale of Shonfield’s construct is the technocratic 
assumption that the "interest" represented by the agents of national 
planning is that of economic growth, a process embodying and activating 
the available powers of the economic system as a whole. (6) J.E, Meade, 
while emphasizing the socio-political as well as purely technical 
forms of state intervention, similarly assumes a primarily consensual 
basis for the public control of the free-enterprise economy. On 
the question of state-implemented egalitarian policies he writes :
"....society may well decide that steps should 
be taken to affect the distribution of income 
and wealth between the rich and the poor of 
the present generation or between present and 
future generations." (7)
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In viewing the source of state measures to alter the structure 
of economic inequality as collective decision-making, rather 
than the relative bargaining strength of competing interest 
groups, Meade adopts the same intellectualist—consensual model 
of the relationship "between society and the state that is 
implicit in Shonfield*s thesis. The central assumption of both 
is that state practices constitute first and foremost the 
implementation of agreed policy in the pursuit of shared values 
or goals. As in the more expressly philosophical formulations 
of Krabbe and Maciver, the relation between state and society 
is perceived in organic and complementary terms, although the 
pragmatic state pursuit of consensus in particular economic 
environments is stressed in Shonfield's study.
The second interpretation of the relation between state 
and society, emphasizing the former's function as a means to 
reconcile or moderate inherent antagonisms within the latter, may 
be traced as a pervasive theme in Western social thought to 
Hobbes' analysis of civil society as an arena in which private 
interests compete in a violent and irrational struggle against 
each other. Only a sovereign state power endowed with coercive 
authority to rule can introduce order into social life. (8)
W.A. Orton's analysis of the state rests on essentially Hobbesian 
assumptions. The pursuit of interests, especially those of an 
economic nature,
"cannot and will not lead to social harmony 
or synthesis but must and will lead to 
increasing discord and disintegration." (9)
The state's exercise of legitimate coercion, consequently, should 
be primarily moral. The policies which it implements embody a
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"continuity of norme and purposes" which, expressing a basic social 
consensus, protect society as a whole from the destructive 
consequences of the pursuit of interest alone. (lO)
A variation on the perceived dualism of the state and society 
is the pluralist conception of government as a means to pragmatically 
mediate the demands and pressures of organized competing interest 
groups. Typically perceiving such a structured competitive social 
arena as best supplemented by representative democracy, the 
theorist of pluralism deries the reality of a unifying societal 
purpose. 3). Nicholls summarizes the pluralist thesis :
"There is no overall, total 'common good' 
or 'public interest*, which the government attempts 
to impose upon the population; it tries simply 
to reach some temporary compromise between 
conflicting interests." (ll)
Durkheim's theory of the state, as elaborated in The Division 
of Labour, views it as essentially the instrumental expression of 
an already existent or potential system of structured social 
coordination, although he also adopts a Hobbesian assumption 
of the social effects of the unmediated pursuit of interests.
Parsons* functionalist model of political organization is in 
many ways similar, but is structured in terms of his particular 
theoretical categories of "value—elements" and the "common value 
system." Parsons' analysis of social power and the state, 
together with the functionalist analysis of stratification as 
developed by a number of recent theorists, is our concern in 
this section. The continuity between Parsons and the tradition 
represented by Maciver and Krabbe should, however, be stressed 
alongside the idiosyncratic presentation of the former's theories .
— 363 "
SYSTEM-AMLYSIS AND SOCIAL ACTION.
We will note at the outset that Parsons* functionalist 
analysis constitutes an attempt to develop a unified theoretical 
approach to the social sciences, based on a number of initial 
premises and assumptions concerning the nature of human action#
It embodies a perspective which has been influential for several 
decades in academic Sociology, although its almost unquestioned 
dominance has been challenged from a number of sources in recent 
years# (12)
Parsons* seminal The Structure of Social Action indicates 
some of the central theoretical questions that were to preoccupy 
his work as a whole# A number of leading sociological theorists 
including Weber, Sombart, Pareto and Durkheim, all, it may be 
noted, more or less centrally opposed to and critical of aspects 
of Marxism, are examined in this work. Parsons did not accept 
some of Weber and Sombart*s major propositions, especially in so 
far as they were both, to some extent, critical of capitalism and 
pessimistic concerning its future and that of Western—type societies 
in general. Nevertheless, he drew attention to Sombart*s notion 
of the historical unfolding of a specifically capitalist "Greist", 
as well as Weber's analysis of the "protestant ethic". Parsons 
discerned in Weber and Sombart a recognition of the autonomy 
of "value elements" and generalized this observation into the identification 
of a realm of values as the distinctive focus of nineteenth century 
social theory#
"in the realm of the .....principal writers here 
treated there has appeared the outline of what 
in all essentials, is the same system of 
generalized social theory, the structural 
aspect of which has been called the voluntaristic 
theory of action." (13)
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Webpr and Sombart *s critiques of Marxism thus became generalized 
in Parsons* hands into a discussion of the importance of value 
elements in social processes and social structures.
Parsons sought in The Structure of Social Action to lay the 
foundations for a general theory of social action which would 
resolve "the Hobbesian problem of social order" by locating 
the springs and orientations of human action in reference to the 
normative aspects of social life. Parsons general theoretical 
orientation draws on both Weber's social action theory and 
Durkheim's functionalist analysis. While his particular variant 
of Functionalism suggests and assumes a more dynamic social 
totality than that found in Durkheim's analysis of organic 
solidarity, Parsons' concern with social order and the moral 
dimension of social existence, together with his later development 
of systems—analysis, evidence continuity with the functionalist 
tradition of social theory. The Structure of Social Action, 
however, presents a basically voluntaristic conception of human 
action. The individual is seen to play an active rather than a 
passive or purely reflexive role in social life, and especially 
in social change. The realization of values involves active 
energy, will and effort, qualities relatively ignored in Durkheim's 
reified conception of moral norms as first and foremost external 
and constraining.
This work anticipates and prepares for Parsons' later concern 
with social stratification and the question of power in two major 
ways. In the first place, the anti-Marxist critique that pervades, 
and in some ways structures it, suggests an attempt at an 
alternative resolution of these theoretical problems. In addition. 
Parsons* preoccupation with the general theory of social action
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and order itself raises the question of stratification and power,
Toeing central to and inseparable from the history of social thought.
Before looking directly at Parsons* treatment of these themes 
we will indicate a tendency since The Structure of Social Action 
for his work to be structured increasingly in terras of systems 
analysis, both biological and mechanical analogies being 
conspicuous. At the same time, Parsons* voluntarism has tended 
to recede, a more deterministic conception of social action 
taking its place. The crucial factor is his concern to see the 
social world as a whole in terms of structural-functional analysis.
In an Appendix to Family, Socialization and Interaction Process 
Parsons notes a number of "striking analogies" between his 
theoretical constructs and dominant ideas in the field of Biology. (14) 
Comparing, for example, the processes of personality and biological 
development, and the function of the family in highly differentiated 
societies with that of germ plasm in higher organisms. Parsons 
stresses his reluctance to assess the significance of these analogies. 
Nevertheless he does suggest that as both fields of science advance 
it may emerge that a common conceptual scheme underlies theory 
in both. Society and personality, he observes, both exist "in 
nature" rather than "set over against" it, and he identifies Biology 
as the closest academic "neighbour" of Sociology.
"Biology is our nearest neighbour in the 
community of sciences and such substantive 
relationships should be expected. We are both 
part of the same larger 'community* of knowledge." (I5)
This Appendix perhaps brings Parsons closest to formally and 
explicitly formulating the organic analogy that underlies and 
sustains much of his sociological holism.
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Parsons elsewhere evidences his intellectual debt to physics 
as well as biology. In Working Papers on the Theory of Action 
he posits four fundamental laws of equilibrium in society, laws 
which correspond to the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy.(16)
The Principles of Inertia, Action and Reaction, Effort and
System-Integration, Parsons proposes, are applicable to the workings
of social systems. Specifically concerning the Principle of
System-Intégrâtion, he contends that a "pattern element" will
tend to be confirmed in its place within the system or eliminated
as a function of its contribution to the integrative balance of
the system, (l?) Mechanistic analogy, a functionalist counterpart
of the Hobbesian model of civil society, thus also serves to
structure Parsons* essentially holistic conception of social organization.
It is, however, in The Social System that Parsons* systems— 
analysis is most evident and most systematically elaborated. The 
importance of this work for Parsons* intellectual development is 
apparent in his characterization of it as :
"an attempt to bring together, in systematic 
and generalized form, the main outlines of a conceptual 
scheme for the analysis of the structure and 
processes of social systems." (18)
Parsons proposes that it is possible to analyze the interaction 
of individuals as "a system in the scientific sense". (19) The 
energy for action derives ultimately from the individual organism, 
but the actions themselves are organized in situations. The 
selective ordering among the possibilities of orientation, moreover, 
implies that "a component of 'system integration*" is operative. (20)
The actual integration of the social system as a whole constitutes 
a "compromise" between the "strains to consistency" of its personality, 
cultural and social components. Such integration. Parsons, observes,
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is tarely if ever complete* Nevertheless, the integrative 
principle, mechanistically formulated in the Working Papers, 
structures Parsons* model of social structure and process, and 
he accordingly defines a society as a system which meets all 
the essential functional prerequisites of long-term survival 
from within its own resources. A society thus contains 
"all the structural and functional fundamentals of an independently 
subsisting system." (2l) The test of the significance of any 
social process is correspondingly assessed by Parsons in terms 
of its functional relevance to the system as a whole.
STRATIFICATION AND THE VALUE SYSTEM.
Parsons emphasizes the largely self—maintaining nature 
of social integration. He refers to the "strains to consistency" 
rather than, for example, "strains to conflict" between the various 
components of the social system. Again, he proposes that i
"the complementarity of role—expectations,
once established, is not problematical......
No special mechanisms are required for the 
explanation of the maintenance of complementary 
interaction - orientation." (22)
The principle of homeostasis perhaps most closely expresses Parsons* 
model of system equilibrium. Together with this holistic 
perspective, however, there co—exists in Parsons* work a pronounced 
Weberian voluntarism, the genesis and basic features of .which we 
have indicated. Central to Parsons* discussion of social stratification 
and power is his conception of a common value system, the theoretical 
bridge between the voluntaristic and functionalist aspects of his 
work. The assumption of shared moral beliefs and values does not 
for Parsons merely relate to the orientations of individual actors.
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Rather, it is central to and constitutes the crucial determining 
variable of his model of the social system.
Parsons suggests that at its present stage of development 
social science is unable to attribute primacy to any variable in 
the determination of social change. He adopts an agnostic view 
concerning the "plurality of possible origins of change," (23) 
Despite his theoretical caution in this particular instance, 
however. Parsons in general attributes particular importance 
to the part played by shared value elements in social processes, . 
In his discussion of deviance Parsons identifies the context of 
social behaviour to be the sphere of value-elements, "All social 
action is normatively orientated," That this value system is seen 
to be essentially shared or homogenuous is also established,
'*The value—orientations embodied in these 
norms must be to a degree be common to the 
actors in an institutionally integrated 
interactive system. It is this circumstance which 
makes the problem of conformity and deviance a 
major axis of the analysis of social systems," (24)
At the same time Parsons points to the ubiquitous absence of 
complete integration as the structural basis of "romantic—utopian" 
cultural elements, Utopian ideas, values and movements arise. 
Parsons suggests, mainly because :
"every complex social system is in fact shot 
through with conflicts and adaptive patterns 
with respect to whatever value-system it 
may have," (25)
Despite the assumed shared value system Parsons thus proposes that
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actual societies are in fact characterized by conflict, but 
specifically at the level of values or beliefs* This pervasive 
concern with moral values, along with his overall commitment to 
system analysis, places Parsons in the theoretical tradition of 
Functionalism and its preoccupation with the problem of social 
order. Writing in this tradition Parsons, echoing Durkheim, 
assumes that no stable social order is possible without a moral 
limiting of men's wants.
The structural and historical primacy that Parsons attributes 
to value-elements is apparent in his analysis of the influence of 
Christianity on Western society. It has, he contends, "produced 
a great society and culture." Especially in its Protestant form 
it has been responsible for the growth of free enterprise, the 
nineteenth century educational revolution and the historically 
unparalleled development of individual character and autonomy.' (26)
Christianity is the dynamic factor behind the contemporary humane 
welfare state. "The millennium", he concedes, "definitely has 
not arrived, " but he proclaims a profound enrichment of social 
life. Christian ideals, for Parsons, have been a major source of 
order and progress in "Western society". (2?)
Elsewhere Parsons suggests that differences between societies 
often "reside in" differences in the context and range of the 
general moral consensus.
"Moral standards are not logical deductions 
from systems of beliefs or manifestations of 
systems of expressive symbols, nor do they 
derive from cognitive or appreciative standards.
The depend in part upon such systems, but they draw 
on all the elements of cognitive, cathectic emd 
evaluative selection from the alternatives of action." (28)
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Such a proposition, in itself, has little or no explanatory 
value, however. In particular, the meaning of "reside", which 
appears to be crucial, is not explicated. If the notion of 
causality is not implied, the sociological content of Parsons* 
contention is at best negligible and at worst mystifying.
Parsons clearly does not mean that different societies have 
different systems of moral consensus and are otherwise the same.
His discussion of the various forms of kinship organization, for 
example, precludes this possibility. (29) Parsons can only 
mean that structural differences are generated by changes in the 
general moral consensus of particular societies, a proposition 
which implies a monocausal theory of social causation despite 
Parsons* agnostic reservations in The Social System.
This interpretation is consistent with Parsons* concern 
with the centrality of value—elements in his work as a whole.
Parsons defines values as symbolic elements which serve as criteria 
for actors* selection among alternative orientations in social 
situations. Their cultural source, moreover, implies a 
homogenous value-complex, despite their frequent empirical 
differentiation. Thus idiosyncratic values constitute "specifiable 
departures from the shared tradition and are defined in this way (30)
Parsons* assumption that deviant values are to be explained 
in terms of their relation to an otherwise common symbolic universe 
rather than the different material conditions and interests of 
social actors has clear implications for his analysis of wealth and 
power. The economic and political content of large-scale social 
confrontations such as those in Russia in 1917* Britain in 1926,
Germany in the 1930*s, and France in I968 suggest that the 
conceptual tools for analyzing them should relate to material as
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well as purely symbolic social processes and relations# Parsons* 
functionalist analysis of stratification and related sociological 
problems, however, systematically overlooks the material basis 
of power and social inequality.
In his early work The Structure of Social Action Parsons, in 
a few pages of largely tautological analysis, suggests that force 
is a marginal or residual aspect of social life. VOiile contending 
that force and fraud, emphasized in Pareto*s theory of social 
change, have been underestimated by liberal theories of progress 
and linear evolution, he observes that they often perform an 
integrative function. (31) They are, moreover, used primarily 
by the state in order to enforce "commonly accepted rules."
Coercion and, by implication, the divergence of material interests 
that characteristically accompany its exercise, are thus theoretically 
transformed by Parsons into the corporeal agency and effect of a 
more or less universally accepted value system. Both the scale of 
coercion and its significance as a determining principle of social 
structure are assumed to be minimal.
A similar assumption pervades Parsons* analysis of social 
control in The Social System. The most fundamental mechanisms 
of control. Parsons suggests, lie in the normal processes of social 
interaction. The main mechanisms :
"are to be found in the institutional 
integration of motivation and the 
reciprocal reinforcement of the attitudes 
and actions of the different individual 
actors involved in an institutionalized 
social structure." (32)
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The institutionalization of motivation, attitudes and 
actions serves to order different activities and 
relations into a "sufficiently co-ordinated system".
Social control is thus continually operating in the 
everyday practices of social action rather than a 
special sector of social effort and behaviour,
Ifhen "special strains" develop, however, corresponding 
special correctives are required. Secondary institutions 
such as those of the North American youth culture constitute 
a "safety valve" for the social system. Control 
mechanisms of this type, Parsons suggests, reinforce 
the more convential forms of social interaction, the 
raormal instrument of social control being "a complex system 
of unplanned and largely unconscious mechanisms." (33)
Social control in its overtly coercive form is analytically 
isolated from the characteristic patterns of everyday 
social interaction, which Parsons sees to be largely 
automatic and self-sustaining. In effect Parsons 
generalizes Adam Smith * s conception of the "hidden 
hand" into a theory of social relationships in general.
Parsons* theoretical and applied studies of 
stratification characteristically minimize the role of 
coercion and power in the determination and maintenance 
of social hierarchy and ranlcing. In his seminal 19^0 
study of this area Parsons defines social stratification 
in terms of the differential evaluation of system units 
and their resultant differential treatment within a complex 
of social superiority and inferiority, (34) Central to 
this definition is the normative ranlcing of social actors.
- 373 -
a conception which follows directly from the primacy of 
value-elements in Parsons* systems analysis. The 
familiar common value system is incorporated into 
Parsons* model.
"Through the differentiation of roles 
there is a differentiation in the specific 
goals which are morally approved for 
different individuals. But, so far as the 
society is morally and hence institutionally 
integrated they are all governed by the 
same more generalized pattern." (35)
Within this theoretical framework Parsons identifies 
six principal bases of differential evaluation. They 
are, in order of presentation, membership of a particular 
kinship unit, possession of personal qualities, 
accomplishment of valued achievements, ownership of 
material and symbolic possessions, possession of authority, 
and finally possession of power. Authority is defined as 
the institutionally recognised right to influence other 
social actors. Power, appendaged to Parsons* list as 
a *'residual category", entails the ability to influence 
others and secure possessions without this sanction 
of legitimacy. Differential status is seen as the result 
of evaluations on the basis of all six of the criteria 
identified by Parsons. Power, however, constitutes a 
special case. It is only operant outside the framework 
of legitimate social relations and actions. Power and 
the coercive dimension thus again occasionally augment, 
rather than permeate and play a persistent part in 
structuring,social stratification as perceived by Parsons.
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In 1953 Parsons extensively revised his 19^0 
analysis, developing its central themes and applying 
them to contemporary North America# Again, stratification 
is identified as a universal process whereby individuals 
are ranked according to a common value system. In this 
work, however, the unit of analysis is the status-role 
complex, which may refer to an individual or a collectivity, 
whereas the earlier version was concerned with the social 
actor pure and simple. (36) The properties of the 
status-role complex may be "classificatory", in so far 
as they are sui generis of the complex, as in the case 
of age or sex, or "relational", as with membership of 
a kinship unit.
Parsons characterizes stratification in contemporary 
America as structured in terms of universalistic-achievement 
criteria. Equality of opportunity is stressed, and status 
depends largely upon individual accomplishment. Parsons 
describes the United States class system to be relatively 
"loose", ifithout either a clear-cut hierarchy of prestige 
or an unequivocal ruling class, with high mobility and 
with a high degree of tolerance of different routes to 
success. (37) Upward mobility depends largely on education, 
and education on ambition. Parsons concedes discrepancies 
between achievement and reward, but sees them to be of 
secondary importance. In his 1940 study Parsons identifies 
the two principal determining elements of the United 
States stratification system as occupational achievement 
and kinship group membership. Occupational achievement is 
governed by the universalistic criterion of equality
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of opportunity. Kinship, however, qualifies the influence 
of this principle. Birth, that is to say, gives differential 
advantages of opportunity which, for Parsons, guarantee 
the stratification system some stability. (38) The income 
hierarchy corresponds quite closely to the process of 
individual evaluation, in which family status is an operant 
factor. Kinship thus mediates the universalistic 
principles inherent in the occupational order, but not 
in such a way as to undermine their operation.
"(The).... dominant pattern of the 
occupational sphere requires at least 
a relatively high degree of * equality 
of opportunity* which in turn means that 
status cannot be determined primarily by birth 
or membership in kinship units.*’ (39)
In the revised version Parsons terms the whole 
complex of occupational roles, income derived from these 
roles, and the status of kinship units "class status." (4o) 
Through such practices as the inheritance of property, 
wealth to some extent becomes a source of status independent 
of the norms of achievement and universalism. In general, 
however, wealth is not a primary criterion of status.
"Like office; its primary significance is as a symbol of 
achievement.** (4l)
In these two studies of stratification Parsons is 
primarily concerned to examine it in terras of value 
elements and systera-unit evaluation. The United States 
stratification system is characterized as essentially 
universalistic, discrepancies being deemed to be of 
secondary importance. Power, defined as the capacity of a
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system-unit to actualize its interests and thereby 
influence processess within the system as a whole is 
minimized and identified as an auxiliary, "special" 
dimension of social relations, (42)
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION AS A 
"NECESSITY".
As against Parsons' attribution of primacy to the 
universalistic-orientated evaluation of system-units 
in the determination of social stratification, much 
functionalist analysis in this area has been concerned 
with the functional inevitability of stxnictured 
inequality imposed by social differentiation. The most 
influential variant on this thesis is that of Davis and 
Moore, first published in 1945. Noting the differential 
functional importance of social positions, Davis and 
Moore suggest that in any differentiated society only 
a limited number of persons have talents which are 
"trainable" for the most important positions. The 
conversion of these talents into actual skills requires 
training, involving sacrifice, and consequently the 
incumbents of the most responsible and important social 
positions must be induced to forego immediate gratification 
by the prospect of privileged access to scarce and desired 
reiyards. The resulting structure of social inequality, 
Davis and Moore propose, is both functionally advantageous 
and for the system as a whole and inevitable.
"Therefore, social inequality among 
different strata in the amounts of scarce 
and desired goods, and the amounts of 
prestige and esteem which they receive.
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is both positively functional and 
inevitable in any society." (43)
B, Barber has elaborated a similar explanation of 
the functional necessity of stratification. Barber 
defines stratification descriptively, in terms of 
the unequal flow of desired scarce resources on the 
one hand and punitive measures on the other. He sees 
the functional importance of activities and roles to be 
its primary criterion.
"a system of stratification can be seen 
as a system of facilities, rewards and 
punishments allocated to the members 
of a society for the ways in which they 
perform its functionally essential and 
valued roles." (44)
Barber proposes that stratification is inevitable because 
the differential evaluation of roles, inevitable when roles 
are unequally important for the system as a whole, is an 
unavoidable corollary of the differentiation that is 
essential in any society. He concludes that "Some system 
of stratification is a functional requirement of societies".(45)
The attempts by R.D. Schwartz and M.M. Tumin to 
correct the perceived simplicity of the Davis and Moore 
thesis, while indicating a more adequate empirical 
recognition of the complex of effects of stratification, 
are ^fritten from the functionalist perspective and share 
its most basic assumptions. Their criticisms augment 
rather than substantively challenge the Davis and Moore study.
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The main points of objection in Tumin's analysis are that 
the conception of "functional importance" is imprecise 
and may provide the basis for a rationalization of the 
existent structure of inequality. Differential esteem, 
he suggests, need not be reflected in inequal rewards 
between social strata, social duty being a possible 
alternative basis for motivation. The only items that 
society must distribute unevenly are the power and 
property necessary for the performance of particular tasks, 
and these constitute resources rather than rewards. 
Stratification, moreover, has dysfunctional as well as 
positively functional consequences for system integration.
It serves to repress as well as foster the emergence 
of talent, limit the expansion of productive resources, 
provides the basis for conservative ideology, and encourages 
inter-strata hostility. Consequently stratification tends 
to lower the motivation of the incumbents of the lower 
strata and constitutes a disruptive influence on social 
integration,
"To the extent that inequalities 
in social rewards cannot be made 
fully acceptable to the less privileged in 
a society, social stratification systems 
function to encourage hostility, suspicion 
and distrust among the various segments of 
a society and thus to limit the possibilities 
of extensive social integration." (46)
Elsewhere Tumin suggests that an effort-deteimined social 
structure and reward system would engender not only a
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more stable mode of integration but also a higher level 
of material productivity. (47) The basis of his critique 
of Davis and Moore, however, is the perceived dysfunctional!ty 
of prevailing patterns of social stratification. Both 
Tumin*s theoretical revision of the Davis and Moore 
thesis and his conception of an alternative form of 
stratification are elaborated in terms of functionalist 
criteria of systems integration. As such they constitute 
technical qualifications to the conservative excesses of 
Davis and Moore rather than the basis of a genuinely 
alternative theoretical interpretation of social 
stratification. IVhile lacking the theoretical rigour of 
Durkheim * s perceived correspondence between meritocratic 
principles and the "normal" form of the division of 
labour, Tumin*s thesis is structured by a critical, but 
still nevertheless functionalist, analysis of social 
inequality.
Similarly, Schwartz * s comparative study of two 
Israeli settlements, while concluding that both communities 
have developed non-inegalitarian ways to fill socially 
important positions, assesses their success in terms of 
system integration. System integration, for Schwartz, 
is evidenced by the technical effectiveness with which 
positions are filled.
"The positional structure can be changed 
to coincide more closely with available 
motivated skills, and the skills can be 
modified in a number of ways other than 
by the unequal distribution of rewards." (48)
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Schwartz, like Tumin, raises the possibility of 
other than inegalitarian cultural practices which "help 
get important positions conscientiously filled by able 
personnel," In both cases, however, the alternatives 
to inequality are perceived and assessed primarily in 
terms of their advantages for the technical-integrative 
potential of the system as a whole. The assumptions of both 
Tumin and Schwartz, in other words, are still those of 
the functionalist model of system integration. The 
question of "functional for what?" remains, as in the 
Davis and Moore thesis, posed at the indeterminate 
conceptual level of the social system. The dominant 
structural principle is that of modified, more variable, 
homeostasis. The concern of both studies is to 
conceptualize the general possibility of non-inegalitarian 
modes of stable organization rather than to establish the 
interest-specific basis of existent patterns of stratification, 
particularly those which characterize advanced capitalist 
societies, (49)
STRATIFICATION, MARXISM AND SOCIOLOGY.
The contrast between the models of social structure 
implied by these two theoretical orientations toward 
stratification is frequently obscured by sociologists. 
Gouldner, for example, proposes "the re-establishment 
of a productive liaison between modern academic sociology 
and Marxism.** (50) Gouldner identifies the "rational 
core" of academic sociology as the Parsonian concern ivith 
the self—maintenance of social systems, and suggests 
that despite its conservative implications in the context of
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Western capitalism it has a liborative potential from a 
wider perspective. Specifically, he proposes that by 
raising the question of social and economic self—governance 
Parsonian equilibrium analysis embodies a specific 
rationality with relevance for the "towering state apparatus" 
of the Stalinist East European societies* (5 1 ) The model 
of self-maintaining social equilibrium, that is to say, 
provides a theoretical construct with a direct bearing on 
the social organization of post—capitalist societies,
Gouldner's thesis, however, in so far as it proposes 
a mutatis mutandis transference of Parsons* general model 
of specifically social relationships to the particular 
context of the socialist states of East Europe, in fact 
undermines his proposed convergence of Marxist and 
sociological theory. While Marxists concerned f^ith the 
analysis of these states have explored the unquestionable 
centralization of political power that has accompanied the 
bureaucratic deformation of socialist democracy, their 
initial problematic has been and remains the material 
conditions favourable to the emergence and consolidation 
of this tendency. For Marxists, the bureaucratization 
of the Soviet Union in particular, inseparable from its 
isolated and technologically backward conditions of 
inception, is both historically and analytically prior 
to any proposed restoration of democratic social forms. (5 2 )
Gouldner, by contrast, undertakes a consistently 
sociological interpretation of the growth of Stalinism,
In particular, he suggests that Weber*s analysis of 
bureaucracy is of greater explanatory value than that of
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Kautsky. Gouldner*s purpose in endorsing the Weberian 
conception of the "dictatorship of the official", it 
should be noted, derives at least in part from his 
concern to defend academic sociology from the polemical 
critique developed by M. Nicolaus.
"Certainly, the subsequent development 
of Stalinism would seem fully to justify 
Weber*s critique. And if this is so, then 
how can sociology be regarded as an 
intellectually bankrupt and totally 
reactionary discipline?" (53)
In effect, Gouldner*s proposed "productive liaison" 
between academic sociology and Marxism constitutes a 
formula ifith which to apply the Parsonian model of sociAl 
organization to the historically unique societies of East 
Europe at the same time as eclectically drawing from 
some aspects of Marxist theory, in particular the concept 
of alienation, to augment the tradition of establishment 
sociology. (54) In attempting to effect this theoretical 
exchange Gouldner seriously misrepresents some of the 
"elements" of Marxist theory that he discusses. He 
endorses, for example, Albrecht Wellmer* s contention 
that in Marx * s later work the contradiction between the 
"forces" and the "relations" of production rather than 
the liberative potential of class struggle "ensures 
the uprooting of capitalism". (55)
Now while his political economy is concerned \fith the 
tendential movements inherent in the capital-labour 
relationship, movements realized by and through what 
Gouldner terms "the structures of society and their
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contradictions'*, it does not follow that Marx abandoned the 
conception of class struggle as the medium of the abolition of 
capitalism, %Vhile the contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production^between the increasingly social process 
of production and the continued private form of appropriation, 
is fundamental to Marx * s analysis of capitalism, class struggle 
and revolution remain the vital social dynamic, without which 
"the uprooting of capitalism" is an abstracted and historically 
meaningless formula. Volume One of Capital, for example, 
concludes with a characterisation of the transformation of 
capitalist private property into social property as "the 
expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people".(5 6 ) 
The objective conditions of this expropriation are, for Marx, 
prepared by historical developments in the structure of 
capitalist society^including the concentration and centralization 
of capital, and the growth of the cooperative form of the labour 
process. Marx never, however, reduced the abolition of 
capitalism to these necessary but not sufficient conditions.
Even the years of theoretical labour in the British Museum 
elaborating the "structures" of the capitalist mode of 
production did not weaken Marx's conviction that ruling classes 
rarely if ever give up their privileges voluntarily.
The main point we ifish to make, however, is that the 
attempts by Gouldner and others to effect a convergence 
between Marxism and academic sociology are fundamentally 
misconceived. Marxism and Functionalism in particular derive 
from and assume quite conflicting models of social organization, 
especially as it relates to stratification and inequality.
As a consequence, attempts such as those of Tumin and Schwartz 
to modify the less sophisticated functionalist analysis of 
stratification, as represented by Davis and Moore, are 
essentially elaborations on rather than alternatives to the 
object of their critique. This is especially apparent in
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Turnin's discussion of the dysfunctions of stratification.
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Schwartz, on the other hand, while correctly questioning 
Davis and Moore's assumed identity of inequality and technical 
efficiency, offers in its place a socio-psychological 
problematic, Davis and Moore, he suggests :
"may have erred in stressing maximum 
effectiveness instead of the individual 
satisfaction which inequality typically 
brings to those powerful enough to 
control the distribution of rewards." (57)
The structural conditions which generate a persistent 
inequality in the reward hierarchy of capitalist society are, 
we must assume, non-problematic. Inequality, for Schwartz, 
is a datum of social existence, one of a number of alternative 
means of determining the positional structure, or of 
functionally integrating the activities and efforts of social 
actors into a consistent complex of social interaction. As 
such it is not a phenomenon systematically examined in terms 
of the objective, group-based material interests that 
differentially benefit in particular stratified societies.
This failure to examine structured relations of conflicting 
interests, the most general weakness of Davis and Moore's 
analysis, is not fundamentally corrected by their critics 
within the functionalist perspective.
STRATIFICATION, VALUES AND CAPITALISM.
Parsons, however, is not concerned with the functional 
inevitability of stratification in terras of the purely'te.cb.nical
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criteria of efficiency and social differentiation 
that dominate the work of Davis and Moore and their 
critics. Rather, his initial assumption is, as we 
have seen, the primacy of evaluation in the hierarchical 
structuring of system-units, and his analyses of 
particular societies are developed accordingly. Gouldner 
is thus correct in suggesting that "there is a 
persistent pressure in Parsons' work to ignore social 
regularities that are not generated by moral codes." (5 8 ) 
The imperatives of economic and political power are 
minimized in favour of perceived legitimate structures 
of social obligations, often leading Parsons to 
virtually transcribe the idealized portrayals of legal 
and constitutional ideology as adequate accounts of 
social reality. His characterization of the effects of 
democratic electoral procedure, for example, constitutes 
little more than an account of the legal framework of 
voting practices, quite abstracted from the economic 
interests which they both are sustained by and sustain,
"In the largest-scale and most highly 
differential systems, namely the leadership 
systems of the most 'advanced' national 
societies, the power element has been 
systematically equalized through the 
device of the franchise." (59)
Characteristically Parsons pays little attention to 
the wealthy and their persistent influence on the 
development of society as a ivhole. Nevertheless, their 
disproportionate effect on economic and political life
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in the advanced capitalist countries is well documented. (6o) 
Parsons empirically concedes the existence of private 
property and inheritance and their implications for the 
relative autonomy of wealth in ’’class status” structuration. 
He neither attempts to elaborate a structural explanation 
of the persistence of wealth, nore adequately resolves 
the challenge that it poses to the supposed dominant 
"univeralist” values of achievement, however. The 
question of brval social power and its source is
effectively conceptualized out of court.
In Structure and Process in Modern Societies Parsons 
attempts to trace and account for the changes he perceives 
to have taken place in the advanced capitalist societies.
The twentieth century, he observes, has witnessed a 
gradual increase in the size of the typical industrial 
firm, with an accompanying tendency to progressively 
employ an increasing proportion of non-family members.
In the dynamic departments of modern industry, especially 
in the United States, functions are fulfilled primarily 
in occupational roles separated from the family, a 
development which Parsons terras ’’the most crucial change 
in the economy since the Marxian diagnosis was made,” (6l) 
Parsons draws the conclusion that large-scale firms are 
now run ”as if” they were no longer first and foremost 
profit-making organizations,
”...it is of dubious value to continue 
to speak of the 'free enterprise* sector 
of the economy as ’capitalistic* at all.” (6 2 )
Characteristically, the problematic of power
is avoided, but in this case the source of that avoidance
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concerns Parsons* perception of the structure of the 
capitalist enterprise itself. Weber’s model of 
bureaucy, he suggests, most adequately describes the 
reality of contemporary industrial as well as governmental 
organization. Control, while still legally in the 
hands of the owners of the enterprise, is effectively 
exercised by a distinct board of directors. Echoing 
Galbraith’s technocratic conception of the industrial 
firm. Parsons proposes that its control-focus lies 
within its o w n  organizational interest, managers 
occupying an essentially administrative role comparable 
to that of the university processor.
That the administrative-managerial groups in the 
private sector coordinate the activities within individual 
firms subject to the imperative to attain at least a 
minimal level of profitability is overlooked in Parsons’ 
formulation. Parsons fails to discriminate between the 
day-to-day empirical administration of the enterprise on 
the one hand, and the ultimate responsibility of the 
managerial strata to capitalist profit-criteria on the 
other. Despite the important structural changes, 
including the decline of the family firm, which have taken 
place, profitability remains the yardstick of both 
capitalist success and failure.
In his important paper Evolutionary Universels in 
Society Parsons restates his functionalist theory of social 
stratification. Culture, he observes, is shared through 
the four basic evolutionary universels of language, religion 
(the orientational aspect of culture), kinship organization
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and technology. Other ”universais” associated with the 
process of ’’breaking out” from the ’’primitive” stage of social 
existence are a system of social stratification, a 
legitimized complex of differentiated social functions, 
bureaucracy, money and markets, and an integrated 
system of universalistic norms. Parsons pays particular 
attention to the problems of legitimacy, integration and 
shared values %fith the emergence of social differentiation 
and stratification. These developments require :
’’solidarity and integrity of the 
system as a whole, with both common 
loyalties and common normative definitions 
of the situation.” (63)
Only such conditions can assume the existence and 
consolidation of a ’’societal community”.
When Parsons specifies the organizational and 
interactional forms through which this process is effected 
he emphasizes the franchise rather than power or coercion.(64) 
Thus while noting that social leaders require ’’sufficient 
power” in addition to legitimation, his exclusion of 
the power element from the list of evolutionary universels 
demonstrates theKt cmost secondary importance he attaches 
to the ’’strain and potential disorganization” he formally 
ascribes to the stratification system.
This effective exclusion of the power dimension of 
social and economic organization is perhaps moèt apparent 
in Parsons’ discussion of bureaucracy. Observing, tfithout 
further comment or explanation, that bureaucracy requires 
a considerable concentration of power. Parsons endorses
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Weber's proposition that bureaucracy is technically "the 
most effective large-scale administrative organization 
that man has invented,” (6 5 ) At the same time, that 
is to say, as power is minimized as an operative factor 
in social processes. Parsons effectively equates 
organizational efficiency with a particular, specifically 
capitalistic, structure of domination-oriented social 
relations, thus generalizing a specific historical 
phenomenon into an intrinsic aspect of rational social 
organization as such.
Similarly, but more fundamentally. Parsons universalizes 
the most basic social relations of commodity society by 
positing the necessity of money and markets for the stable 
functioning of developed societies. Market exchange, he 
suggests, is the most general means of mobilizing economic 
resources, although other means, such as the use of 
political power and the activation of non-political 
solidarities, are also empirical possibilities. Constituting 
a generalized resource, money is able to effect a potentially 
unlimited range of economic transactions.
"possession of physical commodities, and 
by extension, control of personal services 
by purchases, certainly can, very generally 
be legitimized in the market nexus.” (66)
Superficially Parsons characterization of money as 
"the great mediator of the instrumental use of goods and 
services” resembles Marx’s rather less prosaic observation 
concerning the power of universal purchase inherent in the 
money form of capital. "Money is the pimp between man’s 
need and the object, between his life and his means of life.”(6?)
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Parsons, however, goes on to contend that the market 
system depends and rests upon "universalistic norms”.
In The Social System Parsons defines such norms in terms 
of their "generality” as contrasted to the "particularity” 
of a particularistic normative standard. (68) Universalistic 
norms thus, for Parsons, entail a universal applicability, 
a generality as opposed to a specificity of reference.
They are, as such, the sociological embodiement of the 
Kantian categorical imperative to the rational being:
"Act on that maxim which can at the same time be made 
a universal law".
In leaving his analysis of money and the market 
at this point, however. Parsons avoids the corollary 
of his thesis, a corollary crucial for a fuller understanding 
of the relation between money and the structure of human 
relations which it mediates. Immediately following the 
sentence quoted above, Marx continues with an explanatory 
observation :
"But that which mediates my life 
for me, also mediates the existence 
of other people for me. For me it is 
the other person." (6 9 )
The point that Marx is making here, and it indicates 
precisely the weakness in Parsons* formulation, is that 
money mediates not only, or even primarily, between 
person and things, but first and foremost between person 
and person. It is, that is to say, an essentially social 
relation. While it formally equalizes the exchange relations 
between individuals, the transactions and mediations
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effected by money will reflect and be structured by wider 
patterns of more or less unequal socio-economic relations 
between different social groups. E. Preiser notes that 
in the specifically capitalist context labour divorced 
from property ownership is structurally placed in a 
disadvantageous position within the total complex of 
economic relations.
"Behind the elasticity of supply lies 
the power embodied in property, and this 
foundation is much more stable than say, 
a collective monoply of the workers 
which could limit the supply of labour 
only by artificial means and, by its 
very nature, only temporarily." (70)
As Preiser implies, the sphere of economic relations 
is inseparable from the power structure which it both 
sustains and expresses. Specific economic transactions 
are thus effected within a context of antagonistic 
interests, within what H. Albert has termed "a more or 
less conflict-laden concert of persons associated in 
social entities of various kinds." (71) Parsons, by 
orienting his analysis toward the deceptive level of 
formal liberty, equality and universality, fails to detect 
how in capitalist society money mediates and expresses 
the particular conflict of interest between worker and 
capitalist, between exploited and exploiter. This 
relationship constitutes the major challenge to Parsons 
notion of a common value system by posing exploitation and 
conflict of interest as the ontological foundations of the
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social structure. Social stratification is inherently 
unfavourable to the emergence of value consensu*, 
systematic social inequality characteristically fostering 
competing definitions, both factual and normative, of 
the situation. Parkin distinguishes between the 
dominant, subordinate and radical value systems, each 
deriving from a different structural source, and 
promoting deferential or aspirational, accommodative 
and oppositional orientations respectively, (7 2 )
While it should not be confused with expressly revolutionary 
consciousness, the solidaristic ethos of working class 
communities derives directly from the occupancy of a 
shared class position, the crucial feature of which is 
the common sale of labour power, (73) Parsons can 
speak of "the solidarity and integrity of the system 
as a whole" only because he assumes the existence of 
universalistic norms which underlie it. This, however, 
is a utopian assumption in the sense understood by 
Engels rather than Mannheim (74) in the context of 
societies characterized by gross and visible material 
inequalities, particularly in so far as they derive from 
the workings of the capitalist market and the cash 
nexus of the labour-capital relationship.
SYSTEM-INTEGRATION, STRATIFICATION AND THE STATE.
Parsons' theory of social stratification and its 
implications for system-integration are directly related 
to the problematic of the state in THE SOCIAL SYSTEM.
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Parsons examines the state as a power-oriented integrative 
apparatus, the function of which is to confine social 
conflict within bounds compatible with the maintenance 
and survival of the system as a whole. All societies, he 
observes, require some means of control of the exercise 
of coercion by their various system-units. The state, 
which Parsons locates at the point of interception of 
power, force and territoriality, constitutes a particular 
structure functioning to effect this necessary limitation 
of coercive social practices. (75) %Vhile positing a 
common value system Parsons thus avoids adopting Durkheim's 
conception of the state as an expressive and essentially 
epiphenomenal element of the social organism. The state 
is an active component of the normative system required to 
impose limits in the behaviour of individual actors which 
would jeopardise the process of competitive allocation, 
by which Parsons means "the process of economic competition 
in the market situation." (7Ç)
Parsons analysis of order and power, as we have 
seen, assumes and refers to the structures of commodity 
market relatinships. This is particularly apparent in 
his discussion of scarcity, the social context of which is 
identified as a Hobbesian struggle of individual avilis 
and purposes. Power is viewed as a relational property 
of social atoms, its "social" exercise functioning to 
control an otherwise anarchic struggle of individuals.
This perspective is quite consistent wdLth Parsons' 
adoption of the competitive economy model. Concerning 
scarcity generally, he writes :
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"Every social system must have 
mechanisms for the allocation of 
possessions as facilities, because 
their possession is desirable and 
they are inherently limited in supply 
in relation to demand." (77)
The social aspect of scarcity is identified as its 
fundamental feature, the allocation of physical objects 
being a derivative phenomenon. Parsons thus defines 
possessions as rights or bundles of rights, "a set of 
expectations relative to social behaviour and attitudes."
Explicating the source of the perennial scarcity of 
possessions Parsons distinguishes "relational" from "non­
relational" factors. Non-relational factors are "extrinsic 
to the social system as such". This category of sources 
of scarcity includes, for example, physical and biological 
limitations to the availability of objects. Also 
included are objects which can only be produced "at a cost 
in the economic sense of the term." Through this group 
of objects Parsons generalizes the cost-profit criteria 
of capitalist society as the most basic mechanism for 
the allocation of possessions in "every social system" (7 8 ) 
Capitalist production and distribution relations are 
again built into Parsons' model of a functioning social 
system, although he also includes in the category of 
non-relational factors the natural constraints of time 
and space.
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For Parsons, however, the most fundamental limitation 
on human action is the relational factor. By this he 
refers to the mechanisms which effect an avoidance of 
the social disorder that would otherwise be engendered 
by an uncoordinated clash of mutually incompatible 
social actions and practices. These mechanisms have 
an inherently systematic character,
"Relational possessions in the sense 
of rights of any actor to count on 
certain reciprocal actions (and attitudes) 
of others, must in the nature of the case be 
organized into a patterned system," (79)
Following Hobbes Parsons terms this the "relational problem 
of order", in so far as it concerns the allocation of 
possessions as facilities, o Ç "the problem of power". He 
adopts Hobbeÿs usage of power, defining it as "a man's 
present means to any future goal," ivith the qualification 
that those means must be dependent on his relation to 
other actors.
For Parsons the significance of power in the social 
system is dependent upon its degree of generalization 
and, consequently, of quantification. These aspects of 
power are seen as variable, both between social systems and 
over time ^fithin any society. Parsons identifies their 
major determining factors as the degree of differentiation 
of a society's role system, the increasing incidence and 
influence of universalistic orientations within the social 
system, and the extent of operant effectiveness or 
"drasticness" of means. He endorses the Hobbesian analysis
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which purports to demonstrate how the unregulated 
exercise of force would lead to the war of all against all. 
This assumption poses the question of the degree of 
effectiveness of legitimate means for the attainment of 
goals, which is the source of the "struggle for power".
"only by some sort of control 
operating on both parties to a 
conflict can the vicious circle 
be broken." (8 0 )
Parsons thus contends that the question of power 
arises with the development of role differentiation, 
especially in social systems characterized by universalistic 
orientations, and is exacerbated by an absence of control 
exercised over the means used by social actors to attain 
goals. We will indicate a number of critical objections 
to this depiction of the phenomenon of social power in 
general. In the first place, it is structured by the 
assumed universality of scarcity and the Hobbesian image 
of man in society. As such it effectively universalizes 
the market relations of commodity society, locating their 
source in an extra-social sphere, extrinsic to the social 
system. Consequently Parsons' analysis is abstracted and 
essentially ahistorical, in so far as it is decontextualized 
from the specific imperatives of particular social and 
economic power complexes. Parsons * problematic is the need 
for control in social systems in general, rather than 
the actual historical bases of conflicting claims and 
interests in specific contexts. This follows directly 
from his stated purpose to provide in The Social System
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the outlines of a generalized theory of social structure 
and processes* (8l) The result, however, is an essentially 
indeterminate conceptual construct with an absolute 
minimum of object specificity.
In addition Parsons' association of power and 
increasing role or functional differentiation in society 
recalls Durkheim's discussion of the development of the 
social division of labour. Parsons conception of power 
as a directive principle, functioning to engender and 
further the integration of the system as a whole is 
accordingly subject, with qualifications, to the 
criticism we raised in relation to Durkheim's model of 
the state as performing a regulatory role within the 
social organism. In particular, both theorists abstract 
a specifically social sphere from the complex of social 
relations developed through the social effort to transform 
and appropriate the external world.
Parsons differentiates the social, personality and 
cultural systems as aspects of any concrete system of 
social action. No one, he emphasizes, is reducible to 
the others, either singly or in combination. (82) This 
rigid analytical division between levels of analysis, 
together with his general concern to examine a specifically 
and exclusively social sphere of relations, establishes 
Parsons' continuity ifith the theoretical tradition 
consolidated by Durlcheim. Both abstract the complex 
of interactional structures and practices from the sector 
of economic activity which sustains and forms it. Thus, 
while Parsons formally generalizes the exchange relations 
of commodity society and posits them as an inherent element
- 397 -
of the social system as such, his analysis does not 
include a discussion of the underlying relations 
of commodity production. Rather, the interactional 
model that he constructs concerns the power-oriented 
allocation of social facilities as the given data 
of social existence. Parsons' conception of the 
normative legitimation of goal attainment in this way 
bridges the logical contradiction between the supposed 
common value system of a more or less self-maintaining 
society and the socially divisive implications of 
commodity production and exchange. His analysis of 
social power is elaborated accordingly.
Parsons distinguishes two particular modes of the 
generalization and quantification of power, the economic 
and the political. Whereas economic power concerns the 
possession of means to maximize advantages in exchange 
transactions, political power has a quite different 
orientation and field of influence. It entails :
"a mobilization of the total 
relational context as a facility 
relative to the goal in context," (8 3 )
Parsons, that is to say, interprets political power and 
its exercise to involve the effective capacity to 
systematically control the processes of the interactive 
system as a system. Parsons' holistic orientation thus 
intrudes into and structures the voluntaristic ("mobilization") 
dimension of his analysis of political power. Power is 
perceived as a teleological potential for the activation 
of the relational complex in the pursuit of particular 
goals. These goals are, characteristically, quite
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indeterminate. Parsons' analysis of political power 
thus effectively assumes the form of an ideal-typical 
description of one mode of exercise of that power. 
Explanation in this way becomes mere accounting^ and 
theory is replaced by narrative.
Applying this perspective toward political power 
to the particular case of the state Parsons presents the 
foil offing dual proposition, which we will quote in full ;
"The diffuse character of political 
power explains the peculiar relevance 
of it to the gradient of drasticness 
of means. Since ability to use force 
in its relation to territoriality is one 
ultimate focus of power in this sense, 
the control of the use and organization 
of force relative to territory is always 
a crucial focus of the political power 
system, in one sense the crucial focus.
It is this which gives the state its 
central position in the power system in a 
complex society. It is in turn the 
functional need to organize the power 
system relative to force and territory 
which gives control of the machinery of 
governmental organization its strategic 
position as a proximate goal of emulation 
for power." (84)
Parsons explains the concentration of political power 
in the state by on the one hand tautologically noting the 
empirical monopolization of coercive capacity on a
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territorial basis, and on the other by abstractly 
and equally tautologically positing the functional need 
for such a centralized, territorial focus of power. As 
with Parsons* discussion of the nature of power in 
general, the schema is abstracted, ahistorical and 
sociologically explains little if anything about the 
social nature of the state in actual, concrete societies^ 
and its relation to the various interest groups tfithin 
them.
While, in summary. Parsons model on The Social System 
depicts the state as an organ which functions to confine 
social conflict to manageable proportions, he does not 
attempt to locate the objective source of those conflicts 
and relate them to the context-specific exercise and 
practices of state power. At the same time, however, he 
implicitly structures his analysis of the social system in 
accordance %fith the production and market relations of 
specifically capitalist commodity society (the "relational" 
factor of scarcity). This thoroughgoing ethnocentricity 
is reflected in Parsons* fascination for the Hobbesian 
model of man, a model which C.B, Macpherson has convincingly 
related to the development of the possessive market society 
where labour has become a market commodity. (8 5 ) Macpherson 
draws attention to the effective classlessness of Hobbeÿs 
atomized model of social relations and the erroneous 
conception of the state that it sustains :
"Since he left class division and 
class cohesion out of his model, there 
was no place in his conclusions for 
a sovereign body tied to one class.
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Yet that is the kind of government 
most agreeable to the model of a 
possessive market society. Those 
who possess substantial property 
need a sovereign state to sanction 
the right of possession, " (86)
Macpherson*s criticism, that Hobbes did not incorporate 
the class-specific interests exercised by and through the 
state into his model, is applicable to Parsons* analysis. 
Iidiile elaborating a model of the social system which is 
agnostic towards the class nature of the state he at the 
same time incorporates, at crucial points, economic 
relations specific to capitalist society. In this sense 
there are elements of Parsons* model of state power 
which,when their implications are realized, challenge 
the theoretical adequacy of the model itself.
PARSONS* AND POWER : RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.
Parsons* more recent analysés, theoretical and applied, 
of social power are grounded in and constitute elaborations 
of rather than substantive departures from the model 
presented in The Social System. In his paper On the Concept 
of Political Power, for example. Parsons proposes to place 
the concept of power in the context of a more general 
conceptual scheme for the analysis of societies. (8 7 )
This characteristically "systematic" orientation is 
adopted in a number of recent studies of power by Parsons 
and locates them within the perspective developed in
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The Social System. New concepts are introduced, however, and 
power generally becomes a more central and explicit pre­
occupation in these analyses. In concluding our discussion 
of Parsons* analysis of power and the state we will 
indicate the continuity between his more recent development 
and the theoretical framework elaborated in his earlier 
analyses.
In his review of C.W, Mills* Power Elite, Parsons 
challenges Mills on a number of empirical points. He 
suggests, for example that self-recruitment rather than 
inheritance is the major determinant of recruitment 
to elite positions in the contemporary United States.
The theoretical kernal of his criticism, however, concerns 
the "zero-sum" conception of power. This conception, 
emphasizing the sectional character of social power 
based on the mutually exclusive objectives and interests 
of different social groups, is anathema to Parsons.
Rather, he suggests that in the exercise of power all sides 
may gain from a particular resolution. Just as the 
amount of wealth produced varies between societies and 
at different stages of any society*s development, so 
does the amount of power generated. For Parsons the 
collective aspect of power is the most crucial. This 
orientation derives directly from Parsons* familiar 
theoretical concern ivith the legitimization of social 
actions around collective goals which rest on and express 
a common value system, that of "instrumental activism" 
in the case of contemporary North America,
As against the zero-sum formulation Parsons
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counterposes the conception of power as "a facility 
for the performance of function in, and on behalf of, 
the society as a system." (88) Mills, he suggests, 
reifies a secondary aspect of the total phenomenon of 
power into a definition of the relational complex as a 
whole. This criticism derives from a distinction 
between the distributive and collective aspects of 
power. Parsons attributing the latter with analytical 
primacy. Parsons defines power as "a generalized 
facility or resource" in society which constitutes 
the capacity to mobilize social resources for the 
attainment of goals for ivhich a general "public" commitment 
has been made. In addition to its collective aspect 
Parsons indicates its legitimacy within the structures 
of social action.
"It is a molilization, above all, of 
the action of persons and groups which 
is binding on them by virtue of their 
position in society. Thus within a 
much larger complex Mills concentrates 
almost exclusively on the distributive 
aspect of power," (8 9 )
The societal implications of Parsons conception of a 
"general * public* commitment" are modified in later 
formulations, but his critique of Mill *s thesis, first 
published in 1957, clearly constitutes an elaboration 
of his earlier systems analysis. Its key assumptions 
of sociological holism and the structural primacy of 
value-elements establish a continuity i?ith Parsons*
- 4o3 -
established theoretical orientation.
These assumptions are developed further and expounded 
more systematically in Parsons' On the Concept of Political 
Power, concerned idLth three particular problems associated 
with the analysis of power. Parsons, implying a theoretical 
revision of his analysis in The Social System, questions 
the theoretical diffuseness of the Hobbesian formulation 
which sees power essentially as a generalized capacity 
to attain social goals, quite irrespective of the 
medium employed and the status of the authorization in 
question. We will see, however, that the significance 
of this development is more apparent than real. Parsons 
also examines the relation between the coercive and consensual 
aspects of power and restates his objections to the 
zero-sum formulation.
Critically assessing the Hobbesian tradition of 
analysis, Parsons identifies power as a specific mechanism, 
analytically distinct from money, influence and coercion, 
functioning to effect changes in the actions of other 
system-units. He suggests a parallel between the conceptual 
structures appropriate for the analysis of politics and 
economics. With this assumption Parsons defines the social 
collectivity as a system \o,th a capacity for "effective 
collective action." The political process is that which 
builds, operates, determines the goals of and mobilizes 
the resources for that system of action. Power thus 
constitutes a processual and circulatory relational 
phenomenon, "a generalized medium involved in the political 
interaction process" functioning in a similar way as does 
money in the economy, (9 0 )
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As in economics, an input-output model is seen to be 
applicable to the analysis of the polity. As inputs to 
the political process Parsons* identifies the commitment 
of resources to collective action, the demand or "need" 
for collective action, the control of society*s economic 
output for the goals of the social system, and the 
legitimation of the authority under which collective 
decisions are taken. Parsons, however, emphasizes the 
analytical distinction between these at least partly 
economic components or inputs and the actual political 
process itself,
"Power.;.is the means of acquiring 
control of the factors in effectiveness; it 
is not itself one of these factors, any 
more than in the economic case money is 
a factor of production." (91)
Power for Parsons is a sui generis social phenomenon, 
conceptually parallel to the economy and empirically 
incorporating some of its outputs, but analytically 
distinct. He identifies the outputs of the polity 
as the opportunity for effectiveness and the capacity 
to assume leadership responsibility, the latter being both 
a form of influence and an output with specific reference 
to the integrative system. (9 2 )
In this paper Parsons indicates a direction of 
analysis which, if consistently pursued, would lead to a 
qualitative theoretical advance from the position presented 
in his critique of Mills, where he formulates the concept 
of a public commitment in order to explain the exercise
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of power at a societal level. In On the Concept of 
Political Power, however, it is no longer immediately 
clear that the "collective" as against the "distributive" 
or sectional aspect of power has unambiguous primacy in 
Parsons* schema. He observes that in the political sphere :
"The 'wants* are not for consumption in
the economic sense, but for the solution
of 'interest* problems in the system,
including both competitive problems in
the allocative sense and conflict
problems, as well as problems of the
enhancement of the total effectiveness
of the system of collective organization." (93)
Despite this increased recognition of "conflict problems", 
however. Parsons later presents a formulation of system 
solidarity on which conflicting interests are subordinated 
to and constituted within a wider environment of shared 
interests, a conception which recalls Simrael*s model of 
"Opposition between associates." (94)
"A social system ....possesses solidarity 
in proportion as its members are committed 
to common interests through which discreet 
unit interests can be integrated and the 
justification of conflict resolution 
and subordination can be defined and 
implemented." (95)
Collective societal interests and goals regain their 
paramount position in Parsons* analysis of power. At no
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point, moreover, does he specify the substantive content 
and character of the sectional interests which potentially 
cross-cut this societal orientation. Power is effectively 
equated with legitimacy or authority. Its function is 
to ensure, through threat of sanctions, that obligations 
are binding on the members of a social system. But in 
order to function as a "gneralized medium" in this way 
it must be legitimized, that is, it must to some extent 
be "optional". (96)
Parsons idiosyncratic usage thus defines power in 
terras of its legitimacy as perceived by social actors, or 
its "bindingness", which entails and assumes a shared 
value system, "some sort of consensus among the members 
of the collectivity." (97) Parsons elsewhere emphasizes 
this conception of power by contrasting it f^ith the exercise 
and control of force in society. (9 8 ) Power systems 
are dependent upon the institutionalization of authority, 
and compliance is a legitimate and expected mode of 
response. By contrast force, monopolized by the government, 
is reserved as a tactic of last resort. Power, a generalized 
circulating medium, is exercised on a decentralized basis, 
operating through social institutions such as the family.
That force is an instrument of last resort as underlined 
by Parsons* observation that a politically organized 
society is to some degree a "moral community", its members 
sharing common norms, values and culture. Against this 
consensual background legitimate power is the normal 
means for the mobilization of social resources, force 
being a form of behaviour exclusive to a "special set of 
conditions." (99)
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These works together, then, constitute an elaboration 
on the themes developed in Parsons' earlier work and 
systematized in The Social System. VThereas power is viewed 
as a residual relational phenomenon in Parsons' 19^0 study 
of social stratification, it is incorporated into his 
later formulations as a generalized circulating medium, 
pervasive in its incidence and its effects on social 
processes. The conceptual framework is essentially the 
same in both instances, however, a terminological rather 
than theoretical shift distinguishing the two formulations.
The general model of social structure and processes that 
Parsons adopts consistently views the "normal" interactional 
complex, of social behaviour as one in which the mobilization 
of resources for the attainment of goals is structured 
by values perceived by actors as legitimate and morally 
binding. Coercive relations, whether defined in terms 
of "power" or of "force", are located in a special, 
extra-normal category of social behaviour. Accordingly 
power, when incorporated into Parsons' general conceptual 
scheme, is understood as an extension of social consensus 
rather than a mode of articulation of particular interests.
The indeterminate character of Parsons' model derives 
from its systematic lack of concern ifith the nature of the 
conflicts of interest which are supposedly integrated 
through the workings of the political process. This 
omission finds expression in Parsons' account of recent 
developments in American capitalism, which we have already 
critically assessed. Examining the sources of aggression 
in "Western" societies. Parsons analysis of the occupational 
system is confined to the feelings of injustice and insecurity
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which are engendered by the competetive emphasis on 
achievement, quite apart from the structural relations in 
capitalist society which condemn the majority of actors 
to be, at best, "good losers". (lOO) Parsons accuses 
Marxism of psychological naivety, lacking a theoretical 
interpretation of the interpenetration of personality 
and the social system. (lOl) Nevertheless Marx's 
proposition that social existence, understood in terms 
of the complex of inter-class relations structured on the 
basis of the social transformation of nature,determines 
consciousness expresses a conception of the relation 
between these two spheres which, when contrasted with 
Parsons' taxonomic model of the social action system, is 
distinguished by its theoretical rigour and consistency. 
The power-based relations which permeate social relations 
are incorporated into Marx's construct at the most basic 
and fundamental level. Parsons, by contrast, envisages 
a sharp conceptual division between the kinship system 
where the individual personality is crystallized and the 
occupational system where the individual achieves social 
staus. (102) The sequence of biographical development 
is transposed into a model of social causality, the 
environment of which is a systematic moral order rather 
than a complex of conflicting interest groups. Coercion, 
above all, is conceived as a special mode of social 
behaviour, both conceptually and ontologically subordinate 
to the structure of legitmate relations and practices.
If Parsons were proposing that power is not simply 
a question of the exercise of naked force and coercion 
his claim would be uncontentious. Ideology and hegemony
■»
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would, in such a case, constitute alternative forms of 
power relationships. Parsons formulae that power is 
legitimate and that force is a policy of last resort 
serve, however, to obscure the crucial features of 
contemporary capitalist organization. The increasingly 
transparent sectional use of force in the advanced 
capitalist countries, and overt struggles around existent 
power structures, are inexplicable from Parsons* model 
of system integration. His discussion of "power deflation" 
is revealing in this context. Disturbances, Parsons 
suggests, may emerge within a social system from many 
sources, but they are especially likely to be deflationary 
if the system's power commitments are "over—extended", 
or not reconcilable with the normal expectations of the 
system's operations. Such a development. Parsons continues, 
may generate a vicious-cycle in which different social 
units progressively counter each other's demands. (1 0 3 )
As Giddens points out, however, what is missing in 
Parsons' account is a systematic explanation of how the 
corresponding process of "power inflation" takes place. (104) 
Such an explanation would entail an analysis of the roots 
of power in social life and practices. Parsons' concern 
in recent works to compare the conceptual models appropriate 
to the economic and political processes, however effects 
an avoidance of the ways in which the two interact in 
specific instances, and in particular of the structure 
of economic privilege that underpins political processes,
^His schematic analytical separation of their interrelations 
' in terms of political economy. The fundamental theoretical 
problem, still not resolved by Parsons, concerns the source
tiV./f . \prec Wjps vr%I of t Ke %r mf
.-.C
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of the integrative value systems and shared loyalties 
that are seen to cut across the lines of incipient 
conflict which Parsons empirically, if indeterminately, 
recognizes. (105) This problematic in turn resolves 
itself into the question as to how "legitimacy" is 
mediated and sustained ivithin systems of power to which 
it is far from identical. Because of the vagueness of 
his references to the conflicts of interest both in 
contemporary America and in "social systems" in general, 
however, Parsons is unable to locate their structural 
source and consequently their relevance for a theory 
of power. On this point Parsons* recent %fritings on 
the theory of politics, despite their relative 
conceptual sophistication, offer no substantive theoretical 
advance beyond the analysis of inequality, power and 
the state expounded in his earlier works and systematized 
in The Social System.
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III. ANOMIE AND CAPITALISM.
INTRODUCTION.
Durkheim's analysis of the division of labour, 
organic solidarity and anomie offers a perspective with 
which to interpret the sources of social disorder and 
antagonism in advanced societies. As such it lends 
itself readily as a theoretical means of accounting for 
the social, economic and political crises that have 
punctuated the development of capitalism during the 
twentieth century. Most attempts to operationalize 
Durkheim's model of social structure and anomie, however, 
have been based on a mosreading of Durkheim's analysis. 
Typically the radical content of Durkheim's analysis is 
minimized or ignored. This is particularly the case 
in the group of derivative analyses which we shall 
characterize as examples of "systematic conservatism".
To a lesser extent a similar de-radicalization is 
effected in the %friters whose work we shall term "composite 
eclecticism,"
VThere, by contrast, the radical egalitarianism of 
Durkheim's perspective is incorporated, the resulting 
programmatic analyses are characteristically developed 
in effective isolation from both the political economy 
of the decline in "moral cohesion" and a determinate 
conception of the specific agency of social reconstruction. 
We shall be concerned ifith the recent work of A. Fox as 
representative and constituting the most theoretically 
rigorous example of such "abstracted radicalism."
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We have earlier suggested some central theoretical 
weaknesses in Durkheim's own analysis of power and the 
state. Our general concern here is to critically indicate 
some of the major derivative theses, in terms both of their 
relation to Durkheim's seminal work and of their explanatory 
adequacy in relation to developments in the structure 
and function ing of late capitalism.
SYSTEMATIC CONSERVATISM.
One group of sociological analyses have been 
centrally concerned to examine contemporary Western social 
organization in terms of the Durkheimian conception of 
declining moral order and integration. Their theoretical 
debt to Durkheira has been partial, however, in so far 
as they have emphasized the imperative need to restore 
social cohesion per se, quite in abstraction from ^he 
critical meritocratic theme that is built into DuaAcheira's 
model of organic solidarity. The conception of societal 
organization that these writers assume, we shall suggest, 
has close affinities with that implied by the proponents 
of neo-classical economics. The conservative implications 
of both place them in a tradition of social thought 
which is quite antithetical to the critical core of 
Durkheira*s programme for social reconstruction.
An early example of this de-radicalization of 
Durkheira*s perspective may be found in P.P. Drucker's 
studies of Fascism, written contemporaneously during the 
1940* s. While not explicitly derived from Durlcheim's 
analysis of anomie, Drucker's study of the development
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of Western society during the early decades of the 
twentieth century is largely informed by the conception 
of anomic breakdown. In particular, political centralization 
has accompanied the disintegrative "loss of function and 
status" as society has decomposed into "anarchic masses." (1)
While emphasizing the need to actively discover a new 
ethical conception of social life to sustain integration, 
Drufeker echoes Durlcheim*s conception of the immanent quality 
of social cohesion, its basic source in: the conditions of 
the division of labour. As againAt Durkheim*s schema, 
however, Drucker's depiction of the historical aetiology 
of moral collapse is imprecise and idealistic. V/hereas 
Durkheim*s analysis is sustained by an essentially 
materialist model of the transition from Mechanical to 
organic solidarity, Drucker draws particular attention to 
"cultural" and "ideational" factors. Totalitarianism, 
he suggests, is the result of the collapse of common values, 
beliefs and institutions. Its key features are the 
absence of a positive ideology, the denial of a need to 
justify power, and a lack of mass commitment. The 
"glorification of organization as an end in itself" is 
inseparable from the survival of inappropriate pre-industrial 
values and beliefs. (2)
Accordingly Drucker*s primary concern is the perceived 
legitimacy of social and political institutions. He 
observes that German Fascism had some success in generating 
a sense of social equality in the lower classes. (3)
His more general problematic, however, is the construction 
of legitimate power, or rule justified by the "basic ethos"
- 4l4 -
of society, on a wider historical level. Specifically, 
the alternative to a legitimate power based on the 
productive enterprise is a strengthening of central 
government control culminating in totalitarian rule.
"Unless the power in the corporation
can be organized on an accepted principle
of legitimacy, it will disappear. It
will be taken over by a central government." (4)
Drucker's The End of Economic Man is essentially an 
analysis of Fascism in terms of anomie, or normlessness, 
resulting from the breakdown of the traditional social order. 
In The Future of Industrial Man this thesis is generalized 
into an analysis of "managerial society", corporation 
management constituting a new form of corporate property. 
Managerial rule, Drucker suggests, represents an emergent 
form of legitimate rule, but its legitimacy assumes a 
non-totalitarian basis of liberty. In the former work the 
precise nature of the new form of social order is left 
unexamined. Industrial Man, by contrast, clearly specifies 
the managerial strata as the executors of legitimate power, 
although Drucker differentiates his thesis from Burnham's 
more deterministic schema. (5)
In more recent studies Drucker has elaborated his 
analysis of management's role in promoting social and 
economic integration and coordination. Persistently 
emphasizing the discontinuities that distinguish contemporary 
Western societies(6) , Drucker's principal concern is the 
need to effect a stable and functioning integrated regime 
'ivithin the corporate enterprise. With the growth of the 
division of labour it becomes crucial that cooperating
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individuals are integrated into a productive pattern,
"It is this pattern that is actually productive, not 
the individual," (7) A productive system of this complexity 
requires an unprecedented degree of intellectual ability, 
and Drucker suggests that "knowledge workers" of the 
managerial strata have emerged as<. a new leadership group. (8)
Drucker's emphasis is on the perceived legitimacy 
of the corporate form rather than on the correspondence 
between organizational structure and egalitarian life-chances 
which pervades Durkheim's analysis of the division of 
labour. He suggests that the industrial corporation can 
function or even survive only when its members perceive it 
to be rational, or when "the members see the relationship 
between their o\m work and purpose and the purpose and pattern 
of their society," (9) Drucker, in other words, is 
primarily concerned to depict an ideal complex of inner- 
corporate relations, the legitimacy of which is accepted 
by members as binding. He schematically separates 
profitability, an "absolute requirement" of corporate 
enterprise, from the "political" question of the distribution 
of profits, suggesting that the latter issue is largely 
irrelevant for an understanding of the needs and behaviour 
of a business. (10) By in this way conceptualizing the 
specificity of vested interests in corporate profitability 
out of his model of business enterprise, Drucker obscures 
the major institutional challenge to its legitimacy, the 
competitive struggle between employees on the one hand and 
employers and shareholders on the other for their respective 
shares of the total product. At the same time the integration
that he Ws aa <rihef^ o‘tl^  mcLAcKarott-er.Prc>po5i(^^  integriàtioA,
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on the basis of the prevailing structure of inequality, 
both of rewards and life-chances, Drucker in fact endorses 
as legitimate a social and economic structure which 
systematically discriminates against the majority of members. 
Even if its perceived as legitimate by the under-privileged, 
the harmony of interests i and commitment that Drucker proposes 
is pervaded by a value-endorsement of the status quo, a 
position irreconcilible with Durkheim's critical programme 
for social construction.
Mayo's well-known studies of workplace social relations 
and efficiency constitute an application of a similarly 
de-radicalized Durkheimian perspective to the problems of 
integration and commitment directly at the point of 
economic production. The details of Mayo's Hawthorn Studies 
are well-documented, and we will not repeat them. (11)
His basic proposition, however, is that a ‘lack of "community 
of interest" at the point of work tends to engender social 
discord and mal-integration.
Unlike Drucker, Mayo explicitly states his theoretical 
debt to Durkheim. Thus, although he suggests that Durlcheim 
exaggerated the anomic tendencies of the late nineteenth 
century, underestimating the homeostatic mechanisms by 
which new social forms are established, Mayo acknowledges 
the importance of the theory of anomie, "if only as a 
definition of the problem," (12) Following Durlcheim, Mayo 
observes that coercive political action alone is incapable 
of restoring moral solidarity to an "afflicted" social 
organism. (Ibid., l43-4), "Enlightened" company policy is,
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Mayo suggests, equally ineffective. Without an understanding 
on the part of workers as to the nature of the work situation 
and their place within it integration is impossible. An 
understanding based on any purely economic logic is unable 
to effect integration, however. Rather Mayo suggests that 
any human collaboration depends on the evolution of a 
"nonlogical social code," which, while being socially-derived, 
structures individuals' actions in a way which is adequate 
to the situation, (13) "Civilised", as well as "established" 
societies, require a social surveillance of individual 
activities if a stable and functioning order is to be 
maintained.
While Mayo purports to derive his analysis of social 
discord from Durkheim's model, however, he conceptually 
separates his account and explanation of social relations, 
of which those at the workplace are one form, from the 
dictates imposed by the division of labour. For Durkheim 
by contrast, the wider network of social relations on the 
one hand and the degree of development of the division 
of labour on the other are umbilically bound together,
Mayo writes :
"It is probable that the work a man does 
represents his most important function 
in the society; but unless there is 
some sort of integral social background 
to his life, he cannot even assign a 
value to his work," (l4)
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Despite his stated concern to be the relational complex 
of "person-work-company policy" (Ibid,, 112), Mayo 
isolates the spefically social relations at the workplace 
in his wider perspective, Durkheim proposed that organic 
solidarity is the form of integration which corresponds 
to the "normal" developed division of labour. Social 
integration in developed societies, that is to say, in the 
last analysis derives from and is expressive of the degree 
of material development of society as registered in the 
division of labour. The functions of individuals within 
the division of labour in turn embody as social practices 
the organic pattern of integration, itself expressive of 
the division of labour. Mayo's "nonlogical social code", 
by contrast, is detached from the stage of material 
development of society. His model posits an "integral 
social background" which constitutes the normative and 
directing environment of individual social actors. As 
against Durkheim's model of the relationship between 
moral cohesion and the division of labour it is indeterminate 
and abstracted, however. While it helps the individual 
assess the value and significance of his work in relation 
to society as a whole, its source and basis within the 
total complex of work tasks that comprise the division 
of labour is unspecified,
Mayo's actual historical schema of "established" 
and "adaptive" societies is correspondingly vague and 
imprecise. Established society, broadly corresponding to 
pre-industrial society, is characterized by strong social 
ties, spontaneous co-operation and the voluntary subordination
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of the individual's interests to those of the group, (15) 
Disrupted by technological progress, established society 
suffers progressively greater disorganization and 
disintegration, Mayo proposes its successor to be adaptive 
society, in which equilibrium is maintained through the 
exercise of social skills which guarantee the "ability 
to secure co-operation between people," (Ibid,, 33)
As with Drucker, Mayo's conception of integration 
in "adaptive society" is essentially manipulative, a 
redistributionist programme to adjust social and economic 
conditions to correspond with his proposed integration 
not being advocated, Mayo's historical schema, moreover, 
is theoretically unsatisfactory, both in terms of the 
blanlcet category of "established society" which implicitly 
embraces all forms of social organization prior to the 
industrial revolution and of "adaptive society", the 
specific historical basis of which is unclarified. Not 
complemented by a programme to remove the major sources 
of inequality and conflict in contemporary societies,
Mayo's "adaptive society" would be manipulative and 
exploitative, more closely resembling Marcuse's characterization
in One Dimensional Man than Durkheim's model of organic
solidarity, Mayo iirrites ;
"Political action in a given community 
presumes the desire and capacity of 
individuals to work together; the 
political function cannot operate in a
community from which this capacity has
disappeared," (l6)
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But the specific interests that would derive disproportionate 
benefit from such political action have no place in a 
consistently Durkheimian model of organic integration.
Fox and Flanders* analysis of the case for the 
reform and extension of the British collective bargaining 
system, the final example of the "systematic conservativism" 
perspective that we shall consider in detail, is perhaps 
the most rigorous and persuasive study within that genre. 
Following Mayo and Drucker, however. Fox and Flanders' 
analysis and proposals are based on a serious misreading 
of Durkheim. We %fill suggest that Fox and Flanders' 
proposals concerning state involvement in industrial 
relations are informed by a theoretical inconsistency 
which underlies their analysis of collective bargaining 
in general, and indicate a direction which offers a 
theoretical clarification more consistent with their 
premises•
Fox and Flanders begin by rejecting the overtly 
sectional view that collective bargaining should be 
reformed because the trade unions have too much power.
Such explanations, they suggest, have neither a logical 
consistency nor a correspondence with the facts relevant 
to the situation* Instead they explicitly formulate 
the case for reform in terms of what they perceive to 
be a Durldtieimian conception of anomie.
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"For our present purposes we will 
argue that the social conditions 
which he (Durkheim - D,B.) characterized 
as a state of normlessness may be 
produced by an excessive proliferation 
of different normative systems which 
are unrelated and divergent." (17)
Social order, on this interpretation, rests upon a 
normative framework within which the aspirations of groups 
and individuals are shaped so as to ensure integration 
and proportionality, (Ibid., 158). Fox and Flanders' 
repeat Mayo's error of interpreting integration primarily 
in terms of social actors' perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the normative environment, however. They cite a 
short passage from Durkheim's Suicide which appears to 
locate the central problematic as the individual's 
capacity to judge "between the possible and the impossible, 
what is just and unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and 
those which are immoderate." (l8) The historical schema 
elaborated in The Division of Labour is not incorporated 
into Fox and Flanders' analysis, however. Rather, as the 
passage quoted above indicates, their conception of 
anomie views it as a state of normlessness which may be 
the consequence of a number of causes,including prior 
fragmentation within the normative system itself.
Durkheim's materialist historical perspective, despite 
its limitations (19), is replaced by a problematic of 
social-psychology which centres on the perceived 
legitimacy of the corporate structure. We will consider 
some of the main aspects and consequences of this
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theoretical orientation.
Directly the consequence of their misreading of 
Durkheim, Fox and Flanders' depiction of anomie in 
post-war British industrial relations assumes the form 
of a descriptive account of interactional strategies 
directed against the normative system. Thus, when 
specifying the "sources" of disorder in this area they 
initially point to the attempts of organized groups to 
change substantive or procedural norms against the 
resistance of other groups. Disorder is exacerbated 
by an absence of perceived-as-legitimate regulation and 
the cumulative consequence is the progressive breakdown 
of the regulatory system in toto. (20)
This, Fox and Flanders contend, constitutes the 
aetiology of the anomic condition of collective bargaining 
in Britain. Their historical account of the uneven 
fragmentation of collective bargaining throughout the 
twentieth century assesses the process in terms of 
largely ad hoc determinants of and responses to declining 
societal integration per se. The mass unemployment 
of the 1 9 3 0 's, for example, is considered as a check 
to lower class social protest rather than an expression 
of specifically capitalist social and economic development 
at a particular stage of world growth. Correspondingly 
Fox and Flanders proposed reforms involve the reconstruction 
of industrial order quite apart and in isolation from the 
removal of the sources of differential normative evaluation 
within the structured system of material inequality and 
power. "The primary aim must therefore be to achieve as 
great a degree of normative agreement as possible." (Ibid., 1 8 O)
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The specific rationality of the economistic struggle over 
the proceeds of industry within the privately-owned enterprise 
is systematically excluded from Fox and Flanders* 
perspective.
Behind Fox and Flanders' concern with the purely 
normative aspect of social solidarity is their minimization 
of the structured power relations which underlie "anomic" 
fragmentation. They suggest that the erosion of legitimate 
collective bargaining in Britain has been a piece-meal 
process determined by the "accidents of power". (Ibid,,163-4). 
The continuity of inequality and privilege during the 
post-war period and in the longer term, however, suggests 
that power is a structural and systematic rather than 
empirically accidental phenomenon, (21)
The content as well as the overall characterization 
of Fox and Flanders' perceived power-based aspirant 
conflicts is, moreover, misconceived, in relation to 
both the actual structure of inequality in Britain and 
the Durkheimian perspective which the authors purport to 
adopt. For Durkheim conflict between classes was a 
characteristic expression of particular "abnormal" forms 
of the division of labour. Fox and Flanders, by contrast, 
locate the tension-generating inequalities in twentieth 
century Britain principally within the working class.
They point to an unprecedented degree of "jostling for 
advantage" within sectors of the employee class, 
counterposing this insight to the convential view of the 
working class as a homogenous entity. (22) Accordingly 
Fox and Flanders emphasize the growing bargaining inequality 
between different sectors of the labour force and the
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conflict between craft rules and technological change 
in accounting for the stresses and strains in the period 
prior to the First World War. (Ibid., I6 9 )
Built into Fox and Flanders analysis is a set of 
essentially functionalist and pluralist assumptions which 
divert attention away from the more basic divisions of 
social and economic interest. In particular, the relationship 
of capital and labour is effectively reduced to a secondary 
source of antagonism in conditions of full employment.
"...in a situation where all resources 
are fully employed, an advantage gained 
by a strong group may be at the absolute 
or relative expense of weak groups, who 
are more likely to be wage-earners than 
employers, managers and shareholders." (2 3 )
While the pervasive sectionalism of the British labour 
movement has been an important aspect of British industrial 
relations system during the post-war period the central 
problem for British capitalism, as we shall contend in a 
later chapter, has concerned the relationship between the 
requirements of profitability on the one hand and the 
demands of employees as an, albeit organizationally 
fragmented, class on the other, (24) Fox and Flanders* 
attribution of primacy to inner-working class antagonisms 
in the fragmentation of the normative system confuses 
cause and effect. Sectional economism, the corollary 
of capitalist cimership relations in the context of a 
liberal state, is viewed as the dominant source of anomic 
collective bargaining, the whole process determined by
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"the accident of power distribution" rather than the 
structural imperatives of capital within an environment 
of private ownership. The authors* effective shelving of 
the threat that private property poses to the perceived 
legitimacy of the regulatory system has direct consequences 
for their proposals concerning state policy to reconstruct 
social integration.
Fox and Flanders* programme for state reform of the 
collective bargaining system departs from Durkheim*s 
analysis by emphasizing the initiatory as against the 
expressive and supervisory dimensions of the state*s role.
In the reformed system, they propose, the state would 
perform a leadership function, actively guiding and mediating 
between the activities of different firms and industries.(2 5 ) 
Superficially this conception of the role of the state 
resembles Durkheim*s model of its function in maintaining 
organic solidarity in societies with a developed division 
of labour. Durkheim*s model, however, incorporates and 
rests on a radical egalitarian conception of social 
structure in which the tasks of each member are appropriate 
to his innate abilities. Fox and Flanders, by contrast, 
assume a continuity of the present mode of stratification, 
reform being directed at the level of normative regulation 
and members* perception of it as legitimate. They write:
"Distasteful though the wages jungle
may be for many of those who have to
fight within it, no one participant is
in a position to bring about a more ordered,
rational situation, since the others will
not accept his authority..... Nothing
less than the forceful articulation
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of common norms by an authoritative
source can restore order," (2 6 )
Fox and Flanders do not, however, attempt to explain 
the basis on which both common norms and the authority 
of the state would be constructed in the reformed system, 
Durkheim seeks to establish the scientific nature of 
his programme by structuring it in terms of the "normal" 
forms of social species within an evolutionary schema, 
thus resolving the distinction between factual and 
normative statements. (2?) Implicitly, nevertheless, the 
perceived legitimacy of the system of normative regulation 
characteristic of organic solidarity is "justified", both 
historically and normatively, by the radical structure of 
life-chances on which it rests. The alternative, 
epitomized by the "forced" division of labour, is 
characterized by constraint and prevents "the free unfiiding 
of the social force that each carries in himself," (2 8 )
With the "normal" form of the division of labour, however, 
the state's functions are essentially reflexive, expressing 
society's existent solidarity and reinforcing it in a 
supervisory rather than coercive manner. For Marx the 
state, defined in terms of its repressive function,
"wither away" with the abolition of the antagonistic class 
relations on which it is based. For Durkheim it loses its 
coercive character as the structure of life-chances comes 
to correspond to the natural endowments of individual 
social members, as each performs a function that is 
"fitting to him."
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Fox and Flanders, by contrast, view the reconstruction 
of the normative order as largely dependent upon "vigorous 
initiative and stimulus from a powerful external authority", 
that is, the state (29)* IVhile emphasizing the distinction 
between their programme and one based on an authoritarian 
state they do not adequately demonstrate the nature of 
this differentiation in terms of the material as against 
the normative foundations of state authority. The common 
norms that the state would enforce are, so to speak, 
suspended in isolation from the structure of social 
relations that would sustain and express them. Despite 
Fox and Flanders formal distinction, that is to say, it is 
in fact difficult to distinguish their programme,for 
collective bargaining reform from more explicitly 
authoritarian solutions. Without the radical institutional 
reform proposed by Durkheim the pursuit of a commonly 
accepted norrnative^ sys^ tem-^ rnust^ be either illusory or 
assume a manipulative, if not overtly coercive, interest- 
specific form. Such a solution, corporatist in essence, 
is the unstated but logical corollary of Fox and Flanders' 
analysis and programme.
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
WORKPLACE RELATIONS,
Much recent and contemporary work in the area of 
industrial sociology shares the basic assumptions of the 
three examples of "systematic conservatism" that we have 
considered, Treanton and Reynaud, discussing the development 
of industrial sociology between 1951-62^point out that
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interest in the function of small work groups and their 
influence on productivity and workers "contentment", an 
emphasis on the importance of communication, and the endeavour 
to balance employees' motivation and the interests of the 
enterprise are still central and invariable components 
of the "human relations" approach to industrial relations•(30) 
The assumed legitimacy of existent power structures and the 
pragmatic concern to effect or engender a corresponding 
commitment from constituent members constitutes, in the 
last analysis, the rationale of the de-radicalized 
Durkheimian perspective as we have examined it. ^
A notable and pioneering exception to this tradition 
within industrial sociology is Baldamus' study of Efficiency 
and Effort. Baldamus' proposes that the organization of 
industry as presently constituted resolves on a single 
process : the administrative control of employees' effort
by their employers. As against the harmony of interests 
assumed by most ivriters in this area Baldamus views the 
relationship between employer and employee as a structure 
of power which reflects unequally distributed advantages 
and disadvantages. The interests of these two groups are 
diametrically opposed in so far as they embody a structural 
conflict concerning the distribution of the product. (31)
The actual distribution of earned income between management 
and wage earners is determined partly by the structure of 
occupational costs, but particularly by the administrative 
control of the efficiency of labour. Managerial control 
of labour effort acts both to stabilize and raise the 
level of effort per unit of wages (Ibid., 123-4). The 
pursuit of industrial efficiency and workplace integration.
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that Is to say, is inseparable from its context of control, 
deprivation being inherent in the "vertical" power 
relationship between employer and employee, Baldamus, 
in fact, approximates to a Marxist analysis of industrial 
relations. His study eschews the deductive assumption 
of an intrinsic unity of interests in the productive 
enterprise and is concerned instead with the actual 
expenditure and manipulation of labour effort.
"The reason for selecting the human 
factor in efficiency lies in the fact that 
it alone is relevant to social science. f^hat 
we are proposing, then, is that the social 
problems of efficiency are untimately 
problems of the control of human effort."(3 2 )
Baldamus* concern with the normative environment of 
industrial relations points to its ideological role in 
concealing the unequal conditions of labour effort. The 
prevailing structure of industrial production, he observes, 
is reinforced by a normative of the behaviour of
individual members. Effort is surrendered to employers 
in the context of perceived "obligation", which is 
institutionalized within the occupational structure. 
Contemporary methods of effort intensification tend to 
increase the transparency of the relation between effort 
and earnings, however, and thus have a disruptive effect 
on workplace integration, (ibid., 111-2). The conflict 
over the distribution of earned income involves, that is 
to say, the consciousness as well as the behaviour or 
effort expenditure of the participants. Changes in the
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' mode of control of labour effort is accompanied by changes 
in the thinking, organization and behaviour of enterprise 
members•
Baldamus pays particular attention to the effects of 
changes in the external social and economic environment 
on the pattern of conflict within the particular workplace 
(Ibid,, 126-7)* Externally determined developments such as 
parity disputes, unemployment and factory closures pose 
problems which cannot be solved at the plant level. Both 
in terms of the effects of the wider environment on the 
particular firm and of the significance of the workplace 
control of labour effort for a model of social structure 
the power relations within the enterprise reflect a 
conflict of societal scale. For as Baldamus observes :
"...the conditions that create wage
disparaity-limited upward mobility 
and institutionalized work obligations- 
are part of the larger social system," (33)
One major strength of Baldamus* analysis is that it
makes explicit the economic foundations of the social
relations in the workplace. The relations between 
management and employee resolve into the control of the latter*s 
labour effort by the former. The immediate context of 
this relation, further, is the production of earned income, 
the distribution of which constitutes the object of the 
structural conflict between the two groups. Baldamus* 
analysis incorporates a power-informed and exploitative 
political economy, since the worker's "sacrifices are 
greater than his gains". (Ibid., Il4), Managerial
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manipulation of workers* attitudes and sectional conflicts 
among groups of employees do not undermine the primacy of 
this basis structure of power.
The group of writers whose work we have termed 
"systematic conservatism" also assume, if often implicitly, 
a model of economic structure, that of marginal utility 
theory or neo-classical economics* A detailed analysis 
of marginal economics is beyond the scope of our thesis, 
but we feel that a necessarily summary consideration 
of some of its major features will help to clarify the 
socio-economic assumptions of the theorists with whose 
work we are directly concerned. We will use a recent 
study of industrial relations in Britain by N.S, Ross 
to demonstrate this relationship.
Ross's study assumes the familiar intrinsic harmony 
of interests among the various groups within the productive 
enterprise. The "conditions of equilibrium" that he 
identifies include as central elements the legitimacy 
of sectional interests within the firm and an internal 
balance of power". (34) The balance of forces is a 
perpetually shifting complex, however, and the active 
achievement of equilibrium, while inherent in the wider 
community of interests, is a crucial managerial function, 
the major objective of planning and managerial agencies 
being to change the values of individuals and groups within 
the enterprise (Ibid., 78). The firm is concerned primarily 
with the production and distribution of income. Conflicts 
of interest, particularly between producers and consumers 
which derive from this concern are seen as relative to the 
shared interest in maintaining stability within the 
production process, however. Stability in turn is dependent 
upon effective communication between the various constituent
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interest groups, especially in so far as it relates to 
the synthesizing role of management,
"Managerial policy, in particular, is 
important in this respect since it 
represents what may be thought to be 
the central objectives of the firm." (35)
In the context of privately owned productive property, 
Ross's analysis thus assumes the legitimacy of social 
control and manipulation that is implied by the logic of 
the Mayo-Fox and Flanders programme. His proposals 
for the democratization of industrial management bear 
directly upon our contention that this programme assumes 
the model of the economic structure adopted by neo-classical 
economics. Ross writes ;
"Because the claim for participation
rests on the value of the resources contributed
by the participants, this should be the
basis of the scheme and the composition of
the representative council might, therefore,
be determined by the proportion of the
firm's net output attributable respectively to the
equity capital and labour employed. These
propoertions would be broadly equivalent to
those of net profits, wages and salaries
before taxation, (my emphasis - D.B.) (3 6 )
The "thoroughly democratic" managerial structure 
that Ross recommends assumes first and foremost that the 
legitimacy of employee participation derives from the 
value of their contribution to the activities of the 
enterprise as a "ivhole. Within the firm the pure investor
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provides investment funds, the owner-managcr both capital 
and labour services, and the employee labour services 
alone (Ibid., 27-8), Their representative power in the 
determination of managerial policy, Ross suggests, should 
correspond to their respective contribution to the firm's 
net output. The only index of the value of their 
contributions that Ross identifies is the ratio of profits 
to wages and salaries within total corporate income.
The value of labour and capital's role in production, in 
other words, roughly corresponds to their prevailing 
distributed share of company income before taxation, the 
overall structure of which Ross sees as a legitimate basis 
for determining the composition of the representative council.
It may be noted that according to Glyn and Sutcliffe's 
calculations wage and salary earners' representatives 
would have outnumbered those of investors by more than 
6 to 1 in 1 9 7 0 in Britain if the scheme proposed by Ross 
had been operative. (37) Apart from his deductive 
assumption that effective and factual communication within 
the firm is a factor contributing to stability, Ross does 
not attempt to assess the likely effect on employee's 
perception of corporate structure of such an improbable 
institutional reform. His concern idLth employee interest 
articulation, rather, centres on the need to control and 
coordinate trade union activities. (Ibid., 45)
Our immediate concern, however, is the relationship 
between Ross' thesis and the theory of "marginal productivity". 
The central tenet of that theory, E.H. Chamberlin notes, 
is the assumption that each factor of production is paid 
according to its marginal productivity^or the change in
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productivity brought about by employing one more unit of 
the factor in question at a given level of output. (3 8 )
As Machlup points out, however, there has been little 
unanimity as to precisely what is meant by the terms 
"factor* and “production" (39)* Chamberlin distinguishes 
three major interpretations o±' the increments in 
proauctivity obtained through the application of additional 
units of a particular factor as referring to the physical 
product itself, its value and the resulting increase in 
company revenue. The latter interpretation is adopted 
in a recent study by D.F. Heathfield, which assesses 
the risk-taking dimension of entrepreneurial activity in 
terms of the relation between the marginal revenue product 
of each factor and its marginal cost. (4o) Heathfield*s 
orientation does not represent an orthodoxy, however, the 
exact object of marginal analysis still constituting 
an issue of controversy. (4l)
Equally diverse have been the applications of 
marginal productivity theory. Oscar Lange has elaborated 
Schumpeter's analysis of the economic role of innovation 
in terms of a Marxist-tinged variant of marginal theory. 
Innovation, Lange proposes, constitutes a change in the 
production function, or the relation between the input 
of factors of production and the product output level, 
which allows a firm to maximize products in given market 
conditions. (42) J.M. Cassels, by contrast, has used 
marginal theory to clarify the economic law of diminishing 
returns. With constant production methods and equipment, he 
suggests, total physical output ivill vary in three 
sequential phases. In the first phase the application of
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additional units of any variable factor to another fixed 
factor ivill produce an increase in physical output at 
a faster rate than that of the variable factor. The 
second and third phases will see an increase in total 
output, but at a slower rate than that of the variable 
factor, and finally an absolute decrease in the rate of 
total physical output, eventually tending toward zero.
The model Cassels observes, has a symmetrical design, its 
form indicating the declining marginal productivity of any 
variable factor in an otherwise constant or fixed 
environment. (43)
^fhatever the particular factor-object and application, 
however, marginal production theory embodies a distinctive 
conception of economic structure and process. In particular 
it provides the conceptual basis for a homogenous theory 
of distribution, all shares of the total product being seen 
as governed by an identical economic principle. J.M. Clark 
indicates the conservative evaluation that is at least 
implicit in marginal theories of distribution when he 
points out that they :
"furnish a substitute for all forms 
of exploitation doctrine, Marxian or 
other, in the theory that all factors 
of production are not not only productive 
but receive rewards based on their assignable 
contributions to the joint product." (44)
The "marginal revolution", consolidated during the 
1 8 7 0 's by theorists including Walras, devons and Monger, had 
been proceeded by elements in the works of earlier economists, 
most notably J.S. Mill. (45). Mill's analytical separation
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of the spheres of production and distribution, the latter 
an obviously social and the former a natural or "physical" 
aspect of the economic process, anticipated the marginal 
theorists' concern with distribution as a structure 
of relations effectively autonomous from the expenditure, 
control, and appropriation of labour effort which produces 
the goods destined for.distribution. This one-sided 
preoccupation with distribution is epitomized by Jevons's 
proposition that "the theory of Economics must begin 
with a correct theory of consumption," (46) The characteristic 
accompanying conception of the sphere of production is of 
a natural or a social process in which, as Rowthorn observes,
"inputs of labour, land and means of production are
mysteriously transformed into outputs of material and 
non-material goods," (47)
Against this background exploitation, a social 
relation, is logically excluded. Rather the various factors 
partake of the objects of distribution in accordance with 
their marginal productivity. Exploitation, when considered 
by the marginal theorists, is conceived in an idiosyncratic 
form* Chamberlin, for example, suggests that in a situation 
of monopolistic competition, where individual producers 
have a recognised or legitimate control over their own 
economic resources, "all factors are necessarily 'exploited'"(48) 
The rationale of this proposition is that in such a situation 
it is not possible for all factors to be paid the full value 
of their marginal products without exceeding the total 
amount available for distribution. For technical reasons 
the sum of incomes computed on the basis of marginal 
productivity is greater than the total product, (ibid., l49-50) 
Exploitation is perceived as a phenomenon of marginal 
methodology rather than a structured relation among social 
and economic actors.
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G. Therborn has pointed out that many leading 
proponents of marginal theory, including Alfred Marshall, 
have been outspoken critics of trade unionism and the 
working-class movement in general. (49) The more 
fundamental source of the ideological bias in marginal 
theory to which we wish to draw attention concerns 
its schematic division between the branches of 
production and distribution, however. As A. Bhaduri 
notesj the concept "production function" purports to 
depict the pure production aspect of an economy, 
determining the amount of output produced with 
given inputs of land, labour and capital. Risk-bearing 
or profit-maximizing behaviour leading to marginal 
calculations, on the other han^ gives a "marginal 
productivity" theory of distribution. The exclusion 
of an analysis of the exercise and control of labour 
effort within the production process, however, both 
effectively denies the social nature of the economic 
process as a whole and obscures the theoretical U.ntenability 
of the schenSatic separation of production and distribution 
in a general conceptual modlel.. Goods circulated 
through distribution invariably derive from a production 
complex characterized by a systematic structure of social 
relations. "Capital", for example, refers not only to 
a physical component of the production process (included 
in the Marxian notion of "forces of production") but also 
to a social relation based on the right to purchase, 
control and profitably direct the labour effort of others.
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Distribution of the resulting products is both logically 
and sociologically inseparable from its base in social 
production.
Separated from the structured social framework 
of production;,the marginal theory of distribution rests 
on a purely technical model of "factor" components. The 
resulting proposition that the various factors receive 
rewards based on their respective contribution to a 
collective product incorporates the social dimension o±‘ 
production and distribution as a deductive and teleological 
component of the model as a whole. It is deductive in 
that the marginal theory assumes an apriori community 
of interest in the joint productive enterprise, and 
teleological in so far as social relations, introduced 
in the form of relations between persons and things, 
are located at the point where production, abstracted 
from its interpersonal context, affects individuals 
or factors through the distribution of rewards. The 
initial social nature, based on the control of labour 
effort, of the products thus distributed is systematically 
ignored.
The relation between marginal production theory 
and the work of the industrial sociologists whose 
perspective we have termed "systematic conservatism" 
is not simply one of conceptual similarity. Both posit 
an essential community of purpose in the productive 
enterprise, either on the basis of a selective reading of 
Durkheim's analysis of the division of labour or through 
a conceptual denial of the "social" as against the "factor"
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relations of production. Both, moreover, construct 
a model which while formally neutral is effectively 
supportive of the existent power structure. The Mayo- 
Fox and Flanders thesis proposes a programme of moral 
reconstruction on the basis of prevailing institutional 
arrangements. The marginal theorists concern with 
differential social ■. relates to the branch
of distribution, where factors are rewarded in proportion 
to their contribution to the joint product. The two 
models share a common endorsement of the present power 
structure, the basis of which is their common conception 
of integration and mutual contribution in the "social" 
or "factor" complex of production.
As we have suggested, however, their relation is 
not simply one of a similarity of conceptual structure. 
They have a more substantive mutual pertinence, deriving 
from the structure of relations within the workplace 
and the object of its activity rather than from a 
theoretical or ideational resemblance. We saw in the case 
of Ross's study that his analysis of industrial relations 
in Britain explicitly assumes, albeit as a hypothetical 
proposal, the marginal theory of distribution. The ratio 
of net profits to pre-tax wages and salaries is taken 
to roughly correspond to the respective contributions 
of these two factors to the company's net output. (5 1 ) 
Mayo's analysis, while ostensibly concerned with social 
relations at the workplace, incorporates the economic 
purpose and environment of those relations by using 
industrial efficiency as a broad measure of normative 
integration. (5 2 ) Fox and Flanders are more consistently
a 44o -  a*
%
concerned with normative integration within an exclusively 
social sphere of relations* Nevertheless their suggestion 
that industry-ifide guidelines for productivity bargaining 
and job evaluation techniques might comprise part of a 
normative system to regulate industrial relations reminds us 
that the location and object of these relations is a proximate 
component of the social production and distribution of goods,(53)
The point is that social relations within the productive 
enterprise are inseparable from its structurally determined 
objective : the pursuit of profits in the case of capitalism.
That objective is effected through the production and sale 
of commodities ivithin a framework dominated by the private 
ownership of the means of production. Accordingly a theory 
of social relations ^vithin the enterprise must assume, if 
only implicitly, some conception of the relations between 
economic actors and the material process that they mediate 
in production. Production is logically built into workplace 
social relations and a conception of socio-economic structure 
will be a, perhaps unacknowledged, component of any model of 
industrial relations.
The economic model assumed by the theorists considered 
in this section is that of marginal production theory.
Marginal theory, of course, is not the only school of economic 
thought which positively appraises the existent structure of 
power and distribution. Nevertheless its tendency to deduce 
a community of interest from the empirical interaction of the 
various "factors" within the production process and its 
specific endorsement of the accompanying structure of 
distribution are the bases of its affinity ifith the Mayo-Fox
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and Flanders thesis. Social thought, while always articulated 
in particular conditions, has a history and logic of its own.
But notwithstanding the special qualities of human consciousness, 
Marx's proposition that the anatomy of civil society is 
to be sought in political economy has its counterpart within 
the structures and practices of social theory. The productive 
context of all social life necessitates that any conceptual 
model of social relations at least implies a corresponding 
notion of economy, understood in the widest sense of the 
relationship between man and nature. To unravel and clarify 
that often unstated connection is a central task of critical 
theory. This has been our purpose in the particular case of 
a number of sociologists who have adopted a de-radicalized 
Durkheimian perspective in their analysis of and programme 
for the anomic breakdown of industrial relations.
ABSTRACTED RADICALISM.
We take "abstracted radicalism" to refer to the 
perspective adopted by a number of writers which while more 
consistent with the radical Durkheimian critique of 
raalintegrated developed society than the theories considered 
in the preceding section is, for particular reasons, unable 
to adequately encompass, either analytically or programmatically, 
the dominant structural features of contemporary capitalism.
Our particular concern is the recent work of Alan Fox. \<Fhen 
compared with his earlier study of British industrial relations 
co-written wdth A. Flanders, Fox's more recent writings are 
acutely sensitive to the structured inequality that is 
inseparable from capitalist society, and its implications for
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social integration. The assumptions which guide his critical 
analysis of inequality prohibit, however, a complete account 
of the environment, as well as the sources of instability and 
potential change, of contemporary industrial relations. We 
will give special attention to Fox's two studies Beyond 
Contract : Work, Power and Trust Relations and. Man
Mi smanag ement. (54)
Fox observes that Western societies are increasingly 
becoming subject to strain as a result of aggressive power 
struggles between organised groups. Various attempts have 
been made to restrain the contending pressure-groups, but 
the institutional environment of contemporary workplace 
organisation systematically undermines moral cohesion, 
especially among lower level employees. The insignificant 
stake that this stratum has in the distribution of property, 
status and power engenders an instrumental attachment to work 
rather than intrinsic involvement and commitment. In this 
situation appeals to "the common good" are tantamount to calling 
for high-trust in a both actual and perceived "low-trust" 
situation. Moral adhesion could only be secured through a 
major long-term programme of institutional change involving 
a consistent attack on inequalities of wealth, income and 
privilege. With such institutional reform. Fox suggests, 
men would more readily curb their material aspirations, the 
structural source of socially divisive inter-group conflicts 
being removed. (5 5 )
Fox's concern is still the pursuit of social integration, 
the promotion of "a sense of social obligation and responsibility 
towards our common life." (Ibid., 173). The realization of
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this ethic of common purpose depends, however, upon the 
transformation of material and substantive as well as normative 
factors. In particular, the capital-labour relation represents 
the major division of interests in Western societies. Capital 
dominates both in terms of the issues of debate and of the 
articulation of particular aspirations. (Ibid., 145) Fox 
interprets this pattern in terms of Durkheim's model of social 
change, suggesting that Durkheim's conception of mechanical 
and organic solidarity correspond to low-and high-discretion 
patterns of workplace relations respectively. He cites 
Durkheim's observation that "there cannot be rich and poor 
at birth without there being unjust contracts" to indicate the 
spontaneous nature of the normal division of labour. (5 6 )
Fox's thesis proposes that the division of labour imposed 
by the owners and controllers of economic resources has 
created large numbers of low-discretion work roles and relations 
A profusion of low-discretion roles is, however, incompatible 
with the emergence of a high-trust situation based on shared 
ends or values. Rather, subordinates are prompted to 
power-directed practices such as strikes and overtime bans.
Such manoevres. Fox observes, are "the continutations of 
bargaining by other means which mark pressure-group activity 
born of low-trust work relations". (Ibid., 3 1 6 ), Low-trust 
relations, reflecting a structure of inequality based on and 
comprising a differentiated system of life-chances, inherently 
militate against the consolidation of organic solidarity.
Consistently elaborated. Fox's thesis would constitute 
a non-sectional Durkheimian critique of the "forced" division
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o^f labour. Such a critique would view the radical reforms 
necessary for the creation of a high-trust structure of 
relations as an essentially societal task, supervised by 
the state but involving the active and spontaneous practices 
of all sectors of the division of labour. When Fox does 
direct his proposals at a specific social audience, however, 
the strata he addresses are typically managerial. If social 
values rather than the requirements of profitability were 
given higher priority, he suggests, management would find the 
provision of a humane and fulfilling work situation a 
relatively easy task. More specifically Fox indicates the 
particular problems that low-trust social relations raise 
for effective managerial leadership in a dynamic technology- 
based economy.
"The accelerating pace of change in 
technology, methods and markets is 
thought to create a growing need for 
readier rank-and-file response to 
managerial leadership. The manager 
needs to ask himself whether this 
response is ever likely to be 
forthcoming from the lower ranks of an 
organisation which, like the society 
that contains it, is highly unequal 
along all the important dimensions of 
life and experience." (57)
Simply in terms of economic expediency, Fox adds, the structural 
inequalities in contemporary Britain constitute an impediment 
to stability in the widest sense.
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\^ hlle Fox has evidently abandoned the manipulative 
conception of workplace integration that his earlier study 
with Flanders implies, his effective appeal to managers 
rather than their subordinates in the context of institutional 
reform is not without significance. It is expressive of an 
unresolved ambivalence concerning the agency and means of radical 
social change. On the one hand Fox identifies material 
inequality, epitomized by the prevalence of low-discretion 
roles, as the barrier to moral integration in contemporary 
society. At the same time he is reluctant to acknowledge 
the unwillingness of the privileged, the persistency and 
tenacity of whose social and economic advantages figures 
prominently in his analysis, to voluntarily forego their 
class benefits. V/hile its object mainly comprises of 
material and related factors, the form of the institutional 
transformation that Fox envisages is still essentially moral 
and value-oriented. Pluralist ideology, he observes, is 
unable to offset the structural inequalities which engender 
low-trust relations. He characterizes it as an "ignoble social 
myth" which obscures the realities of social power and thus 
serves the interests of the privileged.(58) Only a radical 
change in social values and institutions could produce an 
environment conducive to lasting social integration.
In Beyond Contract Fox does not discuss in detail the 
specific "social reality" which might engender higher-trust 
relations and responses. The means of attaining such a 
hypothetical state, moreover, are depicted.only at the 
most abstract and general level.
"....we might mitigate our 
difficulties by pursuing a radical
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reconstruction which seeks 'to rally 
major sections of society behind 
shared purposes of social justice." (5 9 )
Fox observes that the threat to "community and fellowship" 
raised by the present complex of low-trust relations demands 
"a conscious mobilization" to develop a new, more equitable 
basis of social and economic structure, (ibid., 3 6 0 ) Both 
the means of attaining this mobilization and the likely response 
of privileged members to a perceived radical reform are, 
however, unexamined. Fox's sketchy proposals for a radical 
transformation of social institutions and values are abstracted 
from the constraining environment of structured inequality and 
antagonism that, from a critical Durkheimian perspective, 
he systematically and rigorously examines. The possible 
obstacles to higher-trust solutions that he envisages are 
technical, deriving from the division of labour as a system 
of work specialization rather than a mechanism and medium 
of power. (Ibid., 358-9)* He emphasizes, that is to say, 
what Marx termed "the division of labour in manufacture" 
based on the detailed division of work tasks among wage labourers, 
at the expense of "the division of labour in society" which 
derives from the exploitation-based system of commodity exchange.(6 0 ) 
In general Fox perceives his proposed reform to constitute 
a societal transformation. It entails an engendering of 
high-trust relations through the egalitarian reconstitution 
of the social structure by means of a moral or normative 
reorientation on the part of society as a whole. The effective 
appeal directed specifically at managerial strata in the 
concluding pages of Man Mismanagement indicates, however, an uneasy
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tension between this societal and we suggest utopian 
orientation and the pervasive structure of inequality 
that it is intended to annul.
Fox's diffuse depiction of the attainment of a 
higher trust economy is inseparable from his discussion of the 
political economy of contemporary capitalism. In Beyond 
Contract he illustrates his model of the "contradictions" 
within capitalist societies with the example of Britain. The 
most general contradiction Fox identifies concerns the 
incompatibility between low-discretion and high-trust work 
relations which we have discussed earlier. His discussion of 
industrial relations and incomes policy in Britain centres 
on the relationship between inflation and instability. Having 
summarized the sequence of largely unsuccessful attempted 
incomes policies since the early 1950*s, Fox suggests that 
a low-trust national solution is unlikely to be effective 
because the various constituent parties may, in a situation 
of uncertainty, be unable to fulfil their respective commitments. 
The ability of governments to maintain stable prices, for 
example, is limited, as is the power of trade union officials 
to control the level of wage demands at the shopfloor level.(6l)
Pressure-group struggles. Fox points out, while concerned 
with real income are necessarily pursued through the medium 
of money. Inflation is accordingly characterised as "the 
supreme symbolic expression of low-trust society". (Ibid., 322) 
But having identified inflation as an expression of the low-trust 
relation between labour and capital Fox goes on to discuss 
it as if it were the crucial aspect of the antagonism between 
those two social groups. He asks :
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"Given that Western industrial society 
cannot solve its endemic problem of 
inflation either by a totally high- 
trust or by a totally low-trust 
policy, what remains?" (6 2 )
His answer is a comprehensive and radical change in the 
values and institutions of society as a whole. On the question 
of the specific significance of inflation for British 
capitalism Fox, however, has little to say. His analysis 
of the dynamics of low-trust inter-class relations is 
concerned with the forms of their expression. He notes the 
increasingly organized sector of women employees and characterizes 
the more extreme instances of workgroup self-assertion as 
examples of "instrumental collectivism". In addition Fox 
indicates the increasing loss of control of both management 
and the traditional working class parties over such solidaristic 
practices. (Ibid., 328-332)
IVhile these expressions of an intrinsic low-trust 
situation are, at the most general level, related to the 
structural dominance of capital over labour, no attempt is 
made to account for their exacerbation during the 1 9 6 O's and 
1 9 7 0 *s. We will contend in the following chapter that this 
period represented a watershed in the development of British 
capitalism. Against the background of a sustained decline in 
corporate profitability^real income accruing to wages and 
salaries declined as a proportion of total national income and 
even, during some years, in absolute terms. Employees' 
perception of this development, compounded by state-initiated 
attempts to enforce incomes policies, intensified the 
economistic demands of an organized labour force already
-  449  -
already experienced in collective bargaining procedure.
The particular low-trust inter-class relations of the last 
two decades, that is to say, have a complex of proximate 
determinants which can not be simply deduced from a more 
general model of power disparity, (6 3 )
Fox, nevertheless, constructs a model purporting to 
account for the instability of contemporary British capitalism 
in isolation from its political economy. Beyond Contract, his 
most comprehensive work to date, confines analysis of the 
substantive relation between profits and wages to a footnote 
in which, without further comment, the conflicting theses 
of Phelps Brown and Glyn and Sutcliffe are counterposed. (64)
The same study concludes with a series of impressions, 
dejived from M. Kidron, relating to the international sources 
of stability in the Western world. High levels of armaments 
expenditure, domestic inflation, international economic 
dependence, urban-industrial concentration and the growth of 
nationalist movements comprise elements of what Fox terms 
"a complex of related factors". (Ibid., 3 6 1 ). But no model of 
the structure of international capitalism to unify these developments 
is proposed. Instead it is suggested that many of the wider 
instabilities derive, indirectly at least, from the institutions 
and orientations characteristic of low-trust relations. (Ibid., 3 6I) 
Fox documents the groivth of the low-trust dynamic in terms 
of both its "extensiveness" and intensiveness". Concerning the 
latter dimension he observes :
"A heightening tempo of aggressiveness 
in low trust exchanges can prompt either 
party or both to cut corners, resort
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to sharp practice, default
on established rules and procedures,
or break down standard conventions#" (65)
The substantive proximate determinants of intensified 
aggressive inter-class strategies are not, however, conceived 
as a complex of factors which is problematic in itself.
Fox's analysis of the crisis of low-trust relations in 
contemporary capitalism is pervaded by a quality that we 
found in his diffuse conception of the dynamics of social 
reform : that of abstracted radicalism. An authentic
critical impulse underlies his preference for "planning-by- 
consent" to "authoritarian attempts at planning-by-power."
(I^id, 359)* Our analysis of developments in the political 
economy of post-war Britain will suggest, nevertheless, that the 
imperatives of capital accumulation leave little potential 
for industrial relations planning to be other than pow^r-oriented 
in the present period. The critical edge of Fox's trust- 
analysis, in summary, is blunted by its limited theoretical 
concern, in particular by its ambivalent attitude toward the 
power relations of capitalism and the tenacity of the privileged.
COMPOSITE ECLECTISM.
Partly in order to clarify our critique of the 
Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian analyses of industrial 
relations and politics, we ivill consider two studies which 
have effectively attempted to fuse elements drawn from the 
theories of both Marx and Durkheim. The rationale for 
attempting such a theoretical merger derives from the critical
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orientation of both theorists in question, as well as 
from thei’T common concern to specify the relationship between 
social structure and the breakdown in social continuity which 
accompanied the development of industrial capitalist society.
But over and above these points of apparent similarity, Marx 
and Durkheim developed their analyses of contemporary society 
on the basis of quite different and irreconcilable conceptions 
of the social nature of man. Their radically opposed 
diagnoses for the reconstitution of ordered and non-antagonistic 
social forms reflect and derive their logic from these two 
ontological conceptions, the one denying, the other positing 
an inherent and essential dualism between the individual 
and society.
The two studies with which we are concerned deal with 
ostensibly different aspects of social life. Blauner's 
analysis examines the changing degree and forms of alienation 
f^ith the development of industrial technology, while that of 
Moorhouse is concerned with the political incorporation of 
the British working class. (66) Nevertheless they both indicate 
the theoretical confusion that is inherent in the attempt 
to blend the two traditions of social thought represented 
by Marx and Durkheim. Our proposition is that a synthesis 
of the two perspectives of necessity obscures the crucial 
distinguishing features of both. We have already indicated 
the role and importance of the concepts alienation and anomie 
in the theories of Marx and Durkheim. Nevertheless we -will 
summarize their respective positions in the present context, 
emphasizing the major points of divergence.
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The irreconcilability of Marxian and Durkheimian 
sociology is particularly apparent in their respective 
interpretations of the division of labour, to which both 
attach central importance. Marx and Durkheim commonly 
assume that a relatively large and densely associated 
population is a material prerequisite of the growth of 
the division of labour. (67) But the wider significance they 
attribute to the division of labour establishes the primacy 
of the dissimilarity of their interpretations. For Marx 
the division of labour, historically bound up with and 
developing together with commodity production, underlies 
the phenomenon of alienation. Commodity production and 
circulation, governed by the law of value, is the scenario 
and medium of human self-estrangement, the context of 
fetishized and structured antagonistic social life. (68) 
Durkheim, by contrast, sees it to be the source of the 
solidarity appropriate for modern industrial society.
Properly regulated it neither divides social strata nor 
degrades particular social actors. Rather, in its normal 
form the division of labour has an integrative function, 
expressing through the structure of society the innate 
capacities and potentialities of individual social members. (6 9 )
Underlying these widely different interpretations of 
the division of labour are two opposing conceptions of the 
relationship between man and society. Marx ultimately 
denies a dualism between the two. In alienated conditions 
human products and relations both appear and in fact are 
endowed with a power external to and coercive over individual 
social producers. Nevertheless, the historical realization of
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human species-being in freely associated communist society 
involves the resolution of the antagonism between man and 
nature and between man and man, as well as between individual 
and species. The "detail worker" of today is replaced by 
an individual with an all-round development. But for 
Durkheim society is inherently transcendent, different from 
and morally superior to individual social members. Marx 
views alienated man as imprisoned through his estrangement 
within exploitative and antagonistic social formations. For 
Durkheim anomic man is above all unregulated, unable to 
meaningfully channel or satisfy his unbridled desires.
Marx and Durkheim are concerned with two essentially 
different problems. The former is seeking to liberate man 
from an estranged and constraining mode of social existence, 
the latter to elaborate a means of regulating the bundle of 
potentially insatiable desires and needs that constitutes man. 
The opposition of their diagnoses is complemented by the 
opposition of their prescriptions to end the social malaise 
as they respectively identify it. VThile the critical 
programmes of both are articulated in terms of a radical and 
collectivistic conception of social man, their prescriptive 
content differs fundamentally. Marx proposes the abolition 
of class society and the realization of human freedom in 
autonomous, non-constrained activity. Durkheim, by contrast, 
advocates the re-establishment of moral integration through the 
agency of occupational communities, the modern bearers of 
moral discipline and social control.
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Central to the distinction between the two perspectives 
is the different evaluation of constraint in social 
relations. For Durkheim anomie evidences inadequate or 
inappropriate constraint in societies with a developed 
division of labour. Marx on the other hand views commodity 
society, especially in its capitalist form, to exercise 
dehumanizing constraint on the activities and potentialities 
of social actors in two particular ways. In the first place, 
the division of society into classes negates the communality 
of social life that is at the heart of human species-being.
But more fundamentally, the rule of the law of value dominates 
production relations and imposes a uniquely unplanned, anarchic 
form on social activity. Dictating the pursuit of profit as the 
dominant structural imperative of the "trager" of capitalist 
enterprise the law of value, inseparable from commodity 
production and exchange, epitomizes the historically engendered 
structure of social constraint which, Marx believed, can be 
overcome only by the revolutionary practices of the working 
class.
Despite the irreconcilability of the Marxian and 
Durkheimian schools of social and political thought, however, 
the two studies with which we are concerned embody an attempt 
to merge them into a single perspective ifith which to analyse 
aspects of the contemporary capitalist social structure*
Blauner's concern is to identify and trace long term developments 
in the pattern of alienation in factory production. His 
thesis is that the historical sequence of craft, assembly-line, 
and automation-based production techniques entails a change 
in the intensity of alienation which could be charted on a 
graph in the form an an inverted "u". In the earliest stages 
of industrial growth, dominated by craft technology and
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occupational structure, alienation is at its lowest. The 
workers* freedom is correspondingly at a relatively high 
level. With the rise of machine industry, on the other hand, 
the curve of alienation rises rapidly, reaching its zenith 
in assemhly-line production. The worker becomes increasingly 
estranged in **the regimented milieu of the conveyor belt 
for the sole purpose of earning his bread’*. But with 
automated industry a countertrend develops. Continuous 
process technology increases the workers' control over his 
work tasks, while both the further division of labour and 
the trend toward larger scale production units are checked.
The alienation curve consequently begins to decline, 
completing the pattern represented by the inverted ”u”. (7 0 )
Blauner's analysis centres on the roots of alienation 
in the work process, rejecting Dubin's view that compensatory 
opportunities for self-expression and creativity can be found 
purely in the sphere of leisure activities. Work, he observes, 
still occupies the single most important position in most 
people's lives, (ibid., 183-4) Accordingly Blauner acknowledges 
the seminal formulations concerning alienation in the theories 
of Marx, particularly in his early work. But his own analysis 
of alienation is heavily influenced by Durkheimian assumptions 
concerning the nature of social integration. The relative 
freedom of workers in the continuous-process based chemical 
industry, he observes, derives from automated technology and 
constant technical change. Blauner uses as an index of non­
alienation in the chemical plant he studied the "remarkably 
high degree of morale and social cohesion." The responsibility 
for automated production, he concludes, confers a new source 
of "dignity and worth" on manual employment. (Ibid., 164-5)
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Blauner's positive evaluation of this tendency, essentially 
constituting a shift toward greater workplace integration 
within the existent division of labour, has closer affinities 
with a Durkheimian than a Marxian perspective.
The influence of Durkheim's analysis of organic solidarity 
is also evident in the categories used by Blauner to examine 
the effects of alienation in different historical and 
technological settings. Assessing the differential degree 
of alienation in craft, assembly line and continuous-process 
industries Blauner distinguishes four major dimensions of 
alienation ; those of powerlessness, meaningless, isolation 
and self-estrangement. But despite the apparent Marxist 
character of these categories Blauner's analysis is structured 
by the problematic of workplace integration as such, rather 
than the structure of power-oriented production relations 
and their consequences for workers' life experience. This 
is especially apparent in his discussion of continuous-process 
industry.
Blauner observes that "powerlessness" in industry is a 
variable phenomenon. The level of workers' control is at its 
lowest in assembly-line technology, epitomized by the 
automobile industry. Such conditions apply to a minority 
of blue collar workers, however. Blauner suggests i
"It is likely that most workers 
have jobs that permit them to set 
their own work pace, at least within
limits." (7 1 )
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While this proposition seems improbable or at least 
exaggerated, it is significant in so far as it indicates 
Blauner's conception of power in the industrial setting.
Power is viewed in terms of workers* immediate control over 
the details of work practices, rather than of the wider 
structure of ownership and domination that is bound up 
with the system of private property. "Enlightened 
personnel policies" and the relaxation of workplace tension 
associated with the "affluent society", rather than the 
private ownership of the means of production determine, in 
Blauner*s account, the level of workers * "powerlessness". 
(Ibid., 171) Power-, that is to say, is viewed as a relation 
between the worker and his work task, rather than between 
employer and employee.
"Self-estrangement" is similarly defined in terms of 
the problems of worker identification with the process of 
production. Continuous-process as against mass production 
is seen as liberating in this context. The former's 
"calm-and-crisis" sequence, Blauner suggests, alternates 
the workers' activity between monotony and total involvement. 
This "mode of time experience", he adds, offers relatively 
great opportunity for identification and personal development 
(Ibid., 174) As with Blauner's account of powerlessness, 
self-estrangement is conceived in abstraction from the sale 
of labour power which characterizes capitalist production 
in all technological forms. In both cases a Marxian analysis 
of the structure of production relations is systematically 
avoided.
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It is in Blauner's discussion of "meaninglessness" and 
"isolation" that the influence of the Durkheimian perspective 
becomes increasingly apparent, however. The alienation of 
meaningless, he suggests, involves the difficulty of finding 
"purpose and function" in manual work. This aspect of 
alienation is also minimized in the conditions of advanced 
technology.
"In continuous-process production 
there is little alienation of this type 
because each operator contributes a 
unique function in the processing of 
a standardized product." (72)
Meaninglessness in work is thus reduced through the 
technological rationalization of the division of labour and its 
perception as such by its component members, Blauner's 
account of the reduction of "isolation" with continuous-process 
industry is similarly reasoned. In the highly automated 
chemical industry he observes "a high degree of consensus 
between workers and management and an integrated industrial 
community in which employees experience a sense of belonging 
and membership", (ibid., 178) Blauner attributes this 
pattern of integration to a number of technological and 
technology-based factors, including the presence of a 
differentiated occupational structure, the size and lay-out 
of the plant itself, and the relatively clean and responsible 
nature of blue-collar work tasks. Consistently with his 
discussion of the other three dimensions of alienation, 
isolation for Blauner is resolvable through the normal 
development of purely industrial structure and technique.
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The existent division of labour, rationalized and lubricated 
by enlightened managerial policy, constitutes the basis 
on which integration can be effected quite apart from the 
possible divisive effects of private ownership. Blauner's 
analysis is clearly more consistent with Durkheim's analysis 
of the division of labour than that of Marx. But the 
similarity is in fact more apparent than real. As with the 
writers whom we earlier termed the theorists of "systematic 
conservatism", Blauner's study does not incorporate the 
radical meritocratic dimension of Durkheim's work. Rarely 
does he suggest that inequality of opportunity and the 
structure of power relations between social groups in 
themselves constitute a problematic for analysis.
When he does consider the profit-making orientation of 
private industry, Blauner's concern is primarily wriLth its 
implications for workplace integration in the context of 
automated production. In his exposition, moreover, Blauner 
purports to augment or re-apply Marx's conception of the 
capital-labour relation while at the same time misinterpreting 
the most basic element of the letter's analysis. Blauner 
suggests that the relatively high labour costs of pre-automation 
industry encourage the practice of maximizing the output 
of each, relatively expensive, worker.
"The cost structure furthers the 
tendency to use the workers as 'means' 
as commodities in the classic Marxist 
sense." (73)
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But Marx's theory of exploitation rests on the assumption 
that the worker is more than simply one commodity among 
others. Labour power is seen to produce more value than 
its costs of reproduction, the additional surplus value 
constituting the source of profits both for the capitalist's 
private consumption and for accumulation. In Marx's 
theory labour power is not merely a "means" of producing 
profit, but the only element in the production process 
able to create new value, the fuel and objective of the 
whole reproduction cycle. (74)
Blauner's conception of the political economy of 
capitalism is, by contrast, based on other assumptions than 
those of the labour theory of value. A capital-intensive 
cost structure, he suggests, means that increased efficiency, 
output and profits can more easily be attained through the 
"exploitation of technology" than that of the worker. 
Automation, that is to say, provides the material basis for 
the humanization of production relations within the context 
of private capitalist ownership.
"The economic base of automated 
technology allows a more enlightened 
management to view the workers as 
human beings, as partners in a collective 
enterprise." (75)
The implicit model of economy adopted by Blauner is, as i^ith 
the "systematic conservatism" theorists, that of marginal 
productivity. The factors of production contribute variously 
to the aggregate process, no single factor occupying the
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crucial role that labour—power plays in Marxist theory.
Blauner's citation of Marx's theory of commodities is both 
erroneous and misleading. It neither accurately reflects 
Marx's actual analysis nor, even if it were to do so, 
relates consistently to the logic of Blauner»s conception of 
economy.
The effective consequence of Blauner*s inaccurate and 
mystifying use of Marx's political economy is a de-radicalization 
of the letter's analysis and programme. This is evident 
in Blauner*s introductory discussion of the Marxian 
interpretation of alienation. Blauner elaborates an early 
version of the "epistemological break" thesis, viewing Marx's 
early and late work as primarily concerned with alienation and 
political economy respectively. On the basis of this 
distinction he attributes a subjectivist quality to the 
concept of alienation, suggesting that it is "concerned with 
the inner life and involves a moral critique of the
mechanization and spiritual isolation of modern society". (Ibid., 2) 
While correctly acknowledging Marx's location of the source 
of alienation in the property relations of class society,
Blauner's elaboration is informed by the same subjective 
orientation. On the one hand the worker is aliented through 
the structurally imposed sale of his labour power. But at 
the same time he is "not likely to identify psychologically" 
with the enterprise which is oivned by the capitalist. Again,
Blauner notes a third aspect of alienation in the employee's 
"sense of isolation" from the process and goals of organized 
production. (Ibid., 3). V.Tiereas Marx consistently analyzed alienaiio 
as an objectively engendered form of estranged social life, it 
is transformed by Blauner into a primarily psychological 
condition. Social members' perception of their role in the
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production process has primacy over the structural framework 
of estranged labour. The central problematic in the analysis 
of alienation is, from this perspective, the relations 
between workers and technology and the former's subjective 
evaluation of their life-chances and work experience.
Blauner accordingly writes the following concerning 
the relative freedom of workers in the automated chemical 
industry.
"Based on the responsibility 
required by the non-manual work of 
controlling an automatic technology; 
it reflects new conditions and job 
requirements which result from the 
needs of management rather than the 
consequences of the workers' superior 
power position." (?6)
The conditions in automated industry which reduce alienation, 
conceived primarily in psychological terms, at the same time 
serve managerial needs within the productive enterprise.
Marx's conception of alienation is in this way de-radicalizëd 
from two points of view, both the objective basis of alienation 
and the specific exploitative character of its capitalistic 
form being obscured. Despite the purported derivation of his 
analysis from Marx's work, Blauner incorporates into his 
model of alienation neo-Durkheimian assumptions similar 
to those of the Mayo-Fox and Flanders thesis. Workplace 
integration per se is associated with non-alienation in the 
context of continuous-process technology. (77) The critical edge 
of both Marx's and Durkheim's analyses is blunted in Blauner's
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characterization of diminishing alienation, the positively 
evaluated social type of which corresponds closely to 
C.V7. Mills' conception of the "cheerful robot". Such a model 
of non-alienated man is compatible with the analyses of neither 
Marx nor Durkheim, both of which are consistently structured 
in terms of a clear and distinctive model of man in society 
and informed by an authentic radical impulse.
Neither of those theorists would endorse Blauner's 
proposition that the division of manual labour, ranging from 
unskilled to highly skilled, %fithin the automated plant
"is a socially integrating force, since 
it provides many high positions to 
which employees may aspire, and the 
successful workers most exemplify 
the values and standards of the company.
When possibilities for greater rewards 
of higher pay and status exist, workers 
are motivated to perform well and 
internalize the goals of the enterprise." (78)
From a Marxian perspective differential reward and status 
^fithin the working class is inseparable from the general effects 
of the division of labour, grounded in the socially-divisive 
complex of commodity production on the one hand, and the 
sectional economistic struggle for wages and working conditions 
on the other. While apotential obstacle to revolutionary 
class consciousness, it is in no sense an unequivocally 
integrative factor. A consistent Durkheimian analysis, by
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contrast, would view Blauner*s automated plant as embodying 
a partial or incomplete form of organic solidarity. Perceiving 
the scope of workers'life-chances to reach to the most 
skilled manual strata and no further^ Blauner's characterization 
of the low alienation plant falls far short of Durkheim's 
radical egalitarian programme. Divorced from their respective 
models of the relation between man and society, elements 
draifn from Marxian and Durkheimian theory become transformed 
into the theoretical constituents of a model which views the 
decline of alienation as an aspect of the natural trend of 
technological development. This historical trend is not 
viewed as fully realized. (Ibid., I8 3 ). Nevertheless it 
enables Blauner to conceive of a diminution of the alienating 
effects of modern industry without the radical institutional 
transformations envisaged by Marx and Durkheim.
While Blauner's study seeks to blend insights derived 
from Marx and Durkheim inan analysis of the effects of changing 
industrial structures on workplace integration, Moorhouse 
effects a similar theoretical fusion at the superstructural 
level of political articulation. The letter's concern is to 
account for the pattern of political incorporation of the 
British working class in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, at the same time critically assessing interpretations 
which stress the importance of normative factors. Working class 
compliance, he suggests, is most adequately explained with 
reference to the influence of objective structural constraints 
rather than the development of citizenship rights and the 
influence of subjective factors. Moorhouse points out that
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the dominant trend of interpretation has consistently 
minimized both the historical nature of the extent and type 
of constraint exercised over the development of working 
class political orientations and the problem of the sources 
of political power. His account of changes in the franchise 
during the second half of the nineteenth century is informed 
by the Marxian perspective of class analysis. The shifting 
balance of interests represented in the House of Commons, 
for example, is viewed as a reflection of tensions within 
the ruling class as industrialization progressed. Again 
Moorhouse assumes a structural antagonism between the totality 
of ruling class interests on the one hand and those of the 
working class on the other,
"These tactical battles.... always
occurred with a full realization
of the potential danger to all
ruling class interests represented
by a politically undisciplined
and disaffected urban proletariat." (79)
In accounting for the maintenance of ruling class 
domination, nevertheless, Moorhouse is primarily concerned 
with the methods rather than the sources of the exercise of 
political power. Changes in electoral arrangements, he 
observes, "served as an added buttress to inequality", (Ibid., 137) 
But the maintenance of ruling class parliamentary hegemony 
is viewed as mainly conditioned by and dependent upon the 
tactical manoevres of bourgeois interest groups. Thus the 
effective limitation of the working class vote, despite the 
rhetorical proclamation of suffrage extension, and the Tory- 
Liberal engineering calculated to leave the urban working class
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relatively underrepresented^are attributed with particular
importance, (ibid., 346-8), Other constraints on working
class political activity noted by Moorhouse, including
the direct corruption of voters, the prohibitive cost of
electoral involvement, and the reformist orientation of
Labour Party leaders, similarly emphasize the tactical
means by which ruling class interests undermined the articulation
of effective solidaristic working class political articulation,
Moorhouse refers to factors such as the cost of electoral
representation as econonomic sources of the maintenance of
ruling class political power. But they constitute the
tactical relations between the ruling and working classes at
the specifically political level of ineraction, rather than
an analysis of the roots of the antagonism of interests that
Moorhouse assumes.
It is not simply that Moorhouse does not explicitly 
elaborate the foundations, in property ownership, of the 
conflict between labour and capital that finds expression 
in the sphere of politics. His Marxian influenced conflict 
model of political activity is located within and explained 
in terms of Durkheim's historical analysis of the growth 
of the division of labour. Moral consensus could not arise 
in nineteenth century Britain because the political incorporation 
of the working class was forced rather than spontaneous, 
"external" control and constraint being necessitated by the 
entrenchment of inter-generational economic inequalities.
(Ibid., 354-5). Moorhouse does not, however, attempt to 
elaborate the detailed connections between his adoption 
of Durkheim's model of "forced" integration on the one hand
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and the implicit Marxian assumption of inherent class 
antagonism on the other. In fact the uneasy co—existance 
of the two perspectives is made explicit in his observation 
that the compartmentalization of the moral life of society 
"cannot be justified on theoretical grounds stemming from 
Durkheim (to say nothing of Marx)". (Ibid., 355). The 
sustained threat to ruling class economic interests posed 
by the political initiative of a "disaffected urban proletariat" 
rests on a quite different model of social structure to that 
assumed in Durkheim's conception of organic solidarity, 
however, and Moorhouse does not in our opinion convincingly 
indicate their compatibility.
CONCLUSION, IMAGE OF MAN AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS.
Blauner and Moorhouse's studies demonstrate, at the 
levels of workplace social relations and political articulation 
respectively, the theoretical confusion that derives from 
an attempt to merge the antithetical schools of social 
thought represented by Marx and Durkheim. Marx's concern 
%fith the social relations of production and that of 
Durkheim with organic solidarity, albeit informed by a 
substantially materialist historical perspective, are 
inseparable from two distinct conceptions of the nature of 
social structure and in particular the division of labour. 
IVhereas Durkheim sees the division of labour to constitute the 
relational basis of a specific form of social integration, for 
Marx it is bound up with the historical stage of alienated 
production. Dehumanizing the worker, it epitomizes the 
structure of class-divided commodity societies, objectively 
hindering the development of free, communal social existence
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that constitutes man's historical potentiality.
We have earlier indicated our opinion that the Marxian 
image of social man more adequately expresses the actual 
conditions of contemporary social structure than that of 
Durkheim, Our immediate concern, however, has been to 
suggest that the ontological assumptions that structure 
both are so antithetical as to logically invalidate an 
orientation seeking to eclectically merge them. Marx's 
conception of alienation and Durkheim's analysis of anomie 
are, in summary, intrinsically unamenable to an authentic 
theoretical fusion. Implying respectively the need for 
freedom from constraint and the appropriate restraint of 
human desires and aspirations, any attempt, explicit or 
implicit, to blend them will tend toward either a 
de-radicalized conception of social man (Blauner) or 
theoretical imprecision (Moorhouse)• Our o%m analysis of 
the state in post-war Britain, the concern of the following 
chapter, assumes a Marxian conception of social structure 
and process and is elaborated accordingly.
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INTRODUCTION IMT:ER1-TATI0NAL OAPITALi m  AND THE OECULAR 
DÉCLINÉ OF BRITAIN ‘
Our attempt to provide an aocount and explanation of the 
relationship between the state and the class system in post-war*
Britain will locate its immediate subject matter in the content of Britain’s 
decline as a dominant power within the world imperialist system. Men, H a rK . 
observed,1 rnalce history but not in conditions of their own choosing. The
f V £
same, with qualifications, holds time for states. Our analogy rests on the 
contraints imposed on nation states, in particular on the non-domnant ones, 
in the context of a competitive global seenaho. Voluntarism at this level 
of analysis would be as misplaced as at that of the individual social actor. 
The constraints exercised on national autonomy are above all concrete and 
specific, and with this in mind we will initially sketch the outline*' of the 
historical decline of British capitalism.
Individual. national capitalist societies require a special 
institution, the state, which, standing above the immediate interests and 
practices of particular capitalist enterprises, functions to preserve and 
defend the interests of the capitalist class as a whole. The state in this 
way represents an attempt by capital at the national level to moderate and, 
ideally, to control the anarchic tendencies of the capitalist mode of 
production, (l) In an analogous way, the world capitalist system requires a 
dominant, hegemonic power to guarantee the fulfillment of certain functions 
relating to imperialist and inter-imperalist relations. If not fulfilled, 
these functions will allow the articulation pf de stall Using tendencies, 
deriving from the same essentially unplanned character of capitalist 
production, precisely at the global level where capitalism manifests its 
universal character.(2)
The chief functions, that the dominant national capitalist power wi.ll 
attempt to fulfill are, briefly, as follows: the guarantee of at least a 
minimal degree of "law and order" between competing and potentially 
antagonistic rival capitalist nations : The establishment and enforcement of a 
body of institutional practices to aid the movement of capital and goods
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between countries, a function determined by the international division of 
labour that capitalism produces in general, and of the international relations 
of imperialism in particular: directly an aspect of the imperialist character 
of global capitalist expansionism, the domination of primary producers and less 
developed countries in order to guarantee supplies of cheap raw materials and 
to prevent, or more usually, to control industrialization in these areas so as 
to retain dominance over world markets for the major centres of accumulation: 
closely related is the capacity and preparedness to intervene directly or 
indirectly (direct military intervention being the ultimate sanction "of last 
resort") in these countries in order to suppress anti-imperalist movements, 
whether of a popular nationalist or of an openly communistic character.
Prior toethe Pirst World War Britain performed this role as the 
dominant capitalist power at the internationallevel. Under British economic 
and military hegemony, increasingly expansive areas of the world were brought 
within and subordinated to the system of imperialism, their resources being 
incorporated into the process of capitalist production (s), Britain 
predominantly financed the extraction and export of raw materials from the 
peripK&rfLi aregs, establishing and exercising its political dominance in the 
process. The preparations having been laid in the political revolution of the 
seventeenth century and the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century and 
later, Britain consolidated her position as the dominant capitalist power. By 
the mddle of the nineteenth century, according to one estimate, Britain was. 
producing around § of the world’s aoalj^ of its iron, 5/V of its steel, and 
of its coimiercially-produoed cotton cloth, a prominence indicative of her 
hegemonic position.(d) The late nineteenth century saw the demise of 
unchallenged British global Hegemony, a process largely consolidated in the 
redivision of world markets resulting from, and the changing international 
power relations which underlay, the 1914-1918 war. Contradictory developments 
had been taking place during the period of British dominance. Trotsky observes
f/
that;
"During the period 1850 to 1880 Britain heoame the. 
industrial school of Europe and America, But by 
this, very fact her own monepolistie position was 
undermine!. (5)
VJhile Britain was pioneering the process whereby overseas 
territories were transformed into raw material sources and markets for the 
capitalist heartlands, other countries, often partly financed by British 
money, began to develop along oaitalist lines and to challenge Britain's 
position as., world leader. We see the following pattern emerging for the 
shares of world output of various countries of manufactured goods (measured 
in percentages),
YEm(B) U.K. U. 8 oAo FRANGE. U.S,6,R. jAim
1870 52 25 15 10 4
188i/5 27 29 14 9 5 -
1896/1900 220 50 17 7 5 1
1906/1910 15 55 16 6 5 1
1915 14 46 16 6 6 1
#29/1929 9 42 12 7
-
4 5
î&ermany and the United States were Britain's chief emergent rivals during and
(6)
after the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This international competition 
for annexation and a stake in the imperialist world maz'ket, previously dominated 
by Britain, was a major contributing factor in the towards the First World War, a 
war which, as the figures for 1915 and 1926/9 respectively indicate, constituted 
a watershed in the development of British capitalism. The war and its aftermath 
saw Britain's share of the total world output decline dramatically to less than 
a third of that half a century earlier,
Britain's decline over this period was not only a decline relative 
to the rise of imperalist rivalry. Even cotton, a particularly dynamic sector 
of the national economy, ceased to expand significantly in the general decline
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of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. That the absolute expansion of 
the economy as a whole faltered and then slowed dramatically from the middle 
of that century onward is clear from the following figures for the ra.te. of 
growth of Britain's industrial production.
RATE OF GROmi OF IiNDUhTRIAL PRODUOTIOM (PEROMiT^ iGE UfOREjiüE PER DEOADE)
1800's to 1810 s 22-9 1850's to 1860 s 27.-8
1810'8 to 1820' s 58-6 I860's to 1870 s 55.-2
1820’8 to 1850 s 47—2 1870's to 1880 s 20--8
1850'8 to 1840 s 57-4 1880's to 1890 8 17.-4
1840' S to 1850 8 59-5 1890'8 to 1900 S 17.-9
(7)
The almost iminterfi^ ted fall in thercitècfgrowth of industrial production
from the 1840's to 1900 is expressive of the particular pattern of historical 
development whereby Britain established herself as the dominant imperalist power, 
a process dating back to the earliest days of British capitalism* The pursuit 
of profits, relative to that of Britain's rivals, has been predominantly 
overseas - orientated. By 1870’s, annual British overseas investment exceeded 
net capital formation at home, and by 1911-1915 overseas investment was probably 
double that in Britain, (8) Tliis pattern has., been maintained long after Britain's 
decline as the dominant world power. In 1968 Britadn still invested over tv/ice 
as much abroad as West Germany, and four times as much as Japan, (9) Much of the 
resumed outward flow of capital after 1945 went into the Sterling Area, by and 
large corresponding to the Empire of earlier British imperialism.
Coupled with and additional to Britain's exportoriented pattern 
of economic investment is the substantial parasitic sector of total national 
econonu-c activity. In the period from 1796 to 1975 there were only nine years 
in which the balance of trade (the relation of visible exports to visibleimports) 
was in Britain's favour. In invisible trade, on the other hand, Britain is the 
greatest "exporter" per head of population in the world, (lO) This tendency,
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moreover, has continued up to the present day. Invisible trade is that 
which doesnot involve a direct transfer of goods. Included in this category 
are the sale of services to foreigners Wien they use British shipping, insurance, 
banking and commercial facilities. Britain’s traditional reliance on invisible 
earnings to offset an otherwise adverse balance of trade has led one commentator 
to classify Britain as "a commercial nation" rather than one which is 
internationally uncompetetive in the industrial sphere.(11) Against a 
background of increasingly threatening foreign competition, however, Britain’s 
twin commitments to overseas investments and, in the main, "unproductive" 
invisible dealings has had a clearly deleterious effect on the level of domestic 
investment. A fall in real wages at the turn of the twentieth century, moreover, 
was largely responsible for a wave of labour militancy which in turn contributed 
to the slow growth of productivity. (12) The demands of war expenditure 
compounded the decline in the rate of growth of productive expenditure, further 
weakening Britain's international competetive position. This was particularly 
so in relation to the United States.
American ascendancy to the status of the dominant world capitalist 
power was not a sudden or overnight process, however. During the inter-war 
period, Britain, France, the United States, Japan and Germany were all major 
powers, but none were unquestionably dond.nant in the way that Britain had been
in the earlier period. Stability, even in the medium term, could not be
a
guaranteed in such conditions, and capitalism suffered profound and 
international Depression between 1929 and* 1955. (15) Recovery in the 1950's, 
■within the still unresolved crisis of imperialist leadership, took place on 
a primaiilly national basis, German and Italian capitalism resuming the process 
of accumulation under the extreme conditions of fascist dictatorship. But 
acute trade and capital movement restrictions still hindered prosperous 
capitalist development on a world--wide basis. In particular, Britarn's 
traditional industries and their markets suffered a competitive decline 
d.uring the inter--war period. The technologically new mass-production industries.
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at the same time, entered into a lenghy period of expansion, hut didnot produce 
sectors which were effectively competitive at an international level.(14)
Histonically, we may sunmianze the source of British capitalism's, 
domestic weakness in terms of the following factors. A comparatively 
pronounced overseas, orientation waa gar ne d at the expense of development of the. 
British domestic productive infrastructure. Precisely because of this 
progressively weakening home-base, British capitalism had neither the économe 
nor the poîitieal capacity to defend its initially unchallenged markets, from 
encroachment by emergent rivals. After the Second World War the United States 
confirmed these tendencies through its usurpation of open hegemony within the 
capitalist world. In this wealcened position, the rates of investment, of 
growth ofproductivity and of profits have all deteriorated in the post-war 
period. Britain's decline within the international capitalist community is a 
continuation of the tendency noted by Trotsl<y half a century ago.
"We must consider the internal life of 
Britain from the perspective ...... of
the World role of Great Britain, "which
country, while still retaining the
whole of her possessions, apparatus
and the traditions.of world domination,
is in actuality being more and more thrust
into the position of a second-rate Power."(15)
Writing in 1916, Lenin observed that "the colonial policy of the capitalist 
countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories of our planët "(16) 
On the basis of this development, shifts in the international pattern of 
capitalist control and influence could only take the form of repartition, 
either directly, through overtpolitical annexation, or indirectly, through 
non-annexationist economic and political expansion. Our particular concern 
vd.ll be the post-war consolidation of American global dominance, and its 
consequences for a declining British capitalism, Vfe will examine the present 
crisis in the content of Britain's status as an especially"wealc link" in the
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imperialist chain -within the international capitalist system. In particular, 
the role of the state in and its. response to this crisis will he considered.
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IFIRODUGTIONo EahSEI^ ATIONiiL Gj^ iPITALIhM M D  ÏHË1 GEGULMl DEGLIFE OF BRIÏAIIh R3ÎFEKEÎ+CES
IFIRODUGTIONo ]3TERI4ATI0NMj GjiPITALIBM M D  THE GEGUL&R DEGLIFE OF BRITAIIh R3ÎFEBEI+GES
1. Im anthropological theory of the state, stressing its source in the coexistence, 
of antagonistic social strata" and its class particularity, is developed hy
L. Erader (1968), 28,
2, Ivlarx notes that coinmodities^  whether they are the output of production based 
on slavery, of peasants, of "communes," of state enterprise or of private 
capitalism, "behave" in essentially the same way,
"The character of the process of production from 
which they originate is immaterial. They function 
as commodities in the market, and as commodities they 
enter into the circulation of the surplus -value 
incorporated in it." (K, Marx, 1967b, 115)
It is specifically at the level of the world mai'ket that the production of 
commodities and capitalism in particular realize and demonstrate their global 
and, from the historical viewpoint, revolutionary nature. There capitalism
engenders the "universal inter-dependence of nations creates a world after
its own imrnage." (K, Iferx, 1967a, 84-), See also H. Radice and S. Picciotto 
(1971) and N, Bukharin (1972)
5. R, Halevy (1959), 50-46, L. Trotsky (1970), chapter 1.
4. E.J, Hobsbawm (1972),134.
5. L. Trotsky (1970),2, See also B. Supple (1971), 18-19.
6. A. G-lyn and B. Sutcliffe (1972), 17.
7. Eo J. Hob shawm (1972), 68,
8. Ibid. 192.
9. B. Rowthorn (l971a), 42. Sea also E.J. Hobsbawm (1972), 258-9
10. W.AoP. Manser (1973), 25. P. Donaldson (1971), 62.
11, W. M, Glarke (1967), 173. This is hn fact a central aspect of the
developments to #iich Lenin was refering when he analyzed the. parasitic 
character of imperialism. Lenin envisaged:
"a group of advanced industrial nations, whose, 
upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and 
Africa, with which they support great tame masses of 
retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries 
of agriculture an.d manufacture, but kept in the 
performance of personal services under the 
control of a new financial aristocracy. "
(V.I. Lenin, 1970b, 124.)
12, A. G-lyn and B. Sutcliffe (1972), 18,
13. Even in the dyimnnics of the Depression, however, the ascendant 
Hegemony of American capitalism fomid expression in the collapse of the
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international credit structure built up during the 1920’s-. European 
stabilization had been dependent on the assuiuption of ever growing debt 
obligations, principally to the United States. From 1928 onward the 
shift from foreign bonds to domestic stocks on the part of American investors 
seriously reduced the supply of overseas loans, compelling the European 
countries, and Germany in particular, to borrow more Snd more in the short-term 
market. The resulting series of banlt collapses, developing into an 
international chain of credit default, centred on American finance, of which 
Gallraith has noted that "the banking structure was inherently weak".
(j. K, Gallraith, 1961, 196). Failures were far from exceptional, some 
25,000 independent banks operating in the small-scale and largely unregulated 
Ajïierican system in 1929. The centrality of American finance in the 
development of the Great Depression vms indicative of the primary global role 
that America was already coming to oauupyimn the world economy.
Trotslcy, in 1921, identified the :'!fundemental fact" of the 
contemporary world division of lahour to be that "the centre of gravity of 
capitalist economy and bourgeois power has shifted from Europe to America.... 
Prior to the vrar Europe was the heart of the capitalist world, it was the 
globe's chief market place, its main factory and its main bank..... Today 
this is no longer the case. Europe has been hurled back." (L. Trotsky, 1975, 
254). This changing balance of povrer within the capitalist world occured 
within the context of a long-term trend of economic stagnation. Iladdison 
reports that for Western Europe as a whole 20 of the 57 years 1913 to 1950 
recorded an output which vms below some previous pealc. (A. Iv-addison, 1975,9) 
American global hegemony was consolidated during the recovery prograimne, in 
relation to both the wartime devastation and the earlier economic stagnation, 
which followed the Second World War.
14. E.J. Hobsbawm. (1972), 250-1. It should be remembered, however, that the
effects of the recession were not as pronounced as in a number of other
Western European countries, France and Germany in particular. Britain's 
initial level of economic activity, especially in the area of investment, 
was already low, the proportion of G.E.P. invested in 1929 being about half 
of that in the United States. (A. Maddison, 1975, 25). In addition Britain 
was able to activate the defences of Empire trading, and the early
devaluation of 1931 offered some degree of competetive advantage.
15. D. Trotsky (l970), 8.
16. V.I. Lenin (1970b), 90.
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POLITIQAL EGQHQMI iûîD THE BAGKGfiOUKD TO THE POBT-WAR EAPAHBION
The expansion of the capitalist econoriy as a whole rests upon the 
ability of productive enterprise to extract surplus value from the working class 
and to realize it in the process that Marx termed "extended reproduction".
Unless surplus value can be realized in or near its entirety, the rate of 
expansion will slacken and at a certain point capital's seIf-expansion will 
become problematic, absolute contraction or "contracted reproduction" being 
the most acute form, (l) More or less protracted periods of problematic, 
expansion have been a recurrent feature of capitalist development. Against 
such periodic discontinuities, accumulation constitutes an "adequate" level 
of reconversion of extracted surplus value into the elements of the 
productive process, on an 'extenddd ' scale in the case of "normal" 
capitalist expansion,(2)
While abstractly posing the course of capitalist development 
in this way, Marx was centrally concerned to examine the 'contradictions' 
which arise in the process of extended reproduction. The obstacles to the 
stable expansion of the system are consistently identified in terms of 
capital's capacity for profitable activity. Capitalism, that is to say,
"comes to a standstill at a point • 
fixed by the production hnd realization 
of profit, and not the satisfaction of 
requirements." (s).
Three particular problems are likely to emerge in this process.
In the first place, accumulation may lead to a diminution of the reserve army 
of labour, or the unemployed, leading to a rise in the value, of labour,power 
tlirough the strenghening of worker's bargaining position, and hence to a 
reduction in the rate of profit, the regulator of the accumulation process.(4) 
In addition, the distintion between constant and variable capital and the 
associated tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise over time 
tend to excercise a depressive influence on the rate of profit and, in the 
absence of sufficiently powerful "counterveiling" factors, pose acute, problems
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for the cycle of extended reproduction,(5) Finally, because capitalist 
accumulation is, from the viewpoint of total social capital, essentially 
unplanned and based essentially on the decisions of individual competing 
capitalist units within limits imposed by the prevailing rate of profit, 
development and growth in the capitalist economy tend to be uneven and 
disproportionate.(6)
Marx's analysis, however, even in Volume Three of Capital 
(in its general form of construction Capital,as an albeit uncompleted 
total work moves from a higher to a lower level of abstraction throughout 
the three volumes) remains a highly abstract model of the functioning of 
the capitalist system. For the analysis of concrete capitalist development, 
a distinction must be made between the simplified conceptual models 
constructed by Marx, such as the reproduction schema of Volume Two of 
Capital, and the actual operations of the capitalist economy.(7) That 
Marx's schema and "laws" were derived from a systematic analysis of 
commodity production, an analysis grounded in a study of the social 
relations of production which characterize commodity-producing societies^  
is not being questioned here. The point we are making is that if Marx's 
model is left at the level of abstraction at which, in the context of the 
pioneering nature of his political economy, he necessarily constructed it, 
the resulting conceptualisation more closely resembles a philosophical 
analytic, concerned -with the relations between abstract logical categories, 
than the theoretical specificity of analysis that is embodied in, for example, 
the attempts by Lenin and Luxemburg to explain the nature of imperialism.
This determinate, historical point of reference is a crucial feature of 
Marxist theory and is vital to it* Marx., in his first detailed work infomed 
by the perspective of histincal materialism, accordingly observes 
"The premises from which we begin are 
not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but
real premises from which abstraction 
can only be made in the imagination.
They are the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions, 
under which they live- - - - - These
premises can thus he verified in a
purely empirical way." (S)
The concern of Marxism, in so far as that concern may he legitimately
abstracted from the prograj-mnatic epistemology embodied-, mos,t succinctly.
in the Theses on Feuerbach (9) is to interpret the world in all its concrete
conditions, patterns and variety. Any attempt to reduce it to a system of
purely logical relations is quite alien to this method of social analysis. (lO)
The history of capitalism as a world system may be depicted 
schematically in terms of a nuitber of long period trends, three of which are. 
particularly relevant for our immediate purposes. To some: extent, this 
classification recovers certain sections of our preceding analysis. We mil 
summarize the chief movements in the political economy of recent capitalism 
as a background to the specific post-war restoration, both globally and in 
Britain, and the question of the role of the state within it.
Our first period spans from the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
to the outbreak of the First World War. During the late nineteenth century 
Britain's undisputed global supremacy came to an end and a new phrase of 
international competition began. This period was characterized first and 
foremost by the geographical expansion of capitalismiand, in particular, the 
export of capital. This phrase of expansionism posed the need for new outlets 
fdr commodities, the "realization" moment of the total cycle of extended 
reproduction, in order to maintain the dynemiic of accumulation. The early 
twentieth century, however, was in general foV-Ourable to expanded reproduction, 
for the major capitalist countries provided markets for each other's
products at the same time as they competed more intensively for positions of 
influence in the other areas. The steady flow of overseas investment both kept 
up the rate of profit in the advanced countries and opened up new markets for 
industrial products. The especially rapid rise in the rate of overseas 
investment in the years iiinmediately prior to the 1914-1918 war is apparent in 
the following table.
YEAR. BRITISH GROaw DOMil&TIG FIXED 
aâPITiUi FOlWiTIOM :?o
WET FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT
1880- 9 6.1 4.9
1890- 9 6.9 3.2
1900- 9 7.8 3.9
1905-14 6.0 6.9
■ ■ -... - - (11)
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■Whilé-eBritish cLomestic fixed capital formation faltered during the fifteen 
years before the outbreakcf war, the rate of foreign investment increased 
by well over 50 per cent. These developments took place within afavourable 
framework of stable currencies, the international gold standard, and multilateral
trade, a framework within which the great states of Europe dominated the world
market, despite the emergent strength of the United States. Moretany confidence 
was sustained by relative political stability and a series of important new gold 
discoveries.(12) Monopoly trends became increasingly marked during this period,
A Hunter, in a detailed empirical analysis, identifies a decisive merger wmive 
in the U.S.A. during 1879-1903, and in Britain between 1898-1904. (13) Hunter 
observes
"The massive mergers at the turn of the century
appear to have been unique in the degree to
which they crystallized the industrial structures '■ 
of the U.S.A. and Britain into a concentration pattern 
that persists to the present day." (14)
Finally the tensions associated with the growing international competition 
among the great powers contributed to increased expansion through arms 
production. Generally, the period immediately prior to the First World War was 
favourable to the expansion of capitalism, despite the increasingly ominous, 
development of international rivalry.
The struggle for international dominance, exacerbating and 
exacerbated by increasingly intense rivaliy, culminated in the 1914-1918 war, 
from which the United States emerged strengthened, but not yet securejand finally 
consolidated in its position as the dorminant world power. Largely as a consequence 
of the incompleteness of American dominance, instability and crisis pervaded the 
inter-war period. The pre - 1914 world market m s  drastically disrupted, and 
repercussions were felt in the form of currency disorder, protectionism, and a. 
ckironic international condition of imba.lance. Different countries were 
differentially effected by this process of destabilization, however. The 
deterorating position of Britain in the 1920's contrasted vdth that of the 
ascendant United States and the relatively prosperous Germany until 1929, when 
Depression became generalized throughout the capitalist world.
During this period, how^ ever, international relations never lost all 
semblance of order with a decline into absolute collapse. The breakdown of the 
world market posed acute problems, especially in the older industries, but 
profitable investment and trade continued in other sectors, even during the 
Depression years.
-WORLD PRODUCTION IM ) TRADE. 1929-1957
1929 1932 1937
Foodstuffs.
World Trade. 
World Production,
100
100
89
100
94
108
Raw Materials.
World Trade. 100 82 108
World Production. 100 74 116
Manufacturers„
World Trade. 100 57 87
World Production, 100 70 120 (15)
VJhile both production and trade fell during 1929-52, the fall v/as, mth the
exception of raw materials, most pronounced in trade. Between 1932-7, vhile
both trade and production revived in all tl'iree sectors, trade rose more slowly
than did production, and the former remained significantly below the 1929 levels
in both foodstuffs and manufactures. The overall international econonaic dislocation
was acute, especially during the actual depression years of, 1929-1932, •udien world 
•^ rade in lïianufactures fell by over 40 per cent. In such conditions, British
capitalism resorted increasingly to its traditional activiitieS as a provider of
economic services rather than industrial output. In particular, invisible
earnings as a percentage of total imports rose dramatically,
TEAR. INVISIBLE;^  AB PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTE,
1924 52
1929 29
1955 46
1938 37
(16)
The increased significance of invisible earnings indicates' how a traditional 
pattern helped cushion Britain from some of the consequences of the general 
decline in world economic activity. Nevertheless, the economic crisis of the 
inter-war period was profound, and was accompanied by bitter struggles for 
markets, struggles waged with bilateral agreements, exchange controls, currency 
depreciation and allied means of economic warfare.
Economic recovery was finally consolidated in the late 1930*s. One 
c ommentat or ob s erve s.
"Despite some technical change and the rise 
of new industries, despite public policies 
designed to supplement market forces, there 
v/as never a sign, before 1939, of a real and 
permanent rebuilding of the world market." (17)
That is was largely by means of the arms programme that the leading capitalist 
nations emerged from the Depression indicator the path by which économie!. 
recovery opened the way for the Second World War. Production became geared to 
the needs of the war ecconomy (18), and since a major part of the total output 
did not appear on the capitalist market in the "normal" way, the probleîns associated 
with its "realization" were, in immediate terms, resolved.(l9) Govermaeht control 
and administrative-integration of the whole process of production reached 
unparalleled extents, the operational antonomy of individual enterprises being 
substantially curbed, (20) The armaments- led boom, moreover, augmented the 
increasing interpenetration of state and industry, economic protectionism 
continuing unabated,(21)
War economy took the capitalist world into a long period of economic 
expansion, a period of continous extended reproduction which has only recently 
become visibly problematic. The initial conditions, of the continuation of economic 
expansion into the post-war period derived largely from the legacy of the previous 
years. The relative stagnation of the 1950's, together with the running down of 
much basic productive equipment during the Second World War, provided extremely 
favourable opportunities for increased investment, as did the; general need for 
the reconstruction and reconversion of production on a peacetime footing. The 
means to finance this expansion came partly from the cash balances in the hands 
of business during the phrase of the dismantling of the war economy,(22) In 
addition, from their peaic during the Korean War until the comnodity price 
explosion of the early 1970's, the prices of primary products relative to 
manufactured goods, the former corning in the main from the developing countries, 
persistently fell(25) The structure of imperialism in this way reinforced and 
helped to underwrite the prevailing pattern of capitalist expansion.
Highly varied conditions characterized the different capitalist states 
during this phrase of transition to peace. In Germany, for example, particularly 
favourable conditions for the reconstruction of a new capitalist order had been 
prepared by the period of fascist rule. The share of wages in the national 
products had fallen from 64 per cent in 1952 to 57 per cent in 1958. (24) The 
earlier militancy of the German working class, moreover, had been destroyed by 
armed capital in its fascist form, (25) The combination of lower wages, long 
working Hour® and improved conditions of "realization" in the fom of government 
orders during the Hitler period allowed a rapid pH: use of capital accumulation 
to develop in the German war economy. For manyjears after the v/ar, moreover, 
capital -was not impelled to make serious concessions to the weakened worlcing 
class, and the level of wages in West Germany did not reach that of 1958 until 
at least 1950 and possibly until 1956,(25)
-  q-O'-r ■
Despite such, national peculiarities, however, the capitalist world
a.s 8. whole was, after 194-5, in a favourable, position for a new phrase of 
expansion. In addition to the factors noted above, a vital key to this expansion 
is to be found in the disproportionate development of Anerican capitalism prior 
to and during the 1939-1945 war, and its consolidation as the dominant capitalist 
power. As against Britain’s performance, the United States invested substantially 
in new productive equipment throughout the war period, (27) From this strengthened 
position, as we shall discuss in the following section, the United States took 
responsibility for restoring world capitalism after 1945 with loans and aid of 
various types. Although operating on a narrower geographical base, and also in 
a politically less secure position, -with the expansion of Soviet influence tlirough 
Fast Europe, capitalism and its various national components emerged after 1945 in 
a far more integrated form than it had been in 1959. It is the basis of this 
integration and the expansion which it fostered that will now be our concern.
POLITICAL EGOrTOKY AND THE BAGEGROUliD TO THE POET-WAR EXPANSION. JREEEENOES.
lo E, Mandel (1968), 551-2
2o K.Marx (1967b), 598-9, This depiction of the process of capitalist
accumulation is, we recognise, uncomfortably brief ~ Questions of space 
prevent us from discussing the debates concerning accumulation at greater 
length in a specificsection. Particular aspects of the total process are 
given a rather fuller treatment as they become relevant for our analysis.
In particular, see the discussion of the significance of the money form of 
capital in capitalist reproduction (See "Arms and the State, A New Stability?") 
and that of the problems associated with the falling rate of profit. (Section 
VII,"Profitability and British Capitalism")
;5. K. Marx (1959), 255.
4-. Ibid, 251.
5. See section (VII, "Profitability and British Capitalism".)
6. See, for example, Marx's comments on the complexity of the relations between 
the two departments of total social social production,those producing means 
of production (the elements of "productive consumption") and articles of 
consumption respectively. (K. Marx. 1967b, 599-407)
7. As one commentator observes,
"At best a theoretical model is an 
imperfect replica of the real world, 
more or less adequately representing 
a small part of it while holding 
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mthin particular countries and the immediate economic needs in particular 
instances. In Britain, for example, the state continued to play a 
comparatively supportive role in relation to market processes, while the 
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Guerin predicted:
"The industrialists have attained their ends: at 
last they have at their command the'strong state' 
they -wanted. Through a series of economic and social 
measures, the fascist state -v/ill try to check the 
decline of their profits and make their businesses 
pay once more," (178)
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The accuracy of this prediction is confirmed hy, among other studies, that 
of A. Schweitzer (1964). According to one estimate, the German Reich added 
about a quarter to its domestically produced resources from foreign conquests, 
not including direct seizures of gold, foreign exchange assets, vrorks of art 
and raw materials, (A„ Maddison, 1975, 51). Through such aggressive 
expansionism German capitalism to a large extent recovered from the tmn 
obstacles of high reparation payments resulting from the 1914-18 ?/ar. and 
the particularly acute effects transmitted from the Depression in America 
during the early 1950's. Germany's economic success during the 1950's was 
achieved largely through the war-based centrality of the state in her 
productive system. By 1959 some 25 per cent of G.N.P. was going to current 
government spending, while output per head was higher, and unemployment 
lower, than in any other European country. It may also be noted that, with 
the scaling domi of both her pre- and post-war debts in 1955, Germany was 
one of the few major countries to emerge as a net gainer on foreign account 
because of the war, (ibid, 55-6)
26. E, Alvatar et - al (1974), 9.
27, A. Glyn and B„ Sutcliffe (1972), 55.
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE REVIVAL OF CAPITALISM
Effectively, the United States assumed overall responsibility for the 
future of the international capitalist system after the Second World War. A 
brucialaspect of the occupancy of such a role is the supportive and integrative; 
policy pursued by the dominant power in order to develop and maintain some degree, 
of stability in international relations,* This involves the relations both amongst 
the various competing capitalist powers, and also between them and the weaker areas 
within the international division of labour* Prior to 1914^ the. structure of 
international relations was. supported by two principal trading complexes, India's, 
balance of payments deficit to Britain and her surpluses with other countries were 
one vital means of international integration. The other important factor was the 
network of trading balances between Britain, Europe and North America, (l) This 
framework of international relations which had been constructed over an extended 
period, was violently disrupted by the 1914-1918 war and finally destroyed by that 
of 1959-1945,
During the 1914-1918 war, Britain had become a longterm debtor to the 
United States, a relationship which constituted a reversal of roles between the 
two powers. Between the outbreak of the war- in August 1914 and the end of the 
financial year 1918-1919, Britain had lent some El,741]%. on the international 
market* Ags-inst this she had received loans totalling El,565m,, of which El,027m., 
by far the larger part, came from the United States. British loans, that is to say, 
exceeded borrowing by some £550m*(2) Aiierican loans, in effect, were being 
transmitted to other wartime allies through Britain as a financial intermediary.
In the longer-term, however, Britain's role as debtor tothe United States represented 
more than a simple banker's function. As early as September 1915, the volume of 
A'nerican exports to Britain had increased to such an extent that the exchange rate 
of the pound to the dollar began to deteriorate. Already the. seeds of A'nerican 
ascendancy weie beginning to germinate.
London's strength had long rested on her position as an international 
creditor on a vast scale.(s) By 1918, however, this position had been seriously 
undermined, and in the years immediately preceding the Second World War Britain 
was suffering an uncharacteristic balance of payments deficit. Indicative of this 
change, which developed further during 1959-1945, v;§.8. the changing balance of 
payments, relationship -with India, a cruoual support of the international system 
during the earlier period. Between 1958-1945 British exports to Ind.ia fell from 
E54m. to E18ra. India, further, used her sterling balances to buy a number of key 
British investments in India, Indian sterling balances in London had in gact risen 
to El, 521m. by the end of 1945, and a n'umber of Middle Eastern countries, most 
notably Egypt and Sudan, similarly accumulated favourahle sterling balances over 
the same period. The following table-indicater the scale of Britain's total 
international indebtedness by m d  -1945,
------ - - ------ —-- -- ---- - ------ -- - ---
Em.
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire, 584.
India, Burma, Middle East. 1,752.
Colonies and the other Sterling Area. 607
Total Sterling Area. 2,725
North & South America. 505
European States and Dependencies. 267
Rest of the. World. 62
Total, 5,555.
(4)
The net result of this process, epitomized by the daunting total 1945 
indebtedness of over E5,000m., was to largely offset Britain's traditional income 
from invisible earnings, a major pillar of her erstwhile hegemonic position. The 
new structure of international transactions, moreover, represented a substantial 
claim on Britain's resources after 1945. Post-war exports, in addition to their 
normal purpose of balancing, immediate imports, had to pay for a large part of the 
imports of the war years. Britain, in short, emerged from the Second Vforld War a 
victor, but economically wealcened and subject to the newly -consolidated global 
hegemony of the United States.
The twentieth century, then, has witnessed a thorough- going transformation 
in tie pattern of international capitalist relations. The inter-war absence of an 
effective hegemonic power resulted in the ascendancy of anti-liberal national 
economic tendencies, fascism being their extreme and par excellence manifestation. 
After 1959-1945, the victor powers, guided and dominated by the United States, 
attempted to establish what Milward has termed
"a set of quasi-liberal international 
economic institutions whose purpose 
was to bring order out of the supposed 
international chaos of the inter-war 
period by re-establishing an acceptable 
system of international trade and payments. " (5)
Precisely what form this new system took, the position of the United States within ■ 
it, and its long-term implications for the international stability of capital and 
trade movements is the concern of the remainder of this section.
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An. important part of Auerica's recreation of a stable world capitalist 
system was the restoration of the war-shattered economies of Western Europe and 
Japan, The United States made considerable loans to Europe in particular in order 
to prop up a number of near-destitute regimes and, in doing so, to preserve the 
West European capitalist structure intact. This, from the American point of view, 
was an essential requirement, especially in the content of the consolidation of 
Soviet influence over a belt of Eastern European states, (5) Specifically concerning 
Britain, the Lend-Lease Acts of March 1941 leü, to the provision of ^ ^50,000m. of 
aid to the Sterling Area, the dominant part of which 26,000-27,000m. ) went to 
Britain. To guage the depth of Britain’s needs at that time, it has been estimated 
that the absolute dollar cost of the m r  to Britain would have financed 16 years of 
imports from the United States, at the 1958 level of prices, taldng no account of 
British exports or other dollar earnings,(6)
The Lend-Lease agreements were suddenly cancelled in 1945 and Britain 
had no alternative but to raise a loan from the United Btates on moreConventional 
terms, bothin order to survive in its condition of imnediate indebtedness and to 
repay the substantial already - borrowed sums.. This loan took the form of Marshall 
Aid. (the European Recovery Programme) which came into operation at the end of 
1947, Marshall Aid for Europe as a whole totalled 17 Milliard. Most of this 
sum was distributed over 1948-9, Britain declining further Aid after 1950, It 
was replaced by direct military assistance, however, and, as Pollard notes, it 
had by then "fulfilled it main function of carrying Europe over its critical 
deficit years."(7)
A related facet of the post-war re-stabilization programme was the
historic decision resulting from the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, to restore the
disrupted international capitalist system. At Bretton Woods the decision to 
establish the International Monetary Fund was made. The I.M.F, was to be
provided with a pool of gold and currency, contributed according to an agreed,
plan by the member nations, which would be used to allow any member suffering 
balance of pajnnents difficulties to overcome them v/ithout precipitating a major 
international crisis. Central to the Bretton Woods decisions was the privileged 
position given to the dollar for purposes of international capita], &nd goods 
movements. The dollar was guaranteed at a fixed rate aginst gold enid became; 
the major reserve asset throughout Europe during the post-war period.
Contributions made by the member countries consisted of 75 per cent in domestic 
currency and 25 per cent in gold. Debtor countries could draw from the fund in 
times of balance of pa.yments difficulties, on condition that their currencies 
would fluctuate by only 1 per cent against either side of their par value in 
relation to the dollar. Member^’ currencies were in this way tied to gold.
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(priced at the fixed rate of XK 35 to a fine ounce of gold) through the Dollar.
This privileged position of the dollar in the Bretton Woods programme 
indicates the dominance that the United States had acquired hy this time. The 
post-war stabilizing arrangements were, as against the autarchic tendencies of the 
inter-war period,operated tlirough a set of international institutions, but the 
central position of America in the new structure of relations is crucial for an 
understanding of developments since then. One coimiientator stresses the importance of
"the readiness of successive American 
administrators to play a positive role 
in the development of international 
economic relations."(8)
America acted on two particular fronts, providing large amount.®sof capital and 
being instrumental in creating the new institutions to adrainster and organize the 
process of international recovery and reintegration. In addition to the I.M.F.utexe 
the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (1946) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947).G.A.T.T, luas concerned vd.th tariff policy 
and, with qualifications concerning exceptional cases, embodied the iimerican 
emphasis on multilateralism and non-discrimination. The I.B.R.D, was instituted 
primarilly for the provision of longer-term capital than the. I.M.F., conceived 
] m%3bly for contingencies- would supply. Such institutions, constituted the 
scenario within which restrictions on payments and trade have been progressively 
reduced 'and the international flow of capital resumed. For a long period after 
1945, in fact, trade expanded considerably faster than did actual production, and 
by 1951 West Europe had agin reached pre-war levels of output. International 
controls were gradually relaxed, and by 1958 the major West European currencies 
were made convertible subject only to relatively minor restrictions. The ideals 
of Bretton Woods appeared to have been more or less permanently realized.
European recoveiy^  inconceivable vdthout American aid and initiative, 
both performed a vital military function for the capitalist sector of the world 
and provided investment fields and markets for the U.8. economy. The importance 
of the overseas connections for Anerican capitalism is highlighted by the figures 
for the increase in re'turns from foreign investment,vAich rose from 10 per cent of 
A'nerican corporate profits in 1950 to 24 per cent of gross profits by 1964,(9) 
Enduring trade links, as we have seen, were established in the post-war eccomic 
revival. In addition, new production techniques were developed and applied 
internationally,(lO) and reconstruction vms reinforced by an unprecedented 
peacetime level of arms expenditure,(11) On the basis of these developments, a 
protracted boom, increasingly centred on civilian investment (although at many
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points associated with the military industries) and an expanded market for 
consumer goods, (the material basis for the "embourgeoisement" theories of the 
1950's and I960's^dominated the advanced capitalist countries. Despite periodic 
recessionary tendencies in the heartlands of the United States economic empire 
world capitalism was again able to extract end realize surplus - value on an 
expanding scale.
An important debate concerning the nature and extent of instability 
in the international economy, epitomized by the abandonment of the fixed exchange 
rates system in 1971, has developed over the last decade,(12) Broadly speaking 
two major positions have been held bythe protagonists of the debate, the division 
being centred on the significance of the internationalization of capital and its. 
implications, for the autonomy of the nation state. At one extreme R. Murray 
proposes, on the basis of the post -1945 internationalization of capital, the 
emergence of a pattern of "territorial non-coincidence."(13) By this Murray 
refers to a process whereby the traditionally close relationship between capital 
and the domestic state in the fièid of extended economic expansion becomes 
progressively weaicened. The possible executors of state functions in the international 
context of "extended capital" now include, in addition to the domestic state, 
extended capital itself, foreign states, and co-operatingstate bodies, (ibid.,96-100),
As against the classical liberal model of the international economy 
which views the nation state as "the basic category in the world; the atom of the 
system," Murray envisages the development and consolidation of national economic 
interdependence, characterized by the easing of trade and capital movements, mth 
a resulting decrease in the power of the hitherto discrete nation state,
"There is accordingly a tendency 
for the process of internationalization 
to increase the f potential economic 
instability in the world economy at 
the same time as decreasing the 
power of national governments to control 
economic activity even within their own 
borders,"(14)
While Murray identifies clear and important destabilizing processes 
deriving from this process, his primary emphasis is on the internationalization 
of capital as such. State actions, for example, are seen to weaken their 
;ilomestic capitals by encouraging foreign investment for balance of pa^ yments 
purposes, the result being a brake on the development of home industries.
(ibid,, 108.) In his oscillation between the destabilizing effects of increasing
internationalization and the supposed easing of trade and capital movements, 
on the one hand, and its destabilizing consequences on the other, Murray echoes, 
some five decades later, the theses elaborated by Kautsky immediately before, 
and during the 1914-18 war. Kautslîy asked:
"Cannot the present imperialist policy 
be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist 
policy, which will introduce the joint 
exploitation of thewworld by internationally 
united finance capital in place of the mutual 
rivalies of national finance capitals?" (15)
Kautsky's answer was that such a development is "conceivable", despite, his 
reluctance to predict its likeihood of actual occurance. We will suggest 
that Murray, like Kautslcy, bases his speculations on an erroneous conception 
of the prevailing structure of inter-state relations. Before elaborating this 
contention, however, we will mention a similar position put forward by Mande 1.
Handel's thesis concerns specifically European capitalism. The E.E.O. 
he observes, is both consequence and promoter of capital concentration on an 
international scale within Europe, The bourgeoisie requires state intervention, 
to maintain its sustern of domination, but as European capital interpenetration 
extends a wider state form than that of the national unit becomes increasingly 
necessary. The E.E.G., however, is. still a loose confederation of states, not 
yet corresponding to such a super-national state complex, Handel identifes a 
developing trend in that direction, however, and suggest that if it is blocked 
the result will be an inevitable return to economic nationalism, leaving the 
United States to dominate the world capitalist system,(16) Even in the absence 
of formal European integration at the political level, however, the general 
tendency is, for Mande 1, apparent.
"The direction in which the leading 
concerns are tending is clear. By 
taking their ovm international 
initiatives and by establishing 
international companies, they are 
trying to counteract the relapses in 
European economic integration caused 
by the indecision of national governments."(17)
The test, Handel suggests, will be a general recession in Europe. 
Such an eventuality would lead either to a retreat to nationalism with European 
capital resorting to its traditional state forms, or to a qualitative shift 
towards a European state, the E.E.C. assuming major state functions. Thus, posed 
the outcome depends largely upon the intellectual skills and foresight of
European capitalists and politicians, the "correct" choice offering them, as 
a bloc, a new lease oflife against Anerican competition,(18)
The actual extent of the internationalization of capital requires 
clarification if this prospect is to be assessed, however. The example of 
Britain is particularly instructive. In point of fact rather less than 10 per 
cent of British industrial capital is foreign owned, while British overseas 
investment now amounts to little more than 10 per cent of her domestic 
capital,(19) A useful body of data relating to the interpenetration of 
national capitals may be found in Mandel ' s ovm Eurone Versus Aaerica. Its 
still small if rising significance, especially between the Y/est European 
countries, leads îîandel to a sober caution, if not indécision, concerning the 
prospects of an emergent E^uropean super-state. The still relatively low level of 
interpenetration, especially in the context of an international crisis of 
profitability, renders the possibility of a ;Suropean super-state higb-ly 
improbable. This is even more the case -vdien, as at present, the world market 
has ceased to expand and a struggle for sectional spheres of influence and 
penetration flows organically from the structure of international capital.
What seems more likely is a progressive retrenchment into positions 
of more or less transparent economic nationalism within a scenario of intensified 
rivalry, principally between the United States, Japan and Europe, but also within 
the Y/est European sub-continent, including Britain, itself. Such a development 
vfould broadly correspond to what J, Knapp has termed "the emergent pattern of 
reluctant mercantilism. " (20) This tendency is aggravated by a chronic and 
worsening payments disequilibrium between the major countries in the capitalist 
world. Especially prominent is the persistent West German'surplus as against 
the deficits of Britain and the United States, much of this imbalance deriving 
from the t-win factors of government payiients and capital exports from Britain 
and North America. In addition, the very volatility of short-term capital 
movements, exacerbated by the anarchy of the Eurodollar markets, has played a 
large part in undermining international currency stability, culminating in the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate system in 1971,(21) Both these factors 
have been decisive in effecting a shift away from the earlier post-war liberal 
international structure of relations towards increasingly nationalistic 
restrictive and protective practices.
The re-emergence of tariff barriers inside the E.E.G. during the 
early 1970‘s indicates that this process is already well underway. The dominant 
trend, that is to say, is away from super-national integration and towards a 
strenghening of the national capitalist state in relation to the decisive firms
of the economies concerned.(22)
The dynamic of this movement in the world economy centres on the
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structure of American capitalism and its effects on the international, 
especially European, capitalist system. As early as 1925 it had been pointed 
out that the centre of capitalist power had shifted from Europe to the United 
States,(25), Whereas sterling was used as the main means, to finance international 
investment through the period of the gold standard up to 1914, the American dollar 
has proved unable to perform a comparable role, even in the medium term. Prior to 
the First World War a "strong" pound was adequate for the task of providing the 
means of liquid payment that the world economy required, while the City of London 
provided the accompanying credit and financial services.(24) As W.M.Glarke 
points out :
—  since the 1914-18 war, the 
financial experts of the West Have 
been searching for a viable substitute."(25)
The dollar, however, has proved quite inadequate for that task.
During the early post-war years the United States balance of payments registered 
a persistent surplus and the capitalist world as a whole suffered from an acute, 
dollar shortage. Within a short period of time, however, Clarke's hypothetical 
and retrospective prospect of the development of the New York market into a 
"capital exporting machine" comparable to London a century earlier was underminedu 
by a number of mutually compounding tendencies in the international movement of 
capital.
In the first place the costly European restoration programme, 
together with the military expenditure on the Korean and Vietnamese wars and 
ibnerica's expenses of empire in general, resulted in both a loss of gold reserves 
and a building up of external dollar balances. In the short-term the potential 
deficit engendered by these developments was auginented by the vast outpouring 
of private capital to areas which offered a higher rate of profit. But up until 
the late 1960's the United States maintained a large surplus mn international 
account for goods, services and investment income. That for 1965-67 was as high 
as ^ 8,5 billion. The outflow of dollar-transfers for the same, period totalled 
^  10,8 billion, however, more than offsetting the trade and investment sprplMs(26) 
The content and direction of these dollar outflows - principally military 
expenditure, aid and investment-relate directly to the structure of iimerican 
imperialism.(27) As such they are essential for the maintenance of the trade and 
investment surplus, even while they work to undermine it. That restricted surplus, 
moreover, finally turned into a deficit in 1972, further pressuring the iimerican 
economy in general and the dollar in particular.
It was against this background that a'v/ave of speculation against 
the dollar in 1971 and again in early 1973 further contributed to the undermining 
of confidence in that currency. The siimiltaneous growth of international
competition for markets has compôuncLed the general weakness of the dollar, 
despite short-term fluctuations in its relative strength, and rendered the 
prospect of continued or restored international stability centred on American 
capitalism even more problematic. Having for some two decades provided a steady 
stream of overseas investment and liquidity, thus helping to raise the general 
level of material wealth in the advanced capitalist coimtries, the Anerican 
balance of payments has finally undermined the strength of and international 
confidence in the dollar, the world' s chief reserve currency. The very basis 
of the post-v/ar expansion, proclaimed "as good as gold" prior to President Nixon's 
measures of August 15th, 1971, has in tlds wa.j become the prime mover of a period 
of international economic instability. The three decades since 1945 have seen a 
rise in the proportion of both trade and investment flomng between the advanced 
capitalist countries. at the relative expense of that between this sector and 
the developing world. At the same time, moreover, particular countries have 
tended to specialize increasingly in the supply of particular comiïiodities.
Trade, that is to say, has become more geographically concentrated and 
crystallized araong suppliers and markets over time,(28) Unresolved tensions 
in the world economy, particularly in its American heartlands, ensure, nevertheless, 
that this new global division of labour contains the seeds of its own 
fragment at ion.
THE UNITED BTATEB AID THE REVIVAL OF GAPITALILM. REFERNUEL,
1. A .S .  Milward (1970),45
2. S. Pollard (1969),74
3. This pillar of London's traditional strength is well documented in 
W.A.P. Manser (1966) ,
4. S, Pollard (1969), 335. See also 354.
5. ibid., 559-361. A. Maddison (1975), 36-38.
6. D.F. Mc.Currach (1948)
7. S. Pollard (1969), 361. American aid at this time was not, of course, 
without conditions. Generally speaking, Western European countries were, 
in return for receiving Marshall Aid, expected to curb government spending 
and private consumption in order to increase productive investment and 
exports. Such policies were inseparable from the general United States 
programme to restore production and trade in the capitalist world.
Indicative of this active prominence of America in the restoration period 
were the observations made concerning Britain in 1953 by the Gormxittee for
Economic Development-
"V/ill not increases in v/s-ges and other incomes 
and in government social welfare payments in 
the United Kingdom have to be kept within 
conservative liiïiites until the grovrfch of 
productivity makes possible a more rapid 
increase? The new slower growth of British
production suggests that this will be necessary
to maintain monetary stability."
(Quoted in C.Y.H. Lo, 1975, 58).
Successive British administrations, both Conservative and Social 
Democratic, attempted, as we shall see, to pursue, precisely this policy.
In addition, American control in the form of direct corporate investment 
wi.thin Europe as a whole has intensified significantly since, the Second World 
War. At the same time as the rate cfforeign investment increased after 1950, 
that share going to Western Europe doubled from 15 per cent of the total in
1963 to 30 per cent in 1969, in the latter year overtaking Canada as the
largest single recipient. (Y.S. Hu, 1975, 5-7). This increasing dominance is a 
direct aspect of the central role played by American capitalism in sustaining the 
post-war boom, especially in the context of the West European countries. It may 
also be noted that the global significance of American overseas investment is 
highlighted by the especially rapid increase in European investment after the 
signing of the 1950 N.A.T.O. pact wiiioh provided for a permanent United States
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military presence, oriented primarily toward the East European Soviet 
bloc. (V, Perlo, 1963, 54-5)
8. A. Harrison (1968), 87,
9, H, Magdoff (1965).
10, Blende 1 has termed this aspect of the post-war boom the "third industrial
revolution", a conception critically evaluated in our discussion of 
theories- of the "technocratic state". The emergence of the United States 
as the major beneficiany of the general destruction of values that occured 
during the Second World War placed that country at the directive centre of 
the ensuing reconstruction process, in terms of scientific and
technolgical development as well as of capital movements. D,L, Spencer
thus notes that the United States functioned as the "central magnet" and 
"generator" of international technological transfer after 1945, The two- 
way flow of technicians and managers between North America and the; war- 
shattered economies of Western Europe and elsewhere accompanied the 
provision of capital and grant aid for the restoration of capitalist 
production. (D.L. Spencer, 1970, 41), The ruination of European industry 
for the second time within half a century consolidated America's position 
as the leading capitalist power by virtue both of its capital reserves and 
its closely related military-technological resources and Icnow-^ ow.
11* In Britain, for example, after an initial post-war decline in military 
expenditure spending rose, with small fluctuations, from £1,884 m, in 
1948 to £3,082 m. in 1973 at constant (1972) prices, (E, Allaun, 1974, 5),
V. Permlo (1963) discusses the importance of the military sector for expansion 
and development of the United States economy as a whole in the post-war 
period. Pointing out that the combined areas of militarism and foreign 
investment accounted for over of all North American fixed capital outlays 
by the early 1960's, Perlo indicates the additional impact of the military 
budget tlirough such related industries as aircraft, shipbuilding, missiles 
and electronics. He observes:
"This expanded list certainly embraces a major 
portion of imierican industry, and indicates that 
the material basis for big business support for 
a militarized foreign expansionist economy is 
quite substantial," (lOl),
The destabilizing effects of militarism mthin the capitalist economy are 
discussed later in this section, but its initially stimulating function is 
central to the whole period of expansion which followed the aimaiaents-led 
build up to the 1939-45 war.
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12, The question of international stability, especially within Europe, had
of course been raised earlier than this perhaps arbitrary date. In 1961, 
for example, it v/as pointed out that:
"Ten years of artificial co-operation 
has not stamped out three centuries 
of European history. The age ~ old 
process of jockeying for positions of 
political and economic advantage has 
simply taken on new fon%s. Whenever 
the economic situation reveals, the 
possibility that the market may cease 
to expand or s;tart to contract capitalist 
interests push for national advantages in 
the struggle," ("Labour Review", Vol. 6 No.5, Winter 1961)
It is only since the raid and especially the last 1960’s, however, that the 
visible breaking of earlier patterns of often suspicious co-operation mthin 
the capitalist world has prompted a more widespread debate concerning the 
prospects of continued economic expansion in the Western countries. As late 
as 1969, moreover, Shonfield could confidently assert that:
"Therelsfio reason to suppose that the patterns 
of the past, which have been ingeniously 
unravelled by the historians of trade cycles 
will reassert themselves, in the future,"
(a . Shonfield, 1969, 62),
It is unclear as to whether Shonfield’s mysterious and anonymous historians 
derive their perspectives of trade cycles from the theories of Schumpeter, 
Duesenberry, Kondrs-tieff, Trotslcy or Mandel, Ylioever Shonfield is refering 
to, it seems to us that this passage alone, written within half a decade of 
the deepest global recession since the 1950*s, justifies a far-reaching 
discussion of the prospects for international capitalism.
15, R, Murray (1971), 85,
14, Ibid,, 108,
15, "Die Neue Zeit", April 30, 1915, Quoted in V,I, Lenin (1970b), 142,
16, E, Mandel (1970a), 47-58,
17, Ibid,, 60,
18, This thesis is restated almost verbatim by H. Radice and S, Picciotto (1971), 
It also recalls Servan-Schreiber's proposals for a European industrial and 
scientific policy "capable of dealing mth the United States." (J.J. Servan- 
Schreiber, 1969, 142). Schreiber suggests that in order to defend itself
from and combat American corporate power Europe must secure a breakthrough
in a number of key, advanced technological sectors. This, he elaborates, 
requires the development of European firms large enough to be competitive 
and federal European state aid% comparable to that provided in the United 
States, on a massive scale, (ibid,,152-5), Schreiber counterposes the 
actual trend towards increasing national autonomy within Western Europe to 
the need, central to economic survival in the face of the "American challenge", 
to Great a powerful European technological community vd.th discrete federal 
state authority and financial resources. As v/ith Mandel, statesmanship and 
economic know-how are decisive in determining the prospects of European 
capitalism. We will suggest that this volumtanism underestimates the 
imperatives of the economic envireonment within which both states and firms 
are obliged to operate. See also Ï,S, Hu, (1975) Z80-1,
19, A, Glyn and B, Sutcliffe (1972), 155,
20, J, Ifnapp (1973), 19, See also H,G-, Johnson (1974), 18-19
21, See A, Maddison (1975), 45-4-8,
22, B, Warren (1975) developes this perspective in a study expressly intended as
a critique of Murray’s thesis. The continued protiferation of national barriers 
against the unrestricted flow of capital and of nationalist monetary policies 
within the E.E.O,, quite in contradistinction to Article 3 of the Treaty of 
Rome, testifies* to the powerful economic and political forces working in this 
direction, (S, de la Mahdtiere, 1970, 56-65),
25, L.Trotsky (1973), 233-4,
24. W.M. Clarke (1967), 177-183.
25. Ibid,, 179,
26, H,Xj. Robinson (1974), 401.
27, The imperialistic content of "aid" from the contemporary Western world is 
discussed in T, Hayter (1971), Specifically concerning the United States, see 
87-98, The important role of military spending in engendering and 
exacerbating the American deficit is emphasized in C.Y.H. Lo (1975), Lo 
correctly points out
"In the forties and fifties, U.S. military spending 
abroad eased the balance of payments difficulties 
in Europe, Recently, military spending has been 
exaceràating an ever increasing U.S. deficit, which 
is destroying the stable dise quililriimi of the 
international monetary order," (31),
Post“Korean War military outlays have averaged some 10 per cent of U.S. 
national income, a proportion roughly twice as high as that for the rest of 
the capitalist world, (V,P&rlo, 1973, 156), The relatively inflated share of 
military spending in the American budget and national income has contributed
bol-
G.onsiderably to that country's comparatively low rate of growth in the 
post-war period as well as to its deficit - tending payments situation. 
28o R. Rosencrance and A, Stein, (1975). See tables 6, 7, G, D, and G,
THE HISTORY OF STATE HjTERVmTION OF BRITAIN
Both before the industrial revolution tha.t saw the consolidation of
British capitalism and more recently, the characteristic attitude of government 
towards the economy has been one of recognized obligation to intervene in a
positive way in order to maintain and develops national economic life. A long
intermediary period was dominated by the laissez-faire conviction that a minimal 
level of intervention is the optimal or desirable goal. The ideological 
ascendancy of this doctrine coincided by and large vdth the rise and consolidation 
of Britain's status as the dominant world power, a position congfi/ent mth such 
opinions. Discussing the development of the capitalist economy as a whole,
Radice and Picciotto observe
"The role of the state throughout is to 
act as conscious co-ordinater, over and 
above the apparently free market, and 
thereby to ensure the continued reproduction 
of the relations of production.(l)
Total state laissez-faire, as Radice and Picciotto imply, is,in a society with 
a developing or developed division of labour, a contradiction in terms. State 
activity, if only through the routine enactment and enforcement of a system of laws 
and regulations, must and does affect economic life as it does the life of society in 
general. Specifically, the capitalist state, as the embodiment of a structure of 
class relations, within a nation located in an envix’onment of at least potentially 
antagonistic rivalry. cannot, without inviting its own extinction, abstain from 
exercising control over fundamental economic factors such as the issue of currency 
and the question of international relations. Over and above these necessities, 
moreover, is the requirement totcstrain and moderate domestic inter-class relation­
ships. Miat is at question is thus not the fact of state intervention, but its 
direction and character.
On this basis:, it is possible to identify a number of distinct, if 
overlapping, modes of state intervention from the genesis of the capitalist system 
in Britain to the period of autarchic national orientation of the 1950's. At the 
outset of the British industrial revolution, the major task was to create the 
conditions for the effective functioning of the emergent mode of production. By 
the mid-eighteenth century, the state had established a complex web of largely and 
ad hoc regulations designed to meet this end. Revenue raising, for example, 
originally in the form of the : nights of Horman Kings to levy tolls on trade, 
continued, passing from Crown to Parliament,(2) Domestic manufactures were 
protected by statutes from the fifteenth century onward, and state measures such 
as the 1651 and 1660 Navigation Acts sought to give English ships a monopoly of 
imperial trade, largely in order to curb the commercial power of the rival Dutch.(5)
In addition, mercantilist doctrine led the early British capitalist state to 
protect and encourage the aactivities of merchants who Brought gold into the 
country. Enactments such as the 1665 Staple Act, while in immediate terms 
promoting d.omestic economic growth, also established the pattern of reliance on 
"invisible" imports which was to help sustain the British economy until well into 
the twentieth century,(4)
By the turn of the seventeenth century, however, Britain had 
achieved industrial suprerfiacy in an environment of expanding world trade, and 
a more passive government role was advocated by leading sections, of the new 
industrial capitaist class. Adam Smith advocated the confinement of govemmeiuh 
activity to the provision of defence, the administration of justice, and the 
provision of services such as roads and education as would not otherwise exist 
for lack of adequate profit. Politically, William Pitt advocated the liberalization 
of economic policy, but the 1795 war with Prance reinforced the advocates of trade 
manipulation as a means to the building and maintenance of international hegemony. 
During the 1850’s and 184-0's, nevertheless, tariffs were progressively reduced, 
although the protection of agriculture, the biggest obstacle to free trade, still 
remained. In particular, the Corn Laws limited foreign competition by the 
imposition of a heavy import duty whenever the domestic price of corn fell below a 
certain level. A Lancashire trade depression in 1859, however, intensified urban 
middle class opposition and led to the formation of the anti-Gorn law League, The 
Law was finally repealed in the early 1840's,symbolizing the triumph of the new 
industrial capitalist class over the landed interests in the arena of state policy.
Prom the repeal of the Corn Laws onward, the major economic task 
of the British state v/as the maintenance of the bard-won conditions for capitalist 
expansion. As the dominant naval and industrial power, Britain’s hegemony was as 
complete as it was ever to become. Prom such a position of, strength, the two 
chief pillars of Mercantilist policy, the protection of British trade and the 
provision of military defence for that protection, became progressively lessrelevent. 
Accordingly, the central elements of the mercantilist code were abandoned. The 
Cromwellian Navigation Laws were relaxed and finally repealed in 1849. The system 
of colonial preferences was ended, and the prohibition of the export of British 
machinery and technical experts was lifted,(5) The consolidation of global 
British hegemony provided the material conditions for and fostered the development 
of free trade in British foreign policy.
Domestic state economic intervention, at this time, was also at a 
relatively low level. The mint, some arms expenditure and some building were the 
main areas of government involvement. nobsbama's succinct simile aptly summarizes 
the state ' s domestic role
"Miere it intervened... it was, like the 
traffic policeman, to regulate, but not to 
encourage or discourage." (6)
During the previous decades a nmiber of measures had been taken to formally free the 
labour market, measures which were indispensable to the development of capitalism in it; 
classical form. Most notable were the 1813 Act repealing statutes allowing local 
magistrates to enforce ninium wages, and the 1825 amending Act (to the 1824 repeal of 
the combination Acts) making trade combination a criminal conspiracy under common 
law,(?) Generally, the dominant characteristic of British state policy in the 
mid-nineteenth century, was one of disengagement, a policy orientation consistent 
with a healthy capitalist economy.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century however, it became 
increasingly apparent that the condition for the maintenance and expansion of British 
capitalism could not be guaranteed without progressively greater state, intervention 
in economic activity. The encroaching challenge of rival imperialist powers has 
already been indicated. World tradOi^ i in particular that between Britain on the one. 
hand and her colonies and China on the other, was still grovdng, however. In 
addition, the gaining of the working class vote (1867 and, especially, 1884-5) 
represented a potential social demand for increased welfare provision. On the whole, 
however, welfare expenditure remained at a relatively low level compaired with that 
in the twentieth century, and it was principally the demands of the imperialist 
empire that made the earlier, if never fully realized, policy of cheap and inactive 
government historically impossible.
Even so, prior to the 1914-1918 war, the state took fe?/ immediate 
steps to directly intervene in the economy, and intervention was still reserved for 
exceptionr.l circuv tances.(8) The outbreak of war itself produced no great initial 
changes. By 1916, however, the new goveinment of Lloyd, George imposed detailed 
and wide-ranging controls on the economy, involving intensive powers, of requisition 
and acquisition, as well as direct w^ age-fixing.(9) Even prior to 1914 state support 
for enterprises such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Gunard had been 
established. After the vmr, similar support was extended to sectors such as 
air -transport, radio-communications and broadcasting. Such interventions^intended 
primarilly to render private industry more efficient, were aspects of a tendency 
toward state-supervised "trustification", a process which continued into the 1920's.
Rapid de-intervention followed the 1918 peace, but Britain's inter­
nationally weakened position led, especially during the inter-war Depression, to the 
construction of a web of national protection. Preference and bilateral agreements 
were developed by the state, along with increased intervention in the especially 
crisis-prone industries.
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YEAR. TOTAL. CF WHICH PUBLIC SECTOR
1924. 1,524 512
1926. 1,411 461
1928. 1,645 459
1950. 1,667 482
1952, 1,594 418
1954. 1,754 595
1956. 2,029 552
1958. 2,318 670 (10)
Compared vùth an average of about 20 per cent over 1900-14 (see reference (8) ) 
the portion of fixed capital formation in the public sector was persistently^ high 
during the inter-war years, rising from about qin 1924 almost by 1938. The 
statification of production in other words, had advanced considerably after the 
1914-1918 mnr and continued to develops throughout the inter-'wax' period.
These aspects of state interventionism embody the definitive 
abandonment of the attempt to maintain the liberal economy with the abandonment 
of Free Trade in 1931. State funds, in the form of grants or loans, were granted 
in order to encourage industry to rationalize.(11). The 1939-1945 war, further, 
impelled a highly state-planned and-mana.ged economy, with government acceptance 
of responsibility for overall planning and accordination. Considerable dismantling 
took place immediately after 1945, but the nationalisation and welfare policies of 
the post-war Labour goverruïient were unprecedented in terms of peacetime state 
expenditure. The scale of state involvement in the working of the economy and social 
structure reflected and constituted the essence of the development of the "mixed 
economy," That the post-war pattern of expanded state expenditure and intervention 
is indicative and expressive of a fundamental instability in British capitalism 
will be our main contention in the follovhLng section. We will then examine the 
dynamics of that instability in terms of developments in the productive 
infrastructure,
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POST-WAR STATE-INTERVENTION AND THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH CAPITALISM.
"On the whole .... social reforms are never conditioned 
by the weakness of the strong; they must and will be 
brought to life by the strength of the weak". (1)
"Governments, of course, cannot subsidize anything; they 
can only see to it that one part of the economy subsidizes 
another part, that socially - available profits are 
distributed in such a manner as to enable the prevailing 
society to function". (2)
Over the last half century, and particularly since 1945, the state has 
assumed an unprecedented interventionist role in the British economy, as the 
following table indicates.
YEAR.
■“ . . . . . . ..  . .  . . . . . . .
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.
1913
1923
1933
1948
1953
•1958
1968
» -< ------- — ------------------------LJ-------------1-------
13.5
27.5
30.0 
40.2
44.5
40.6
52.1 (3)
As a percentage of G.N.P., public expenditure had almost tripled from its 
1913 level to 40.2 per cent by 1948, and had risen to over 50 per cent by 1968. 
Measured as a proportion of Net National Income at factor cost the rise is even 
more striking. Using that mode of measurement, total government expenditure 
(Central and Local) rose from 26.5 per cent of National Income in 1929 to 40 per 
cent in 1958 and 54.5 per cent in 1968, falling slightly to 54 per cent in 1973. (4)
The actual forms of state intervention in the post-war economy have been 
varied. The state has intervened directly in the form of nationalization, assuming 
direct responsibility for a number of key areas of the economy as part of a more 
general strategy to provide a second infrastructure for the rest of the system. (5) 
This sector of the economy accounted for as much as 50 per cent of all capital 
formations by the late 1 9 6 0 's. (6) In other areas the state has intervened less 
directly, attempting to maintain stability and growth through the application of 
Keynesian-type monetary and fiscal policies. In addition, it has attempted to draw
the Trade Union movement into a system of wage-planning so as to assist the process 
of private capital accumulation. More recently, it has to an increasing extent 
provided direct financial aid for bankrupt or near-bankrupt sectors of private 
industry. In general, the state has been important in the fields of defence 
and research, providing a guaranteed market for firms engaged in armaments, electronics 
and other related industries. These last two state functions were both dramatically 
illustrated by the aid given to the Ferranti firm during 1974-75.
To some extent, this increased level of state interventionism has been a result of 
and a response to working class pressure for higher wages, improved social services 
and security of employment after the experiences of the 1 9 3 0 's. Unlike, for example, 
the German Labour Force which had been both politically and economistically 
weakened by the corporatist period of fascism, the British working class openly 
expressed its new aspirations in its return of a Labour Government in July 1945.
That government rapidly committed itself to reformist policies, as is evident from 
Herbert Morrison's statement to the Labour Party Conference that his party's social 
reforms would depend upon "greater efficiency in industry, greater production and a 
greater national drive in industry". (7) Fundamental social reforms were, nevertheless, 
carried out in the years immediately following 1945. Earlier rearmament and the war 
itself had eliminated unemployment by 1941, and throughout the war Trade Union 
membership rose dramatically to over 8 million, (an increase of more than 2| million). 
Actual earnings, moreover, rose considerably more rapidly than did prices, although 
this was primarily the consequence of overtime and shift work. (8) Government 
taxation policies, furthermore had a redistributionist effect during the war, even 
though this was largely due to technical necessities rather than any radical social 
impulse. Greater progressiveness in taxation, that is to say, was primarily the 
result of the need to pay for the war. (9) The return to peace, nevertheless, saw 
the return of a Labour Government, with a decisive parliamentary majority, committed to 
a wide range of social reforms. Nationalization brought some 20 per cent of industry 
under public ownership, and reforms in education, health, pensions and unemployment 
benefit, among other areas were introduced. In the long term the redistributionist 
content of these changes was in fact negligible. Even so, it is questionable if they 
would have taken place without the heightened aspirations of an organized labour force 
finding expression in the post-war policy and economy. As Henry Felling observes:
"The Union leaders ended the war feeling that they had 
earned a right to «.say in the reconstruction of British 
Society and industry. With their increased membership and 
national prestige, they looked forward to the post-war era 
with high expectations". (10)
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At the heart of capitalist expansion, however, is the process of capital 
accumulation and extended reproduction. From the viewpoint of the system as a whole, 
consequently, the most fundamental aspect of the post-war state-interventionist 
programme is the transparent inability of Britains traditional forms of capitalist 
organizations to restore the conditions of normal expansion. European and British 
economic recovery took place, as we have seen, under the hegemonic umbrella of 
American aid. Within that context, the pattern of British state intervention
constituted a crucial aspect of the "domestic" side of capitalist restoration.
When compared with the 1933 level, government expenditure on economic services had, 
by 1948, barely risen (6.8 per cent and 6.9 per cent of G.N.P. respectively). At 
first sight, moreover, the share of economic expenditure on capital expenditure 
(2.2 per cent of G . N . P . , rising to only 4.4 per cent by 1968) appears small. (11)
The changes that took place in the British economy over this period were fundamental, 
however. The various nationalization projects undertaken immediately after the 1945
left some 20 per cent of industry under public ownership. (12) The profitability of the
newly-nationalized industries, moreover, was on average about one third of that of 
private industry before the war. Compensation to original owners was high, and when 
nationalized the industries in question proceeded to supply commodities to the private 
sector at prices below those that could have been possible under continued private 
ownership. The recurrent deficits of the National Coal Board, British Rail and the 
nationalized airlines are linked directly to the provision of cheap products, the 
payment of compensation, the initial unprofitable position of the sectors in question, 
and the payment of interest on borrowings for investment. The price of coal, for 
example has been raised considerably since nationalization in 1946, but rises have been 
persistently delayed or limited for national economic reasons and deficits accordingly 
incurred. One wfrter summarizes the overall relation between the nationalized 
industries, the state and private capitalism in the following way;
"The statutory obligation to break even does not forbid 
profits, but it clearly does not envisage them on any large 
scale, and it has discouraged some industries from exploiting 
monopoly advantages when they could do so; there has been
Government pressure to keep down prices to check inflation __
The upshot of these restrictions - often economically sound 
in isolation -has been that industries which got into 
difficulties found it very difficult to get out of them". (13)
Post-war nationalization, that is to say, assumed the form of a state- 
subsidized support to national capital as a whole, the system retaining its essential 
features, in particular the dominance of the profit motive, despite some necessary 
changes in legal ownership. The "private" and "public" sectors of the mixed 
economy are both aspects or components of the totality of social capital, itself 
located within a wider capitalist system of international proportions. The economic 
pratices of the two departments, (as well as the state itself) are closely 
interwoven and do not operate independently. This structure of relationships is 
particularly clear in the case of the expanding field of direct state aid to 
private industry. During 1969-70, a total of £1,700 millions of such aid was given, 
a sum which comprised of almost 10 per cent of all public expenditure and was the 
equivalent of | of all private sector fixed capital formation excluding dwellings.(14) 
In the four years following from April 1970, the state returned to industry in 
the form of financial aid, about | of the taxation it had paid to the government.
"Or put in another way, government has been financing just under one half the 
payment of dividends to shareholders". (15).
The primary purpose of state aid on this scale has been to promote capital 
investment in areas where private capital is unwilling or unable to invest or even 
sustain its immediate liquidity position. An explanation of the relationship between 
state and private industry must, accordingly, centre on the poli teal economy, 
of the capitalist structure as a whole. This is our concern in two later sections, 
"Profitability and British Capitalism" and "The State and the Falling Rate of 
Profit". (16) Our intention in the preceding pages has been to indicate the 
specifically capitalistic character of the prevailing forms of state economic 
intervention in Britain. In particular, present nationalization, through a complex 
of pricing and investment tactics, represents in essence the nationalization of 
profitability in the interests of national capital as a whole. (17) Accumulation, 
of which the classical entrepreneur need no longer be the immediate executor, is 
promoted, sustained, organized and subsidized by the economic practices of the 
interventionist capitalist state.
Within the total expanded area of public expenditure, the share allocated to 
social services rose from about one third to almost | of the total in the 50 years 
up until 1968. The rise of this portion of state expenditure was especially 
rapid during the 1 9 6 0 's.
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YEAR. SOCIAL SERVICES AS PERCENTAGE OF G.N.P.
; 1933 12.5
1948 18.6
1953 18.8
1958 18.2
1968 26.0 (18)
By 1968 Social Services expenditure ammounted to over twice that of 1933 as a 
proportion of G.N.P. The background to this increase was the generalized wish for 
social reforms to satisfy the wartime and post-war aspirations of the labour movement, 
in particular its organized sections. The Beveridge Report and the 1944 White Paper 
on Employment Policy embrodied this new note in state policy. The introductory 
sentence of the White Paper, drafted during the period of coalition g o v e rn m e n t ,stotej 
t k a t
"The Government accept as one of their primary aims 
and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and 
stable level of employment after the war". (19)
The clear and stated intention of the White Paper was to avoid a repetition of the
interwar experience. Mainly concerned with the problems of transition from war to 
peace, it expressed fear of an inflationary boom followed by slump, as had occurred 
after the 1914-18 war. Its authors expected cyclical fluctuations in effective 
demand and aimed, through state policy, to offset them via public expenditure and 
variations in national insurance contributions, both of which were innovatory and 
outside traditional budgeting policy. The Paper had a pronounced Keynesian character,
as Beveridge recognized when he characterized it as "a public works policy". (20).
Beveridge's own document "Full Employment in a Free Society" was more radically 
and consistently Keynesian, however, Beveridge anticipated not a series of economic 
cycles and fluctuations, but rather a chronic tendency toward a "general deficiency 
of aggregate demand". (21) To deal with the resulting stagnation Beveridge outlined 
"a long term programme of planned outlay directed by social priorities and 
designed to give stability and expansion to the economic system". (22) Such a 
programme would socialize demand through the expansion of total outlay, both public 
and private. Proposals such as these were not unprecedented, but their correspondence 
with a widespread desire for social reform gave them a particular social relevance, 
a relevance which found expression in the pursuit of full employment and the expansion 
of social welfare provisions which characterized the post-war years.
The major component in the increased share of G.N.P. allocated to the social services 
has been that of free provision rather than social insurance. The conception of "free" 
is problematic in this context, however, meaning simply that the majority of received 
services are not paid for directly. What, if any, redistributionist effect they have 
is dependent upon a wider structure of payments and exchange relations, in particular 
that comprising the taxation system. In the context of British policies, 
any egalitarian tendencies deriving from the effects of taxation would be expected 
to be most pronounced during periods of social democratic rule. The 1964-70 
Labour government took no such steps to redistribute the national income through 
taxation,however.
WEEKLY INCOME BEFORE TAX.
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PERCENTAGE OF INCOME PAID IN TAX.
A m
1964.
1 a
1968.
l i
5 22 23
6 24 25
7 31 27
9 28 27
11 29 30
13 30 32
16 30 34
19 30 35
23 30 36
28 31 35
34 32 36
40 32 36
50 33 37
60 and over 38 36
ALL INCOMES 31 35 .(23)
That the portion of income paid in tax rose almost proportionally for all incomes 
(over £13 per week) except the very highest, over the four years of social democratic 
rule between 1964 and 1968 demonstrates that the occupancy of government by the 
Labour Party had absolutely no redistributionist effect through the taxation system. 
The decline in the proportion of income paid in tax by the highest income category 
from 38 per cent to 36 per cent moreover actually indicates a regressive tendency.
It is, furthermore, a commonplace that opportunities for tax evasion are 
disproportionately present at the highest level of incomes, compounding the regressive 
shift over the four years in question. The virtually uniform tax rate for all incomes
over £16 per week in 1968, finally, also refutes the widely held but erroneous 
views that the British tax system is progressive. (24). The taxation system, in sum, 
acts as a cruical buttress to systematic social inequality which, as is amply 
doccumented, has not been substantially altered in Britain or in the capitalist 
world as a whole over the last half century. (25)
More recent data gathered by Dr. Jackson et al, confirm that the prevailing 
pattern of state findings and welfare provision is of a non progressive character. 
Benefits provided for the lower paid, moreover are more than offset by total tax 
deductions, indicating an overall worsening of lower class real disposable 
income in so far as the effects of state welfare provisions are concerned.
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD. INCOME ADJUSTED FOR TAX AND BENEFITS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
1961-4
1 Adult
2 Adults
2 Adults, 1 child 
2 Adults, 2 children 
2 Adults, 3 children 
2 Adults, 4 children
ALL HOUSEHOLDERS IN SURVEY
104
82
81
90
101
112
87
1965-8
103
80
78
86
96
109
84
1969-70
105 
77 
76 
82 
93
106
82 (26)
The sample for all households together, as well as each one separately with the 
exception of the single adult category (the authors suggest that changes in tax 
exemption allowances in 1969 may have especially benefited widows and widowers 
and accordingly been responsible for this exception to the general pattern), 
indicates that the overall ratio of benefits - received to taxes - paid fell 
throughout the 1960's. Since, moreover, the majority of households in the survey 
were those of employees, it is particularly the case that the falling trend of 
benefits to taxes was experienced by wage-earners. (27) Wage-earners as a group, 
that is to say, not only do not benefit relative to higher income groups from the 
prevailing tax-benefit patterns, but actually, with the sole exception of four 
children families, suffer an absolute loss in the process and increasingly did 
so during 1961-70.
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While the rise in social services provisions in the post-war period has been at 
least in part a response to lower class aspirations and political pressure, its 
actual effects have clearly been quite the contrary to those that would result from 
any long-term redistributionist policy. The significance of the rise in state 
expenditure in general, and that on social services in particular, is, that the 
reproduction of British capitalism has become increasingly socialized within the 
movement of capital as a whole. Specifically, the reproduction of labour power has 
become progressively socialized through an unprecedented growth of state welfare 
provisions. Between 1958-73, public expenditure on housing and social services as 
a proportion of National Income rose from 20 per cent in 1958 to 27.8 per cent in 
1968 and 30 per cent in 1973. This rise represents an increase of 1 per cent 
per annum over the most rapidly expanding years of 1963-68 and one of 0.66 per cent
per annum over the period as a whole. The significance of this development is
frequently overlooked, however. (28)
D. Yaffe, for example, has attempted to calculate the prevailing rate of surplus value 
in Britain on the basis of post-tax rather than pre-tax figures. Yaffe suggests:
"Taxation would have to be counted as part of the surplus -
value produced by productive workers and only the net real
wages after tax of productive workers could be regarded as
variable capital. Such a calculation would give us some
indication of the enormous increase in the rate of exploitation 
since the Second World War". (29)
In point of fact, the take-home wage alone no longer represents the entirety of 
necessary labour, or that required to reproduce the worker's labour-power, in conditions
where state services play a significant part in that process of reproduction. This
fundamental distinguishing feature of late capitalism renders Yaffe's estimation 
of the scale of the increase in the rate of exploitation over the last three decades 
problematic. The crucial point, however, is that the persistent rise in the extent 
of state intervention, both in the form of direct economic services and in that of 
welfare provisions, constitutes a reliable if imprecise barometer of a tendency 
that Marx repeatedly emphasized: that of the increasing socialization of the 
production and reproduction processes with the development of the capitalist 
mode of production. (30).
We have suggested that the increased state expenditure on social welfare after 
1945 was at least in point a response to prevailing social and political aspirations, 
primarily amongthe labour force. Such aspirations, however, cannot in themselves 
account for the rise in state economic services to private capitalism during this 
period. Neither can they account for the continued prevalence of poverty and 
material deprivation, an aspect of the inegalitarian taxation - welfare complex that 
survived and possibly even intensified after the Second World War. (31) Both these 
developments, rather, are aspects of an attempt to resolve a structural crisis which, 
on the one hand, is symptomatic of late capitalism on a global level, but at the 
same time is proximately located in the context of the specific long-term secular 
decline of British capitalism within that wider environment.
The material basis of state interventionsim, the "Etatisation of Labour 
power". (32), that is to say,isthe economic necessity to offset the deestabilizing 
effects of unaided private capital accumulation. The source of this unstable
economic scenario is our concern in the following sections. It will be noted
immediately, however, that persistent proposals, particularly from some sections of 
the Conservative Party (33),concerning substantial and thoroughgoing reductions in
state expenditure both to private industry and social welfare would, if pursued, lead
to a chronic disruption of the workings of British capitalism. The statisfication of 
the production and reproduction processes is tooadvanced to allow a cut in public 
spending on the advocated scale without engendening a social crisis of massive 
proportions.
THE BRITISH ECONOMY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.
A long-term historical decline, we have argued, became apparent in the workings 
of the British economy before 1914 and continued into the post-1945 period, even 
though its full extent has, to some degree, been concealed by a general expansion 
of the world market. One forms that this decline has taken, and which has been the 
object of an important aspect of state economic management, is the semi-permanent 
balance of payments crisis that Britain has experienced since the Second World War, 
a crisis which led to devaluation as early as 1949 and which has exacerbated the 
instability of Sterling as an international currency. Two proximate determinants 
of state economic intervention concern us in this context: the loss of invisible 
earnings, an important element of Britain's balance of payments difficulties, and the 
resistance and aspirations of the Labour force which have persistently undermined a 
series of largely ad hoc attempts to engender an export drive which could resolve 
those difficulties.
In the first place, the rate of economic growth since 1945 has been slower in 
Britain than in most West European countries, G.N.P. rising by some 75 per cent between 
1948 and 1968, that is at an average rate of almost 3 per cent per annum.
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
AT CONSTANT (1958) PRICES.
 ^ 1948 1953 4.6 1958 0.5 1963 4.6
1949 2.8 1954 3.8 1959 4.0 1964 5.9
1950 4.0 1955 3.0 1958 4.9 1965 2.6
1951 2.7 1956 1.9 1961 3.5 1966 1.7
1952 0.6 1957 1.9 1962 1.2 1967 1.5
1968 3.0 (1)
The rate of growth has by no means been even and uninterrupted. Periods of rapid 
advance (especially 1948-51, 1953-5, 1958-60 and 1963-64) have been followed by 
periods of stagnating growth or recession. These fluctuations have, on international 
comparison, been especially pronounced and have exacerbated an already uncompetitive 
growth rate.
Prior to 1939 war, British capitalism relied to a large extent upon invisible 
earnings to maintain an overall surplus, but this source of income was in the main 
lost during the war years and after. (2) As a consequence, a rapid expansion of 
physical exports together with a stabilization of imports was necessary if Britain 
was to regain its place as a leading world power. Recent years have in fact witnessed 
a substantial growth in British overseas investment. (3) The background to this 
development which itself at least in part reflects a capitalist response to 
declining profits at home, is a steady long-term worsening of Britain's performance 
in the international market. R. Blackburn notes:
"a comparison of the percentage share of world exports of 
manufactures by the major capitalist powers gives a sharp 
picture of the . decline of British Imperialism despite 
the high level of its continuing export of capital" (4)
Britain's share of exports of manufactures from the 12 major exporting countries 
has declined as follows:
YEAR. PERCENTAGE.
1955 20
1967 12.3
1971 11.0 (5)
The fall in Britain's share between 1955-71 was, as the table shows, one of 
almost 50 per cent. A similar decline is apparent in Britain's changing balance of 
imports to exports. During the decade following 1956 the ratio of imports of 
manufactured goods to Gross Domestic Product rose from 4.1 per cent (1956) to 7.9 per 
cent (1966). (6) Britain's competitors experienced similar or even greater
increases in the import-produce ratio, but to a greater or lesser extent they were 
offset by a rising export ratio, a pattern sustained by the long expansion in the 
world market. Britain's decline, that is to say, took place within and against the 
background of the development of the expanding international capitalist system of 
the post-1945 period.
A plethora of writings on the British economy have identified the balance of 
payments as the fundamental determinant of Britain's international weakness.
S. Brittan, for example, suggests: "The underlying payments deficit of the 1960's
had a debilitating effect in many ways: the never-ending crises, the continual 
recourse to international borrowing, the accumulated debt repayment obligations and 
the sense of chronic national weakness were all too evident". (7) Another study 
similarly observes "The weakness of the British balance of payments position acted.
s 20"
and still acts, as a brakë on internal economic growth". (8)
The initial post-war years witnessed a rapid reconstruction and reconversion of 
the economy onto a peacetime footing both in Britain and in Europe as a whole.
Between 1945-50 the rate of growth of the G.N.P. averaged around 4 per cent per annum, 
a figure considerably higher than the pre-war rate as well as of that of the 
following years. During the years 1948-60, for example, national output grew on 
average by only 2 and three-quarters per cent. (9) In spite of the inflationary boom 
resulting from the Korean War and the ensuing period of readjustment up to 1952 , 
Britain's economy continued to enjoy sustained expansion until 1955, The balance 
of payments crisis which followed the Korean War, however, revealed and highlighted 
the weakness of Britain's payments situation, a weakness which the export drive 
policy after 1945 and the 1949 devaluation had in no way fundamentally resolved. (10)
Beneath the widespread optimism engendered by the attainment of full employment and 
rising real incomes a serious economic deterioration was developing. Prices, began 
to rise at persistently more rapid rates than they had in earlier years.
I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PRICES SINCE 1900 (1661 “ 100),
1900 79 1950 234
1910 84 1955 287
1920 270 1960 322
1930 104 1965 379
1935 103 1970 474
1940 152 1973 594
1945 191 (1 1 )
Rapid price rises had occurred at earlier periods, most notably 1910-20 and 1935-40. 
From the 1940's onward, however, the secular fall in the purchasing power assumed a 
steadiness, at a relatively high rate,, which persisted until the inflationary explosion 
of the mid-1960's and after. This pattern of high and persistent inflation was well 
established by the 1 9 5 0 ‘s, inflation averaging between 4 and 5 per cent during 1946-58.
Against this inflationary background the ratio of imports to exports, as we have 
noted, became adverse and Britain's balance of payments became Increasingly critical. 
In addition to the factors identified above, Britain's position relative to countries 
such as Germany and Japan, which were prevented by the allied powers from re­
arming, was weakened by the increase in military expenditure from the late 1940's 
onward.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON MILITARY DEFENSE.
YEAR. £ MILLION AT CONSTANT PRICES (1972).
1948 1,884
1949 1,930
1950 2,071
1951 2,602
1952 3,271 (12)
WKile military expenditure had been rising from 1948, the 1950-2 increase was especially 
high at over 20 per cent per annum. The decade following 1945 was a crucial period for
global capitalist recovery and Britain's relatively high level of armaments
expenditure, diverting resources from productive capital investment, exacerbated her 
already deteriorating international competitive performance. As early as 1935 Britain's 
current account registered a slight deficit. The 1939-45 war confirmed this tendency, 
over £1,000 million of capital invested abroad being liquidated to pay for necessary 
war imports. In addition, key Latin American and Asian markets were abandoned in 
order that the British owned factories which served them could be converted to 
munitions production. British merchant marine, previously an important source of 
invisible receipts, furthermore, suffered heavy losses through wartime sinkings, and
the state incurred heavy debts in North America and throughout the Sterling
area. (13)
The post-war liberalization of trade opened up Britain's protected markets in the 
Commonwealth to overseas competition, and world demand for British goods fell in line 
with her weakened competetive position. 1955 saw a current account deficit of £157 
millions, but it was followed by a surplus in 1956 and the period of 1953-59 saw an 
overall surplus of over £1,000 millions. From the late 1950*s however the balance 
of long term payments deteriorated and began to manifest itself openly. The 1960 
£265 millions deficit was not eliminated the following year, and the 1962-63 saw 
only small surpluses, well below those of the mid 1950's. 1964-68, moreover, showed
large deficits in every year, totalling over £1,300 millions. Britain's payments 
situation has progressively worsened since then, overseas debts being incurred at an 
annual rate of 5| per cent of G.N.P. by 1975. (14).
Domestic investment funds flowed disproportionately into land and buildings, 
exacerbating Britain's relatively low level of productive industrial expansion.
(15) The Labour government's 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, intended to curb 
these activities, had left a number of important loopholes. In particular, developers 
who obtained a building licence avoided the newly imposed building development 
charge if they began work before July 1st, 1948. War-damaged buildings, moreover, 
could be restored without any planning permission at all. Even these limited 
controls were relaxed during the period following a Conservative rule, and planning 
permission for building, especially that for office facilities, rose steadily over 
1951-55. (16)
The state thus played a significant part in deflecting potential funds for 
productive industrial investment into often speculative and parasitic property 
development, as well as into armaments manufacture. That this was to a large extent 
an aspect of a wider policy, mainly pursued during the Conservative rule during the 
1950's,is evidenced by that administrations not inconsiderable success in restoring 
the traditional role of the City. During those years the Conservative government 
re-opened the London commodity markets, re-established the convertibility of Sterling, 
permitted the large scale export of capital, and restored the role of the capital 
market in the allocation of domestic investment funds. (17) The capital market, 
however, directed funds not predominantly into manufactures and industry, but to a 
large extent into profitable property development or overseas. (18) The years 
following 1948 had witnessed a progressive dismantling of the wartime system of 
economic controls. This trend was briefly reversed by both Labour and Conservative 
administrations during the 1950-52 crisis conditions. The dismantling process was 
continued in the following years. Conservative policy relying increasingly on 
monetary tactics, principally the use of the Bank Rate as a regulatory, for economic 
control. (19) The upshot of these policies, in an already deteriorated competitive 
context, has been a comparatively low level of productive investment, culminating in 
a series of progressively chronic balance of payments deficits.
The payments difficulties were further exacerbated by direct state intervention in 
the form of "stop-go" economic policy. Britain's economic policy between 1950-1960's, 
as has been pointed out.
"followed a very characteristic zig-zag path unlike 
anything on the continent. This path is not the result 
of spontaneous - endogenous - trends, but is due, for 
the most part, to deliberate Government action, in rapid 
succession, alternately to restrain and to stimulate 
economic activity". (20)
Following the rapid 1953-55 expansion for example, the three years from 
October 1955 were characterized by relatively slack, or even falling, production.
The role of the state in bringing about this reversal (its contribution in the earlier 
expansionist period had been one of relaxation of restrictions on investment and 
credit and a reduction in direct taxation) has been summarized by D. Winch.
"These cyles (i.e. expansion - contraction: D.B.) 
in turn impaired the growth of the economy by 
making long-term expansion in productive capacity 
difficult to sustain". (21)
The chronology of the "stop-go" sequence during theearly 1960's was, briefly, as 
follows. By 1958 monetary convertibility had been realised on the basis of the 
Bretton Woods programme. In these changed conditions, British state economic policy 
shifted to one of medium-term planning. The overall payments deficit of 1960-61 
prompted Lloyd George to advocate a longer-term plan, and in April 1961, the 
government proposed direct collaboration with industry in furtherance of such a plan. 
Letters were sent to the Federation of British Industry and the T.U.C. outlining 
proposals for new planning institutions. Central to these proposals were the 
establishment of a representative Council (N.E.D.C.) together with its technical 
bureau (N.E.D.O.). The F.B.I. gave immediate support, but expressed concern about 
giving the state a dominant role in the planning apparatus. By February 1962 majority 
T.U.C. support had been given even though the government had by this time proposed a 
"pay pause" in the interests of national economic recovery. (22)
The two bodies were formally set up in 1962, am! achievement described by 
Selwyn Lloyd as "a major step in economic history". The N.E.D.O., smaller than the 
representative council, produced a series of "forward !j<ooks" for the economy as a 
whole and public expenditure in particular. From late 1963 a number of Economic 
Development Committees were established. Concerned with specific industries, they were 
designed to examine performance and plans and to consider possible improvement measures, 
although they were not invested with mandatory authority.
In October 1962, N.E.D.C. outlined a plan for economic development up to 1966.
(23) G.N.P. was optimistically proposed to be raised by 4 per cent per annum, a goal 
which was far from realized, despite the relatively high increases in productivity 
during 1963-64. Domestic consumption was to be raised, but especial attention was 
given to increasing the annual rate of investment. Consequently incomes increases 
would be moderated firstly to allow increased investment, and secondly for balance of 
payments considerations. The target of an annual 5 per cent expansion of exports, 
depending on strong external demand; improved productivity and a restrained labour 
force, was crucial for the intended resolution of the payments situation.
The N.E.D.C. plan proved to be an unqualified failure, however. In 1962 the 
government did begin to introduce expansionary measures, most notably the easing of 
credit and hire purchase conditions, the removal of restrictions on banks' liquid 
assets, and the raising of public expenditure and of tax relief. Productivity rose 
at an exceptionally rapid rate during 1963, but adverse balance of payments conditions 
reduced expansion to 4 per cent during 1964. (24) Export demand fell and imports
rose simultaneously. An important compounding factor was that t h e r e r e l a t i v e l y  
few unused productive resources available, the presence of which had contributed 
significantly to the prior expansion. Exports of manufactures rose in 1963, but an 
overall deficit of over £350 millions was registered the following year. The 
immediate determinant of this deficit was a merchandise imbalance, aggravated by an 
unfavourable movement in the terms of trade together with an untimely rise in long­
term capital exports.
The Conservative plan in this way fell far short of its intentions and a Labour 
government was returned in October 1964. Inheriting a large balance of payments deficit, 
the new administration took immediate steps to deflate the economy while preparing 
a new plan to cover the period up to 1970. (25). A new Department of Economic Affairs 
took over from the Treasury a number of important responsibilities, including prices 
and incomes and regional planning. The Department's key function (its staff were 
drawn mainly from the Economic division of N.E.D.O.) was overall economic coodination 
and orchestration. Accordingly it laid particular stress on relations with private  
industry. Day to day responsibility for the administration of the plan was vested in 
the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour.
The target of the National Plan was a 25 per cent growth of G.N.P. over the 1964-70 
period. The drafting document, recalling the failure of the earlier Conservative 
policy, expressed caution in the light of balance of payments difficulties. (26) The 
target an expansion of 3.8 per cent of G.N.P. per annum was certainly ambitious. 
Productivity improvement and an increase of labour mobility and skill were the 
dominant means intended to achieve that goal. The plan aimed at a rising ratio of
exports to importsand the maintenance of the rate of domestic expenditure lower than 
that of the projected G.N.P. In addition, allowances and cash grants were provided 
for new investment in manufacturing and extractive industries. Government action, 
identified as a decisive influence on economic developments (27), was to operate in 
three main areas: the taxing of capital exports, cuts in official expenditure abroad, 
and flexible short-term demand-management. The latter, in particular, indicates the 
Keynesian assumptions that permeated the plan. The nationalized industries, finally, 
were to be an area for planned streamlining and improved efficiency.
The Economic Development Committees were an important aspect of Labour planning 
during this period. Their function was to prosecute plans in particular industries, 
nationalization and the substitution of home manufactures for imports being their goal. 
(28). Also, the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation was set up in 1966 with a view 
to aiding private firms, via financial aid, to undertake the reorganisation necessitated 
by the imperatives of technical progress and foreign competition.
The Labour government's various measures did not resolve Britain's long-term 
balance of payments weakness, nevertheless, and it soon assumed unprecedented and 
chronic forms. The incoming Labour administration imposed a special temporary 
15 per cent levy on imports of manufactured goods, and in addition instituted a system
of export bonuses in the form of tax reductions. There was little ensuing improvement
in the competetiveness of British exports, however, and in November of 1964 an 
international loan of 113,000 millions was made available to the Bank of England in 
order to maintain the exchange rate of the pound and support sterling. James 
Callaghan negotiated loans both from the I.M.F. and directly from the United 
States Johnson administration in exchange, it will be noted, for a promise to
introduce legislation to halt wage increases.
The readiness of the United States to provide loan facilities in order to avoid a 
devaluation of the pound is to be explained primarily in terms of the international 
role of sterling. Despite the dominance of the dollar as the major international 
trading currency, sterling still accounted for over one quarter of world trade in 
the immediate post-war years, and its importance was still substantial in 1964. The 
historical prominence of sterling, as the only international currency alongside gold 
during the 1870-1914 period, and Britain's large post-war debts combined, as J.E. Nash 
has pointed out, to keep sterling "locked in" as a means of international payments, 
performing an important banking role. (29) Britain's reserves, that is to say, have 
played a double role, both supporting domestic financial operations and providing 
liquidity for international bankers and traders who hold sterling, that is, hold claims 
on the United Kingdom. That these claims amounted to over £4,000 millions in 1964 as 
against British reserves of under £900 millions indicates the significance of
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sterling's international role. A devaluation of the pound in these circumstances would 
have been destabilizing on an international scale.
The massive 1964 loan, nevertheless, brought no fundamental or lasting stability 
to the British economy. Export performance improved in 1965 and the pound was 
temporarily more secure, but by mid-1966 private investment had begun to stagnate 
and the government responded with a number of emergency measures. Investment grants, 
for example, were increased. The stabilizing meausures left the structural imbalance 
in Britain's payments situation unresolved, however. A forced devaluation of sterling 
finally took place in November 1967. As early as 1966 however, it was clear that the 
National Plan had failed in its objectives. As one commentator has wryly summarized 
its hasty entry and exit from the shifting sands of the British economy: "Conceived 
October 1964, born September 1965, died (possibly murdered) July 1966" (30.). Neither 
Conservative nor Labour administrations could devise an effective policy for planned 
economic growth which would not be undermined by Britain's long-term balance of 
payments difficulties.
It is apparent that the state deflationary policies associated with the "stop-go" 
sequence played a part in interrupting the phase of steady expansion that was 
projected by both major parliamentary parties as a desired goal for post-war Britain. 
Some commentators have suggested that state economic "management" was actually a 
destabilizing factor, aggravating the fluctuations that it was intended to moderate. 
This constitutes the qualified conclusion of J.C.R. Doul's detailed analysis of the 
1945-60 period. (31) J.M. Bristow, by contrast, suggests that taxation policies in 
particular did aid stability, but only minimally, as they were persistently applied 
too late to have their full effect. (32) Milton Friedman supports this view, 
suggesting further that "too late and too much" has been the general practice 
internationally. (33) Whichever of these views and variants is in fact the case, 
however, the very practice of state economic orchestration, and in particular the 
"stop-go" form that it has assumed in post 1945 Britain, is only explicable against 
the background of an enduring balance of payments problem, an imbalance that has 
persistently disrupted government ambitions of attaining sustained and competetive 
economic expansion.
Working class aspirations, expectations and demands, we suggested earlier, have 
been a significant factor in preventing post-war governments of all political 
complexions promoting a necessary export drive in order to resolve Britain's long­
term uncompetetiveness. The economic effects of lower class aspirations can be 
identified from a breakdown of changes in total national expenditure.
~  /
COMPONENTS OF TOTAL FINAL EXPENDITURE (AT FACTOR COST)
PERCENTAGE ATTRIBUTAfiifTO 1953-6 1957-60 1961-4
1
1965-8 1969-70
1. Consumer expenditure 52 53 52 50 48
2. Public authority 
current expenditure 15 14 15 16 16
3. Gross domestic fixed 
capital formation 
(plus physical increase 
in stocks). 13 15 16 17 16
4. Exports, goods and 
services 19 19 17 17 , 20
(34)
Faced with recurrent payments deficits, British Governments have responsed in two 
principal ways, in addition to tackling productivity, by attempting to curb total 
domestic effective demand, or at least its rate of increase, and to raise the share of 
resources allocated to exports. As column (1) in the above table indicates, some 
success has been achieved in the former field. Having been virtually static 
before the mid-1960's the share of consumers' spending in total final expenditure 
fell, though not dramatically, from 52 per cent in 1961-64 to 50 per cent in
1965-8 and 48 per cent in 1969-70, an overall fall of 4 per cent for the ten years
in question. Concerning the allocation of resources to exports, on the other hand, 
there was an actual decline from the mid-1950's onward from 19 per cent in 1957-60 
to 17 per cent over the period covered by 1961-68. This decline was only reversed
after the 1966-67 wages policy of severe restraint and the 1967 devaluation, which
together served to raise this share of total national expenditure to 20 per cent 
between 1969-70, its highest level during the whole period since the early 1 9 5 0 ‘s.
The increased share of investment indicated in this table, furthermore, is 
deceptive. Productive industrial investment is of especial relevance to Britain's 
competetive position in the international capitalist economy. The larger part of 
this investment takes place in the corporate and public sectors, and the following 
break-down, assembled by the same authors, indicates a less impressive performance in 
this area than the tendency suggested by the "blanket" figures in column (3) of the 
preceding table.
SHARES OF GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
BY SECTOR (AT MARKET PRICES).
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
G.D.F.C.F. BY SECTOR 1953-6 1957-60 1961-4 1965-8 1969-70
PERSONAL 17 16 16 14 13
COMPANIES AND 
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 57 64 62 60 60
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 26 20 22 26 27 (35)
The decline in the shares of total fixed capital formation in the Companies 
and Public Corporations sector from 64 per cent in 1957-60 to 60 per cent by 
1969-70 suggests that directly productive domestic investment, as a share of total 
investment, declined during the 196o"s even though it never fell back to the low 
level of the earlyl950's.
The real but small fall in the share of consumers' spending within total national 
expenditure being inadequate to offset the sustained weakness in the investment and 
exports sectors, and thereby improve the balance of payments situation, successive 
governments have attempted in various ways, both statutory and voluntary, to find a 
solution in an operational prices and incomes policy. The post-war history of such 
attempts spans such diverse examples as Stafford Cripps' 1948 appeal for voluntary 
restraint, Selwyn Lloyds' "pay pause" of 1961, the Labour government's National 
Board for Prices and Incomes, the following Conservative administration's 1971 
Industrial Relations Act and the present precarious if not already irrelevant 
"Social Contract". A. Flanders suggests that "impending balance of payments 
difficulties ha ve been the principal factor in pushing governments into action over 
wages". (36) While such considerations have undoubtedly been a major proximate 
determinant of incomes policy, we will contend in the following sections that the 
balance of payments problems are in themselves an aspect or consequence of a more 
fundamental crisis in British capitalism. Concerning state monetary policy.
Winch points out
"The balance of payments and the defence of a 
particular exchange rate provided the usual reasons 
for changes of direction in British fiscal and monetary 
policy - changes which created the stop go cycle" (37)
Beneath the immediate balance of payments fluctuations, that is to say, was the 
weakness of sterling, itself symptomatic of Britain's economic decline. The 
importance of the balance of payments to a national economy, a factor emphasised in
different ways by economists from the Hercantilistlv onwards, derives in the most 
general sense from the division of the capitalist world into more or less overtly 
antagonistic nation states, and from their uneven dynamic development and 
relations. Representing the totality of international transactions of a country's 
residents, companies and state;,;, it is indicative of relative national economic 
performance in the global context. Against the historical background of relative 
decline in the world economy, the British post-war balance of payments difficulties 
have been compoundedby and derive their dominant content from movements in the 
structure of corporate profitability. A fundamental question of methodology is at 
issue here. Plekhanov, drawing on Hegel's logical doctrine, distinguished clearly 
and profoundly between the "form" of an object and its "appearance". "Form", as 
distinct from mere "outer form", relates to the "law" or "structure" of the object 
in question. (39), In the case of the capitalist mode of production, the crucial 
structure is the production and appropriation of surplus value in the context of the 
law-like domination of capital. In this process the realization of profits 
constitutes both the yardstick of capitalist success and the motor force of the 
system's expansion. The profitability of British capitalism, the concern of our 
following chapter, is the foundation and cornerstone of all economic practices, 
including those of the state, within the British economy, subject of course to 
the international structure and movement of capital. As such its importance for 
I our thesis cannot be overestimated.
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PROFITABILITY AND BRITISH CAPITALISM.
The key to the post-1945 problems of British capitalism, we have suggested, is to 
be found in an examination of recent trends in profitability. In earlier sections we 
indicated the historical roots of Britain's uncompetitive position in the international 
economy, in particular its overseas orientation and a comparatively large parasitic 
sector. The balance of payments difficulties which have persistently been the 
expression of Britain's secular decline, especially from the 1930's onward, have been 
magnified, and attempts to resolve them obstructed by, developments in the pattern 
of corporate probitability.
Two particular problems face an attempt to assess movements in profitability from 
our perspective. In the first place Marx's laws, as he repeatedly emphasized, are 
tendential, relating to long term historical processes which find expression in 
uneven and irregular forms. Caution should accordingly be taken to avoid the 
mechanistic error of identifying a short or even medium term movement as "proof" or 
"disproof" of the proposition in question. (1) In addition, economic data as 
typically processed and assembled is not presented so as to directly "fit" the 
categories of Maxist political economy. There is an inherent element of imprecision 
in the tendencies that are indicated by such data, an imprecision which exacerbates the 
problematic character of theMüfXian laws. We are not, in short, dealing with a 
precise or exact science.
Given these qualifications, however, the categories with which we are concerned do 
purport to relate to real movements and developments in capitalist society, and while 
imprecision is an insurmountable problem, identifiable trends as recorded by 
conventional means of measurement constitute a useful if imperfect barometer of the 
processes at work. The categories of political economy provide the theoretical 
framework for an analysis of those developments.
A number of seriously conflicting evaluations of recent trends in the profitability 
of British capitalism have been made in recent years. Glyn and Sutcliffe's 
influential study documents a pronounced downward trend through the post-war years, a 
trend they see to be of crisis proportions. (2) Panic and Close, by contrast, contend 
that such estimates are exaggerated and that the pre-tax decline in profitability had 
ended by the 1 9 6 0 's, although the post-tax decline continued. (3) Much of the 
variations in the findings of these studies derives from differences in the 
definitions of profitability that are used. Before evaluating their different 
conclusions we will clarify precisely what the rate of profit represents, and on the 
basis of this clarification identify the sources of the conflicting claims of the 
studies in question. In particular we will consider the relationship between Marx's 
law of the falling rate of profit and his theory of capitalist crisis.
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A tendency for profits to decline over time was identified by political 
economists prior to Marx's formulation. Adam Smith discerned it in "the known fall 
of the longterm interest rate". Smith's explanation centred on the market forces of 
supply and demand, competition among sellers being the mechanism by which their 
profits were lowered. (4). For Ricardo the decline in profits resulted from growing 
population pressure on scarce land resources, above all on the supply of corn.
Such pressures generate a rise in the price of corn, which in turn results in wages 
and rent increases, all at the expense of industrial profits. (5) Neither saw it as 
fatal to the capitalist system, although Ricardo perceived it to be a more enduring 
problem that did Smith. Neither, however, attached to the tendency the significance 
that Marx did.
Unlike both Smith and Ricardo, Marx's account and explanation of the falling rate 
of profit locates it at the heart of the process of capital accumulation. The 
relative rise in the value of constant capital (machinery plus raw materials) as 
against that of variable capital (labour power) which accompanies the 
revolutionizing of the means of production under capitalism reduces the role of 
direct, living labour, the source of all new value, in the production process.
Assuming a constant or increasing rate of exploitation, however, surplus value in the 
form of profit depends precisely upon the proportion of living labour power 
embodied in commodities. The dynamic of capitalist development itself is thus the 
basis of Marx's law.
It would, however, be incorrect to view the working of the law as either a 
mechanical or a linear process. Marx's concern was, in the first place, with the 
social relations of production of capitalism, relations which appear on the surface 
of society in the form of relations between "things" (commodities). Their only common
quality, the source of their value, is that they are the products of abstract labour,
the quantitative measure of which is time. The concept "value" expressed in social 
processes as exchange value, is, in other words, both logically and historically 
subordinate to the commodity and the social relations of production that it 
embodies. (6) To reify the category value and construct a deterministic historical 
model on its basis is to abstract it from its source and context, the living relations 
and conflicts of men and classes.
In Volume of of Capital Marx develops the basic equation that the Rate of
Surplus Value - where s= surplus value and v= the value of labour power or variable
capital. Another way of expressing this formula is to say that the Rate of Surplus
Value = surplus labour In this version necessary labour is that expenditure of labour 
necessary labour.
power necessary to sustain the worker in a given historical situation, and surplus 
labour that over and above the level required for the reproduction of labour power. (7)
The rate of profit, on the other hand requires a different formula. Marx's 
equation for this aspect of the labour-capital relationship is Rate of Profit 
“ s where C= the value of constant capital. (8) The rate of surplus value thus
e x ÿ r Ô î ÿ ï ^ t h e  ratio of surplus-value to labour power or variable capital, whereas the 
rate of profit measures the ratio of surplus-value against total capital employed, 
the constant portion included. Marx indicates that the two formulae constitute 
"different measures of the same entity" (9) The difference, however, is crucial.
The introduction of C into the equation for the rate of profit introduces the question 
of the organic composition of capital. The organic composition is the value 
composition ofcapitalin so far as it reflects its technical composition, orthe 
relation between the respective quantities of labour and raw materials incorporated in 
the process of production. (10).
Now as value expresses living labour embodied in commodities, a diminution of the 
variable portion of capital will, given a constant rate of surplus-value (^), lead to a 
reduction of the rate of profit. It is precisely this tendency, grounded Yn changes of 
productive technique, for labour power as against constant capital to perform a 
progressively smaller function in the process of production that underlies Marx's 
twin theses of the rising organic composition of capital and the falling rate of profit. 
For the capitalist, productivity is raised through the reduction of the paid part of 
purchased labour power. The share of living labour is reduced, while that of past 
or dead labour in the form of constant capital is increased. The purpose and content 
of increased labour productivity, however, is that the total quantity of labour embodied 
in a particular commodity declines. The portion of living labour, that is to say, declin­
es at a faster rate than that of past labour declines. (11) The mechanism by which this 
process works is that the individual capitalist, working in a competetive environment, 
is able, with an advance in the methods of production, to temporarily produce commodities 
at a below average cost and, by selling them at their prices of production, realize 
increased profits. He is able to do this because, while he has a monopoly of the 
improved productive technique, the socially necessary labour-time required to produce 
commodities in his enterprise is less than the average social level. In the absence of 
the means to maintain his monopoly, the competitive diffusion of productive technique 
removes the progressive capitalist's advantage; however, and his rate of profit returns 
towards a correspondence with the social average. (12)
This process of technical improvement in the methods of production, by its
diminution of the quantity of labour power embodied in commodities, necessarily leads to
an increase in the relative proportion of constant capital incorporated in the 
production process and hence to a rise in the organic composition of capital. As 
Marx observed:
"The increasing productivity of labour (in so far as it is
connected with machinery) is identical with the decreasing
number of workers relatively to the number and extent of the
machinery employed. (13)
The objection that technical innovations may be capital-saving as well as labour-saving 
is fundamentally misconceived. Where it does take place, capital-saving innovation, 
while effectively altering the purely technical composition of capital, at the same time 
represents a reduction of socially necessary labour time and the portion of living labour 
in the capital goods industries. (14) Its effects, consequently, compound the general 
tendency of the exclusion of labour power from the process of production. From the 
viewpoint of total social capital the rise in the organic composition of capital will 
not be offset by innovation of this type.
From the rising organic composition Marx deduced, a tendency for the rate of profit 
to fall, although its mass may continue to rise with the increased scale of production 
resulting from technological innovation. (15) The rate, rather than the mass, of profit
is the decisive variable for capital accumulation, as the rate measures the ability to
accumulate in relation to existing capital stock on a proportional basis. (16). M. Itoh, 
by contrast, has suggested that a fall in the rate of profit does not in itself endanger 
or impede the accumulation process. Itoh hypothetically envisages a simultaneous fall 
in the rate of profit due to the rising composition of capital together with an 
increase in the absolute volume of surplus value, the latter financing accumulation.
"Depending upon the production of relative surplus value, the
absolute volume of surplus value can go on increasing and
capital accumulation can also continue even though at a 
diminishing pace. (17)
This thesis, however, misinterprets the process whereby relative surplus is 
produced. Asagainst absolute surplus value which is producedvia a lengthening of the 
working day, relative surplus value derives from a reduction in socially necessary 
labour time. (18) It is a means, that is to say, to raise the rate of exploitation of 
labour by the extraction of an increased amount of surplus value within the same number 
of hours. But the production or extraction of relative surplus value involves a decline 
in the portion of living labour power used in the production process. Marx indicates the 
consequences for capital of this mode of intensified exploitation in the 
following terms:
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"__  the manipulation to produce relative surplus value amount,
on the whole, to transforming as much as possible of a certain 
quantity of labour into surplus-value, on the one hand, and
employing as little labour as possible in proportion to the
invested capital, on the other, so that the same reasons which 
permit raising the intensity of exploitation rule out exploiting 
the same quantity of labour as before by the same capital." (19)
This reduction of the relative portion of variable capital - Marx terms it 
"the real secret of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall" (Ibid, 228) - essentially
constitutes the process of technical innovationthat we have discussed. The intention,
to raise the rate of surplus-value by increasing the unpaid part of total expended 
labour power, is to be achieved by the contradictory means of employing as little 
labour power as possible. This exclusion of labour power will, in consequence, tend 
to lower the relative mass of surplus value (being its source) as well as the rate of 
profit, at the same time as it increased the former's rate. The rising composition 
associated with technical innovation and the production of relative surplus value, that 
is to say, will result in a decrease in the mass of surplus-value produced by a given 
capital, and by extension a decrease in the mass of total social-value proportionate 
to capital as a whole.
This does not contradict Marx's thesis that a rise in the mass together with the 
rate of surplus-value is "bound up" with the falling rate of profit. (20). The rate
of surplus value (s^ j constitutes the relation of surplus-value to the variable portion 
of capital, or the value of labour power, while the increase in its mass is an absolute 
increase, associated with the growing mass of capital employed. The progressive 
diminution of the role of labour power, however, will tend to reduce this absolute 
increase in the mass of surplus-value as a proportion of the (also increased) absolute 
mass of total capital. For total social capital, in other words, the total mass of 
surplus-value, a rise in the rate of which is engendered in the production of relative 
surplus-value, tends to decline in the same movement that reduces the rate of profit.
Consequently the rise in the former (the mass of surplus-value) cannot be viewed, 
as Itoh suggests, as a substitute for the fall in the latter (the rate of profit) in 
the process of accumulation. A falling rate of profit implies a declining mass 
of surplus value proportionate to the mass of existent total capital to accumulate on 
the basis of extended reproduction, or the reproduction of total social capital on an 
enlarged scale. (21) The rate of profit is the regulator of the accumulation process, 
in Marx's words "the motive power of capitalist production. (22) It is for this 
reason that Marx undertook such a detailed analysis of its tendency to fall in Volume 
3 of Capital, significantly introduced as "The Process of Capitalist Production 
as a Whole";
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Despite the influence of a number of "counterveiling factors", the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall is central to the Marxist theory of crisis, the prospect of 
indefinite accumulation being rendered problematic. (23) The counterveiling factors 
identified by Marx fall under five headings. These are: the attempt by capitalists 
to increase the intensity of exploitation, particularly in advanced capitalism, through 
the increased production of relative surplus value: the depression of wages below the 
real value of labour power: the cheapening of the elements of constant capital: the 
emergence of relative overpopulation: and finally an increase in the rate of surplus- 
value through the mechanisms of foreign trade. A long historical debate has centred on 
the implications of these factors, singly or combined, for the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. We will indicate them to be aspects of that tendency rather than 
longterm offsetting factors.
Concerning the question of the increase of the rate of surplus-value, we have already 
criticized Itoh's thesis that an increase in the absolute volume of surplus value may 
offset the impediment to accumulation posed by a fall in the rate of profit. The 
rising mass of surplus-value produced by capital-saving innovation is. 
subordinate both as a historical tendency and in terms of its effects to the tendency 
for the rate of profit to fall with the rising composition of capital. From the 
standpoint of total social capital all technological innovation, on which the 
production of relative surplus-value rests, is labour-saving and consequently works to 
undermine the intention of capitalists to reduce the unpaid portion of labour-time.
At the same time the cheapening of the elements of constant capital that 
accompanies the development of technique lowers its relative value within the sector of 
specifically manufacturing industry. Simultaneously, however, occurs a process of 
labour saving in the capital goods sector. A fall in the value of total constant capital 
would require that its value composition fell at a faster rate than the simultaneous rise 
of its total mass, thus offsetting that rise. Since its value is directly determined 
by the diminishing socially necessary labour time required to produce it, and since 
this also raises, through the increased social productivity of labour, the total mass 
of that constant capital, such a development is, in the longterm, clearly impossible.
The labour-saving nature of all technological innovation means that for capital as a 
whole it cannot, through the cheapening of the elements of constant capital or, more 
particularly, through increasing the production of relative surplus-value, fully offset 
the rise in capital's organic composition.
The depression of wages below the value of labour power, which as Marx points out 
"has nothing to do with the general analysis of capital, but belongs in an anaylsis of 
competition", relatesdirectly to the empirical struggle between capital and labour for 
the proceeds of labour. The outcome of this struggle in particular instances cannot be 
deduo&jL from a general model of the capital-labour relationship, the relative strength
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and organizational capacity of the two major factors being decisive factors. We will 
suggest in the following sections that in fact the portion of national income accruing 
to wages and salaries in post-war Britain has declined, though not at a sufficient 
rate to offset the decline in profitability.
Whereas the depression of wages is bound up with the changing balance of class 
relations, the implications of Marx's "relative overpopulation" thesis are inseparable 
from longer-term changes in the structure of capital. The development of capitalism has 
released labour, notably that of women, for new sectors of production. Marx suggested 
that new lines of, especially luxury, manufacture would absorb this displaced labour 
power, but that they would by degrees "pass through the same evolution as the other 
lines of production"! that is, be subject to the same process of a rising composition 
of capital,
There is, however, notipriori reason why, with a rising mass of profits, the new 
industrie sshould from the start have a lower composition than the older ones. The 
increasing concentration of capital and the corresponding larger amounts of amassed 
profits, coupled with extended credit facilities, allow bigger capitals to invest in 
constant capital on a progressively larger scale. In point of fact, the key 
expanding sectors of British capitalism such as oil extracting and processing and the 
chemical industries are distinguished, as we shall see, by a higher capital to labour 
ratio than declining sectors such as textiles. The assumption of an initial relatively 
low organic composition in the new lines of production is, that is to say, inapplicable 
to the conditions of advanced capitalism.
Again, the mechanisms of international markets and investment are, in contemporary 
conditions, chronically inadequate to the task of offsetting the fall in domestic 
profitability. Marx observed that overseas investment tends to yield a high initial 
rate of profit due to its fav ourable position with regard to competition and its 
particularly high rate of exploitation. An example of the relative advantages of such 
enterprise is that of the American General Electric Company, whose average wage of 
$3.40 per hour in Massachusetts compares with around $0.30 for the identical work in 
Singapore. (24) Despite some opportunity for the realization of super-profits on 
this scale, however, the rate of industrial growth in the underdeveloped countries is 
too slow to give any real relief to world capitalism. Any significant further 
development would require an excessively high initial outlay on capital investment.
In addition the restricted market in these areas, itself a result of the high rate of 
exploitation, would render such investment impracticable in terms of profitability. 
Imperialism today, as Nicalous has pointed out, carries a particularly heavy overhead. 
(25) As with the other "counterveiling factors" it is unable,even more than when 
Marx indicated its limits, to neutralize the effects of the rising organic composition
in the capitalist heartlands. The tendency for the rate of profit to fall identifies 
the outer parameter of the self expansion of capital. Marx repeatedly emphasised 
that the precise form that capitalist crises would take could not be predicted from 
his model. The essential relationship of the "law" with the process of accumulation, 
nevertheless, places it at the centre of the general theory of crisis.
A point of qualification should be made concerning the question of profitability,
however. The rate of profit which is important in the immediate determination of the
level of investment is not the gross rate of profit, that is total surplus
value divided bv total capital stock fs ). Despite the trend toward the formation
(C plusT)
of an "average rate of profit" (26), the individual capitalist unit is the agent or 
"Trager" of investment and accumulation, albeit in an impure form with the socialization 
of production through such developments as the increase in state grants to corporations 
and the emergence of finance capital, the merging of industrial and banking capital.
(27). The important category for the direct determination of investment is what Marx 
termed "profit of enterprise" or the rate of profit minus interest (p-i). We will 
look at this category and its relationship to the gross rate of profit more closely.
In Volume 3 of Capital Marx examines the nature of the relationship between the 
"functioning" industrial capitalist and the owner-lender of money-capital. Interest 
represents the portion of surplus-value paid by the former to the latter for the loan of 
capital in its money form. (28) The two groups of capitalists perform different roles 
in thereproduction process: the one loans, the other productively employs, the same 
capital. This constitutes what Marx terms a "qualitative" division in the profit on 
every capital. It points to two categories of profit which are related to different 
aspects of the particular capital, whether or not that capital or a portion of it is 
empinically borrowed.
"The independent form assumed by the quantitative division of 
gross profit creates a qualitative one" (29)
Interest-bearing capital and productive capital accordingly face each other as "opposites" 
This relationship is quite distinct from the basic capital-labour antagonism. The 
functioning industrial capitalist, in his relationship with labour, produces surplus- 
value, consisting of interest plus profit of enterprise, a surplus of profit over 
interest. He actually receives, that is to say, less than the gross level of profits
represented by s_ _ _ _ _ _ . (Ibid 372-5).
T  plus V
"So long as money-capital is to exist as money-capital 
it must always be loaned out, and indeed at the prevailing
rate of interest, say of 1 per cent, and always to the same
class of industrial and commercial capitalists, so long as 
these functions as capitalists, the sole difference between
the one working with borrowed capital and the other with his
own is that the former must pay interest and the latter must not; 
the one pockets the entire profit p, and the other p-i, the
profit minus the interest" (30).
It is, however, the functioning industrial capitalist who must, as a capitalist,
conduct and prosecute the process of accumulation. Profit of enterprise is accordingly
the theoretical category which corresponds to the portion of surplus-value available
to function as the fund source of accumulation, without, that is, further borrowing of
money-capital. Specifically concerning the profitability of British capitalism, the
principal area of concern is net profitability, deducting the now especially significant
sector of interest payments. This is a cruical aspect of any evaluation of
profitability trends. The money-capitalist sells to the functioning capitalist the
use-value of his money - c a p ita l .  I t ' s  use-value consists o f i t s  a b i l i t y  to produce
exchange value, and above all surplus-value when productively employed. (31) A portion
of that surplus-value is paid, as interest, to the money-capitalist in return for the
use of his money-capital as productive capital. P-i in this way replaces s_ _ _ _ _ _
C plus V
as the decisive form of the rate of profit for accumulation, for the analysis of the 
actual process of extended accumulation.
Two conflicting sets of calculations concerning the profitability of British 
industry over the last two decades have been presented during the early 1970's, the 
different patterns suggested having widely differing implications for both the
immediate and longterm prospects of British capitalism. Glyn and Sutcliffe and, more
recently, Burgess and Webb,have argued for a declining level of profitability, both 
studies suggesting that this decline constitutes a threat to future investment. (32)
By contrast: Panic and Close and, drawing substantially on their work, J. Hughes, 
have concluded that profits have either been maintained or at least have not fallen 
dramatically, particularly during the 1960's.fe3)We will examine these four studies and, 
working with the assumption that profit of enterprise is the most important index of 
profitability, attempt: to identify the source of their conflicting assessments. Our 
own conclusion will be that there has been a sustained decline in profitability since 
the early 1950's and that this decline raises serious doubts concerning British 
capitalism's potential for continued extended accumulation, with present rates of 
exploitation, in the coming years. Having elaborated this view we will clarify the
character of the present profitability crisis, and in particular the question of the 
role of the state in its development. (34) Firstly we will examine the "optimistic" 
Panic-Close-Hughes thesis.
Panic and Close, in the first place, have suggested that fears expressed by a 
number of economists concerning "an almost imminent collapse of the existing economic 
system" in Britain have been exaggerated. (35) In order to examine the foundations of 
such fears they examined the rate of return of British manufacturing industry from 1950- 
70. Rate of return is measured by calculating the ratio of net income in any year to 
the average of net assets at the year's beginning and end. Net income, in these 
calculations, consists of trading profits, after deducting director's fees, pensions 
to past directors, and superannuation and compensation payments. Net assets are fixed 
assets net of depreciation plus total current assets net of current liabilities and 
provisions: they "represent the longterm capital employed in the firm" (21). On the basi: 
of this calculation Panic and Close derive the following figures:
THE AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN ON NET ASSETS IN U.K. MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (AT HISTORIC COST).
, Pre-Tax. Post-Tax.
■ Mean % Mean %
1952 19.0 10.5
1961 14.4 10.1
1969 13.3 7.9
From this table the authors conclude that since the 1950's there has been a decline 
in the rate of return, a decline which is especially pronounced at pre-tax level.
The 1960's, however, showed little pre-tax decline, what deterioration did take place 
being attributed to changes in capacity utilization. Comparing the annual rates of 
growth in the 8 leading capitalist countries over 1959-69, they further suggest that, 
given the rates of growth of output, the increase in investment in the U.K. was higher 
than in many of the other countries including Sweden and West Germany. On this criterion 
Britain's rate of investment was exceeded only by the United States, Belgium and 
France, (37)
While measuring investment against output, Panic and Close ignore completely the 
comparatively low level of both output and investment that their calculations indicate 
for Britain over the decade in question. The U.K. average annual rate of growth of 
investment of 4.4 per cent is higher than only that of Sweden at 4.1 per cent. Rate of 
growth of output, moreover stood at 3.5 per cent per annum, the lowest level of any 
country in the sample. Japan's rates of growth, by far the most exceptional, were by
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contrast 16.0 per cent and 13.0 per cent respectively. Britain's uncompetitive rate of 
growth, however, has been a key symptomof her international weakness during the post-war 
period, successive administrations attempting to reduce the balance of payments 
difficulties by means of an export-oriented rise in manufacturing output. On the basis 
of these calculations, together with their data on the rate of return in manufacturing 
industry, however. Panic and Close conclude that developments within the period as a 
whole, and particularly within the 1960's "fail to reveal any signs of a crisis in 
profitability in this country". (30).
Two critical points will be made in relation to this conclusion. In the first 
place, while giving particular emphasis to their calculations based on historic cost.
Panic and Close observe that both pre and post-tax rates of return declined through the 
1960's, "though rather gently", when replacement cost is considered. With this , 
distinction a tendency quite the opposite to that suggested by their formal thesis becomes 
apparent. Calculations at replacement cost take inflation into account and are, as a 
consequence, more accurate in real terms than those at historic cost. The period in 
question has been characterized by inflation, the peristency of which, although its 
rate has varied, has meant that its effects have, by and large, been generalized 
throughout the economy as a whole. In particular, "time-lag" distortions; due to 
variations in the inflationary process at different temporal points of the production 
process will in the main have been neutralized. Profitability calculated at 
replacement costs, being weighted to account for inflation will thus give a more 
accurate picture of real developments than the unweighted figures of historic cost.
The latter will tend to overestimate the rate of return. (38).
The extent of the overestimation of profitability when measured at historic cost is 
apparent from the following figures, reported by Burgess and Webb, comparing 
calculations based on that method with those derived from replacement costs:
I QUOTED COMPANIES IN U.K. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, TRADING
INCOME NET OF DEPRECIATION AS PERCENTAGE OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED.
Year Historic Cost Basis Replacement Cost basis.
1950 20.9 19.6
1954 19,1 16.6
1958 14.8 11 .9
1962 12.4 10.3
1966 12.0 9.6
1970 11.5 8.5. (39)
The overstatement of the profit rate, calculated a historic cost rose from around 10 per 
cent in 1950 to about 20 per cent by 1962 and as much as 40 per cent by 1970. Clearly 
the historic cost method employed by Panic and Close leads to a substantial overestim­
ation of the rate of return.
That this overestimation is compounded in Panic and Close's calculations is
apparent from their comments concerning the trend of increasing external financing.
"The falliajjî;.„ ability to finance new investment from internal 
resources has been offset by an increasing supply of funds from
external sources". (40).
As we shall show later, the banking institutions have been particularly prominent in 
the external financing of industrial firms. In a period of high inflation, however, 
such loans to productive capital constitute a substantial reduction of the gross profit 
rate, a reduction not registered by Panic and Close' construct for the rate of return 
(net income to net assets).
In addition. Panic and Close define net income in such a way as to include both 
non trading profits and profits from overseas. These two factors also give their 
calculations an upward bias. Profits from overseas tend to be higher than the 
prevailing domestic rate, this being the primary motivation for investing abroad. 
Furthermore, recent years have seen a significant rise in the proportion of non trading 
income as a percentage of total company profits. (41) These figures, compounding Panic 
and Close's ommission of external financing and their use of historic cost as the 
principal basis for calculation, would, if taken into account, reduce their evaluation 
of the rate of the return considerably. Before attempting a more realistic assessment of 
i ' profit trends, however,.we will look at Hughes' variant on the "optimistic" thesis.
A study with an overtly political intention (42), Hughes' paper contends that 
there was no substantial decline in corporate profitability during the 1960's, and a 
substantial rise in the early 1970's. As against the C.B.I. whose method of measurement 
is to examine the share of gross trading profit in the total national product, Hughes' 
concern is to focus on trends in company income arising in the U.K, in particular in 
the industrial and commercial vis-a-vis the financial sector.
Hughes draws on three particular sources of data. For the 1950's and 1960's he 
summarizes and endorses the conclusions of Panic and Close's study. On the basis of 
"National Income and Expenditure" data he calculates a rise of 25 per cent in gross 
trading profits of companies during 1970-72. Finally, drawing on the "Financial Times" 
quarterly analyses of company profits he concludes that the 1971-73 period "produces 
even more exceptional figures of the forward sweep of profits" (17). The main sources 
of upward bias in Panic and Close's study have already been indicated, so we will 
concentrate on the second and third parts of Hughes' analysis.
Hughes' data drawn from National Income and Expenditure 1973 is presented in 
the following table:
GROSS COMPANY TRADING PROFITS, FIRST | 1971 TO FIRST
i 1973 (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED).
£ MILLION, INDEX: INDEX.
1971, FIRST i 1970 AS 100.
as 100 m i
First 1 1971 2,851 100 108
Second 1971 2,905 102 110
First i 1972 3,113 109 118
Second | 1972 3,471 122 131
First i 1973 3,938 138 144 (43)
From this data Hughes deduces that over the two year period from the first half of 
1973 company gross profits have risen nearly 40 per cent. He further adds that over 
the period in question over the whole economy stock appreciation due to inflation rose 
by some 28 per cent, that is considerably less rapidly than gross trading profits. 
Assuming that companies account for a similar proportion of stock appreciation,
Hughes concludes that gross trading profits net of stock appreciation have in fact 
risen more rapidly than the table indicates.
As with Panic and Close's calculations, however, this data is misleading precisely 
in that it is gross trading profits that are being measured, a measurement which does 
not incorporate the drain on profits deriving from interest re-payments. An upward 
distortion is the consequence, essentially the same bias which leads to an over­
estimation of profitability in his "Financial Times" data. Using this source Hughes 
deduces that the total industrial sector showed an increase in trading profit over
1971-73 of more than one half and an increase in profits earned for equity of nearly 
three-quarters, the rate of return on net assets improving by 29 per cent as 
compared with 1970-71. (17),
_ LINKED INCREASES 1970/1 to 1972/3 (TOTAL INDUSTRIALS).
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN PROFIT INCREASE IN RETURN
ON NET ASSETS.
Trading Earned for equity. a) as percentage b) as percent 
of total assets. age of 1970/71
return.
+52 +73 +4.3 +29
(44)
The impressive 29 per cent increase in return on net assets between 1970-1 and
1972-3 appears less so, however when the "Financial Times" method of calculation is 
takèh into account. Net return on capital "is arrived at by dividing net capital 
employed (net fixed assets plus current assets less current liabilities) by profits 
after depreciation charges but before interest and taxation" (my emphasis - DB)
(25). By excluding interest and taxation payments from his calculation of the rate 
of return on assets and profits (concerning the latter he reports a net return on 
capital of 19 t5per cent in 1972-73 as compared with 16.5 per cent in 1971t72 and 
14.8 per cent in 1970-71) Hughes again presents data which corresponds closer to 
gross rate of profit than profit of enterprise. As with the two earlier sets of 
data, his findings overestimate real profitability as it relates to investment 
potential and capital accumulation.
In considering a more realistic assessment of the profitability of British industry 
we will draw heavily on the detailed analysis of Glyn and Sutcliffe, as this constitutes 
the most rigorous single attempt to examine this area to date. At the same time, we 
will indicate what we see to be weaknesses in their study, suggesting why their 
estimation of the decline in British capitalism's profitability is, if anything, 
conservative.
Glyn and Sutcliffe report a sustained if uneven decline in both pre-tax and post­
tax profit rates since 1950, relative fluctuations within the general decline being 
; most pronounced in the post-tax rate.
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RATES OF PROFIT ON NET ASSETS OF INDUSTRIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES 1950-70 (PER CENT)
Year 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69
Pre-Tax
16.5
14.7 
13.0
11.7
Post-Tax
6.7
7.0
7.0 
5.3
1 9 6 4 13.7 7.1
1965 12.8 7.8
1966 11.3. 4.9
1967 11.7 6.1
1968 11.6 5.2
1969 11.1 4.7
1970 9.7 4.1 (45)
Glyn and Sutcliffe's data indicates that the pre-tax rate of profit fell by some 40 per 
cent during the two decades following 1950, a conservative estimate as profits from
foreign subsidianes are included. An "avalanche" between 1964-66 is reported, a
decline from 13.7 per cent to 11.3 per cent occurring during these two years. A 
similar pattern is apparent in the post-tax rates, the fall from 7.1 per cent in 
1964 to 4.1 per cent in 1970 being even more pronounced than the pre-tax decline.
Glyn and Sutcliffe account for this differential decline in terms of increased tax 
ra^es on the one hand and reduced investment incentives on the other. In addition, 
stock appreciation was counted as taxable profits, inflating the tax bill and further 
reducing real profitability. Glyn and Sutcliffe discount the possibility of distortion 
due to under-reporting of profits because of the scale and persistency of the decline, 
and summarize their findings in almost catastrophic terms: "we can conclude that since 
1964 the rate of profit in the U.K. has collapsed" (68), They conclude that British 
capitalism is faced with acute problems in the area of capital accumulation.
"In Britain, as in nearly all capitalist countries, there
are signs that the tightening profits squeeze is making it
increasingly difficult to finance investment and so keep 
economic growth going." (46)
As confirmation of this trend Glyn and Sutcliffe point to the fall in manufacturing 
investment of 10 per cent between the last quarter of 1970 and the second quarter of 
1971, a fall indicating an annual rate of decline of 20 per cent, British capitalism; 
on the basis of this study, can no longer afford to exploit its workers on an 
expanding, or even on a static, scale.
-Glyn and Sutcliffe's method of calculating the rate of profit incorporates one of 
the major factors which we suggested, gives Panic and Close's study an upward bias, 
however. Interest on borrowing is included in profits, and consequently it is gross 
profits rather than profit of enterprise, that is being measured. Explaining their 
calculations Glyn and Sutcliffe point out that "post-tax profits are equal to ordinary 
and preference dividends and longterm debt interest (net of tax) plus the amount 
retained in reserves", (myemphasis - DB) (245). If, further, we compare these two 
studies neither, in calculating the post-tax rate of profit, incorporate investment 
grants in their analysis. Both, moreover, include non trading profits. (47) The key 
difference is that whereas Glyn and Sutcliffe incorporate the deduction of stock 
appreciation, that is calculate the rate of profit at replacement cost (66), the rate 
of return tabulated and emphasized by Panic and Close is based on historic cost. (24). 
Panic and Close,chart the pre-tax rate of return at replacement cost, though not the 
corresponding post-tax movement (22). They suggest that this pre-tax rate fell 
"rather gently" throughout the 1960's. A breakdown of their chart casts doubt on this 
judgement, however. A fall from 14 per cent to 9 per cent is registered over the years 
1960-70, hardly a "gentle" decline. While Panic and Close's graph indicates quite 
extreme fluctuation over this period, they roughly correspond to those in Glyn and 
Sutcliffe's pre-tax rate of profit, peaks of profitability occurring in 1964 and 1967-8. 
Their reported overall decline for the decade as a whole (14 per cent to 9 per cent) 
moreover, is a fairly close match to that identified by Glyn and Sutcliffe (14.9 to 
9.7), When, that is to say, replacement cost is taken into account. Panic and Close's 
calculations for the pre-tax rate of profit during 1960-70 indicate a pareil el 
decline, but one which begins and ends almost one full per cent below that of Glyn 
and Sutcliffe.
A similar trend, suggesting an even more pronounced rate of decline, is reported'in 
a more recent analysis by J.L. Walker.
RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED. INDUSTRIAL AND
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES. (AT CURRENT REPLACEMENT COSTS
AFTER PROVIDING FOR STOCK APPRECIATION).
1960 13.4
1962 10.6
1964 11.9
1966 9.9
1968 10.1
1970 6.9 (48)
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Walker's calculations indicate a decline of almost 50 per cent over the decade, 
considerably higher than the fall reported by Panic and Close and Glyn and Sutcliffe, 
Panic and Close, in explaining their rationale for basing their conclusions on 
historic cost calculations, cautiously point to the lack of consensus among 
economists concerning the most appropriate way to adjust accounts to incorporate the 
effects of inflation. (21). The persistency of the decline in the rate of profit at 
replacement cost reported by themselves, Glyn and Sutcliffe, Walker and Burgess and 
Webb (49) suggest, nevertheless, that the decline is a real process at work. The 
profitability of British capitalism has been declining since the 1950's, a decline 
which renders the prospect of further extended accumulation problematic. Before 
offering an explanation of how this has happened, and in particular the role of 
the state in the overall process, we will suggest that Glyn and Sutcliffe's data, if 
anything, underestimates the extent of the fall in profitability.
As already indicated, Glyn and Sutcliffe use a method of calculation which
corresponds roughly to Marx's formula for the gross rate of profit (s J
(C plus V).
Glyn and Sutcliffe point out, however, that over the two decades from 1950 a rising 
proportion of profits as measured by their criterion have been channelled as 
dividends. In addition, investment levels continued to rise for most of this period, 
These factors, together with the decline in gross profitability, have led to a 
situation in which companies are increasingly less able to finance their own 
investment programmes. Revell has calculated the changing pattern of U.K. capital 
expenditure financing as follows:
FINANCING OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY U.K.
NON FINANCIAL COMPANIES, 1952-70 (PERCENTAGES).
1952-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70
Saving 86 80 69 65
Capital Issues 10 10 11 10
Bank Borrowing -1 7 13 13
Other 5 3 7 12
T O T A L :- w 100 100 100 (50)
While financing from capital issues remained almost constant as a proportion of 
total financing, the main changes took place in the saving or retained earnings and 
the borrowing sectors. Capital expenditure from retained earnings declined from 86 
per cent of total in 1952-55 to 65 per cent in 1966-70, a fall of over 25 per cent for 
the period as a whole. The rise in the proportion of bank financed expenditure is even 
more dramatic, increasing by almost 100 per cent in the decade between 1956+60 and 
1966*70. The final residual category, consisting mainly of other sources of borrowing 
and state services, rose by 400 per cent as a proportion of total capital expenditure 
over the same decade.
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The movement that these changing proportions represent is one an increasing 
corporate resort to shortterm borrowing in order to continue the process of capital 
accumulation in a,context of declining profitability. Interest payments on this 
borrowing constitute a further burden on already acutely pressured company liquid 
assets. (51) Such lowered levels of corporate liquidity compound the likelihood 
of company failure and bankruptcy that the low rate of profit places on the 
agenda. The conceptual clarification that is associated with substituting profits 
of enterprise for gross rate of profit as the crucial measure of capital's 
potential for accumulation, in summary, indicates an even greater dilemma for 
British capitalism than the uncorrected deterioration that Glyn and Sutcliffe' 
document suggests.
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